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Does Shareholder Activism Help or Hinder 
Shareholder Value Enhancement?:  
Empirical Evidence from the UK 
 
Abstract 
  
Shareholder activism has increasingly become a widespread value enhancement 
strategy for institutional investors in the UK.  However, thus far only one paper has reported 
a clinical study to analyse its impact on target firms (Becht et al, 2008) in contrast to 
numerous papers based on US data. The UK differs from the US in a number of institutional 
arrangements and legal framework. Hence analysis of the UK context may shed further 
insights into the motivation and impact of shareholder activism. Firstly, I conduct a survey 
of UK institutional shareholders to understand the scope and magnitude of shareholder 
engagement in the UK. I find evidence that UK institutional investors are increasing the 
level of engagement that they conduct with investee companies.  Furthermore, my results 
suggest that investors prefer to engage with companies in private and fear this could be 
made more difficult if legally mandated engagement or voting disclosure is introduced.  
Additionally, I find evidence that UK institutional investors are wary of hedge funds as 
activists and do not feel that their aggressive activism is necessarily in the interests of the 
institutional investor‟s client‟s interests. 
Secondly, using a sample of 595 companies targeted by voting by institutional 
investors abstaining or voting against resolutions at AGM or EGMs, 172 companies 
targeted through private negotiation, and 29 companies targeted by shareholder resolutions 
over the period 2002 to June 2007, I attempt to analyse the impact of activist pressure on a 
large sample of targeted firms in the UK.  I find evidence that targeted firms out-perform 
control firms over a three day window surrounding the targeting indicating a positive stock 
market reaction, but under-perform over the two and three year periods following the 
activist‟s intervention when assessed using multi factor benchmarks.  This is consistent with 
existing US literature.  I also find limited or no change in operating performance, firm 
strategy, corporate governance or executive compensation at targeted firms after becoming 
targets of activism when compared to the matched control firms.  Again, this is consistent 
with US research, although it contradicts findings from the UK study by Becht et al (2008).  
Overall we find short term enhancement from being targeted by a shareholder activist in the 
UK, but this value gain is not sustained over the longer term. Thus benefits of activism 
seem transitory.  
Finally, using a sample of 370 UK companies in which 39 activist hedge funds 
disclose substantial shareholdings; and 101 companies UK and EU that were targeted by 
activist hedge funds through the press over the sample period 2000 to 2007, I conduct an 
empirical analysis of activism by hedge  funds against targeted firms.  In contrast to 
activism by traditional institutional investors I find evidence that hedge fund activism 
generates significant positive abnormal returns over both the short and long term.  Thus it 
would appear that the more aggressive tactics used by the activist hedge funds is necessary 
to generate significant shareholder value increases. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
Background to the Research 
Traditionally, UK investors unhappy with corporate governance practices in investee 
companies were faced with very limited options, primarily to sell their equity stake and 
reinvest elsewhere, vote against the board, or to vote in favour of the board and remain 
passive.  However, divesting leads to costs for the investor, not only the transaction and 
research costs, but also the opportunity cost of reduced diversification.  As a result, 
shareholders have traditionally continued to passively hold the stocks and suffer the 
resulting drag effect on the performance of their portfolios.  However, globalisation of stock 
markets has allowed activist practices often only seen in the US to be transferred to other 
regimes.  The similarities of the UK market framework to those of the US have made it a 
perfect hunting ground for activist investors.  As a result, activism in the UK by traditional 
institutional investors and by new types of activism by hedge funds, have become much 
more prevalent. 
Despite the efforts of a number of researchers in the US over the past 20 years there remains 
a lot of ambiguity about the impact that activism has on the performance of target 
companies.  A number of studies, reviewed in surveys by Karpoff (2001), Gillan and Starks 
(1998), Black (1998) and Gillan and Starks (2007), have attempted to analyse the impact of 
shareholder activism in the US by traditional institutional investors, with conflicting results.  
The literature is reviewed in depth in Chapter 2.  Evidence on the impact of activism on 
target firms is conflicting and depends upon the issues targeted and the methods used.  
Activism by proposals tends to have a negative effect on shareholder value due the negative 
signals that it sends to the market.  However, activism through focus lists or private 
negotiation often leads to value creation.  
Engagement usually has very little impact on target firms‟ operations.  There is little 
evidence of significant changes in operating performance, measured by operating efficiency 
variables.  There is a small impact on restructuring efforts by target firms, but there is no 
real change in capital expenditure.  Board composition is one area in which shareholder 
intervention has positive effects.  Boards generally become more independent and diverse 
once intervention occurs.  However, there is little evidence of significant changes in CEO 
turnover rates or executive compensation structures as a result of activist pressure. An 
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underlying theme is also present in some articles.  Activism targeted against some minor 
issues appears to be used as a proxy for larger issues which are harder to target.  They might 
also be used to test the responsiveness on the target executives. 
However, the existing literature does indicate that activism by hedge funds does lead to 
positive abnormal share price returns over both the short and long term.  Hedge fund 
activism also has a positive impact on operating performance, while there is strong evidence 
that activist hedge funds target cash rich, or underleveraged companies with the intention of 
forcing them to return the unused cash to shareholders.  This is borne out by the increase in 
leverage and reduction in cash balances at target firms in the year after the activist hedge 
fund targets the company. 
The existing research in this area is primarily focused on the US environment.  The 
differences in legal and market frameworks between the US and UK mean that the results of 
research in the US are not easily generalisable to a UK context.  Only Becht et al (2008) 
have empirically studied the impact of shareholder activism in Europe via a clinical study of 
engagement carried out by Hermes UK Focus Fund (HUKFF).  They find a positive 
announcement effect on the stock market value of the investee companies resulting from 
governance related engagement as well as a small change to operating performance 
following engagement.  However, the clinical nature of this study covering only one fund 
limits the generalisability of its results.   To address the gap identified in the existing 
literature, this thesis conducts a thorough empirical investigation of shareholder activism in 
the UK. 
The aim of this research is to assess whether shareholder activism makes a difference to 
corporate behaviour and performance, and creates value for shareholders when targeting 
UK companies. I use a large sample empirical analysis, as well as a qualitative survey of 
UK institutional Fund managers to understand the scope and impact of shareholder 
engagement in the UK.  In order to carry out this assessment, its impact on the intermediate 
mechanisms outlined above must be investigated.  These issues that are to be studied in the 
research are: 
 Define and identify various types of shareholder activism  
 Assess their frequency and intensity  
 Evaluate the impact of activism on structural and behavioural changes in investee 
companies 
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 Evaluate the impact on efficiency and effectiveness of specific corporate decisions 
e.g. acquisitions and executive compensation   
 Evaluate the impact on overall operating performance and shareholder value 
creation. 
 Evaluate the impact of hedge fund activism on UK and EU targets firms. 
The research aims listed above knit together well to provide a rich understanding of the 
activism within the UK.  It will provide a good understanding of the types of activism and 
the circumstances in which it is deployed, as well as identifying the impact of these policies 
on important facets of the targets‟ performance.  It will also provide a contrast between the 
activism by traditional UK institutional shareholders and the new activism conducted by 
activist hedge funds. 
Brief Summary of Main Findings 
In Part II of the thesis I conduct an investigation of the scope and magnitude of shareholder 
engagement by institutional investors in the UK.  In Part III of the thesis I conduct an 
empirical analysis of the impact of hedge fund activism on target firms from UK and the 
EU.  My main findings are summarised as follows: 
Chapter 4 presents the findings of the shareholder engagement survey.  I find evidence that 
institutional shareholders have no preference for being called „activists‟ or „engaged‟ 
investors.  Some investee companies were becoming wary of being targeted by an „activist‟ 
investor, which the interviewees attributed to the rise of hedge funds and the aggressive, 
public tactics that they employ.  However, the interviewees felt that that the investees 
understood them enough to not view them as aggressive activists.  I also found some 
evidence that the institutions surveyed were having difficulty assessing the impact of their 
engagement programmes unless they were a specialist engagement house.  The performance 
was limiting their ability to secure resources to expand their shareholder engagement teams, 
with some teams employing as few as 3 or 4 individuals to cover a large investment 
universe, and as such SRI was better left to specialist SRI houses.  Finally, the respondents 
felt that the future of shareholder engagement lay in well thought out engagement 
programmes and not through mandatory voting or engagement as advocated in recent 
government reports (See Myners Review in 2001).  In this respect, the interviewees 
expected to see a rise in the use of specialist engagement institutions unless they can obtain 
the necessary funding to expand their own departments significantly.   
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Chapter 5 analyses the recent phenomenon of shareholder activism in the UK and 
empirically assesses its impact on target firms shareholder value and operating 
performance.  Until now, only one study by Becht et al (2008) has attempted to assess the 
impact of activism in the UK.  I find evidence that UK institutional investors target average 
performing companies with operating performance that is generally higher but statistically 
insignificanlt to the control sample.  Furthermore, I find operating performance at targeted 
firms declines, with the exception of small improvements when using targeted voting, as a 
result of activist pressures.  I further find that firms targeted by institutional activists in the 
UK generally outperform a control sample portfolio and the FTSE All Share over the short 
term around the meeting dates. This outperformance is not carried through to the long term 
when we use the same benchmarks, or when I measure the impact relative to more 
sophisticated multifactor models.  Firms targeted by activists repeatedly using voting 
activity over the sample period exhibit significantly large negative abnormal returns over 
the long term.  These results suggest activism by UK institutional investors is largely 
ineffective.   
Chapter 6 presents analysis of the impact of activism by UK institutional investors on target 
firms‟ where the issue of focus was problems with the firm‟s strategy, corporate governance 
or executive compensation.  I find limited but small changes in the number of employees 
employed by the firm two years after targeting occurs.  Furthermore, I find a small 
reduction in leverage and R&D spending for firms targeted through private negotiation over 
the two years after targeting occurs.  Furthermore, I find little significant change in the 
composure of target firms‟ corporate governance over and above a small change in the size 
of target company boards relative to the benchmark samples.  I do, however find targeting 
through voting activity reduces the CEO‟s cash component of the compensation by -0.21 
(p-value 0.00) relative to the median industry firm.  However, firms targeted through 
private negotiation suffer an increase in the levels of compensation for both executive and 
CEO pay relative to both benchmarks.  I find similar results to Chapter 5 in that I document 
positive abnormal returns over the short term, but negative abnormal returns over the longer 
windows.  Furthermore, I find more evidence that repeat targeting destroys long term 
shareholder value. 
Chapter 7 presents a case study of the eventually thwarted takeover bid by Deutsche Boerse 
for the London Stock Exchange. Primarily the case marks the emergence of the Anglo-
American style shareholder rights movement in a country that offers only limited power to 
5 
 
the shareholders of corporations.  In the process it illustrates the mechanisms by which 
functional convergence of corporate governance regimes can occur long before the legal 
framework catches up.  In Germany, the corporate governance regime requires stakeholder 
interests to be maximised rather than the sole interests of shareholders. This case illustrates 
how a single issue such as the strategic logic or the value creation potential of a takeover 
bid can rapidly spiral to become a wider campaign over deeply rooted governance concerns 
at targeted companies.  Furthermore, the case sheds light on the importance of 
communication between management and shareholders especially when corporate decisions 
of great strategic importance are being implemented.  The globalisation of stock markets is 
empowering shareholders to assert their rights and their activism is driving corporate 
governance regimes towards greater convergence and recognition of the primacy of 
shareholder interests.  The case further suggests an additional mechanism by which 
international governance systems can converge in function towards a common theme even 
if the form of national regimes remains largely unaltered.  
Chapter 8 empirically assesses the impact of hedge fund activism on target companies.  I 
find evidence that targeting by an activist hedge fund produces tangible changes in the 
operating performance and strategic focus of targeted companies.  Activist hedge funds are 
also successful in forcing cash rich, underleveraged firms to ramp up both leverage and 
dividends in order to return cash to shareholders.  I find significant short and long term 
abnormal returns associated with the announcement that a known activist hedge fund has 
purchased a stake in a UK company.  I also find substantial returns over both the short and 
long term for press campaigns undertaken by hedge fund activists.  Furthermore, over the 
long term I find strong evidence that the increase in abnormal return is tempered as the 
number of hedge funds targeting a company increases.  I further find that instances in which 
the activist hedge fund attempts to target companies involved in M&A proceedings generate 
significant abnormal returns over both the long and short term.  Finally, my results indicate 
that hedge fund activists are much more successful that institutional investors in bringing 
performance enhancing change to target companies.   
Structure of the Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows.  Part I reviews the existing literature, 
mainly emanating from the US, regarding the impact of shareholder activism by US 
institutional investors against US companies.  Part I also frames the main research questions 
and outlines the methodology that I will use to assess the impact of shareholder activism in 
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the UK.  The three chapters in Part II present the results of the main analysis investigating 
the impact of shareholder activism by UK institutional investors.  Chapter 4 presents the 
results of the engagement survey, Chapter 5 presents the empirical analysis of activism on 
shareholder value and operating performance, while Chapter 6 presents the results of 
targeting on the issues of strategy, corporate governance and executive compensation. Part 
III presents the results of analysis of hedge fund activism against UK and European 
companies.  Chapter 7 presents a case study looking at the Deutsche Boerse takeover 
attempt for the London Stock Exchange in 2005.  Chapter 8 conducts an empirical analysis 
of activism by hedge fund activists on target companies‟ shareholder value, operating 
performance and strategy.  Finally, Part IV concludes the results and offers suggestions for 
future research. 
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Chapter 2 Theory Building and Literature Review 
 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Since 1963 the share ownership structure of the UK economy has changed dramatically.  
According to the 2006 ONS Share Ownership report, the proportion of shares held by 
individuals fell from 54% in 1963 to just 12.8% (worth £238.5bn) by the end of 2006.  At 
the same time, holdings by insurance companies and pension funds grew from 10% to 
14.7% (£272.8bn) and 6% to 12.7% (£235.8bn) respectively over the same period.  Unit 
trusts now accounted for 4% of UK shares (£75.1bn) compared to 1% four decades earlier.  
Furthermore overseas holdings increased from 7% in 1963 to 40% (£742.4bn) in 2006.2  
Many of the overseas holders are European or US investment funds.  At the end of 2006, 
North American investment firms held 33% of foreign owned shares, while European 
holdings stood at 30%.  Asia accounted for 21% and Africa 13%. This is significant for the 
evolution of corporate governance in the UK. US investment companies pioneered the 
practices of shareholder activism, which is defined by Bernard Black (1998) as “proactive 
efforts to change firm behaviour or governance rules.”  
Talner (1983) argues that shareholder activists, particularly those in the US, can trace their 
origins back to the early 20th century.  At the 1932 annual meeting of the Consolidated Gas 
Co in New York, Lewis Gilbert, a shareholder with 10 shares was incensed by the 
chairman‟s decision to ignore shareholders‟ questions and adjourn the meeting for lunch.  
Along with his brother, Gilbert became a prominent shareholder activist over the 
subsequent years.  In 1942, shareholder power gained more ground when the SEC adopted 
rule 14a-8 on proxy proposals forcing companies to allow shareholder proposals that 
constitute a “proper subject for action by the security holders” (Gillan and Starks, 2007).  
From then on, shareholder proposals became a regular fixture at annual meetings in the US.  
However, much of the activism was conducted by a small group of individuals that became 
known as the gadflies (Ross, 1983). 
                                                   
2 See ONS Share Ownership 2006, www.statistics.gov.uk  
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In the late 1980s and „90s, shareholder activism hit the headlines due to the actions of large 
activist funds such as CalPERS, TIAA-CREF and the Council Institutional Investors (CII) 
(its members accounted for over $3 trillion in assets under management at the end of 2007).  
These investors produced focus lists naming and shaming the companies that they intended 
to target over the next proxy season.  This marked the start of widespread activism in the 
US as mutual funds started to take a more active role in the governance of their investee 
companies.   
The origins of the UK shareholder activist movement can be traced back to the corporate 
governance scandals of the late 1980s and early „90s (Owen, 2001).  Owen (2001) 
highlights the failure of Polly Peck, a fruit packaging company, in 1990, as well as the 
Maxwell scandal in 19913 as the major events that focussed the attention on corporate 
governance failure in the UK.  The Cadbury (1992), Greenbury (1995), Hampel (1998), and 
Turnbull (1999) reports, all made recommendations regarding improvements to the 
corporate governance framework that eventually led to the development of the Combined 
Code on Corporate Governance4 and laid the foundations for shareholder engagement in the 
UK.   
2.2  Evolution of Corporate Governance in the UK5 
The scandals surround Polly Peck and Robert Maxwell in the early 1990s focussed public 
and regulatory attention on the way in which companies are run and the need for adequate 
controls (Mallin et al, 2005).   
2.2.1Corporate Governance Reform 
The Cadbury Committee, chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury, was formed in 1991 to address 
the concerns raised by these corporate governance scandals.  The Cadbury Report made 19 
recommendations through the „Code of Best Practice‟ including those relating to the Board 
of Directors, Non-executive Directors, Executive Directors and those on Reporting & 
                                                   
3 Robert Maxwell died in 1991 in strange circumstances.  Shortly after his death it was discovered that he 
had used the pension fund of the Daily Mirror Group, whom he had acquired in 1984, to shore up the 
finances of his struggling publishing empire.  Polly Peck grew from a small UK textile company valued at 
£300k to a world wide group controlling over 200 subsidiaries and valued at £1.7bn in just 10 years after 
being purchased by Asil Nadir in 1980.  In 1990 the company collapsed, revealing that £700m of 
shareholders money was missing.   
4 The Combined Code on Corporate Governance, last updated in 2003, contains 17 principles and 48 
provisions which set out how a company should operate.  It is appended to the listing rules of the London 
Stock Exchange. 
5 For an in depth analysis of the evolution of corporate governance in the UK see Mallin et al (2005) 
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Control.  The key provisions were the separation of the CEO/chairman roles and 
appointment of a balanced board with an adequate number of Non-Executive directors.  The 
aim was to ensure that too much power did not lie in the hands of one board member 
(Mallin, 2007). The report also looked to „the institutions in particular... to use their 
influence as owners to ensure that the companies in which they have invested comply with 
the Code.‟  This report was the foundation upon which the subsequent corporate governance 
edifice in the UK was built and emphasised from the beginning the role that institutional 
investors had to play.     
The Greenbury Report (1995) focussed on the levels and makeup of executive remuneration 
and stated that “the investor institutions should use their power and influence to ensure the 
implementation of best practice as set out in the code.”  The emphasis placed on the 
institutional investors to self regulate the corporate governance environment was further 
emphasised in the Hampel Report (1998).  The focus of this committee was to review the 
progress that had been made by the Cadbury and Greenbury reviews.  Hampel‟s main 
contribution made was to combine the findings of the two earlier reports into one document, 
the Combined Code on Corporate Governance („the Combined Code).  The Code‟s 17 
principles and 48 provisions lay down a framework of principles of good governance and a 
code of best practice (Mallin, 2001).  In section 2 of the code, the responsibility of 
institutional shareholders is made clear.  The section‟s first principle states that 
“institutional shareholders have a responsibility to make considered use of their votes” 
while one of the 48 provisions also states “institutional investors should take steps to ensure 
that their voting intentions are being translated into practice”.  The Combined Code 
operates on a „comply or explain‟ principle.  UK listed companies are not obliged to follow 
the code.  However, they are obliged to state in the annual report all instances in which the 
company has not adhered to the Combined Code‟s principles. 
Finally, the Turnbull Committee (1999) reviewed the management of internal controls and 
risk within companies.  As Mallin et al, (2005) succinctly state, “the most influential 
committees‟ reports that have reported on corporate governance in the UK clearly 
emphasise the role of institutional investors.”  Myners (1995) had already outlined a way in 
which a model company and a model investor could interact with each other while Mallin 
(1994) had emphasised the importance of one-to-one meetings between companies and their 
institutional shareholders.  
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2.2.2Encouraging Shareholder Intervention 
In the budget of 2000, the Chancellor commissioned the Myners‟ Review of Institutional 
Investment in the UK.  Its aim was to investigate institutional investors‟ activities in the UK 
capital markets and identify any distorting factors that might hinder efficiency and 
flexibility in these markets.  The 2001 Myners Report states that there is, indeed, need for 
more activism by institutional investors as they had traditionally been too passive and 
tolerant of poor performance.6  It recommended that UK law should include a fiduciary duty 
clause similar to that in operation in the US.7  
The ISC‟s Statement of Principles8, released in late 2002, was an effort to encourage 
institutional investors within their membership to become more actively involved with their 
investee companies where necessary.  The principles include a number of recommendations 
for institutional investors‟ interactions with their investees, split into four main groups.  The 
policy of compliance with the ISC recommendations must be a publicly available 
document.  Firstly, the principles recommend institutions should “have a clear statement of 
their policy on engagement and on how they will discharge the responsibilities they 
assume.”  Within this principle, the institutions must state how they will monitor investee 
companies and deal with any conflicts of interest that might arise.  The policy statement 
must also address how and when the institutional investor will meet with their investee‟s 
board; the strategy by which the investor would intervene and how they plan to use and 
disclose their voting rights.    
Secondly, the institutional investors are expected by the ISC principles to explain the 
process in which “investee companies will be monitored to determine when it is necessary 
to enter into an active dialogue with the investee company‟s board and senior 
management.”  The monitoring reviews “need to be regular, and the process needs to be 
clearly communicable and checked periodically for its effectiveness.”  In particular, the 
institutional investor‟s must monitor the company accounts and attend meetings with the 
company to raise questions about the investee companies.  Furthermore, the institutional 
shareholder should “seek to satisfy themselves, to the extent possible, that the investee 
                                                   
6  It must be noted that this report‟s conclusions were not based on academic findings. 
7 The US legislation is ERISA Act 1974, which promotes the fiduciary responsibility of investors.  
However, it also limits the areas in which shareholders can engage.  The role of US institutional investors 
and ERISA is outlined in section 2.3. 
8 See ISC website, http://www.institutionalshareholderscommittee.org.uk/index.html for a full copy of the 
ISC principles. 
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company‟s board and sub-committee structures are effective, and that independent 
directors provide adequate oversight” as well as maintaining a “clear audit trail, for 
example, records of private meetings held with companies [and] of votes cast.”  The main 
objective of the monitoring process is to try and identify problem areas quickly and 
intervene where necessary to prevent minor problems turning into crises. 
Thirdly, the institutional investors must set out their policy for “intervening where 
necessary” in order to make sure that the fiduciary responsibility of both the investor and 
the company is fulfilled.  The ISC principles list a number of areas in which intervention 
might be deemed necessary, such as concerns about the company‟s strategy or internal 
controls failing.  The principles also set out the possible types of escalation that the 
institutional shareholders could take if they feel the investee isn‟t responding satisfactorily 
to their concerns. 
Finally, the ISC Principles indicate that “Institutional shareholders and agents have a 
responsibility for monitoring and assessing the effectiveness of their engagement… This 
should include a judgment on the impact and effectiveness of their engagement.”  The 
principles highlight the importance of transparency for effective institutional activism, but 
also advise that sufficient discretion should be exercised in circumstances in which 
disclosure of engagement might be „counterproductive‟.  The principles were intended to 
“significantly enhance how effectively institutional shareholders and/or agents discharge 
their responsibilities in relation to the companies in which they invest.” It might also have 
been an attempt by the ISC to pre-empt any initiative by the government to legislate and 
force institutional shareholders to vote or engage with their investee companies.  They 
might also have been based on genuine concerns that such moves could possibly lead to a 
box ticking mind-set that might not promote effective engagement by committed 
shareholder activists.  As Mallin (2007) highlights, the principles were „a milestone in the 
encouragement of institutional shareholder activism in the UK.‟ 
In 2004 the UK government Treasury conducted the „Review of Myners principles for 
institutional investment decision-making.‟9  The aim was to assess how much progress had 
been made in implementing the findings of the 2001 Myners Review.  The review 
concluded that “the voluntary approach is beginning to work, but more effort is needed to 
                                                   
9 See HM Treasury, 2005, “Review of Myners principles for institutional investment decision-making”. 
Available from http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_109_04.htm.  Accessed 12 June 2008.  
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ensure that problem areas identified by the review are addressed. It believes that pension 
funds would better serve their members' and sponsors' interests if the best practice 
embodied in the Myners principles were to be strengthened and amplified.”  The Myners 
Report had stated that engagement would be best encouraged through legislation.  However, 
the government agreed with the ISC‟s alternative view “that effective engagement requires 
informed consideration and judgement, and cannot be achieved by a 'box ticking' approach 
based on mere formal compliance.”  A review of the enactment of ISC principles was to be 
carried out two years later.  In 2005, the ISC reviewed the extent of compliance with their 
principles.  They found “a significant change in the approach of institutional shareholders 
and agents (institutional investors) in the nearly three years since the Statement was 
published. In summary, there has been a general increase in the level of engagement with 
investee companies.”  Hence they concluded that there was no need to further rewrite the 
statement of principles.  A further review would be carried out after another 2 years had 
passed.  Thus it can be concluded that faced with an alternative of legislated engagement, 
institutional investors were increasing their engagement with investees. 
2.2.3 Difference between US and UK legal environment 
The UK and US legal frameworks have a number of differences that make the type of 
activism used by shareholders different for each region.  For instance, the US legal system 
often uses the plurality voting system available under Delaware corporate statute.  Under 
this system, directors only need to obtain the highest number of yes votes relative to 
alternative candidates to be re-appointed.  Shareholders don‟t have the ability to vote 
against a director.  The only way for them to air their disapproval is abstain or vote for 
alternative candidates (Bebchuk, 2005).  In this respect the US system favours incumbent 
management more than the UK model.  In the UK, each director up for re-election must 
obtain a majority of the votes to be re-elected to the board.  Institutional investors can 
abstain but crucially they can also vote against the director.  If the director doesn‟t obtain a 
majority, they must resign with immediate effect.  This gives UK shareholders much more 
power to influence the board composition of their investee companies. 
A further difference is the UK shareholder‟s ability to change the company‟s charter 
without board approval.  This is done in the same voting manner as for other resolutions.  In 
the US, board approval must be obtained if the shareholders wish to change the charter. 
This further protects the incumbent board (Bebchuk, 2005).  Furthermore, staggered boards 
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allow managers further protection as shareholders are unable to significantly influence the 
board over just one proxy season.  Staggered boards, also known as classified boards, occur 
when a company elects a few board members at a time, rather than all at once.  These 
directors are split into classes with overlapping multi year terms, rather than single year 
terms that expire en masse.  It has the effect of preventing institutional investors from 
changing the board in one attempt.  Instead, the activist must target the board directors up 
for election over a number of years as different classes come up for re-election.  As a result, 
activist pressure can take a number of years to take effect depending on the number of 
classes of directors that exist.  
In the UK, shareholders can call an extraordinary general meeting if they have a 10% 
shareholding in the company.  They can then submit a shareholder resolution to remove one 
or all directors of the board as long as they obtain at least 50% supporting votes from other 
shareholders.  Under Delaware law under which most large US corporations are 
incorporated, US shareholders do not have this right.  They are unable to call an 
extraordinary general meeting unless a provision is specifically made in the company 
charter. Thus, UK shareholders have more power to remove directors if they are unhappy 
with the latter‟s efforts in running the company.  These rights give UK shareholders a 
formidable arsenal when engaging with companies.  Boards are aware of the shareholders 
ability to remove them if necessary, making directors more receptive to their suggestions.  
Black (1998) argues that the legal regime in the UK made it a perfect setting for shareholder 
engagement when compared to the US. 
2.2.4 Overseas Investors 
As we highlighted in the introduction, overseas investors have grown to become a very 
large group of holders of UK equities.  At the end of 2006, they held 40% of listed equities 
equating to a value of £742.4bn.  In comparison, UK based institutional shareholders held 
24.7%, equating to £508.6bn.10  A third of the overseas holding lay in the ownership of US 
investment funds.  This was a significant development for the relationship between 
investors and their investee companies.  We indicated earlier that US investors had been the 
pioneers of the practices of shareholder activism during the 20th Century.  They are much 
more proactive in corporate governance issues (Mallin, 2002).   US institutions differ from 
their UK counterparts in two areas.  Firstly, the compliance centred governance model in 
                                                   
10 See ONS Share Ownership report 2006, www.statistics.gov.uk  
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play in the US has led to a confrontational relationship between investors and their 
investees (Hendry et al, 2007).  As a result, they often resort to high profile, antagonistic 
methods of activism, such as focus lists or shareholder proposals.11, 12  In contrast, Holland 
(1998) explains the more cordial relationship that exists between UK financial institutions 
and their investees.   
Secondly, private US pension funds are mandated by law to vote the shares held in investee 
companies (Mallin, 2002).  The 1974 Employment Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA)13 mandated the private pension funds to vote the shares as part of their fiduciary 
responsibility.  They generally continue this practice with overseas equities in which they 
invest.  Thus, as a norm, they vote shares held in their overseas investees (Mallin, 2002).  
The ERISA act doesn‟t apply to public pension funds, such as CalPERS or TIAA-CREFF, 
although they tend to vote their shares anyway (Mallin et al, 2005). 
In 1997, Hermes, the fund manager for the BT pension fund joined forces with Lens inc of 
the US to form a Focus Fund of UK companies in which they would take an activist stance.  
This fund was the subject of a 2007 clinical study by Becht et al.14 Hermes has a unique 
shareholder activism model in that it is a dedicated activist pension fund management 
company.  As a result it has larger resources than other institutional investors to engage 
with their investee companies.15  Hermes‟ experience and success may therefore be unique 
and unrepresentative of the effectiveness of institutional fund activism in general.  
However, we can say that the role and presence of overseas institutional investors on the 
share register of UK companies has helped to introduce activist practices into the UK 
corporate governance framework. 
                                                   
11 Focus lists, as often used by CalPERS contain a list of companies that the activist is planning to target 
due to concerns over their performance and often appear in leading financial press such as the Financial 
Times and Wall Street Journal.  The aim of the focus list is to „name and shame‟ the poorly performing 
companies on the list and try to harness public pressure to drive through changes at the target 
organisations. 
12 Shareholder proposals are the most common type of activism in the US.  Gillan and Starks (2007) state 
that in the period 1987 to 1994 there were 2042 submitted proposals.  As a contrast, in the UK over the 
period 2002 to 2007 there were only 29 proposals submitted by institutional shareholders (See part II of 
this thesis).   
13See http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/health-plans/erisa.htm for full information regarding the ERISA 
legislation and the responsibilities it places on private pension funds. 
14 The results of this study are presented in the following section. 
15 See Becht et al (2008) for a full overview of the HUKFF and its activities. 
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2.3  Shareholder Activism 
Shareholder activism can be defined by a broad spectrum of shareholder activities.  On the 
one hand, an investor divesting an investment could be termed an activist, as he is making 
explicit decisions about the value of the shares that he trades, selling overvalued stocks and 
purchasing those he feels are undervalued.  However this process is more akin to active 
portfolio management than activism.  The practice of divesting shares as a disciplinary 
action aimed at target management is sometimes referred to as the „Wall Street Walk‟.16  At 
the other extreme, the corporate control market could be thought of as a market for activist 
shareholders.  The investors in this market are making judgements about the performance 
and policies of the target companies under current management and ownership and by this 
definition they fit the shareholder activist mould.  However, these investors are more than 
simply portfolio investors as they acquire a controlling interest in the target firm and take a 
hands-on management role, going far beyond the role of monitoring the management.  As 
Robert Monks17 stated in a paper given at Cranfield School of Management in 1998, 
“Nobody wants the shareholders to be determining the colour of the paint on the walls of 
the rest rooms.”  Thus the role of an activist is to take an interest in the performance and 
direction of its investments, but not to get too involved in the operational details of investee 
companies. Figure 1.1 delineates this process. 
Figure 1.1 - Shareholder Activism process 
 
Researchers in this field use a number of definitions of shareholder activism. Bernard Black 
(1998) defines activism as “proactive efforts to change firm behaviour or governance 
rules.”  Gillan and Starks (1998) define states: “an investor who tries to change the status 
quo through the option „voice‟ without initiating a change in control of the firm.”   
Combining these definitions, the definition that is used in this research, is “an effort to 
change the governance structure, strategic direction and/or the behaviour of target 
companies so as to better serve shareholders‟ interests.”  This is a better definition as only 
activism aimed at realigning management and shareholder interests will be analysed. The 
                                                   
16 The „Wall Street Walk‟ is explained in section 2.2. 
17 Monks R.A.G, Shareholder Activism Adds Value, Cranfield School of Management, 10th February 1998 
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effects of politically motivated activism, such as environmental activists purchasing a 
nominal shareholding with the intention to hassle company management, or activism 
preceding corporate control transfers will be ignored.  
2.3.1How are targets selected? 
There is a common misconception that shareholder activism is undertaken solely by 
dedicated activist institutions such as CalPERS and Hermes.  This stems from the limited 
press coverage of activism that usually focuses solely on major financial institutions.  
However, the majority of the activist initiatives in the UK and Europe are probably the 
result of those by institutional shareholders rather than specialised institutions.  The targets 
of activism are often selected using a number of processes.  For many institutions, the 
targets of their activism are incumbent constituents of their portfolios.  Often, poorly 
managed, but good companies, can have a dulling effect on overall fund performance if 
they don‟t perform as well as expected. Thus the investor will engage with the company to 
try and reduce this problem.  Some financial institutions, especially those with specialised 
divisions, such as a focus fund division, will often invest in underperforming companies 
with the sole aim of engaging and improving their returns.  These investors select targets by 
utilising a multi stage selection process based primarily on financial underperformance.  
Initially, “a typical performance screen of companies against their peers based on long-term 
total shareholder return and cash flow return on investment”18 is conducted followed by 
subsequent stages designed to identify corporate governance weaknesses upon which the 
engagement process can be focused.  Thus, although the selection criteria focus on 
corporate governance and executive management issues, the ultimate aim is to enhance the 
financial return from these investments. 
For all shareholders, one criterion that is important when selecting their targets is the level 
of their institutional ownership.  Institutional investors try to maximise their chance of 
success by choosing targets where allies are easily found.  Institutional investors are often 
willing to join together to coordinate engagement policies and provide a stronger alliance 
against the targets.  However, coordination can be difficult to achieve if each investor has 
different outcome criteria that don‟t match or compliment those of the other activists.  
Coupled with this, the targets need to have low insider ownership as this ensures that there 
will not be a strong opposite voting block that could blunt the activist pressure. 
                                                   
18 Performance screen process taken from the Hermes Focus Fund „Investment Process‟ website: 
http://www.hermes.co.uk/focus_funds/focus_funds_investment_process.htm 
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This study focuses on those institutional investors that specifically carry out activist actions 
against investee companies.  The targets of their activism have usually manifested poor 
operating or financial performance and/ or poor corporate governance (Forjan, 1999; 
Karpoff et al, 1996; Opler and Sokobin, 1995) and an adequate level of institutional 
ownership. 
2.3.2Success Criteria 
The six success criteria identified by the main researchers in the field are listed below: 
 Increase in the share price performance of the target firm 
Wahal (1996); Nesbitt (1994); Smith (1996); Karpoff et al, (1996); Opler 
and Sokobin (1995) 
 Improvement in the target firms‟ accounting performance 
Woidtke (2000); Wahal (1996); Prevost and Rao (2000); Song and 
Szewczyk (2003) 
 Improvement in the target firms‟ operating or managerial structures 
Woods (1996); Huson (1997); Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) 
 Adoption of activist proposals by the target  
Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999); Smith (1996); Hann (2002) 
 Some changes in target operations attributable to activism (such as asset or 
employee base) 
Smith (1996); Huson (1997); Wu (2004); Gillan et al (2000) 
 The percentage of votes in favour of the shareholder proposal at the  target 
shareholders‟ meeting 
Gillan and Starks (2000) and Song and Szewczyk (2003) 
The above list illustrates that the researchers find the main success criteria by the activists 
are an improvement in the financial performance and subsequent share price returns of the 
selected targets.   
2.3.3How do activists engage targets? 
Shareholder activism is a generic term.  However, the policies available to the activist differ 
across countries.  In the US, focus lists and shareholder proposals are the favoured route 
taken by the activists.  However in the UK and Europe, private negotiation is the preferred 
choice as there is traditionally a more informal and less adversarial relationship between the 
board and shareholders.  
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Private negotiation is a process by which dialogue is conducted between the activist 
shareholders and the target management. The aim of this type of action is to obtain, in a 
discreet way, a mutually beneficial solution to the activists‟ concerns without resorting to 
public pressure in the form of proposals or media campaigns.  It is deemed by the UK‟s 
investment management Association (IMA)19 as the most desirable form of activism in the 
UK because it reveals willingness by the executive management of the target to work with, 
rather than against, the shareholders.  It is often also referred to as relationship investing, 
especially in the US, due to the long dialogue and relationship that are built up between the 
target firm and its shareholders.  Institutional investors in the UK also prefer to be called 
engaged shareholders as oppose to shareholder activists, as one of our engagement survey 
interview participants explained: 
We certainly don‟t think of ourselves as activists.  We are as I said more 
responsible shareholders and we are acting always in our client‟s best interests.  
We aim to influence where appropriate to develop corporate governance principles 
and procedures at the companies we invest in. … So I think activists to our mind 
would take a more involved, more active approach and often have a specific 
agenda that they want addressed.  And we certainly wouldn‟t go down that route.” 
The other prominent forms of activism comprise shareholder proposals and focus lists.  A 
shareholder proposal is an item on the agenda at the shareholder meeting, which is raised by 
the activist shareholder.  It is then voted upon by the shareholders at the general meeting.  It 
is a very public form of activism as the results of the vote quickly disseminate into the 
public domain and media.  Focus lists are even more public in the nature of their activist 
pressure.  They are published by major activist funds such as CalPERS, CII20, Hermes and 
TIAA-CREF and often appear in leading financial media such as the Financial Times and 
Wall Street Journal.21  The aim of the focus list is to „name and shame‟ the poorly 
performing target companies on the list and try to harness public pressure to drive through 
changes in the target organisations.  Focus lists are not normally used on their own, with 
many of these large activists also utilising negotiation and shareholder proposals to help 
achieve the desired solutions. 
                                                   
19 See IMA Survey of Fund Managers Engagement with Companies, 2007,  
http://www.investmentuk.org/press/2007/20070704-01.pdf  
20 CII mainly publish proceedings against single target rather than a full list.  Their main role is to assist 
their members in their engagement proceedings. 
21 CalPERS Adds Xerox, Five Other Firms To Governance List, Wall Street Journal, 28th March 2003 
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The „Wall Street Walk‟ (Admati and Pfleiderer, 2008) is the name sometimes given to the 
targeted act of divestment of targeted firms‟ shares by an investor.  The aim is to discipline 
underperforming management using the market price of the company‟s shares.  This can 
happen in one of two ways.  Firstly, the negative impact of a substantial divestment upon 
both the market price, and also in terms of market information, should discipline 
underperforming management by forcing them to find ways of boosting the market price of 
the company shares.  Secondly, if the executive compensation structures contain an equity 
option component, the price impact of shareholder divestment should act as a direct wealth 
incentive to realign executive interests with those of the shareholders.  The shareholder does 
not necessarily need to actually divest their shareholding; merely making a credible threat 
of divestment should have the same effect.  However, this policy will only be successful if 
the threat can be made credible.  It is a very rarely used form of activism, as other routes to 
engage are more likely to be successful.  The investor might also not be willing to divest a 
reasonably performing business purely because it is badly managed.   
The final form that activism can take, although rarely used, in the UK is a proxy fight.  This 
can take many forms, one of the least used earning shareholders seats on the board of 
directors of target companies.  This is usually a last resort for most activists as it 
necessitates taking an active role in the company management and thus ties up activists‟ 
employees, time and resources for a considerable length of time.  Often activists try to avoid 
this option where possible, even when all other methods fail, due to the severe financial 
costs that it can impose on the activist.  The gain from acting in this manner may not 
compensate for the costs of doing so.  Taking a seat on the board also opens the activist up 
to possible insider trading charges if they act on information obtained privately, further 
reducing the suitability of this policy for most institutional investors.  In this instance, an 
active fund manager might actually find their ability to conduct their fiduciary duty limited 
by exposure to inside information obtained through their seats on the board.  Thus the usual 
activist paths are focus lists, shareholder proposals and private negotiation, with negotiation 
and focus lists the preferred route to obtain value enhancements at target firms (Huson, 
1997; Opler and Sokobin, 1995; English et al, 2004; Nelson, 2006). 
2.3.4To act or not to act? 
It is fair to say that shareholder activism in Europe is a less publicised phenomenon than in 
the US, which has only been embraced publicly by a small number of institutional 
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investors.  However, in the US, large activists such as CalPERS and TIAA-CREF have been 
following these policies since the early 1990s and the evidence from the literature (Opler 
and Sokobin, 1995; Gillan et al, 2000; Karpoff, 2001; English et al, 2004; Nelson, 2006) is 
that these activists obtain tangible benefits from them22.  It would therefore seem apparent 
that there is a benefit to activism that outweighs its cost.  The process of activism 
intrinsically has a number of costs associated with it, which deter potential activists from 
embracing it.  However, there is also a number of opportunity costs associated with failing 
to act.  Figure 1.2 shows the process which the activist will go through during the 
engagement period.   
The anticipated benefit of undertaking activist policies is simple - higher post-activism 
sustainable financial return from the target.  This is usually the main desired outcome 
that the investor seeks to achieve.  This benefit is created by improving the corporate 
governance structure and business strategy of the target and thus providing a value 
creation possibility for the firm to exploit.  There are also other benefits for the activist.  
The more often an investor acts, the more well known the activist becomes and thus it 
makes future activism far easier to accomplish.  The target will know that the activist is 
not bluffing in his demand for change and should be more willing to negotiate with the 
investor to obtain a mutually beneficial outcome. 
Figure 1.2 - Engagement Process 
 
                                                   
22 CalPERS and TIAA-CREF is the subject of much research by US researchers and generally create 
positive abnormal returns from their actions.  The results of this research will be highlighted later. 
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Several costs are associated with being an activist.  The main cost is the time that the 
investors and their staff spend in engaging with the target management.  Activism is a long 
and slow process often requiring many rounds of negotiation and the manpower required to 
successfully obtain the desired outcome may be very large.  This cost often puts off 
potential activists, as does the free rider cost where the activist bears the costs of 
engagement but the other non-activist shareholders in the target get a share of the spoils23.  
Lipton and Rosenblum (1991) indicate that engagement by the activist can often distract 
target managers from their normal duties and could actually hinder the improvement that 
the target might otherwise make. 
Finally, there is also often a skills gap at the activist investors where those chosen to engage 
with the targets don‟t have the necessary skills to efficiently identify weaknesses at the 
target and promote the necessary changes (Lipton and Rosenblum, 1991). Fund managers 
are rarely accomplished business men with working experience of the industries in which 
their investee companies operate.  Thus, it is very difficult for them to understand and 
execute the changes required to improve the business and financial performance of the 
target.  This necessitates the investor to either purchase the skills or proceed anyway, and 
embark on a learning curve, which lengthens the process and makes it more costly. Bhide 
(1993) also identifies the possible hindrance that insider trading rules might present in 
promoting more activism by institutional investors. As noted above, many investors will be 
wary of engaging with the management of the target since any privileged information that 
they receive might expose them to insider trading prosecution if substantial equity holding 
changes are made based on that information.  Furthermore, this situation might prevent the 
investor from fully fulfilling their fiduciary responsibility if they are unable to act on the 
information that they receive. 
The decision to act or not is made more complicated by the costs and benefits associated 
with not acting.  One benefit of not acting is that the investor doesn‟t waste valuable time 
and money on the engagement process, resources which can either be channelled back to 
the beneficiaries of the fund or be allocated to research into other investment opportunities.  
Secondly, the investor doesn‟t obtain ‟notoriety‟ as a troublesome activist, which could 
damage relationships with target management.  The cost of not acting is that the portfolio 
                                                   
23 The free rider cost is most frequently used as the main argument against activism.  However, as long as 
the activist‟s private benefit outweighs its costs of acting, the free rider effect should be ignored.  For 
instance, if the cost to the activist is £1m but the value created for the activist or the activist‟s share is 
£1m+, activism should be undertaken regardless of the benefits to third parties. 
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will be forced to support an underperforming security that could have a drag effect on its 
performance.  Secondly, the investor could get a name as an inactive investor which could 
lead the investee companies to take a lax stance on corporate governance issues and make it 
more difficult for future engagement to have a successful outcome.  Thus as long as the 
benefits of acting outweigh both the direct and indirect costs of doing so, as well as the 
benefits of not acting, the activist has to engage with the target and try to obtain its desired 
outcome. 
The costs and benefits associated with activism are not solely financial. Many financial 
activists are part of larger financial institutions such as investment banks which rely on 
other business relations with their key clients. Activism targeted against a client could lead 
to bad blood between the two parties, with the cost of losing the client‟s future business 
offsetting the gain obtained through activism.  But the major factor in the activist‟s strategic 
decision making process is the financial impact that activism is likely to have on its 
portfolio.   
2.4 Hedge Funds as Activist Investors 
Recent developments in shareholder activism have been driven by the emergence of activist 
hedge funds.  Activist hedge funds fit into this category.  They invest in poorly performing 
companies with the intention of bringing about change to act as a catalyst for improved 
shareholder value performance.  Caldwell (1995) attributes the first hedge fund to Alfred 
Winslow Jones who formed a private investment partnership in 1949 with the aim of 
reducing risk through simultaneously buying and shorting stocks from the same industry.  
By the end of 2006, there were believed to be over 9,000 hedge funds in operation 
managing in excess of $1,500bn of assets.24  However, despite the large number of hedge 
funds operating around the world, there is no clear definition of a hedge fund.  Indeed, in a 
roundtable discussion on hedge funds in 2003 held by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, one participant highlighted fourteen different definitions from industry and 
government documents.25   
Brav et al, (2008) highlights the major characteristics that are generally attributable to 
hedge funds.  They state that hedge funds are pooled, privately organized investment 
                                                   
24 “London doubles share of hedge fund assets”, www.ft.com, 17th April 2007 
25 See SEC Roundtable on Hedge Funds (May 13, 2003)  (comments of David A. Vaughan), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/hedgefunds/hedge-vaughn.htm  
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vehicles that are administered by professional investment managers.  Furthermore, hedge 
funds fall outside the Investment Company Act of 1940 because they either have fewer than 
100 beneficial owners and don‟t offer shares to the public; or because their investors are 
„qualified‟ high net worth individuals (Partnoy and Thomas, 2007).  Hedge funds 
traditionally made their money by profiting from transitory trading opportunities through 
arbitrage (Goetzmann et al, 2003).  However, the proliferation of hedge funds had reduced 
the arbitrage opportunities available to hedge funds.  In 2005, Citigroup estimated that 
hedge fund returns had shrunk from an annualized 17% from 1990-1999 to 7% from 2000-
2004 (Zenner et al, 2005).   
As a result, hedge funds had to seek new ways to generate a return.  Event driven hedge 
funds developed, utilising a strategy of investing in companies undergoing significant 
change, such as a restructuring process or M&A attempt (Stokman, 2007).  The hedge fund 
hoped the change would act as a catalyst to improved shareholder value, with distressed 
securities and merger arbitrage the most commonly targeted „event‟.  More recently, some 
event driven hedge funds have waged activist campaigns as a catalyst for generating a 
return from their portfolio. 
Clifford (2008) explains that the different organisational form of hedge funds can make 
them more effective as shareholder activists than mutual funds.  Firstly, mutual funds must 
be diversified in order to gain tax benefits.  In the US, the 1940 Investment Company Act 
stipulates that a mutual fund must not hold more than 10% of a company, or have more than 
5% of the funds assets invested in any one security.  Hedge funds do not have to adhere to 
these tax regulations, allowing them to take larger positions in companies they wish to 
target.  Furthermore, Partnoy and Thomas (2007) explain that hedge funds are able to use 
leverage to take larger positions in companies than would be possible for a traditional 
mutual fund.   
Additionally, until recently, hedge funds were exempt from disclosure regulations (Klein 
and Zur, 2008). This allows them to use stock lending (Christoffersen et al., 2007) or 
derivatives contracts (Hu and Black, 2007) in order to acquire substantial voting rights 
without having to build large positions in companies.  Furthermore, hedge funds are able to 
use short sales to hedge their activist positions, for instance in a takeover situation.  If they 
are trying to force a bidder to abandon a deal and use an alternative strategy to increase 
shareholder value (as in the case of the Deustche Boerse takeover bid for LSE in 2005 
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explained in chapter 9), the hedge fund might take long positions in the bidder and short 
positions in the target in order to profit if the bid is abandoned and the target share rice falls. 
Hedge fund managers are also incentivised because they often receive a proportion of the 
funds profits.  In contrast, mutual fund managers are restricted in the level of compensation 
they draw.  Davis and Kim (2007) further explain that hedge funds are not subject to the 
conflicts of interest that we outlined earlier.  For instance, they are not discouraged from 
targeting a company because a different part of the group is seeking a pension fund 
management mandate in the near future.  Finally, Clifford (2008) explains that hedge funds 
can often use the threat of purchasing the target company to place pressure on management 
to listen to their concerns.  Completely purchasing a company as part of the activism 
process is not possible for a traditional mutual fund.  As a result of the advantages outlined 
above, hedge funds are able to use more innovative approaches to target companies they 
feel could perform better.   
2.4.1Targeting strategies 
As Davis and Kim (2007) explained, hedge funds do not face the conflicts of interest that 
mutual funds face.  Furthermore, they also have a distinct advantage over traditional mutual 
funds in that they build positions within companies with the sole intention of forcing them 
to change part of their operations. As we show in chapter 4, mutual funds usually engage 
with companies that are long standing positions within their portfolios and as such they like 
to maintain cordial relationships with them.  Thus, hedge funds are able to use different 
tactics in their activist campaign.  They shareholder proposals and private negotiation to 
work towards the hedge funds‟ desired outcomes.   
However, they are also able to use much more hostile tactics in situations in which the 
target company is resistant to their pressure.  Hedge funds activists tend to be much more 
high profile than those of their institutional counterparts, with high profile press campaigns 
not uncommon, such as the recent press campaign waged by Knight Vinke in 2007 aimed at 
forcing HSBC to change its future strategic direction.26  Additionally, Kahan and Rock 
(2007) explain that hedge funds are willing to use litigation, threat of takeover or proxy 
contests in order to achieve their objectives in instances where the softer tactics used by 
traditional institutional activists are proving futile.  Gillan and Starks (2007) explains that 
                                                   
26 “HSBC braced for activist campaign”, 6th September 2007, www.ft.com 
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proxy contests have risen from 30 contests in 2004 and 40 contests in 2005 to 91 contests in 
2006, which they attribute to the rise in activist hedge funds seeking board seats in order to 
further their campaigns.   
At a presentation in Milan in 2003, Knight Vinke Asset Management (KNAM) listed a 
number of strategies that they would use in one of their campaigns.  They include: (1) 
Writing open letters to management and/or the Board, using websites, press contacts, 
regulatory filings; (2) Holding public meetings (“town hall meetings”) inviting large 
shareholders, board members and management to attend; (3) Requesting special disclosure 
by the Company and/or a special audit; (4) Suing one or more of the directors/ trustees 
(including by means of class action lawsuits); (5) Conducting a proxy contest; (6) 
Contacting potential acquirers for parts (or all) of the business and making their interest 
known to the Board, to the press, and/or to other large shareholders.  These strategies form 
part of KVAM‟s policy of exploiting opportunities to make „spectacular returns‟.  They 
state that “Opportunities sometimes arise to make spectacular returns from investing in 
fundamentally sound companies trading at quasi-bankruptcy valuations…” 
As a result of the strategies used, the hedge funds‟ tactics are often met with disapproval by 
traditional institutional investors who cultivate long term relations with the investee 
companies. However, Klein and Zur (2008) find that a reputation as an activist shareholder 
is positively related to improvements in shareholder value.   
2.4.2Targets of activist Hedge Funds 
As highlighted earlier, hedge funds usually target firms in which an event (or series of 
events) can prove a catalyst to shareholder value improvements.  Brav et al (2008) outline a 
number of situations in which hedge funds can drive through these catalysts.  Firstly, hedge 
funds might advocate changes to the capital structure of the firm aimed at releasing value 
for the shareholder.  For instance, Clifford (2008) finds some evidence that hedge funds 
target companies with high cash, and that cash returns to shareholders increases as a result 
of the activist‟s intervention.  Klein and Zur (2008) also support this view, indicating that 
hedge fund activists target companies in which there is the potential to change the capital 
structure in order to affect share buyback or increased dividend payments.  
Secondly, Brav et al (2008) highlights opportunities to change the business strategy of the 
target in order to unlock shareholder value.  Stokman (2007) and Zur (2008) indicate that 
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changes to firm strategy is one of the more prominent objectives listed by activist hedge 
funds on their 13D filings.  TCI is a well known activist that took legal action against 
Vedanta Resources in 2008 over its restructuring plans.27  Brav et al (2008) further indicate 
that hedge funds target companies that are either already involved in a takeover, or where 
there is potential for takeover to occur.  The hedge funds aim is often to either campaign for 
improved offer terms or to try and prevent the takeover in favour of more value enhancing 
alternatives (as in the case of the Deustche Boerse takeover bid for LSE in 2005 explained 
in chapter 9).  An example is Knight Vinke‟s campaign against the takeover bid by VNU of 
IMS healthcare in 2005.28  Knight Vinke had written to the VNU board urging it to conduct 
a review of strategy in order to find ways to enhance shareholder value. However, it felt the 
takeover offer for IMS was too expensive and would harm VNU‟s shareholders over the 
long term.  VNU subsequently dropped the bid after facing opposition from over 40% of its 
shareholders who backed the Knight Vinke campaign29. Hedge funds also sometimes try to 
find alternative bidders in the hope of encouraging a bidding war to drive up the potential 
acquisition price.  Their activism is therefore often speculative in nature as they cannot be 
certain of obtaining their desired outcome if they don‟t have wider support from other 
shareholders.  Hedge funds were also instrumental in forcing the sale of ABN AMRO to a 
consortium of European banks in 2008. 
Finally, hedge funds might target companies in which corporate governance problems are 
hindering the value of the company (Brav et al, 2008).  Klein and Zur (2008) indicate that 
hedge funds routinely invest in companies in which they can influence underperforming 
management and unlock improvements in the firm‟s performance.  For example, Knight 
Vinke was instrumental in forcing Royal Dutch Shell to abandon its dual board structure in 
the wake of the reserves scandal.30  Shell‟s reserves were over estimated, forcing the 
company to take a write down to the accounts.  Knight Vinke and other shareholders felt 
that the dual board structure was hampering governance standards and the ability of the 
board to operate the company in an efficient manner.   In this respect, activist hedge funds 
are often not as short termist as their critics accuse them of.  Changes to corporate 
governance or strategy may take many months or years to fully impact the company share 
                                                   
27 “UK hedge fund takes on Vedanta over rejig”, The Economic Times, 23rd September 2008. 
28 “CEO quits as VNU forced to drop IMS deal”, Washington Post, 17th November 2005. 
29 “Memo to HSBC: Knight Vinke Isn't a Typical Activist Investor”, Wall Street Journal, 10th September 
2007. 
30 “No company is out of reach of activists”, The Sunday Times, 8th July 2007 
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price.  This means the full benefits of activism of this type might only be obtained by 
holding the stock over a sustained period.     
Prior literature supports KVAM‟s statement that the companies they invest in are 
fundamentally sound with the exception of their valuation.  Klein and Zur (2008) find that 
hedge funds target companies with higher profitability, larger cash balances and higher 
investment spending compared to their industry peers.  Clifford (2008) also indicates that 
targets of hedge fund activist have larger ROA and ROE than firms in a matched control 
sample.  Finally, Brav et al (2008) find evidence that hedge fund targets are more profitable; 
have more takeover defences and lower dividend payout rates than control firms.  These 
findings support the theory that an event (such as board change or changes to financial 
strategy) are required to unlock the good underlying performance that is not reflected in the 
market vale of the companies.  The empirical literature‟s analysis of hedge fund‟s impact on 
target firms is presented in the following section.  However, it could be possible that the 
more hostile, high profile approach used by the hedge funds is necessary to bring about the 
catalyst required to unlock shareholder value at these companies. 
2.5 Empirical evidence of impact of activism 
A number of studies in the US have sought to assess the impact of shareholder activism on 
the performance of the target companies. While the main focus of these studies is 
shareholder value performance, they also provide evidence for the impact on accounting 
performance measures and on corporate structure in target organisations.  The findings of 
this body of research are very mixed and give no firm consensus about the direction and 
magnitude of the value impact.  Karpoff (2001) and Gillan and Starks (1998) provide two 
systematic reviews of the most important US-based empirical studies in the field of activism 
by traditional mutual funds.  Karpoff concludes that “researchers and investors disagree 
over the extent to which shareholder activism facilitates improvements in target firms‟ 
market values, earnings, operations and governance structures.”  Gillan and Starks find 
“empirical evidence as to the influence of shareholder activism is mixed.” Appendix 2.1 
lists a summary of the main empirical studies on shareholder activism. Appendix 2.2 lists a 
summary of the methodology used by them. 
To gain a better understanding of the existing evidence into the impact of activism, the 
literature is dissected into the types of activism that the prior studies investigate. 
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2.5.1Impact on Shareholder Value 
Much of the research conducted by US academics focuses on the impact of activism on 
shareholder value creation and analyses the effects of engagement events on target share 
prices by calculating abnormal returns during periods surrounding those events (this 
technique is known as event study methodology)31. Activism conducted for shareholder 
value purposes is often associated with the focus list approach used by CalPERS and CII.  
This approach starts with a publicly published list of target firms upon which the activists 
will act over the subsequent year.  This is an area that has been researched a lot in the US, 
as it is the approach used by the most high profile activist pension funds listed above.  
 Shareholder value impact of focus lists 
 
Short term impact 
The researchers often analyse the announcement effect on the target share price of a specific 
action by a shareholder activist.  For focus lists, the announcement date is the day on which 
the focus list is published in the financial press.  The event window, i.e. the observation 
periods for measuring the effects of the event or the action, used to estimate the abnormal 
returns are usually up to 31 days.  Only English et al (2004) use a control group.  All studies 
use either a 95% or 99% confidence level.  Table 2.1 summarises the results of different 
studies examining focus list targeting.  
 Table 2.1 - Short term shareholder value impact of focus list activism
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Study Sample Size 
Sample 
Period 
Shareholder Value Impact 
(Abnormal return) 
Benchmark 
Event 
Window 
Wahal (1996) (US) 146 firms,  
356 events 
1987 – 1993 0% (pre-1990) 
0.8%b (post-1990) 
Equally-
weighted 
CRSP index 
7 days 
English et al (2004) 
(US) 
47 firms,   
63 events 
1992-1997 0.95%b  Value-
weighted 
CRSP index 
2 days 
 
Nelson (2005) (US) 91 firms, 
113 events 
1990 – 2003 1.72%b Equally-
weighted 
CRSP index 
6 days 
 
                                                   
31 Abnormal return is the return of the target shareholders over and above a benchmark return.  For 
instance, if a UK firm‟s share price for the event window rises by 12% and a FTSE benchmark index rises 
by only 8%, the abnormal return in this case would be 4%.  Event studies are also able to calculate 
negative abnormal returns and are a particularly useful tool for financial research. 
32 In all tables the figures a,b,c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
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Wahal (1996) finds that for targets receiving a letter from CalPERS in the early years of 
CalPERS activities (pre-1990), there is no significant improvement in abnormal returns.  
CalPERS altered its selection criteria in 1990 (Crutchley et al, 1998).  The previous method 
of selection solely based on poor corporate governance was replaced by a more rounded, 
shareholder value driven approach. One of the main effects was to reduce the average size 
of firms on its focus lists. Post-1990, targets see a small but significant improvement with 
CARS of 0.8%.  English et al (2004) study the announcement effect of inclusion of a target 
on CalPERS focus lists between 1992 and 1997.  They estimate a statistically significant 
short term abnormal return of 1 % for single announcement targets who appear on the 
activists‟ focus list only once.  Nelson (2006) finds a positive and significant short term 
abnormal return of 1.7% associated with CalPERS targeting but no evidence of persistent, 
long term improvements in returns. 
Long term impact 
Several other studies have examined the long term impact of focus lists as shown in Table 
2.2.   The event windows used ranges from 12 months to 5 years.  All returns are significant 
at the 95% or 99% confidence level. 
Table 2.2 - Long term shareholder value impact of focus list activism 
Study Sample size 
Sample 
Period 
Shareholder Value 
Impact (Abnormal 
return) 
Benchmark 
Event 
Window 
Nesbitt (1994) 27 firms,  47 
events 
1991 - 
1998 
41.3%b  S&P 500 4+ years 
Opler and 
Sokobin (1995) 
117 firms 1991 - 
1994 
11.6%a equivalent to a 
$39.7 billion abnormal 
dollar return 
Matched 
Benchmark 
Portfolio 
2 years 
Crutchley et al, 
(1998) 
47 firms 1992 - 
1997 
-19.6%b S&P 500 <12 months 
Del Guercio and 
Hawkins (1998) 
125 firms, 
266 events 
1987 - 
1993 
Long term improvements 
found but not reported 
Equally-weighted 
CRSP index 
2 – 3 years 
Gillan et al (2000) 1 firm case 
study 
1989 - 
1992 
12%b annualised Value-weighted 
CRSP index  
4+ years 
English et al, 
(2002) 
47 firms, 63 
events 
1992 -1997 52.5%b  Value-weighted 
CRSP index 
1 – 5 years 
 
Nesbitt (1994) finds a 41.3% abnormal return from CalPERS targeting over a five year 
horizon. Opler and Sokobin (1995) investigate CII focus list activism and uncover a mean 
abnormal gain of 11.6% post-targeting equivalent to a $39.7 billion abnormal dollar return 
and state that CII focus list firms far outperformed benchmarks. 
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Crutchley et al (1998) find a negative return of 19.6%, 12 months after the initial targeting 
occurred.  Del Guercio and Hawkins (1998) find no evidence that targeting by a large 
pension fund leads to significant long term improvements in shareholder value after the first 
3 years.  Martin et al (2000) report that, in the year after CalPERS has put Sears Roebuck & 
Co on its focus lists, there is a significant long term (5 year) improvement in the firm‟s 
share prices of 12% per annum between 1989 and 1994.  English et al (2004) find repeat 
appearance on CalPERS focus lists doesn‟t generate significant abnormal returns. They do, 
however, identify a positive abnormal holding period return of 52.5% over a five year 
period post-single list targeting.  Nelson (2006) finds no evidence of long term persistent 
improvements in target shareholder value. 
In summary, shareholder activism by focus lists has a positive impact on shareholder value 
in most cases. The short term effects are only slightly larger than zero, with a range of 
between 0.8% and 1.7%.  Only Crutchley et al (1998) identify a negative effect of focus 
lists on shareholder value with a return of -19.5%. The higher short term returns identified 
by Becht et al (2008) for the UK (see Table 1) don‟t allow for mean reversion because they 
don‟t study the shareholder value impact over the longer term and only look at an 11 day 
event window. Most of the other authors define short term as up to six months. Over the 
long term, the abnormal returns generated are far more significant. Nesbitt (1994) identifies 
a return of 41.3%, English et al (2004) of 52.5%, both for a horizon of 5 years. This adds 
weight to the argument that much of the impact of activism is only tangibly seen over a 
longer time period and short term event windows fail to capture the true impact of 
engagement (Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999). 
Shareholder value impact of shareholder proposals 
Shareholder proposals are proposals submitted by shareholders to the general meeting of 
shareholders. They usually centre on issues such as compensation levels, firm strategy or 
takeover battles. Proposals are submitted in advance of a shareholder meeting in order for 
time for proxy voting to occur. (The website, www.shareholderproposals.com outlines the 
shareholder proposal process from submission right through to voting and possible 
adoption). 
Single proposals are about a specific issue. These proposals are included in the proxy 
statements sent out by the company prior to the annual meeting.  Multiple proposals are 
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those that raise a number of issues in the same proxy statement.  They are either included as 
one item or, more often, split into separate items for specific issues. 
For all proposals, the shareholders either vote for, against, or abstain from voting.  It is 
usually very difficult for the supporters of proposals to obtain the support necessary to 
achieve a successful outcome if they are not sponsored by a large institutional investor 
(Strickland et al, 1996, Gillan and Starks, 2000).  If the shareholders are not happy with the 
outcome of their proposals, they may submit repeat proposals over the following years.  
Table 2.3 summarises the main studies that have looked at the impact of shareholder 
proposals. All of the returns, except those reported by Faccio and Lasfer (2002), are 
significant at the 95% level.  Each study uses a control group methodology to isolate the 
effects of contaminating events.  In all cases, the control groups are matched using size, 
industry sector, asset value and sales volume.  The event windows analysed in the studies 
vary from two to thirty one days, making them all short term in nature.  Studies looking at 
repeat proposals still use short term event windows for each subsequent proposal. 
Table 2.3 - Shareholder value effect of proposals 
Study Sample size 
Sample 
Period 
Shareholder Value Impact 
(Abnormal return) 
Benchmark 
Event 
Window 
Karpoff et al, (1996) 269 firms, 
522 events 
1986 - 1990 Shareholder proposals -
0.3%a around annual general 
meeting 
Equally-
weighted 
CRSP index 
2 days 
Wahal (1996) 146 firms, 
356 events 
1987 - 1993 Post-1990, 0.8%b  Equally-
weighted 
CRSP index 
7 days 
Huson (1997) 18 firms 1990 - 1992 0.4%b for single proposal. 
Repeat proposal destroys 
value 
S&P Market 
Index 
31 days 
Del Guercio and 
Hawkins (1998) 
125 firms, 
266 events 
1987 - 1993 19.4%b for board related 
proposals. Others destroy 
value 
S&P 500 2 days 
Prevost and Rao 
(2000) 
128 events, 
73 firms 
1988 - 1994 Repeat proposals destroy 
value (-4.5%b) 
Equally-
weighted 
CRSP index 
2 days 
Faccio and Lasfer 
(2001) 
289 firms 1995-1996 Proxy voting restrains firm 
value - fall in abnormal 
return from 62.6%b to 
18.6%a.   
Not reported 7 days 
 
Several studies have examined the impact of shareholder proposals on firm value since data 
on the number of proposals, targeting date and the focus of the proposals are widely 
available.   
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Research into the short term impact of proposals is the norm due to the ease with which 
announcement date data can be obtained.  In the short term, activism through shareholder 
proposals is usually associated with a negligible or negative abnormal return.  Karpoff et al 
(1996) find a small negative wealth effect of -0.3% as a result of targeting by shareholder 
proposals around annual general meeting date announcements and proposals supported by 
large votes are more likely to generate positive abnormal returns.  
Daily et al (1996) find there is no relation between the number of proposals received and 
the abnormal returns.  Wahal (1996) finds, for the period before 1990, no improvement in 
returns from firms targeted by pension funds putting forward shareholder proposals.  Post-
1990, he finds positive returns of 0.8%.  Huson (1997) reports that single proposal targeting 
generate a small abnormal return of 0.4%; however, repeat proposal targeting destroys 
value.  Del Guercio and Hawkins (1998) find no significant short term valuation effect 
except board related proposals. Prevost and Rao (2000) estimate abnormal returns 
surrounding mailing dates of repeat proposals are negative but insignificant (-0.05%). 
Over the long term, the available research indicates, there is very little improvement gained 
from activism through shareholder proposals, except in the case of board related proposals.  
Del Guercio and Hawkins (1998) report no significant long term improvement in returns at 
target firms.  However, Prevost and Rao (2000) find repeat proposals lead to significant and 
large returns of -4.5% over a ten day window after the proposal is received.  Faccio and 
Lasfer (2002) find that activism, using proxy votes, by UK pension funds restrains firm 
value over time (the pension fund value was lower than a benchmark portfolio based on the 
FTSE index), with returns falling from 62.7% to 18.6% as a result of targeting by a pension 
fund.  However, for specific proposals on governance structures, post-activist performance 
improves from a negative return of -39% before the activism to a positive return of 10.3% 
after the event.  However they do caution that this could easily be attributed, at least in part, 
to mean reversion.   
These results are consistent with the view that firms receiving proposals are unwilling to 
change their policies as requested by the activist during private negotiations.  Thus, the 
activist is forced into more public measures in order to try and gain the necessary support 
for the desired changes. Huson (1997) supports this view by indicating that the market 
reaction after the proposals is recognition of the target management‟s desire to change and 
not to the activism itself.   
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To summarise, in the short term, the effects of a shareholder proposal are either negligible 
or negative.  Over the long term, shareholder value is often destroyed as a result of activism 
through shareholder proposals.  However, for board related proposals that usually target 
board composition or structure33, there is a small value enhancement.  The positive wealth 
effect of board related proposals seems to rest on the expectation that the restructuring of a 
poorly performing/structured board would lead to an improvement in decision making and, 
subsequently, firm performance.  
Long term targeting by shareholder proposals, especially repeat targeting, significantly 
destroys shareholder value over time.  Over the long term, if an activist or a coalition of 
activists is forced to submit repeat proposals, it is a sign that the target is unreceptive to the 
changes demanded by the activist investors.  In this situation, there is very little chance that 
the target management will make the desired changes and a more radical approach might be 
required, such as targeting the executive management team itself as a precursor for strategic 
change. This is in contrast to focus list activism where the effects are usually positive, 
especially over the long term. 
Shareholder value impact of private negotiation 
Activism through private negotiation is likely to be a lengthy and secretive process which 
makes analysis of its short term value effects difficult. Therefore, all of the research to date 
into this type of activism is conducted to identify long term valuation effects. The number 
of studies is also limited as shown in Table 2.4. The impact of private negotiation in the 
short term is very difficult to measure; hence, long term event windows are used.  In this 
case, the studies use between 3 and 5 year periods with the exception of Becht et al (2008) 
who use a short term 11 day window. All returns are significant at the 95% or 99% 
confidence level. 
 
 
 
 
                                                   
33 Board structure defines the independence of the Chairman and CEO and the number of non-executive 
directors present.  Board composition looks at the diversity of the board in terms of gender, background 
and experience. 
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Table 2.4 - Shareholder value impact of private negotiations 
Study Sample size 
Sample 
Period 
Shareholder Value 
Impact (Abnormal 
return) 
Benchmark 
Event 
Window 
Akhigbe et al, 
(1997) (US) 
144 firms 1985 – 1992 23.1%b  Value-
weighted 
CRSP index 
3 years 
Huson (1997) 
(US) 
18 firms 1990 – 1992 5.6%b for negotiation 
targeting asset divestiture 
and joint ventures  
S&P Market 
Index 
2 years 
Carleton et al, 
(1998) (US) 
45 firms and 
62 events 
1992 – 1996 1.3%b Value-
weighted 
CRSP index 
12 months 
Becht et al (2008) 
(UK) 
41 firms, 1 
Institutional 
investor  
2002 – 2005 5.5%b, 7%b, 6.5%b and 2%b 
(associated with different 
changes in targets) 
FTSE All 
Share 
11 days 
 
Activism through private negotiation generally has a positive impact on shareholder value 
at target firms.  Opler and Sokobin (1995) study private negotiation by CII and its members 
in conjunction with focus list targeting and state that “„quiet‟ attempts at activism are the 
most successful at generating abnormal returns.” In their study, the sample is split into sub 
samples to independently measure the effects of „quiet‟ activism, focus lists and then the 
combined effects.  However, the authors don‟t analyse the impact of other activism types 
and compare their returns to those obtained through other research.  Akhigbe et al, (1997) 
find a 23% positive abnormal return by end of the third year after activism by negotiation. 
Huson (1997) analyses the impact of negotiation on 18 targets between 1990 and 1992 and 
unearths significant abnormal returns generated solely by targeting aimed at asset 
divestiture and joint venture announcements 34.    
Non-core asset sales are an area in which activism is sometimes focused (Sears Roebuck‟s 
sale of its financial division was pushed by CalPERS) in order to allow the target to focus 
on its core strategic activities.  There can also be activism aimed at altering new market 
penetration strategies from wholly owned subsidiaries to joint ventures until the full market 
potential is known.  Therefore, the aim of this type of activism is to reduce risk and enhance 
value creation potential. 
Romano (1998) reveals that negotiated settlements are a good substitute for „value 
increasing oversight by independent directors‟ and are more likely to influence the right 
decisions than shareholder proposals.  Carleton et al (1998) investigate private negotiation 
                                                   
34 Exact returns unavailable due to unpublished nature of this article.  Conclusion drawn from journal 
reviewers comments  
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activism by TIAA-CREF and find statistically significant abnormal returns of 1.3% over a 
12 month period in which a privately negotiated settlement was reached.  This is consistent 
with the idea that firms agreeing a private settlement are more willing to improve and 
change their policies and thus more likely to implement value enhancing suggestions by 
their investors (Black, 1997; Karpoff, 2002).  The lack of more research on private 
negotiation as an activist instrument is symptomatic of the problems of obtaining accurate 
data on the timescale, scope and outcome, of these activities as such activism occurs in 
private and is very rarely publicised. 
Becht et al (2008) conduct a clinical study of activism by Hermes Focus Fund over a three 
year period.  Using a sample of 41 companies selected by the fund, they track the impact of 
policies designed to invoke CEO/Chairman changes, restructuring, changes in dividend 
payout and Nonexecutive Director changes at target firms and estimate abnormal returns of 
5.5%, 7%, 6.5% and 2% respectively using an 11 day event window.  All of the returns are 
statistically significant.  These results imply that there is a positive abnormal return 
associated with privately negotiated targeting in the UK.  The weakness of this study in its 
current state is that the methodology only identifies the short term performance benefits of 
activism conducted by a single fund.  It does not attempt to identify the impact of 
engagement by other activists. It suggests that the short term returns generated will hold 
over the long term, which assumes markets are completely efficient and that no lag effects 
exist.  The study also fails to use a control group methodology in its current state and thus 
there are no returns from non-targeted firms with which to compare the activist triggered 
returns. 
Summary of Impact of Activism on Shareholder Value 
The literature on shareholder value effects of activism gives a varying picture depending 
upon the type of activism analysed.  Activism through focus lists generally has a positive 
impact, especially over the long term.  In these circumstances the returns generated can be 
as much as 52%.  Activism through private negotiation, although harder to measure, also 
appears to generate positive value effects, although the returns identified vary widely, from 
1.2% to as much as 23%.  Such wide variation is indicative of the difficulties researchers 
experience in obtaining accurate data and in defining an appropriate event window.  Finally, 
researchers generally report that shareholder activism through proposals destroys value. The 
value effects are usually small, for example, -0.3%.  However, for some specific issues, 
such as board reforming proposals, the literature identifies positive wealth effects as high as 
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19.4%.  This is because the possibility of executive management changes is viewed as a 
precursor to successful strategic change.   
Thus, on the whole the literature associates activism through private negotiation and focus 
lists with value creation effects, especially over the long term.  However, shareholder 
proposals, especially repeat proposals over multiple proxy seasons, are associated with 
value destruction in most cases. 
2.5.2 Impact of shareholder activism on operating performance 
An alternative performance metric used by activists in their selection of targets is operating 
performance defined by earnings variables such as return on assets, return on equity or 
return on sales.  Karpoff (2001) states “the evidence indicating that shareholder activism 
has negligible short-run stock price effects might simply reflect low-power tests.  Therefore 
several researchers have investigated whether activism prompts significant changes in 
target firms' earnings and operating performance.”   
Return on assets/operating return on assets (ROA) 
Return on assets is a ratio designed to indicate how profitably a firm has invested its capital.  
Researchers analyse this ratio as a metric to assess to whether activism improves the 
profitability of targets asset investment decisions. The impact on ROA is analysed by 
comparing abnormal ROA after activism with a benchmark control group of firms that are 
matched in terms of size, industry, sales volume and asset value. The impact of activism is 
analysed over the long term (up to 3 years) due to the annual reporting of accounting 
variables.  Table 2.5 summarises the results of US based studies evaluating post-activism 
performance by ROA. 
Table 2.5 - Impact of Activism on Return on Assets (ROA) 
Study Sample size 
Sample 
Period 
Impact on ROA Event Window 
Carleton et al,  (1998) 45 firms, 62 
events 
1992 - 1996 No significant change 
3 years 
Del Guercio and 
Hawkins (1998) 
125 firms and 
266 events 
1987 - 1993 No significant change 
2 -3 years 
Karpoff et al, (1996)  144 firms 1985 - 1992 No significant change 2 days 
Opler and Sokobin 
(1995) 
117 firms 1991 – 1994 Significant increase 
2 years 
Prevost and Rao 
(2000) 
146 events 1988 – 1994 Small increase from single 
targeting.  Decrease from 
multiple targeting. 
3 years 
Smith (1996) 51 firms 1987 – 1993 Limited improvement 1 year 
Strickland, Wiles and 
Zenner (1996) 
85 firms and 
216 events 
1986 – 1993 No significant change 
3 years 
Wahal (1996) 146 firms and 
356 events 
1987 – 1993 No significant change 
1 year 
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In most cases, these studies uncover no significant change in the return on assets achieved 
by the targets of activism. Karpoff et al (1996), Strickland et al (1996), Wahal (1996), 
Carleton et al (1998), Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) report no significant improvement 
in ROA.  However, there are two exceptions to this picture.  Smith (1996) examine 
proposals targeting poor performance and find limited evidence of improvement in 
operating return on assets over the 12 months after the activism event.  Opler and Sokobin 
(1995) find that after being listed as a target by the CII, return on assets increases 
significantly over the following two years.  However, Prevost and Rao (2000) identify 
mixed effects.  They find a significant long term decline in return on assets for firms 
repeatedly targeted with shareholder proposals but a small increase for those targeted only 
once.   
Return on equity 
Return on equity measures the profitability of shareholder investment in the target firm.  
Strickland et al (1996) is the only study to analyse the impact of shareholder activism on 
this ratio.  They find that, compared to a control group matched in terms of industry, size 
and performance, there is no significant improvement in the return on equity of targeted 
firms.  ROE is calculated over a 3 year period, using published figures at the end of each 
accounting period and compared to the ROE of the control group to obtain an abnormal 
ROE value. 
Return on sales/operating return on sales 
Return on sales (ROS) is a ratio often used to evaluate a company's operational efficiency.  
Whereas ROA and ROE look at how well the firm uses its invested capital, ROS measures 
how well a company turns its sales revenue into profit and gives an indication as to its 
operational cost efficiency.  Table 2.6 summarises the results of US studies that have 
examined ROS changes due to activism.  Since they look at accounting variables, they are 
long term studies covering time periods of between one and four years.35 
 
 
 
                                                   
35 For a full summary of control group selection, event window and significance level used by each 
author, see appendix 2.2 
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Table 2.6 - Impact of activism on Return on Sales (ROS) 
Study Sample size 
Sample 
Period 
Impact on ROS Event Window 
Carleton et al, (1998) 45 firms, 62 
events 
1992 - 1996 No significant change 
3 years 
Del Guercio and 
Hawkins (1998) 
125 firms, 266 
events 
1987 - 1993 Small but insignificant 
improvement 
2 -3 years 
Karpoff et al, (1996)  144 firms 1985 - 1992 No significant change 2 days 
Prevost and Rao 
(2000) 
146 events 1988 - 1994 Generally no change except 
small decline from pension 
fund repeat targeting 
3 years 
Smith (1996) 51 firms 1987 - 1993 No significant change 1 year 
 
None of these studies find that engagement by activists has a significant improvement in 
target firms‟ return on sales (Carleton et al, 1998; Karpoff et al, 1996; Prevost and Rao, 
2000 and Smith, 1996).  Instead, Prevost and Rao (2000) did identify a negative relationship 
between pension fund repeat proposal targeting and the targets‟ return on sales. Del Guercio 
and Hawkins (1999) analyse the impact on return on sales over the two year period from 
one year pre to one year post engagement and find a small improvement.  However, this is 
smaller than that of the control group and not statistically significant.36   
Sales Growth 
Karpoff et al (1996) analyse the impact of shareholder intervention on sales growth and find 
that, in their sample, sales growth at targets declines during the four years following 
engagement.  However, Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) find no significant improvement 
after targeting 
Overall, activism appears to have very little impact on the operating performance of target 
firms.  Any impact that does occur is small (Prevost and Rao, 2000).  Repeat targeting can 
have significant reducing effects on return on assets and profit margin ratios (Opler and 
Sokobin, 1995). 
2.5.3Impact of shareholder activism on target strategic decisions  
Activists often resort to engagement in order to protest against major strategic decisions 
such as acquisitions or divestments at the target companies and this is an area in which 
limited research has been undertaken.  For example, the Deutsche Borse acquisition bid for 
the London Sock Exchange was abandoned due to activism by three major hedge funds that 
                                                   
36 See Appendix B for an explanation of the control group characteristics. 
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saw the potentially destructive impact the deal could have on shareholder value.37  More 
recently, Carl Icahn tried to force through a proposal to split the Time-Warner group into 
four divisions in order to improve their operational effectiveness.  However, he was largely 
defeated and eventually settled for increased share-buyback rate of $20bn and some input 
into the appointment of two board directors.38   
Asset divestments, restructuring and employee layoffs 
One area to which engagement is often directed is the operating structure or business 
portfolio of the target organisation.  For instance, Sears Roebuck & Co was targeted by 
activists who demanded the sale of non-core operating divisions.  Once the financial 
division was sold off, performance at Sears improved (Gillan et al, 2000).  Table 2.7 
summarises a number of studies that have examined the impact of activism on strategic 
decisions at target firms. All these studies analyse strategic decision making in the long 
term (two to five years) and merely investigate whether strategic decisions such as asset 
sales, restructuring or redundancies increase or decrease after the activism event.  Some 
compare these results to those of a control group.  
Table 2.7 - Impact of activism on target strategic decisions 
Study Sample size 
Sample 
Period 
Impact on strategic decision Event Window 
Carleton et al, 
(1998) 
45 firms, 62 
events 
1992 - 1996 No significant change in rate of 
restructuring processes at target firms 
(assets or employees) 
3 years 
Del Guercio and 
Hawkins (1998) 
125 firms, 
266 events 
1987 - 1993 increase in sell off of assets and 
restructure core activities/divisions 
2 -3 years 
Huson (1997) 18 firms 1990 - 1992 Asset sales and employee layoffs 
increase 
5 years 
Opler and Sokobin 
(1995) 
117 firms 1991 - 1994 increase in announcements to 
restructure the company after CII 
focus list inclusion announcement 
2 years 
Smith (1996) 51 firms 1987 - 1993 Significant increase in asset sales 1 year 
 
Generally, these researchers find that targets increase their restructuring efforts after 
shareholder intervention occurs.  Smith (1996) reveals that targets significantly increase 
asset sales in the year following targeting by large shareholders.  Huson (1997) also 
observes a significant increase in asset sales and employee layoffs.  Opler and Sokobin 
(1995) find that CII focus list targets quickly announce increased restructuring when such 
lists are announced in the press.  Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) state that “targets of 
activism have an increased rate of decisions designed to improve the performance of the 
                                                   
37 Source: Deutsche Borse/LSE, Lex column on FT website, www.ft.com, 7th March 2006  
38 Source: Time Warner, Icahn Reach Accord, The Wall Street Journal, 18th February 2006. 
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firm over the three years following engagement, including asset divestments and firm 
restructuring.”  However not all authors reach the same conclusion.  Carleton et al (1998) 
find no significant improvement in decisions designed to restructure the target organisation 
as a result of engagement. 
Capital expenditures 
Only Smith (1996) looks at the impact of engagement on capital expenditure.  He finds that 
there is no marked change in the expenditure plans of target firms after engagement by 
shareholders.  The capital expenditure plans analysed include replenishment of operating 
assets or other strategically important asset classes.  The impact of activism on takeover 
decisions and acquisitions is analysed in section 2.6.5.  
Dividend Payout and Cash Flow 
Dividend payouts are an important source of income for institutional shareholders.  
Dividends provide a cash flow which the funds trustees are able to channel to the fund 
beneficiaries, e.g. pension payments.  Institutional investors are also interested in the cash 
flows generated by the targets, as well as where the cash is reinvested.  The investors are 
usually happy to allow the firm to have a lower dividend payout rate coupled with high cash 
flow, as long as the cash is reinvested in value enhancing investments, such as firm 
expansion or new product development.  However, if the firm is unable to find value 
enhancing investments, or fully exploit them, the shareholders might feel that it is necessary 
to intervene.  This allows them to receive higher cash flows which they can reinvest 
elsewhere.  However, they will only engage in this area if they feel that the cash/profit 
generated is not reinvested by the target in a manner that will enhance the long term value 
of their shareholding. 
Both Smith (1996) and Del Guercio and Hawkins (1999) examine the impact of activism on 
these measures.  In both pieces of research, they find no significant increase in the payout 
ratios of target firms. Smith does, however, note that undistributed cash flow at target firms 
reduces after intervention by shareholders.  He, however, doesn‟t say where the reduction in 
cash flow originated.   
A recent example of this type of activism is Time-Warner.  The activist (Carl Icahn) was 
pushing for a major restructuring of the company into four sub-companies but, eventually, 
settled for an increased share buyback level of $20bn compared to $5bn before he had 
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started his engagement.39  Time-Warner has immense free cash flow and even this increased 
cash flow back to the investors will do little to limit its future reinvestment plans.  Microsoft 
has often been cited as an example where activism could occur due to the huge cash balance 
of over $60bn that it maintains on its balance sheet.40  
Anti takeover measures 
Bizjak and Marquette (1998) find that firms receiving proposals aimed at rescinding poison 
pills usually modify or rescind them completely following engagement. They also note an 
increase in the incidence of takeover approaches to targets of activism over this same 
period.  However, they argue that rescinding of poison pills is probably done to satisfy the 
shareholders as new pills can be adopted if a new takeover bid occurs. 
Activism and takeover decisions 
Takeover decisions are an area in which activist investors are increasingly leveraging their 
ownership rights.  Around half of the acquisitions made actually destroy value so it is not 
surprising that this is an area in which shareholders are active41 (Bouwman, Fuller and 
Nain, 2003; Klein, 2006).  In the previously cited case of Deutsche Borse, the three hedge 
funds that held a substantial chunk of Borse‟s equity fiercely opposed the takeover bid for 
the LSE.42  Not only did they prevent the bid from occurring, but they were also 
instrumental in forcing the resignation of CEO Werner Seifert as well as the Deutsche 
Borse‟s entire supervisory board.  They felt that the bid overstated the value of LSE to 
Deutsche Borse and would harm shareholder value in the long term.  There is no existing 
research into this area of activism and this is a gap that will be addressed in this research. 
However, there is also a belief that activism is one of the reasons for the increase in mergers 
and acquisitions that are occurring both in the US and Europe.43  The Walt Disney Co‟s 
purchase of Pixar Animated Studios Inc was encouraged by activist shareholders who saw 
acquisitions of profitable companies as a way to improve the group‟s flagging earnings.  
                                                   
39 Time Warner, Icahn Reach Accord, The Wall Street Journal, 18th February 2006. 
40 Exciting Times, Flat Shares; Microsoft Shareholders Still Wary At Meeting, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 
10th November 2005. 
41 Creating Value from Mergers and Acquisitions: The Challenges, Chapter 4, Sudarsanam, Prentice Hall 
2003. 
42 Deutsche Borse/LSE, Lex column on FT website, www.ft.com, 7th March 2006 
43 Institutional Shareholder Services - Corporate Governance Blog, Banner Year for M&A Activity, 1st 
March 2006.  
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Pixar is also a very good strategic fit for Disney and adds a number of valuable animated 
film franchises to Disney‟s library.44  
Therefore, despite the lack of research into the area of activism and takeovers, this is one 
area in which activism could have a potentially very important impact in disciplining the 
actions of managers against empire building acquisitions. Note, however, that research in 
this area is scanty. 
Overall, the impact on strategic decision making is mixed.  There would appear to be an 
increased efficiency of decisions aimed at the business portfolio of the target firm, with 
asset sales and restructuring efforts generally increasing after intervention.  However, there 
is little impact on other decisions such as capital expenditure and dividend payout ratio. 
2.5.4Impact of activism on board structure and executive compensation 
A number of studies in the US have tried to analyse the impact of activism on target firm 
board structure and executive compensation levels and their determinants.  
CEO turnover 
CEO turnover is the rate at which companies replace their CEO.  An increased CEO 
turnover rate signifies that a company replaces its CEO more often.  CEO turnover rates 
have increased over the past decade.  Table 2.8 shows the results of studies that have 
analysed the impact of activism on CEO turnover rates at target companies.  If a company 
has replaced its CEO more frequently after activism when compared to the control groups 
and in the pre activism period, it is said to have increased its CEO turnover rate.  All studies 
use a long term horizon averaging three years, with the longest being five years and the 
shortest one. 
Table 2.8 - Impact of activism on CEO turnover 
Study Sample size 
Sample 
Period 
Impact on CEO turnover Event Window 
Del Guercio and 
Hawkins (1998) 
125 firms, 
266 events 
1987 - 1993 No significant change 
2 – 3 years 
Huson (1997) 18 firms 1990 - 1992 CEO turnover rates increase 5 years 
Karpoff et al, (1996) 269 firms, 
522 events 
1986 / 1990 No significant change 
2 years 
Opler and Sokobin 
(1995) 
117 firms 1991 - 1994 CEO turnover rates decrease 
2 years 
Smith (1996) 51 firms 1987 - 1993 No significant change 1 year 
                                                   
44 Iger Puts On a Show for Disney's Investors; The new CEO's quick action on several fronts earns him a 
honeymoon with shareholders, Los Angeles Times, 10th March 2006. 
44 
 
 
A number of authors have analysed the impact of activist engagement on CEO turnover 
rates in target firms. The general consensus indicates that there is very little impact on the 
rate of CEO change attributable to engagement.  Smith (1996) analyses 51 firms subjected 
to activism between 1987 and 1993 and finds no marked impact on management turnover 
rates.  These findings are consistent with those of other researchers (Karpoff et al, 1996; 
Woods, 1996; and Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999).  However, there are some instances in 
which CEO turnover rates do change. Huson (1997) finds that CEO turnover rates actually 
increase slightly after intervention occurs.  Contradicting this evidence, though, is the 
finding of Opler and Sokobin (1995).  They report that, in a 1993 sample of targets, CEO 
turnover rate declines after shareholder intervention occurs. 
Board composition 
One area of corporate governance that has received a lot of government attention is that of 
board structure and independence. Numerous reports in the UK, such as the Higgs and 
Turnbull reports, have tried to identify ways of making boards more independent and 
accountable for their actions.  Some studies have looked at this idea from an activism 
viewpoint, and the results are summarised in Table 2.9.  Once again, they are long term in 
nature and examine whether the composition, structure and independence of the executive 
board change after the firm is subject to shareholder pressure. 
Table 2.9 - Impact of activism on board composition 
Study Sample size 
Sample 
Period 
Impact on board 
composition 
Event Window 
Akhigbe et al, 
(1997) (US) 
144 firms 1985 – 
1992 
Targets willing to improve 
board independence by 
appointing more 
independent directors  
3 years 
Carleton, Nelson 
and Weisbach 
(1998) (US) 
45 firms and 
62 events 
1992 – 
1996 
Increase in female board 
members 3 years 
Girard (2000) 
(UK/France) 
79 firms in 
France, 57 
firms in UK 
1989-2000 
in France, 
1992-2002 
in UK 
UK investors more likely to 
force through board changes 
Descriptive Report 
Wu (2004) (US )794 firms 1988 – 
1995 
Reduction in board size and 
number of internal directors 
2 years 
 
Board Composition, especially independence, is one area in which activism does seem to 
have a genuine impact.  Akhigbe et al (1997) identify an increased willingness to improve 
board independence and governance structures by targets through moves to seek 
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independent directors when appointing new members of the board.  Carleton et al (1998) 
find that firms targeted by TIAA-CREF by proposals requesting appointment of female 
directors subsequently meet these requests within 18 months.  Wu (2004) finds a reduction 
in post- activism board size and number of internal directors after activism, whilst 
management career progression is linked more closely to past performance with the target 
firm more likely to promote directors based on results.  Wu also discovers an increased 
likelihood of appointment of external directors after activism occurs. Finally, Girard (2000) 
explains that UK investors are more likely to force through changes in board composition 
than their French counterparts.     
Executive compensation 
Executive compensation, especially that of the CEO, is one area in which activism is 
routinely focused.  However, Hendry et al (2007) indicate, from interviews with 
institutional fund mangers, that executive compensation isn‟t a major reason for engaging.  
However, it is often used to signal to the target that there are larger governance issues that 
need to be addressed, i.e. as a proxy for larger structural problems. 
Compensation levels 
Woods (1996) finds that, post-activism, target CEO compensation actually increases in cash 
terms.  Daily et al (1996) examine proposals targeting compensation levels in 197 firms 
between 1990 and 1993 and find that activism merely slows down the rate of increase in 
compensation.  Perry and Zenner (2001) analyse compensation related proposals and find 
no change in post-activist compensation levels.  Johnson et al (1997) reveal an increase in 
total compensation levels due to increase in stock options. However, activist pressure is 
effective in slowing the rise of compensation packages over $1 million.   
Compensation structures 
Daily et al (1996) remark that proposals don‟t significantly change the structure i.e. the 
components of executive pay.  Johnson and Shackell (1997) find that shareholder proposals 
bear no relation to changes in the structure of executive compensation.  Girard (2000) 
conducted a preliminary investigation into the activities of UK and French activists and find 
that French activists are more likely to make a larger impact upon executive compensation 
contracts. More recently, institutions have taken a dim view of compensation contracts 
loaded with incentive plans in which too much focus on short term share price movements 
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to the possible detriment of long term corporate stability.  The solution is to use longer term 
vesting periods to align the management incentives with the goals of long term 
shareholders.  In the UK, performance criteria for options and limitations on payments for 
executive failure have been incorporated into compensation structures for many years.   
Overall, shareholder engagement has a mixed impact on the governance structure of target 
firms.  There is limited evidence that engagement changes CEO turnover rates or 
compensation levels. However, research into board diversity and structure indicates that 
activism is successful at creating a more independent and diversified board structure.   
2.5.5 Other effects of shareholder activism 
Strickland et al (1996) find that activism through proposals designed to target firm decision 
making are more likely to be successful if supported by high voting levels amongst the non-
activist shareholders.  Johnson and Shackell (1997) believe some proposals targeting 
executive compensation could be politically motivated.  Compensation may not be the real 
issue which the investor wishes to address/raise but is probably being used as a proxy for 
other concerns. 
English et al (2004) explain that firms repeatedly targeted by CalPERS failed to respond to 
the activists‟ requests for governance structure improvements such as better board 
independence. CalPERS very rarely issue compensation-related proposals against firms on 
its focus list due to the negative impact they believe they have on shareholder value. They 
prefer to tackle this issue through private dialogue. 
2.5.6 Impact of hedge Fund Activism 
A number of recent papers have analysed the impact of hedge fund activism on target firms‟ 
performance.  In the US, investors purchasing a substantial shareholding in a company in 
excess of 5% must file a 13D form with the SEC which not only outlines the share 
transaction details, but also states the intended purpose for which the investor purchased the 
shareholding.  Many US studies use this filing date at which the 5% threshold is crossed by 
an activist hedge fund filing a 13D, as well as any subsequent press statements by the 
activist, as event dates from which to analyse the impact of activist shareholding on the 
targeted company.  The underlying assumption is that the presence of an activist hedge fund 
on a company‟s share register will begin the process of change desired by the activist even 
before initial contact is made (Boyson and Mooradian, 2007).  The company will be fearful 
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that if they do not voluntarily address the issues that are causing concern, they will possibly 
become subject to a high profile campaign by the activist hedge funds.  Analysis is also 
undertaken of the impact of such share acquisition on investee firm operating performance.  
Boyson and Mooradian (2007), and Clifford (2008) also attempt to analyse the impact of 
being a hedge fund activist on the hedge fund‟s performance relative to non-activist hedge 
funds.  The findings of these papers are presented in the following sections. 
Impact on Shareholder Value 
The few studies that have analysed the impact of activist hedge funds on targeted firms‟ 
shareholder value performance have shown positive results around the hedge fund‟s filing 
of the Schedule 13D.  Zenner et al, (2005) find that stocks targeted by activist hedge funds 
generate positive abnormal returns of almost 10% over the month following the initial 
announcement that the firm has attracted the attention of an activist hedge fund.  Similarly, 
Boyson and Mooradian (2007) find an abnormal return in excess of the matched sample of 
11%, over the 50 day window surrounding the filing date, which they conclude “indicates 
major short-term stock price movements relative to non-target firms.”  Clifford (2008) finds 
that firms targeted by hedge funds activists earn a median CAR of 1.74% around the filing 
date.  Klein and Zur (2008) find that hedge fund targets earn an abnormal return of 10.2% 
around the filing date.  They conclude that the abnormal return “suggests that, on average, 
the market believes activism creates shareholder value.”  Zur (2008) finds evidence that a 
portfolio of hedge fund targets earns statistically significant positive mean market-adjusted 
returns of 3.5%, 6.8% and 8.3% over the 5, 11 and 21 day windows respectively.  
Greenwood and Schor (2009) finds an abnormal return of 3.5% over the 15-day window 
around the initial activist targeting. 
The eventual outcome of the activist‟s campaign has been shown to have an impact on the 
magnitude of the abnormal return generated around the filing date of the 13D.  Klein and 
Zur (2008) also find that the stock market differentiates between successful and non-
successful activist campaigns.  They find a mean abnormal return for successful campaigns 
in which the activist achieves its objectives within one year of 10.7%, compared to 2.6% for 
campaigns that prove unsuccessful.  Greenwood and Schor (2009) finds announcement 
returns of 5% in instances in which an acquisition was announced or completed within 
eighteen months of the initial 13D filing.   Thus it appears that the stock market is efficient 
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in determining which activist hedge fund campaigns are likely to be successful over the 
medium to long term. 
The reason for targeting given by the hedge fund on the 13D form has been shown to have 
an impact upon the magnitude of the announcement effect abnormal return.  Zenner et al, 
(2005) find that “the gains from activism are greater in situations where the hedge funds are 
directly involved in influencing the outcome of a pending takeover bid (such as pressuring 
for a higher premium) or making a bid directly to buy the company.”  Clifford (2008) also 
states that “much of the gains from aggressive activism are driven by the cases where the 
hedge fund requests that the firm sell off part of its assets or the entire firm.” He finds that 
firms targeted with a stated purpose of “Sell Assets or Firm” generate an additional 3.7% in 
event returns around the 13D filing date.  Greenwood and Schor (2009) find that hedge fund 
activists targeting non-takeover events only generate an abnormal return of over 2.4% 
percent, which is roughly half of that earned by targeted firms that are eventually taken 
over.  Furthermore, activist targeting that lead to a spinoff earn significantly positive 
announcement returns of 6.4%.  Klein and Zur (2008) find evidence that the stock market 
reaction is largest in situations in which the activist hedge fund hints at increasing its stake 
with the intention of buying the firm (mean abnormal return of 13.1%).  Greenwood and 
Schor (2009) also finds positive abnormal returns when “the activist indicates a desire to 
“engage management,” when the activist requests an asset sale or tries to block a merger, 
and when the activist wages a proxy fight.  These results would indicate that the stock 
market reacts positively to the news that an activist hedge fund is seeking to intervene in, or 
facilitate a takeover situation. 
As we highlighted earlier, activist hedge funds will target firms in order to change the 
corporate governance or strategic direction of the firm in the hope of unlocking improved 
share price returns.  Boyson and Mooradian (2007) find that firms targeted for corporate 
governance reform experience the largest stock price reactions.  Klein and Zur (2008) also 
find evidence that the abnormal return is large when the hedge fund is seeking for at least 
one seat on the board of directors (mean abnormal return of 12.6%).  However, Klein and 
Zur (2008) find that campaigns in which the hedge fund activist is seeking to change the 
strategic direction of the target, the abnormal return is much lower (mean abnormal return = 
4.3%).  Greenwood and Schor (2009) finds that “returns are not significantly different from 
zero when the activist targets capital structure issues, corporate governance, corporate 
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strategy, or proposes a spinoff.”  Thus it would appear that the area of focus of the hedge 
fund‟s targeting can have a large impact upon the magnitude of the abnormal returns 
generated around the filing date of the activist‟s Schedule 13D. 
Boyson and Mooradian (2007) examined whether the manner of targeting leads to a 
different announcement effect abnormal return and find evidence that the stock price 
performance is better for targets of aggressive activism than for firms targeted through other 
types of activism.  Furthermore, Clifford (2008) indicates that in instances where the 
blockholder switches from a passive to an active stance, the target firm generates a positive 
abnormal return of 1.87% surrounding the filing date.  Zur (2008) also finds that “my results 
also indicate that the announcement premium is positively related to whether the fund 
initiates a confrontational campaign against the target firm and reveals in the “purpose” 
section of the 13D that it intends to proactively influence management‟s future decisions.”  
These results would seem to indicate that the stock market reacts positively to the news that 
an aggressive activist is seeking to bring about change in the companies that they target.  
These results might also indicate why traditional mutual funds do not generate significantly 
large abnormal returns using „softer‟ activism techniques such as private negotiation.  
Finally, Brav et al, (2008) find an abnormal return of 7.2% over the 40 day window 
surrounding the activist hedge funds‟ Schedule 13D filings.  However, they explain that 
“about half of the total abnormal return, approximately 3.5%, is achieved during the ten 
days prior to filing.”  Furthermore, they document high abnormal share turnover during this 
pre-disclosure period. This leads them to conclude that “on average, information related to 
hedge fund activism appears to begin to be reflected in share prices and trading volumes 
before the Schedule 13D filing date.”   
A number of papers have looked into the impact of hedge fund activism over the longer 
term.  Clifford (2008) uses the calendar-time portfolio approach with the Carhart (1997) 
four factors to estimate long-run excess returns and finds an annualised average abnormal 
return of 22.32% in the year following the acquisition of a block by an activist hedge fund.  
Brav et al, (2008) use calendar time regressions to test the long term share price 
performance of firms targeted by hedge fund activists and conclude that “the short-term 
abnormal returns are not market overreactions. Instead, the price that incorporates the 
event-window abnormal returns is sustained during longer periods of time.”  Similar 
findings are found by Klein and Zur (2008) document sustained improvements in 
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shareholder value over the year after targeting for firms targeted by an activist hedge fund 
of 11.4%, compared to an abnormal return of 3.2% for their matched firm sample.  
Greenwood and Schor (2009) find an abnormal return of 10% over the 18month period 
following targeting by an activist.  They further find that “a large portion of these returns 
accrue in the [+3 months, +18 months] window.  Consistent with the short term results, 
Greenwood and Schor (2009) find evidence that instances where the activist tries to force a 
sale, or when they try to block a merger earn the largest abnormal returns.  They conclude 
that situations “in which an acquisition was announced or completed earn post-filing 
abnormal monthly returns of 25.85%, reflecting the takeover premium paid by the 
acquirer.”  These results would indicate that the impact of hedge fund activism is persistent 
over the longer term, and that hedge fund‟s do not necessarily take short term focussed 
strategies as they are accused of by some traditional mutual fund managers.45 
Impact on operating performance and strategy 
Similar to the research into shareholder activism by traditional mutual funds, the incumbent 
literature has also attempted to study the impact of activism by hedge funds into the 
operating performance of targeted companies.  Clifford (2008) finds evidence that targeting 
by activists leads to greater improvements in ROA than firms targeted by passivists.  
Boyson and Mooradian (2007) also find significant long term improvements in operating 
performance when measured by changes in ROA and Tobin‟s Q.  However, Greenwood and 
Schor (2009) find no significant change in ROA or operating ROA.   
Chapter 2 explained that activist hedge funds target companies which have high cash 
balances, or are under leveraged.  The aim is to force the company to increase leverage and 
increase dividends or other cash payouts to return unused cash to the shareholders. Boyson 
and Mooradian (2007) find that the ratio of cash as a percentage of assets for target firms 
decreases by 0.52% but increases by 0.55% for matching firms.  Klein and Zur (2008) 
document a fall in each of the industry-adjusted proxies for cash in hand46 that they analyse 
over the fiscal year following the 13D filing that indicates attention from an activist hedge 
fund.  They also document a significant decline in industry adjusted EBITDA/Assets ratio 
which is statistically different from the control sample.  They further find weaker evidence 
                                                   
45 See chapter 4 for our survey of mutual fund managers engagement policies and their view on hedge 
fund activists. 
46 Klein and Zur (2008) use Cash/Assets, Short-term Investments/Assets, and (Cash plus Short-term 
Investments)/Assets as proxies for cash in hand. 
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that cash flows from operations also declines. Finally, median industry-adjusted 
CFO/Assets declines by –0.1 and is significantly different than the change for the control 
sample.  These results indicate that cash flow and cash on the balance sheet falls at target 
firms in the year after targeting occurs.   
Klein and Zur (2008) also analyse the impact of hedge fund targeting on leverage at 
targeted firms.  They document significant increases in leverage at firms targeted by hedge 
funds for ach of the proxies for leverage ratio that they analyse.47 They suggest that the 
increase in leverage.  Greenwood and Schor (2009) also document evidence that surviving 
firms dramatically increase their leverage ratio by almost 40%.  Clifford (2008) finds 
evidence that targeting by activist hedge funds leads to increases in dividend yield of 0.24 
percentage points in the year following the acquisition of the block.  Klein and Zur (2008) 
analyse the impact on target firm dividends as a result of pressure from an activist hedge 
fund.  They document an increase in dividends per share of 11.2 cents per share.  This 
increase meant that dividends per share of targets in their sample of targeted firms almost 
doubled since the previous dividend.  Greenwood and Schor (2009) find no significant 
change the payout ratio of firms targeted by a hedge fund activist.  These results are 
consistent with the theory that activist hedge funds target cash rich or underleveraged 
companies in order to force them to raise cash payouts, such as dividends or share 
buybacks.  
Finally, incumbent activist hedge fund literature has looked at the impact on the asset base 
of target firms. Clifford (2008) documents larger decreases in total assets for firms targeted 
by activist blockholders than firms targeted by passivist blockholders, indicating greater 
asset divestitures. Klein and Zur (2008) analyse the impact of hedge fund activism on the 
asset base of targeted companies and find a decline in industry-adjusted assets within one 
year of targeting by an activist hedge fund.  They suggest that this decline indicates that 
target sell-off unwanted assets within one year of the activist‟s targeting.  Greenwood and 
Schor (2009) find no significant change in asset growth.  They do, however, find that 
capital expenditures scaled by property, plant, and equipment falls from 36.5% to 22.1% for 
the average firm in the sample.  These results are consistent with the findings of Brav et al 
                                                   
47 Total Debt/Assets ratio rises by 0.016 and the industry-adjusted ratio increases by 0.020. The average 
Long-term Debt/Assets increases by 0.024 and the industry-adjusted Long-term Debt/Assets increases by 
0.026. 
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(2008) that hedge firms often target companies in which they can attempt to change the 
strategic direction of the firm, such as in the sale of underperforming assets. 
The incumbent literature has shown that targeting by activist hedge funds can lead to 
significant improvements in target firms shareholder value and operating performance.  
Hedge funds are also successful in encouraging targeted firms to increase leverage and 
payout ratios in order to return unused cash to shareholders.  The abnormal return around 
the 13D filing date might also indicate that the market reacts positively to the news that a 
know activist is seeking to make changes at the company it targets.  Zur (2008) finds 
evidence that “a hedge fund that gains a reputation for industry-specific expertise earns 
higher excess returns around „day zero.‟”  He further explains that a “hedge fund can gain 
a reputation for being successful (and be rewarded by the market), and, conversely, can 
weaken its reputation by failing (and experiencing lowered market returns).” The results 
might also indicate that a more aggressive stance is required instead of the softer approach 
used by mutual fund investors if shareholder activism is to lead to improvements in target 
firm‟s performance. 
2.6 Conclusion from the literature 
2.6.1 Overall Impact of activism on target firms 
Evidence on the impact of activism on target firms is conflicting and depends upon the 
issues targeted and the methods used.  Activism by proposals tends to have a negative effect 
on shareholder value due to the negative signals that it sends to the market.  However, 
activism through focus lists or private negotiation often leads to value creation.  
Engagement usually has very little impact on target firms‟ operations.  There is little 
evidence of significant changes in operating performance, measured by operating efficiency 
variables.  There is a small impact on restructuring efforts by target firms, but there is no 
real change in capital expenditure.  Board composition is one area in which shareholder 
intervention has positive effects.  Boards generally become more independent and diverse 
once intervention occurs.  However, there is little evidence of significant changes in CEO 
turnover rates or executive compensation structures as a result of activist pressure. An 
underlying theme is also present in some articles.  Activism targeted against some minor 
issues appears to be used as a proxy for larger issues which are harder to target.  They might 
also be used to test the responsiveness on the target executives. 
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However, the existing literature does indicate that activism by hedge funds does lead to 
positive abnormal share price returns over both the short and long term.  Hedge fund 
activism also has a positive impact on operating performance, while there is strong evidence 
that activist hedge funds target cash rich, or underleveraged companies with the intention of 
forcing them to return the unused cash to shareholders.  This is borne out by the increase in 
leverage and reduction in cash balances at target firms in the year after the activist hedge 
fund targets the company. 
2.6.2 Limitations of existing research 
As previously stated, the existing research in this area is primarily focused on the US 
environment.  The differences in legal and market frameworks between the US and UK 
mean that the results of research in the US are not easily generalisable to an UK context. 
Despite the efforts of a number of researchers in the US over the past 20 years there remains 
a lot of ambiguity about the impact that activism has on the performance of target 
companies.  The lack of clarity not only stems from the different activism strategies48 
analysed but also from the confusing way in which the intended outcomes are presented.  In 
most of the articles, the data are not separated by either activism type or intended outcome.  
This makes it very difficult for the research and practitioner communities to extract clear 
and meaningful conclusions from the results. 
A further weakness of the extant research is the confusion and unreliability caused by the 
wide variation in event windows used to test the shareholder value performance.  These 
range from a few weeks (11 days in the case of the clinical study of Hermes Focus Fund) to 
a couple of years. However, the majority of the researchers use event windows ranging up 
to 90 days.  Based on the stock market efficiency argument, a short event window such as 
30 days could be justified as the abnormal returns identified over this period should be an 
indicator of the long term trend.  However, such a short event window fails to allow for lag 
effects or frictional forces in the market which could slow down the impact of activism and 
thus understate its long term impact. Of course, there is a trade-off between short and long 
event windows in that the latter could be impacted by contaminating events such as merger 
activity or other influences which need to be tightly controlled for, a challenging task. 
                                                   
48 Activism strategy means proposals, private negotiation or focus list targeting 
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The final area in which the existing literature is weak is that it presumes that as long as a 
positive abnormal return is generated, activism is conducive to shareholder welfare.  
However, the literature makes no effort to try and identify the costs associated with activism 
that will have to be absorbed by the activist investor.  Without an understanding of these 
costs, we may not know whether the activists realise net losses, once their private costs are 
taken into account.  For example, without an understanding of the cost to the investor, an 
abnormal return equating to £5million will look very positive. However, if the cost of acting 
was £6million, the true net gain from activism is misrepresented.  This lack of costing 
information possibly stems from the difficulty of obtaining this information from activists. 
But without the cost of activism being factored in, the reported value gains may overstate 
the true gains.  Thus the existing literature on shareholder activism has a number of 
weaknesses that represent sizeable gaps which this research should help to fill. 
2.6.3 Research Gaps 
The main area in which a contribution to knowledge will be made is in the analysis of 
activism within a European setting.  It will be one of the first studies of its type and should 
provide valuable large sample empirical evidence about the impact that engagement has on 
target performance in this region.  The only UK study so far is a clinical study of one UK 
activist and the narrow focus of this research means that the results won‟t be universally 
generalisable across UK institutional investors.  Furthermore, the activist hedge fund 
literature contains little analysis of the impact of activism of this nature at UK and EU 
companies.  There is isolated analysis of hedge fund activism aimed at specific takeover 
situations within the UK and EU.  However, there is no empirical study that expressly 
attempts to study the impact of hedge fund activism on a large sample of UK or EU targets. 
A further gap is the disparity between the analysis windows used in the previous research 
and the liability matching periods faced by institutional shareholders.  These institutions 
will have liabilities stretching out into decades and thus will be faced with long term 
holding periods, often in excess of 3 or 5 years.  Therefore simply analysing the impact of 
activism over a 20 day window is not going to provide indicative results of the long term 
benefits and this window needs to be lengthened to match the holding periods being used.  
Longer event windows are especially important for private negotiation where the exact 
activism event dates are unclear and the process often takes a long time to complete. 
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Finally, the existing institutional shareholder activism research takes a very close look at the 
impact of activism on executive compensation and on executive turnover rates, but very few 
papers look at the impact on how executive pay is linked to company performance as a 
result of activism.  This impact forms an integral part of the analysis to be conducted in this 
research. 
2.6.4 Research Aims 
The aim of the research is to assess whether shareholder activism makes a difference to 
corporate behaviour and performance, and creates value for shareholders. In order to carry 
out this assessment, its impact on the intermediate mechanisms outlined above must be 
investigated.   
These issues are expanded below: 
Define and identify various types of shareholder activism  
Due to the incipient nature of shareholder activism in the UK, some of the policies and 
strategies adopted in the US may not be available or suitable for use in this region.  
Therefore the engagement survey aims to investigate what types of activism are routinely in 
use in the UK and to understand the issues upon which UK institutional investors engage 
with their investees. 
Assess their frequency and intensity  
A subsequent aim of the research once the activism types have been identified is to assess 
how often they are used and analyse the contexts in which they are used.  This should 
provide a comprehensive picture of the activism framework within the UK and elucidate 
how investors frame issues, specify desired outcomes and choose activist strategies to 
achieve those outcomes. 
 Evaluate the impact of activism on structural and behavioural changes in investee 
companies 
Activism is designed to have an impact on the target companies‟ strategic choices, 
operations and governance structures. Therefore, a key part of the research is to investigate 
whether it has the desired effect.  The research will examine pre- and post- activism 
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governance structures and behaviour in target firms and compare the two to identify and 
measure significant changes that can be reliably and causally linked to activism.  
Evaluate the impact on efficiency and effectiveness of specific corporate decisions e.g. 
acquisitions and executive compensation   
One of the concerns that often ignite activism is investors‟ dissatisfaction with the corporate 
decision making process.  The research will identify whether target firms‟ practices in areas 
such as investment appraisal (acquisition and divestment) and sensitivity of executive 
performance to pay improve significantly after the target is subject to engagement by its 
investors. 
Evaluate the impact on overall operating performance and shareholder value creation. 
Ultimately the test of the impact of shareholder activism in the eyes of institutional 
investors is the impact on operating performance and shareholder value.  Thus the research 
will analyse the impact on target‟s accounting performance measures as well as the 
shareholder value gains over both short and long event windows. The long window is 
expected to be between 1 and 3 years depending upon data availability. 
Evaluate the impact of hedge fund activism on UK and EU targets firms. 
Hedge fund activism against UK and EU companies has been increasing in frequency over 
the past decade and the aggressive tactics used are designed to generate large shareholder 
value and operating performance gains.  Thus part of the research is to evaluate the impact 
of hedge fund activism on UK and EU companies over both the long and short term.  The 
research will analyse the impact on target firm shareholder value, as well as the target‟s 
operational performance, strategic direction, corporate governance and executive 
compensation structures. 
The research aims listed above knit together well to provide a rich understanding of the 
activism within the UK.  It will provide a good understanding of the types of activism and 
the circumstances in which it is deployed, as well as identifying the impact of these policies 
on important facets of the targets‟ performance.  It will also provide a contrast between the 
activism by traditional UK institutional shareholders and the new activism conducted by 
activist hedge funds. 
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2.6.5Research Questions 
The literature review has revealed a number of gaps in the extant literature, which this 
research aims to fill as explained in the previous section.  In order to fulfil this goal, a 
number of questions and hypotheses need to be framed. 
The main question that the research aims to address is whether, in the UK, there is a 
significant impact of shareholder activism on corporate performance and in target firms and 
shareholder value.  This broad question is split into a number of related questions: 
 What types of activism are used in the UK and how intensively are they pursued? 
 What are the motivating factors that make institutional investors activists? 
 What is the impact of shareholder activism on shareholder value? 
 What is the impact of shareholder activism on corporate performance? 
 What is the impact of shareholder activism on executive pay-to-performance 
sensitivity? 
o Is the compensation structure of executives more closely aligned with 
performance in targets post-activism than before? 
 What impact does activism have on target board structure?  
o Post-activism: is there any significant change in the make-up of the board of 
directors? 
o Post-activism: Is there improvement in the target firms‟ strategic decisions? 
 What impact does hedge fund activism on target company corporate performance? 
o Is there an impact on target firms‟ shareholder value or operating 
performance as a result of attention by a hedge fund activist? 
o Post-activism: Is there improvement in the target firms‟ strategic decisions, 
corporate governance or executive compensation? 
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Separate questions about the impact on corporate performance and on executive 
compensation are framed as activist policies may have an impact on one variable but not 
another or both.  The individual hypotheses are explained at the beginning of each empirical 
chapter.  The methodology that will be used to test answer these questions are outlined in 
the following section. 
2.7 Summary 
 This chapter reviews the existing literature base analysing the impact of shareholder 
activism by both traditional institutional investors and activist hedge funds on US target 
companies.  Evidence on the impact of activism on target firms is conflicting and depends 
upon the issues targeted and the methods used.  Activism by proposals tends to have a 
negative effect on shareholder value due the negative signals that it sends to the market.  
However, activism through focus lists or private negotiation often leads to value creation.   
The incumbent literature base also shows little impact on operating performance, strategy or 
corporate governance characteristics of target firms.  However, the confrontational targeting 
strategies of US activist shareholders are very different to the more friendly approach 
undertaken by UK institutional investors.  As such the findings of US research is not 
directly applicable to the UK environment.   
Thus far, only Becht et al (2008) look at the impact of activism by a UK institutional 
investor, the Hermes UK Focus Fund.  They find positive returns of up to 7% to activism by 
this investor over an 11 day window for a sample of 41 targets.  However, the clinical 
nature of this study, and the unique engagement approach used by Hermes, means that the 
results are not generalisable to the general UK investor universe.  Thus there is a substantial 
gap in the existing shareholder activism literature base. This is the gap I aim to fill in this 
research.  The following chapter outlines the test methodology I will employ.  
 
Appendix 2.1: Summary of Previous Research Results 
Research 
Authors 
Type of 
Activism 
Sample size 
and period 
Target 
Selection 
criteria 
Results 
Valuation (Shareholder 
Value) 
Accounting 
Performance 
Target Firm 
Structure 
Executive 
Compensation 
Other 
         Panel A: Activism by Institutional Investors      
         Akhigbe et 
al, (1997) 
(US) 
Shareholder 
Proposals and 
Negotiation 
144 firms, 
1985 - 1992 
Poor 
Corporate 
Governance 
23% positive abnormal return 
by end of 3rd year after 
activism occurred 
  Apparent 
improvement in 
targets, willingness 
to improve 
governance 
structures 
  No alteration in 
the risk profile of 
target firms after 
engagement 
Anson et al, 
(2004) (US) 
CalPERS 
engagement 
96 firms, 
1992 - 2001 
Poor stock 
price 
performance 
and low return 
on capital 
Small short term 
announcement effect of 0.26% 
rising to 11.99% after a period 
of 3 months.  Repeat 
proposals produce slightly 
higher returns on 0.33% and 
13.31% respectively 
  Improvement in 
corporate control 
frameworks post 
activism. 
  Coverage by 
more than ten 
analysts produces 
larger impact than 
coverage by 
fewer analysts.  
Large cap 
companies 
respond more 
effectively to 
targeting than low 
cap companies. 
Barber 
(2006) (US) 
CalPERS 
focus lists 
115 firms, 
1992 - 2005 
Stock price 
under 
performance 
0.23% market-adjusted return 
in short run.  Equivalent to 
$224m annual value creation 
or $3.1bn over 14 years.  32% 
long run abnormal return over 
5 years, equivalent to 2 week 
hardening period return of 
$10.5bn and $89.5bn over 5 
years 
  Some improvement 
in target firm 
shareholder rights.   
  Extent of 
abnormal return 
dependent upon 
the 'shock value' 
of the information 
contained in the 
focus list.  If prior 
knowledge of the 
components of 
the list is known, 
the market 
reaction will be 
smaller. 
Becht et al 
(2008)  
Private 
Negotiation 
41 firms by 
1 
Financial 
under-
Abnormal returns of up to 7% 
over the 11 day window 
Improvements in 
ROA and Market to 
Decline in employee 
numbers of up to 
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(UK) Institutional 
investor, 
1998 - 2004 
performance.  
Opportunity to 
make 20% 
return 
depending on the issue 
targeted 
Book over the two 
years after Hermes 
targeting.  Not 
statistically 
significant 
40% over the two 
years after Hermes 
pressure. Not 
statistically 
significant 
Carleton et 
al, (1998) 
(US) 
Private 
Negotiation 
by TIAA-
CREF 
45 firms and 
62 events, 
1992 - 1996 
Targets with 
high 
institutional, 
low insider 
ownership 
(improves 
likelihood of 
successful 
vote) 
Statistically significant return 
around targeting 
announcement date, no 
significant return around 
compliance date.  Valuation 
effects only short term 
No significant 
improvement in 
accounting 
measures as a result 
of targeting 
    Valuation effects 
highly related to 
the issues being 
raised, such as 
board diversity 
and accounting 
performance. 
Crutchley et 
al, (1998) 
(US) 
CalPERS 
engagement 
47 firms, 
1992 - 1997 
Poor 
Governance 
structure 
Return for 1 year after action 
not different from S&P500.  
1992 - 1994 sample, 
significant abnormal return of 
15% after one year.  1995 - 
1997 sample, significant 
negative abnormal return of 
19% after twelve months 
      Early CalPERS 
targeting structure 
very successful at 
obtaining desired 
value enhancing 
changes at target 
firms.  Latter 
policies not as 
effective and 
related to 
negative returns 
Daily et al, 
(1996) (US) 
Shareholder 
Proposals 
197 firms, 
1990 - 1993 
Targets 
selected 
depending on 
the number of 
board and 
executive 
compensation 
related 
proposals 
received 
No relation between 
shareholder value and the 
number of proposals received. 
    Proposals only 
slowed down rate 
of increase of 
executive 
compensation 
levels - didn't 
significantly 
change 
compensation 
structure. 
Targets of 
multiple 
proposals less 
likely to 
implement 
changes sought 
by activists. 
 
 
Del Guercio 
and 
Hawkins 
(1998) (US) 
Shareholder 
Proposals by 
leading 
activist 
pension funds 
125 firms 
and 266 
events, 
1987-1993 
Mainly 
specific 
governance 
issues but 
consideration 
given to 
No significant short term 
valuation effect except for 
board related proposals (19% 
short term abnormal return).  
No significant long term 
improvement in returns 
Response to poor 
performance by 
target no better than 
industry average 
Greater executive 
management 
turnover  
  Failure to respond 
to engagement 
leads to increased 
likelihood of 
takeovers.    
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performance.  
Selected to 
maximize 
fund value 
Del Guercio 
et al, (2008) 
(US) 
Just Vote No' 
campaigns 
92 firms, 
1996-2003 
Poor corporate 
governance 
Positive median 2.9% CAR 
associated with CEO turnover.  
Positive stock market reaction 
to campaigns targeting M&A 
activity. 
Improvements in 
operating ROA for 
firms targeted on 
strategy or 
underperforming 
CEO 
'Just vote no' 
campaigns 
successful in forcing 
companies to fire 
underperforming 
CEOs. 
  Just Vote No' 
campaign 
effective at re-
aligning 
shareholder and 
manager interests 
Dodd and 
Warner 
(1983) (US) 
Proxy Contest 96 proxy 
contests, 
1962 - 1978 
Corporate 
under 
performance, 
poor 
management 
structure 
Positive abnormal return of 
0.2% around announcement of 
proxy contest.  Small 
insignificant return of 0.1% 
for activists that fail to win the 
contest 
      Majority of the 
good or bad news 
surrounding the 
contest outcome 
largely 
anticipated by the 
market prior to 
the 
announcement.  
Share price 
reaction not 
permanent 
English et 
al, (2002) 
(US) 
CalPERS 
engagement 
47 firms and 
63 events, 
1992 - 1997 
Small firms, 
poor operating 
performance, 
underperformi
ng share price 
Statistically significant 
positive abnormal return of 
1.25% for single 
announcement targets.  No 
significant return for targets of 
repeated announcements.  
Significant positive abnormal 
returns of 52% for holding 
periods up to 5 years post 
event 
  Firms with repeat 
targeting fail to 
reform as desired by 
the activist 
  Removal of 
contaminating 
events still 
reveals positive 
effects of 
engagement 
Faccio and 
Lasfer 
(2002) 
(UK) 
UK pension 
fund activism 
- proposals 
289 firms, 
1995 - 1996 
Firms selected 
from LSE 
listing 
documents 
and pension 
fund 
ownership 
data to find 
firms with 
Pension fund proxy voting 
limits growth in firm value.  
Fall in abnormal return from 
63% to 19%.   
      No link between 
pension fund 
holding and firm 
value.   
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high pension 
fund equity 
ownership 
Forjan 
(1999) (US) 
Shareholder 
proposals 
467 firms, 
1076 events, 
1978 - 1991 
Various 
criteria 
ranging from 
corporate 
governance to 
accounting 
performance 
Negative 0.3% abnormal 
return for announcement date. 
2 day positive abnormal return 
of 0.6% for proposals settled 
early through negotiation 
      Less than 15% of 
proposals 
sponsored by 
'important 
shareholders' e.g. 
CalPERS.  
Sponsorship by 
insignificant 
shareholders less 
likely to obtain 
success 
Gillan and 
Starks 
(2000) (US) 
Shareholder 
Proposals by 
Institutional 
Investors 
452 firms 
and 2042 
events, 1987 
- 1994 
Various 
criteria 
ranging from 
corporate 
governance to 
accounting 
performance 
Insignificant return for 
shareholder proposals.  
Significant increased return of 
5% only for poison pill and 
cumulative voting proposals.  
Stock market reaction 
dependant upon issues 
targeted 
  Proposals by 'gadfly' 
investors received 
low institutional 
support with less 
likelihood of 
success 
  Non-coordinated 
activism has 
insignificant 
impact on target.  
Coordinated 
action by 
institutional 
investors has 
small but 
significant impact 
on shareholder 
value.   
Girard 
(2000) 
(UK/France
) 
Institutional 
Activism in 
UK and 
France 
79 firms in 
France 1989 
- 2000, 57 
firms in UK 
1992 - 2002 
Poor corporate 
governance 
and poor 
accounting 
performance 
 
    UK activists more 
likely to force 
through desired 
changes 
French activists 
obtain larger 
impact on 
compensation 
structures 
UK institutions 
more active than 
French 
counterparts 
Huson 
(1997) (US) 
Proposals and 
Negotiation 
18 firms, 
1990 - 1992 
Firms targeted 
solely for poor 
performance - 
first year 
CalPERS used 
solely this 
criterion. 
No significant change in 
abnormal returns from 
targeting based on acquisition, 
plant closure, discontinuance 
of operations, CEO change or 
general restructurings.  
Significant abnormal returns 
of 6% for divestiture 
announcements and joint 
  Intervention by 
CalPERS affects 
firm decision 
making and 
operational 
characteristics 
  Activism is 
merely the 
mechanism by 
which change is 
brought about and 
it is the change of 
strategy or policy 
that will lead to 
value creation. 
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venture announcements 
John and 
Klein 
(1995) (US) 
Social and 
Governance 
Proposals 
344 Events, 
1991 - 1992 
Corporate 
governance or 
social issues 
  Poor prior firm 
performance 
increases likelihood 
of receiving a 
corporate 
governance related 
proposal 
    Support for 
shareholder 
proposals 
dependent upon 
cost to investors 
of support 
Johnson 
and 
Shackell 
(1997) (US) 
Shareholder 
Proposals 
based on 
executive 
compensation 
106 firms 
and 169 
events, 1992 
- 1995 
Low sales 
growth, 
negative 
financial press 
coverage 
Political motivations (to 
satisfy external monitors such 
as government bodies) not 
shareholder wealth 
considerations main criteria 
for submitting executive 
compensation based 
proposals. 
    Shareholder 
proposals bear no 
relation to 
changes in the 
structure of 
executive 
compensation.  
Negative 
relationship 
between 
institutional 
holding and 
probability of 
receiving a 
compensation 
based proposal 
Structure of 
executive 
compensation and 
poor firm 
performance main 
reasons for filing 
a proposal 
Johnson et 
al, (1997) 
(US) 
Shareholder 
Proposals 
184 firms, 
1992 - 1995 
Targets 
subject of 
excessive 
compensation 
allegations by 
media and 
$1million+ 
pay levels 
    $1million dollar pay 
cap legislation in 
US not 
accomplished its 
goal 
Increase in total 
compensation 
levels due to 
increase in stock 
options.  Strong 
evidence of 
changes in pay-
to-performance 
sensitivity and 
firm performance 
linkages 
Shareholder 
pressure effective 
in slowing rise in 
compensation 
levels at target 
firms 
Karpoff et 
al, (1996) 
(US) 
Shareholder 
Proposals 
269 firms 
and 522 
events, 
1986/1990 
Large firms, 
low 
accounting 
measures 
(book-to-
market, higher 
Weak significant difference of 
0.5% around Wall Street 
Journal announcement date.  
Statistically significant 
negative return -1% around 
proxy mailing date.  
Targets still suffer 
low sales growth 
rates but assets grow 
closer to those of 
control group.  No 
link between 
Several firms 
underwent structural 
changes within one 
year of proposal 
announcement date, 
weak link with 
Probability of 
CEO turnover 
unrelated to 
reception of 
shareholder 
proposals over a 
Proposals with 
large voting 
support more 
likely to generate 
positive abnormal 
returns. 
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leverage), 
large 
institutional 
ownership 
(improves 
possibility of 
persuading 
other 
shareholders 
to vote in 
favour of the 
proposal) 
Successful proposals at 
meeting dates related with 
positive abnormal return of 
1% 
engagement 
persistence and 
return on sales but 
negative 
relationship between 
engagement 
persistence and 
return on assets  
engagement event. three year post- 
activism time 
scale. 
Gillan et al 
(2000) (US) 
Proposals and 
Negotiation 
1 firm case 
study, 1989 - 
1992 
Sears 
Roebuck  - 
poor financial 
performance, 
low stock 
return 
No significant stock price 
change around targeting 
announcement dates.  
Significant long term share 
price improvement post 
targeting by CalPERS.  Poor 
long run buy and hold return 
compared to pseudo portfolio 
  Improvement in 
decision making 
post- activism 
resulting in 
divestiture of ailing 
financial division. 
  Majority of 
announcements 
post- activism 
regarding strategy 
changes met with 
insignificant 
negative stock 
price movements. 
Nelson 
(2006) (US) 
CalPERS 
engagement 
91 firms and 
113 events, 
1990 - 2003 
Financial and 
stock market 
under 
performance 
Short term positive abnormal 
return of 2% from CalPERS 
targeting.  No evidence of 
long term persistence of 
"CalPERS Effect". 
      Targeting by 
large institutional 
investor such as 
CalPERS more 
likely to shock 
target 
management into 
reform. 
Nesbitt 
(1994) (US) 
Shareholder 
Proposals by 
CalPERS 
27 firms and 
47 events, 
1992 - 1998 
Negative 
abnormal 
return prior to 
events 
41% significant abnormal 
return over 5 years post 
CalPERS targeting.  Higher 
returns for targeting towards 
end of period than events at 
beginning of period 
      Support for 
shareholder value 
benefits of 
relationship 
investing as 
highlighted by 
previous research. 
Opler and 
Sokobin 
(1995) (US) 
Council of 
Institutional 
investors 
(CII) Focus 
Lists 
117 firms, 
1991 - 1994 
historically 
strong 
performers 
that suffered 
poor share 
price 
Mean abnormal gain of 12% 
post targeting equivalent to 
$40 billion abnormal dollar 
return.  CII focus list firms far 
outperformed benchmarks 
post activism events 
  Decline in 
acquisitions and 
increase in 
divestments post- 
engagement 
Top management 
turnover rates 
slow down 
  'Quiet' activism 
most effective 
method for 
generating 
abnormal returns 
(consistent with 
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performance 
prior to 
targeting 
relationship 
investing theory).  
Coordinated 
institutional 
activism more 
effective than 
isolated attempts 
Parthiban et 
al, (2001) 
(US) 
Various 
methods by 
institutional 
investors 
82 firms, 
574 
observations
, 1987 - 
1993 
Poor 
investment 
levels in R&D 
    Institutional 
Activism positively 
associated with 
R&D intensity.  
Institutional 
Ownership not 
correlated 
  SEC policy 
limiting areas 
upon which 
investors can act 
could be relaxed 
to encourage 
more activism. 
Prevost and 
Rao (2000) 
(US) 
Shareholder 
Proposals 
146 events, 
1988 - 1994 
Firms targeted 
solely by 
pension funds.  
Proposals 
targeting 
corporate 
governance 
issues 
CARs surrounding mailing 
dates negative but 
insignificant.  Significant 
negative two day returns (-
3%) for CalPERS and 
shareholder coalition sub 
samples.  Repeat proposals 
lead to significant large 
negative returns (-5%) around 
subsequent proposal dates 
Significantly 
negative long term 
decline in case of 
firms repeatedly 
targeted by activists.  
Small negative 
return for single 
proposal targets.  
(Exact accounting 
figures not 
presented) 
Firms targeted 
multiple times have 
weaker governance 
structures than those 
targeted only once. 
  Single proposal 
targets perform 
similar to peer 
group over 5 
years after 
targeting but 
those facing 
repeat proposals 
under perform 
over the same 
period 
Smith 
(1996) (US) 
Proposals and 
Negotiation 
51 firms, 
1987 - 1993 
Large firms, 
poor share 
price 
performance, 
high 
institutional 
shareholding.  
'Failing Fifty' 
group over 
period 
Targeting has no effect on 
target share price for group as 
a whole.  Successful proposals 
that change strategy induce 
insignificant positive returns 
(1%).  Unsuccessful proposals 
small negative (not published) 
or no abnormal return. 
Small evidence of 
improvements in 
operating 
performance over 
year surrounding 
targeting event.  
Significant 
reduction in 
undistributed cash 
flow after targeting.  
(Exact accounting 
figures not 
presented) 
In year post-
activism, significant 
increase in asset 
sales.  Small 
reduction in asset 
acquisitions. 
Targets suffer 
higher CEO 
turnover than 
control sample 
over event period.  
No marked effect 
on other 
management 
turnover.  
Proposals 
successful at 
improving 
governance 
Performance 
related proposals 
more successful 
than takeover 
related proposals 
Song and 
Szewzcyk 
(2003) (US) 
CII Focus List 
Targeting 
156 firms, 
1991 - 1993, 
1994 - 1996 
Poor 
Shareholder 
Value 
Negative BHAR of 46.2% 5 
moths prior to focus list 
publication.  Positive BHAR 
  Focus List firms 
more active in Debt 
market than 
  Pension funds 
hold significant 
equity holdings a 
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Performance of 14.6% 5 months post 
announcement and 38.9% 
BHAR compared to CII 
benchmark portfolio. 
benchmark firms.  
Focus List firms 
more likely to be 
involved in 
unsuccessful 
acquisitions 
year after focus 
list targeting.  
Small general 
increase on 
overall 
institutional 
shareholding after 
targeting.  
Negative Analyst 
reporting prior to 
focus lost 
announcements - 
little short term 
change after 
announcement of 
focus lists.  
Analysts see little 
benefit from 
targeting by focus 
lists over short 
term, but positive 
benefits over the 
long term 
Strickland, 
Wiles and 
Zenner 
(1996) (US) 
Proposals and 
Negotiation 
85 firms and 
216 events, 
1986 - 1993 
Large firms, 
low stock 
returns prior 
to targeting 
Average 1% abnormal return 
for firms that negotiate 
settlements.  No significant 
returns for mailing and 
meeting dates. 
  Proposals targeting 
physical target 
structure obtaining 
high level of voting 
support more likely 
to be adopted. 
  Targets with 
many 
shareholders and 
low insider 
ownership more 
likely to negotiate 
agreements, large 
institutional 
ownership more 
likely to get to 
voting stage 
Thomas and 
Cotter 
(2006) (US) 
Corporate 
Governance 
Proposals 
1454 events, 
2002 - 2004 
Large firms 
with high 
institutional 
ownership.  
Poor prior 
share price 
performance. 
Small, insignificant negative 
abnormal return as a result of 
proposal targeting 
    Positive 
relationship 
between 
executive 
compensation 
proposal and 
announcement 
Negative 
relationship 
between 
announcement 
effect CAR and 
level of 
institutional 
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effect abnormal 
return. 
ownership 
Wahal 
(1996) (US) 
Shareholder 
Proposals 
146 firms 
and 356 
events, 1987 
- 1993 
Poor stock 
price return 
prior to 
targeting 
No significant change in 
returns for group as a whole.  
Firms targeted by CalPERS 
letters and earliest targets 
small significant CAR of 
0.8%.  No 'dramatic' 
improvement in targets after 
targeting 
No significant 
improvement in 
accounting 
measures as a result 
of targeting by 
pension funds 
    Pension fund 
equity ownership 
share ranges from 
0.1% to 2%.  
Many firms 
require repeat 
targeting to force 
through desired 
changes.  Little 
variation in 
institutional 
holdings post-
engagement 
Wu (2004) 
(US) 
Focus Lists 
by CalPERS 
and public 
opinion 
(media) 
794 firms, 
1988 - 1995 
Poor 
governance 
and executive 
compensation 
structures 
    Reduction in board 
size and internal 
directors after 
activism.  
Management career 
progression linked 
more closely to 
performance 
Public opinion 
(media) targeting 
leads to 
restructuring or 
reduction of 
executive 
compensation in 
most cases 
Increased 
likelihood of 
external director 
appointment after 
engagement 
         Panel B: Activism by Hedge Funds 
              Boyson and 
Mooradian 
(2007) (US) 
Hedge Fund 
Activism 
397 firms and 
418 events, 
1994 - 2005 
High book to 
market ratio, 
small firms. 
Poor prior 
stock price 
performance 
Short term abnormal return of 
up to 11% in excess of the 
matched sample. 
Hedge fund 
targeting of capital 
structure and cash 
flow leads to 
improved operating 
performance 
 
  Hedge funds 
activists generally 
hold positions for 
around two years 
Brav et al, 
(2008) (US) 
Hedge Fund 
Activism 
882 firms, 
1059 events, 
2001- 2006 
Smaller 
market to 
book ratios, 
higher ROA, 
lower payout 
ratios, higher 
institutional 
ownership 
Abnormal return of 7.2% over 
the 20 day window after the 
13D filing.  Abnormal return 
continues over three year 
window for some samples.  
Reduces to zero over 9 
months for others. 
      Hedge funds 
often successful 
in achieving their 
desired outcome. 
Clifford Hedge Fund 2185 activist Poor prior Short term abnormal return of   Limited evidence of     
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(2008) (US) Activism hedge fund 
block 
holdings, 
1998 - 2005 
stock price 
performance.  
Higher cash 
balance.  Low 
market to 
book ratios. 
up to 2% around the filing 
date.  Over the long term, 
abnormal returns as high as 
22% as a result of hedge fund 
targeting 
higher evidence and 
higher cash payout 
rates 
Greenwood 
and Schor 
(2009) (US) 
Hedge Fund 
activism 
against 
takeovers 
811 firms and 
980 events, 
1993 - 2006 
Target firms 
involved in 
takeover 
situations 
Short term abnormal return of 
2.4% for firms announcing 
takeovers after an activist 
hedge fund purchases a stake.  
6.6% for firms announcing 
spinoffs 
  Fall in investment 
spending and large 
increase in leverage 
for firms targeted by 
hedge funds but not 
subsequently 
involved in 
takeover. 
  Hedge funds 
invest in small, 
undervalued 
companies with 
the aim of finding 
a buyer for that 
company 
Klein and 
Zur (2008) 
(US) 
Hedge Fund 
Activism 
194 firms, 
2003-2005 
Range of 
opportunities 
including 
merger 
opportunities, 
share 
buybacks and 
potential fir 
increased 
dividends 
10.3% percent abnormal stock 
returns during the period 
surrounding the initial 13D 
filing 
Decline in ROE, 
ROA and EPS over 
year following 
activist pressure 
Reduce cash 
balances and 
increase leverage by 
returning cash to 
shareholders 
  Hedge funds 
successful in 
obtaining their 
objectives in over 
60% of cases 
studied 
Zenner et 
al, (2005) 
(US) 
Hedge Fund 
Activism 
31 firms, 
2004-2005 
Low valuation 
multiples, 
poor share 
price 
performance, 
high cash, 
under/over 
leverage 
Target firms underperform 
market by around 5% over 9 
months prior to activist 
pressure.  Over perform by 
around 10% over 40 days after 
activist hedge fund targeting 
      Larger returns 
when hedge funds 
target M&A 
transactions 
Zur (2008) Hedge Fund 
Activism 
695 
investments 
by 117 activist 
hedge funds, 
1994 - 2006 
Small firms, 
low market to 
book ratios.  
Targeting 
usually 
against firms 
strategy or 
corporate 
governance 
Abnormal returns of up to 
8.3% over 20 day window 
surrounding hedge fund 13D 
filing 
      Positive 
relationship 
between activist's 
reputation and 
success of 
campaign 
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Appendix 2.2: Summary of research methodologies 
Study Characteristics Methodology 
Study Type of Activism Sample size Sample Period Control Group Event Windows 
Used Selection Criteria Short Run Long Run 
        Panel A: Activism by Institutional Investors      
        Akhigbe et al, 
(1997) (US) 
Shareholder Proposals and 
Negotiation 
144 firms 1985 – 1992 YES Size match based on 
CRSP monthly tapes 
 3 years 
Anson et al, (2004) 
(US) 
CalPERS engagement 96 firms 1992 - 2001 NO   Up to 6 months  
Barber (2006) (US) CalPERS Focus Lists 115 firms 1992 - 2005 NO   31 days 1 - 5 years 
Becht et al (2008)  
(UK) 
Private Negotiation 41 firms by 1 
Institutional investor 
2002 - 2005 NO   11 days 2 years for operating 
performance and 
firm strategy 
Carleton et al, 
(1998) (US) 
Private Negotiation by 
TIAA-CREF 
45 firms and 62 
events 
1992 – 1996 NO   2 days 3 years 
Crutchley et al, 
(1998) (US) 
CalPERS engagement 47 firms 1992 – 1997 YES Firm size, ownership 
structure, managerial 
actions 
 Up to 12 months 
Daily et al, (1996) 
(US) 
Shareholder Proposals 197 firms 1990 – 1993 NO    4 years 
Del Guercio and 
Hawkins (1998) 
(US) 
Shareholder Proposals by 
leading activist pension 
funds 
125 firms and 266 
events 
1987 – 1993 YES Industry, size, prior 
accounting 
performance 
2 days 2 - 3 years 
Del Guercio et al, 
(2008) (US) 
Just Vote No' campaigns 92 firms 1996-2003 YES 2-digit SIC, operating 
ROA in previous year 
2 days  
Dodd and Warner 
(1983) (US) 
Proxy Contest 96 proxy contests 1962 - 1978 NO   60 days  
English et al, (2002) 
(US) 
CalPERS engagement 47 firms and 63 
events 
1992 - 1997 YES Size, book-to-market 
ratio, listed on CRSP 
2 days 1 - 5 years 
Faccio and Lasfer 
(2002) (UK) 
UK pension fund activism – 
proposals 
289 firms 1995 - 1996 YES Industry and size  2 years 
Forjan (1999) (US) Shareholder proposals 467 firms, 1076 
events 
1978 - 1991 NO   Up to 3 months  
Gillan and Starks 
(2000) (US) 
Shareholder Proposals by 
Institutional Investors 
452 firms and 2042 
events 
 
1987 – 1994 NO   31 days  
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Girard (2000) 
(UK/France) 
Institutional Activism in 
UK and France 
79 firms in France, 
57 firms in UK 
1989-2000 in 
France, 1992-
2002 in UK 
NO   Descriptive report Descriptive report 
Huson (1997) (US) Proposals and Negotiation 18 firms 1990 – 1992 YES Industry, size, 
performance 
 5 years 
John and Klein 
(1995) (US) 
Social and Governance 
Proposals 
344 Events 1991 - 1992 NO   No shareholder value 
analysis 
No shareholder 
value analysis 
Johnson and 
Shackell (1997) 
(US) 
Shareholder Proposals 
based on executive 
compensation 
106 firms and 169 
events 
1992 – 1995 YES Same 4 digit SIC code 
and opening period 
equity value 
 3 years 
Johnson et al, (1997) 
(US) 
Shareholder Proposals 184 firms 1992 – 1995 NO    5 years 
Karpoff et al, (1996) 
(US) 
Shareholder Proposals 269 firms and 522 
events 
1986 / 1990 YES Industry and size 2 days  
Gillan et al (2000) 
(US) 
Proposals and Negotiation 1 firm case study 1989 - 1992 NO   2 days 4+ years 
Nelson (2006) (US) CalPERS engagement 91 firms and 113 
events 
1990 - 2003 NO   6 days  
Nesbitt (1994) (US) Shareholder Proposals by 
CalPERS 
27 firms and 47 
events 
1991 - 1998 NO    4+ years 
Opler and Sokobin 
(1995) (US) 
Council Institutional 
investors (CII) Focus Lists 
117 firms 1991 - 1994 YES Prior one year stock 
returns, book-to-
market ratio, industry 
 2 years 
Parthiban et al, 
(2001) (US) 
Various methods by 
institutional investors 
82 firms, 574 
observations 
1987 - 1993 NO   Regression analysis 
using 574 firm years 
worth of data 
 
Prevost and Rao 
(2000) (US) 
Shareholder Proposals 146 events 1988 - 1994 YES Industry and size 2 days 3 years 
Smith (1996) (US) Proposals and Negotiation 51 firms 1987 - 1993 NO   2 days 1 year 
Song and Szewzcyk 
(2003) (US) 
CII Focus Lists 156 firms 1991 - 1996 YES industry, firm size 
(with 20% equity 
market value), and 
prior performance 
 1 - 5 years 
Strickland, Wiles 
and Zenner (1996) 
(US) 
Proposals and Negotiation 85 firms and 216 
events 
1986 – 1993 YES Firm size, book-to-
market ratio, 
governance structures, 
prior 2 year stock 
returns 
2 days 3 years 
Thomas and Cotter 
(2006) (US) 
Corporate Governance 
Proposals 
1454 events 2002 - 2004 NO   Up to 21 days  
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Wahal (1996) (US) Shareholder Proposals 146 firms and 356 
events 
1987 – 1993 NO   7 days 1 year 
Wu (2004) (US) Focus Lists by CalPERS 
and public opinion 
794 firms 1988 – 1995 YES Firm size and 4 digit 
SIC code 
 2 years 
        Panel B: Activism by Hedge Funds   
 
  
        Boyson and 
Mooradian (2007) 
(US) 
Hedge Fund Activism 13D 
filings 
397 firms and 418 
events 
1994 - 2005 YES 2-digit SIC and book-
to-market match 
Up to 50 days 1 year 
Brav et al, (2008) 
(US) 
Hedge Fund Activism 13D 
filings 
882 firms, 1059 
events 
2001-2006 YES 2-digit SIC and book-
to-market match 
40 days Up to 3 years 
Clifford (2008) (US) Hedge Fund Activism 2185 activist hedge 
fund block holdings 
1998 - 2005 YES Passive hedge fund 
block holdings 
4 days 3 years 
Greenwood and 
Schor (2009) (US) 
Hedge Fund activism 
against takeovers 
811 firms and 980 
events 
1993 - 2006 YES Surrogate portfolio 
calculated from four 
factor model 
15 days 2 years 
Klein and Zur 
(2008) (US) 
Hedge Fund Activism 194 firms 2003-2005 Yes 2 control portfolios 
(1) Industry and size 
match. (2) Non hedge 
fund activist targets. 
up to 60 days  
Zenner et al, (2005) 
(US) 
Hedge Fund Activism 31 firms 2004-2005 NO   3 months  
Zur (2008) Hedge Fund Activism 695 investments by 
117 activist hedge 
funds 
1994 - 2006 NO   Up to 20 days  
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Chapter 3 Methodology and Data 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter outlined the existing theory surrounding shareholder activism, along 
with the aims of my research.   The impact of shareholder activism in the UK is tested with 
a sample of activist initiatives by UK institutional investors against companies listed on the 
UK London Stock Exchange over the time period from 2002 – 2007.  UK institutional 
shareholders only began to publish voting and engagement records from 2002, consistent 
with the introduction of the ISC‟s Statement of Principles in the same year.   Targeting by 
activist hedge funds is excluded from the samples for the analysis in part II of this thesis.  
However, the impact of hedge fund activism is analysed in part III.  I outline the process for 
selecting the sample of hedge fund interventions in chapter 8.  In this section I outline the 
process that I follow to select the sample of firms that were targeted by shareholder 
activists.  
3.2 Shareholder Engagement Survey 
I conduct a qualitative survey of UK institutional investors in order to obtain an 
understanding of the shareholder engagement arena within the UK and guide the focus of 
the empirical analysis. My chosen method takes the form of interviews conducted with a 
selected group of managers from fund management organisations preceded by a 
questionnaire made available to a much larger group of institutional investors that form the 
membership of the four industry associations that make up the Institutional Shareholders 
Committee (ISC).  A pilot test of the questionnaire was carried out with the ISC steering 
panel members.  The finalised questionnaire was subsequently mailed to the respondents 
out on our behalf by the ISC to institutional investors that they had identified as having an 
engagement programme.  I didn‟t target institutions that weren‟t identified as „engaged 
investors‟ because I focused this part of the research on obtaining information about the 
depth and focus of engagement in the UK.  The questionnaire was sent to 43 organisations, 
from which I received 13 responses (30%).  A copy of the questionnaire is attached in 
Appendix 3.3.   
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The questionnaire allowed me to find out general information from the ISC member bodies‟ 
constituents about the types of engagement that they conduct.  It also allowed me to find out 
information, such as the issues that they routinely target as well as the processes they use 
when engaging with companies.  Interviews were then carried out with four respondents.  
These sessions provided much more detailed information regarding the types of engagement 
that they are undertaking, as well as the techniques that they use to gauge the effectiveness 
of their engagement efforts.   
The interviews were also used to explore in more depth any of the interviewees prior 
questionnaire responses in which I felt further explanation was necessary.  For instance, one 
questionnaire respondent indicated that they would use focus lists as part of their 
engagement process.  When asked about this in the interview, the respondent clarified their 
response by stating that the focus list was an internal document and not a published list such 
as those issued in the US by CalPERS.  I also used the interviewees to ask the interviewees 
about their views about other aspects of the shareholder engagement arena in the UK, such 
as the growth of hedge funds as activists and the future of the engagement arena.  This 
allowed me to gain an insight into how the institutional investors that were actively 
engaging with investee companies expected the arena to evolve in the future. 
The main advantage of this type of survey is that it enables information to be elicited from a 
very wide variety of institutional investors via the questionnaire,49 as well as a very deep 
understanding from a small group of investors via the interviews.  It is also a method that 
we were able to conduct quite quickly, especially when compared to the ethnographic 
alternative.  Thus it fulfilled the requirement that I needed to conduct the survey quickly in 
order for the main empirical study to get underway.  Finally, this methodology categorised 
the information obtained from the questionnaire in such a way that it could easily use it to 
inform the empirical analysis.  I used information regarding the types of issue targeted, as 
well as the engagement strategies used to decide upon the samples for use in the empirical 
analysis as presented in section II. 
A study of this type did have some potential problems attached to it.  Firstly, the response 
rate of questionnaire respondents can be low.  Institutional investors are very busy, which 
could have limited their willingness to provide responses to the survey.  They might also 
have been unwilling to divulge commercially sensitive information about their engagement 
                                                   
49 Upon viewing the results of the 13 questionairres, the ISC steering panel members were happy that the 
respondents covered a good cross section of the engaged UK institutional investor universe. 
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process, especially in the case of the specialist engagement institutions.  However, since this 
research is supported by the ISC of which the sponsoring organisation, the NAPF, is a 
member I expected a reasonably high response rate.   
Secondly, the questionnaire approach was a little inflexible in that it required the same 
questions to be answered by all potential respondents.  Depending upon their investment, 
and engagement, policies, some of the questions asked might not have be relevant to all 
respondents and we observed a number of responses in which questions were left 
unanswered, particularly those surrounding engagement performance evaluation.  This had 
an impact upon the usability of some of the information gained.  However, as the survey 
data was not directly used in the empirical study, this was not a serious issue.  To a limited 
extent, the interviews helped me fill in some of the gaps in responses due to the 
inappropriateness of the questions.   
An alternative approach to the survey-cum-interview methodology was to use an 
ethnographic study of the fund managers.  Ethnography, which stems from the field of 
anthropology, is a research process in which the researcher integrates himself into the 
environment of the subjects they are observing.  A famous example was the study 
undertaken by Andrew Pettigrew in which he studied the ICI Corporation for a period of 
nine years (Pettigrew, 1985).  It can be a very valuable tool when the researcher is 
attempting to identify relationships, interactions between subjects and their behaviour 
within the research environment.  It also has benefits when the research is aimed at studying 
change strategies, or subtle organisational differences which are impossible to track without 
deep integration into the subject environment.  Primarily, the major gain from using 
ethnography is the depth of detail and understanding that is obtained surrounding the 
subject under study.  In the case of shareholder engagement, ethnography would provide 
rich and deep knowledge surrounding every aspect of the engagement process, from the 
policies used and areas targeted, to the parties interacting and the effectiveness of the 
communication between subjects.  In my context, it could provide an in-depth analysis of 
the shareholder engagement process in the UK. 50   
                                                   
50 The clinical study of the HUKFF by Becht et al (2008) in part used a form of ethnography in that the 
researchers attended some of the fund‟s engagement meetings with targeted companies and had access to 
confidential documents pertaining to the engagements studied.  However, I was trying to study a much 
larger engagement.  However, use of ethnography by my study might simply have led to replication of the 
Becht et al (2008) study, which would have been of limited contribution to the engagement literature. 
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However, the nature and intensity of the ethnographic process also poses a number of 
limitations for the small exploratory study that was undertaken for this research project.  
Firstly, it is a very intensive process that requires in depth integration into the subject‟s 
organisation (Hammersley, 1992).  Shareholder engagement is usually performed by a 
number of institutions, while the targets are often a wide range on investee companies.  In 
this instance, it would have been impossible for us to research even a small set of 
institutions and companies.  Secondly, for ethnography to fully illustrate the engagement 
process, it needs to be undertaken over the long term.  The timescale for my entire project is 
2 years, with the bulk of that time being used for the empirical work, thus making 
ethnography an unrealistic research methodology for the intended research.  Finally, an 
ethnographic approach would be intrusive and demanding of the subjects‟ time and 
resources.  It is highly unlikely such demands would be met.   
Overall, an approach utilising both questionnaires and interviews is a natural methodology 
given the information sought.  It allows for a broad understanding of the investment 
institutions‟ activist practices, as well as deeper probing of issues via interviews with 
„activist‟ institutions. 
3.3 Empirical Analysis Sample Selection 
Shareholder activism in the UK is markedly different from that in the US in many respects, 
which makes sample selection difficult.  Shareholder activism in the UK is a relatively new 
phenomenon and this presents challenges to building a meaningful sample. My first step is 
to define the types of shareholder activism that we seek to analyse in this study.  From an 
analysis of UK government commissioned research51, industry body reports52 and 
discussions with the ISC members, I settle on three types of activism: targeted voting, 
private negotiation and shareholder resolutions submitted by institutional investors. 
I compile three samples of companies based on activism type and targeted by activists over 
the period 1st January 2002 to 30th June 2007.  I compile a sample of 595 companies 
targeted by voting (against or abstentions) at 1668 of their annual general meetings (AGMs) 
and extraordinary general meetings (EGMs); a sample of 172 companies that were targeted 
                                                   
51 The Myners Review of Institutional Investment, Paul Myners, 2000, 
http://archive.treasury.gov.uk/pdf/2000/myners.pdf.   
52 Pension Funds' Engagement with Companies 2006, www.napf.co.uk and Fund Managers Engagement 
with Investee Companies, http://www.investmentuk.org  
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249 times by activist institutions through private negotiation; and a sample of 29 companies 
that faced 29 EGMs requisitioned by activist institutions. 
Voting Sample 
Unlike in the US53, UK institutional investors are not obliged to disclose in detail their 
proxy voting for each meeting voted.  As a result, most institutions either refuse to disclose 
publicly their voting activities, or only make a summary available on their websites which 
merely state the number of meetings voted at and the proportion of votes voted for, against 
(resolutions) or abstentions from voting by the investor.  This level of detail provides no 
meaningful basis for my analyses.  However, at the time of sample selection 16 institutions 
made detailed voting records available on their websites. Using these voting records over 
2002 to June 2007, I build a sample of 595 companies and 1668 of their Annual General 
Meetings (AGMs) or Extraordinary General Meetings (EGMs) at which these 16 
institutional investors either abstained on or voted against one or more resolutions.  I don‟t 
include meetings where the institutional investors voted for the resolutions as this is not a 
direct form of shareholder activism and is indirectly accounted for in my control group of 
companies where I assume they haven‟t been subject to votes against or abstentions by 
institutional investors.54 Thus, their control firms‟ AGMs and EGMs will be meetings at 
which institutional investors voted for the resolutions. Some sample companies were only 
targeted once throughout the sample period, whilst others were targeted more than once.  As 
a result, the average number of meetings per company is 2.8.   
I split the voting sample into a number of subsamples based on the types of issues targeted, 
as well as the nature of the votes cast by the investors.  I measure shareholder activism by 
the voting behaviour at AGMs and EGMs, as well as votes against the resolution, and where 
the investor abstained from voting on a resolution.  I classify the sample by the meeting 
type because we believe that voting at an EGM is a more severe form of activism than 
voting at and AGM.  Usually, EGM resolutions have already been defeated at an AGM.  
Alternatively, they might be on issues of major significance for the company‟s future, such 
as a takeover or major asset sale.  On the other hand, AGM voting is usually taken on more 
routine resolutions, such as re-election of board members or adopting the accounts for the 
financial year.  I also look at voting type (against vs. abstention) because we believe that a 
                                                   
53 Rule 30b1-4, Investment Company Act of 1940 adopted April 2003, 
http://www.sec.gov/about/laws/ica40.pdf . Accessed 15th March 2006. 
54 See the following section regarding how we select our control samples. 
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vote against is a more aggressive activism tactic than abstaining from voting.  To abstain 
implies that the shareholder is   not happy with the resolution, but that with small changes it 
could be passed (such as abstaining on the remuneration report due to insufficient 
disclosure, a common abstention vote in our sample).  However, to vote against a resolution 
means that the shareholder is firmly against the proposal (such as appointing a non-
independent director for an independent board role).  In this instance, I expect the impact on 
the company to be larger.   
I also subsample by the number of issues targeted at each meeting, as well as by the number 
of times that the company is targeted over the sample period.  I regard a firm targeted on 
more than one issue (such as board structure and remuneration) to evoke more serious 
concern than a company targeted on only one issue at a meeting.  Similarly, I regard 
companies that are targeted repeatedly to have deeper routed problems than a company only 
targeted once over the sample period.  As such, I expect the firms targeted repeatedly, or on 
more than one issue, to have worse performance than those targeted only once or on one 
single issue at a time.  I report shareholder value improvements for each of these 
subsamples in our results. 
Private Negotiation 
Selecting a sample of firms targeted by private negotiation is, not surprisingly, even more 
difficult.  The secretive nature of this type of activism means that only a fraction of this type 
of events has related information available in the public domain.  I, therefore, have to rely 
again on institutional investors‟ published engagement reports detailing the companies they 
engaged with over the sample period, along with the issues of concern.  These engagement 
reports outline engagement between the institutional investor and the target company that 
occurred in the form of private meetings.  I only include examples of engagement that is 
instigated by a problem falling into one of three groups of issue; corporate governance, 
executive compensation or company strategy.  Routine engagement is not included in the 
sample.  Using published engagement reports from institutional investor websites, I am able 
to create a sample of 172 companies targeted 249 times by activist institutions.  However, 
the engagement reports only report the quarter of a year in which the engagement took 
place, thus precluding the precise identification of event dates for use in an event study. 
Shareholder Resolutions  
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Finally, I select a sample of 29 companies that faced a resolution submitted by activist 
institutional shareholders over the sample period 2002 to June 2007.  These are selected 
from company regulatory news records from the Perfect Filings database.  All shareholder 
communications of this type are publicly disclosed by the proposal sponsor, or recipient.  
All of the resolutions concern the board structure of the target company.  This resolution 
sample is then matched with a control sample as described in the following section. 
3.4 Methodology 
I measure the effect of institutional activism using a number of metrics.  I analyse the 
impact on the target company‟s shareholder value as well as on the operational 
characteristics of the targeted companies.  The empirical tests utilised are explained in the 
following sections. 
3.4.1 Shareholder Value 
I analyse the impact on the company‟s share prices over both the short and long term.  To 
analyse the impact on the short term stock price reaction, I use 3 day (-1, +1), 7 day (-3, +3) 
and 11 day (-5, +5) windows centred on the announcement date, Day 0.  Over the longer 
term, I measure the impact on shareholder value using 1 year (+1, +12 month), 2 year (+1, 
+24) and 3 year (+1, +36) windows.  Share price data is extracted from Datastream. 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Over the short term, I measure the impact on shareholder value by calculating cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs).  I use the date of the meeting as the event date (Day 0) for the 
voting samples.  For the shareholder resolutions sample, I also use the dates at which the 
EGM was requisitioned and the date the proxy form was mailed to shareholders as 
additional event dates (see Wahal, 1996; Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1998 for a similar 
approach).  The reason for analysing the value effects of these additional dates is to measure 
any stock market movement around the prospect of an EGM vote.  The stock market might 
react to the news that the issues at the target company are likely to be addressed by the 
shareholders that have requisitioned the EGM rather than wait for the EGM itself.  I 
calculate the abnormal return using the following formula: 
ARit = Rtit − Rbit           (1) 
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where Rtit is the target firm return and Rbit is the return on the selected benchmark
55 over the 
same period.  Cumulative abnormal returns are calculated by summing the abnormal 
returns:  
T
t
iTiT ARCAR
1
.         (2) 
For firms targeted more than once over the sample period, I calculate further CARs for each 
sequential targeting to analyse the stock market reaction to repeat targeting.  I also calculate 
median CARs and the percentage of abnormal returns that are positive as non parametric 
tests of the impact of activism on shareholder value in the short term.  In order to test the 
statistical significance of the returns, I calculate t-statistics for the mean CARs, as well as 
the Wilcoxon z-statistic for the median CARs.  The p-values for these statistics are reported 
in the tables alongside the mean and median CARs.   
CARs are calculated for the short term window because the abnormal return is calculated 
daily, then summed and averaged to give mean and median cumulative abnormal returns.  
However, over the long term Barber and Lyon (1997) highlight a problem with CARs as a 
long term event study model.  CARs are a biased predictor of long-run buy and hold 
abnormal returns because they mis-estimate the returns.  CARs ignore the effect of 
compounding because returns are calculated periodically (daily or monthly) and summed to 
give the CAR for the event window under analysis.  As such, they mis-represent the true 
size of the abnormal return.  Therefore, the CAR methodology is accurate for the short term 
analysis, but would inaccurately estimate abnormal returns over our longer term window.  
Barber and Lyon (1997) prefer the Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns (BHARs) event study 
model for analysis over longer periods. 
Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns 
I calculate buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs) to test the shareholder value impact 
over the long term (Barber and Lyon 1997; Lyon et al 1999).  For the voting samples, I 
calculate BHARs from the time of the final targeting in cases of repeat targeting.  Using the 
event date of the final targeting ensures that the abnormal returns capture the cumulative 
effect of by each individual targeting in the sequence.  As such it also reports the long term 
impact on shareholder value from the completed activism process. 
                                                   
55 See the following section for a description of the various benchmarks that I use. 
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I calculate the BHAR as the holding period return on the stock, Rt, minus the holding period 
return on the benchmark Rb: 
)1()1(
1
,
1
,
T
t
ti
T
t
tii RbRtBHAR       (3) 
where T is the holding period with t=1, …., T. 
These returns are then value weighted and summed to get the mean return for this portfolio: 
N
i
ii BHARwBHAR
1
        (4) 
Where wi is the market value weight of the sample firm i. 
I report t-statistics and Wilcoxon z-statistics for significance of the mean and median 
BHARs.  The main advantage of BHARs is they measure the abnormal returns by 
mimicking the investment strategy of buying the security at the activism date, and selling at 
the end of the one, two or three year holding periods.  Thus they are a more suitable proxy 
for the investor‟s long holding period returns (Barber and Lyon; 1997).  The second benefit 
of BHARs is that the effects of compounding are included within the calculation.  Barber 
and Lyon (1997) note that if the security returns are more volatile than the market, CARs 
will overestimate the abnormal return relative to that calculated using the BHAR 
methodology.  As a result, BHARs will be more accurate.  However, there are also 
problems associated with BHARs.  Barber and Lyon (1997) notice that BHARs test 
statistics can be biased where market indices are subject to rebalancing and new listing 
biases.  Conversely, when size and industry matched control firms are used as the 
benchmark, the test statistics are well specified.  However, Mitchell and Stafford (2000) 
argue that BHAR method often assumes independence among the event observations, 
inflating the abnormal returns even when no true abnormal return might be present.  As a 
result, they prefer the calendar time regression approach as outlined in the following 
section. 
Calendar Time Analysis 
Mitchell and Stafford (2000) argue that a calendar time regression (CTRG) model gives a 
more accurate indication of the long term performance of firms targeted by an event.  
BHARs can inaccurately specify the abnormal returns exhibited by targeted firms where 
overlapping of events might occur.  This could be a problem for my study, especially for 
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firms that have been targeted repeatedly over the sample period.  I try to moderate the effect 
of this problem in the BHAR methodology by only measuring the long term impact from 
the time of the final targeting in the sequence for all targeted firms.   
However, I also calculate CTRG as an additional check of the long term performance for 
targeted firms.  To do this, the calendar time portfolio returns are calculated monthly for 
firms targeted by an activist institution.  The returns from this portfolio are then regressed 
onto one of two multi-factor models, namely the Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997) 
three and four factor models respectively.  These benchmarks are outlined further in the 
following section.  The alpha reported by these regressions is the mean monthly abnormal 
return over the selected test window. 
Loughran and Ritter (2000) state that clustering of events (or a „hot‟ and „cold‟ period in 
which activism occurs) can lower the power in detecting abnormal returns for event firms.  
In order to limit this problem, calendar months are weighted by the number of targeting that 
occur (Kothari and Warner, 2006). 
I further test for the long term impact of activist targeting using the calendar time portfolio 
returns (CTPR) approach.  Mitchell and Stafford (2000) advocate the CTPR approach over 
that of the CTRG because it has sufficient power to detect abnormal performance relative to 
the CTRG approach.  The CTPR are calculated using the same multi-factor benchmarks as 
used in the CTRG model. 
GARCH (1, 1) 
As I have stated, the long term abnormal returns can be biased if the targeting events are 
clustered over calendar periods.  This can be a problem for measurement of targeting in the 
UK, especially for voting activity, because meeting dates tend to be clustered depending 
upon the annual reporting period of the listed firms.  For instance, the first quarter of the 
year can be a busy period for annual general meetings for companies with financial year 
ends towards the end of the previous year.  I account for this problem in the CTRG model 
by weighting the calendar months by the number of targeting.  However, as a robustness 
check, I further mitigate this problem using the GARCH (1, 1) model as advocated by 
Benou and Richie (2003).  The GARCH methodology allows for changes in the 
composition i.e. number of events of the portfolio across time that may affect the 
conditional volatility of the portfolio returns.  The results of this analysis are presented at 
the end of each results chapter and in the appendices that accompany the relevant chapters. 
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Portfolio Analysis 
Event studies cannot be used to analyse the impact on shareholder value from private 
negotiation due to the lack of identification of a defined event date in the institutional 
investor engagement reports.  A solution could be to use the mid point of the quarter of 
targeting as the event date and run an event study based on these dates.  However, this is 
less than ideal as the event dates so selected are arbitrary.  Instead I utilise a portfolio 
analysis approach to measure the returns to this type of activism.  A portfolio is formed by 
entering all firms targeted by institutional investors from the first day of the quarter in 
which the targeting occurred.56  A value weighted monthly return is calculated, with the 
portfolios rebased quarterly to account for new firms being targeted.  These returns are then 
compared to a benchmark return described below to obtain an abnormal return for these 
portfolios.  I estimate the p-values for t-statistics and Wilcoxon z-statistics for significance 
of the mean and median portfolio return.   
3.4.2Shareholder Value Benchmarks 
For both the short and long term event studies, as well as the portfolio analysis, I use a 
number of benchmarks.   
Control Groups 
Primarily, we use the control group methodology (Barber and Lyon, 1997).  I create a 
sample of companies matched to the activist target sample based on industry (2-digit SIC)57 
and size. The control firm must have market capitalisation within ± 20% of the target‟s 
market capitalisation 30 days prior to the first targeting. Where no match can be found, I 
relax the criteria slightly to ± 50% of the target‟s market capitalisation one year prior to the 
first targeting.  The return on the control firm is then subtracted from the return on the 
targeted firm to obtain the abnormal return for this target.  I make the assumption that if the 
control firms aren‟t on the voting or engagement reports for the 16 institutional investors 
which published records at the time of data collection they haven‟t been subject to 
targeting.58  For firms in the private negotiation sample, the, matching is carried out at the 
                                                   
56 For instance, if a firm is targeted in Q1 2005, the firm is entered into my portfolio on the 1st January 
2005 and held in the portfolio for the duration of the holding periods. 
57 I use the 2-digit SIC code for the match due to the small number of listed UK firms.  Most US research 
uses a 3-digit SIC match.  However, in this study I have some 3-digit industry groups in which all firms 
are targeted by an activist.  Therefore, 2-digit SIC matches allows a suitable control firm to be found.  
58 This is a limitation of my study because I cannot be sure that they haven‟t been subject to such targeted 
voting without access to exhaustive voting records for all institutional investors holding a stake in those 
companies.  I assume that our samples are a representative set of UK institutions as a whole.  As a further 
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start of the quarter in which they are targeted.  If an adequate match cannot be selected, the 
target firm is removed from the sample.  Twenty three companies were removed from the 
analysis as a result of a lack of an adequate control firm. 
The assumption behind this process is that the control group has the same systematic and 
unsystematic risk profiles as the sample firms, but the control firms are not subject to the 
event under study (Brown and Warner, 1980).  Inadequate control groups may be a further 
contributing factor to the inconsistency reported in existing research that uses event study 
analysis as many of the prior studies analysing shareholder activism do not use control 
portfolios or use inadequate matching characteristics. (Strickland et al, 1996; Akhigbe et al, 
1997; Gillan et al, 2000; Wu, 2004).  See Appendix 2.1 for a summary of the matching 
methods used by existing research.   
The limitation of my control methodology assumption forces me to test a number of 
alternative benchmarks.  For the short term, I also calculate abnormal returns using the 
FTSE All Share return as the benchmark.  I use it as it is a broad based index for the UK 
stock market.  As a result the impact of incorrectly classified control firms will be reduced.   
Multi-Factor Benchmarks 
For the long term analysis, I use multi-factor benchmark models to further test the validity 
of the abnormal returns generated.  For the calendar time portfolio returns and regressions I 
use multi-factor models.59  Firstly, I use the Fama-French (1993) three factor model: 
(Rp - Rf)t = α + β1(RM - Rf)t + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + εt     (5) 
where (Rp - Rf)t is the average monthly return on the portfolio of targeted stocks less the 
return on the one-month risk-free rate in calendar month t; (RM - Rf)t is the return on the 
FTSE All Share less the return on the one-month risk-free rate (30 day UK t-bill) in 
calendar month t; SMBt is the difference between the value-weighted average return on the 
small-cap portfolios and large-cap portfolios; HMLt is the difference between the value-
weighted average return on the high book-to-market portfolios and low book-to-market 
portfolios.  The advantage of this model is that the abnormal return generated is attributable 
                                                                                                                                                     
check, I also condust a search of FACTIVA and RNS documents for signs that the firms were targeted 
over the sample period. 
59 See appendix 3A for the multi-factor models calculation methodology.  
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to the event under analysis as any risk premium associated with size or growth prospects is 
accounted for in the benchmark model. 
Secondly, I use the Carhart (1997) four factor model which is an extension of the Fama-
French (1993) three factor model: 
(Rp - Rf)t = α + β1(RM - Rf)t + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4UMDt + εt   (6) 
where UMDt which is the difference between the value weighted average return on the high 
past-year stock-return portfolios and low past-year stock-return portfolios and measure 
stock return momentum.  This model builds on the three-factor model advocated by Fama 
and French (1993) in that it also accounts for the impact of stock return momentum in the 
abnormal return calculation.  
3.4.3 Change in Target Firm Characteristics 
In order to assess the drivers of changes in shareholder value I analyse the impact of each 
type of activism on the targets‟ characteristics.  This allows me to see if shareholder value 
gains are driven by tangible improvements, brought about by activist pressure, in the way 
the firm operates.  I follow the approach used by Becht et al (2008) to measure the 
percentage improvement in firm variables over the period from two averaged accounting 
years prior to the targeting to two averaged accounting years after targeting has occurred.  
We calculate the variables as the average value of the two fiscal years for both the pre and 
post periods.  For the Voting sample, I calculate the changes from two years prior to the 
first targeting, to two years after the final targeting has occurred.60  This enables us to 
calculate the impact of the complete activist intervention.   
I calculate the percentage change for the target firms and subtract the percentage change for 
the matched control firms defined earlier to give a control adjusted improvement.  I also 
calculate the change relative to the median industry firm, selected using the target firm‟s 2-
digit SIC code.  I only use listed companies for calculating the industry median data due to 
the problems of obtaining accurate data for private companies across the entire sample 
period.  I subsequently calculate the t and Wilcoxon z statistics for the mean and median 
abnormal performance changes to test whether these changes are significantly different 
from zero.61 
                                                   
60 Data is winsorised by replacing all values lying over 3.5 standard deviations from the sample mean 
with the median value to remove extreme outliers. 
61 For MV, TOTASS and EMP the statistical tests are conducted using log values due to the positive skew 
of these variables.  For CASH the statistical tests are condicted on variables scaled by TOTASS.  
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Operating Performance62 
I analyse the impact of activist pressures on a number of accounting variables. Tangible 
changes in the accounting performance of the company will usually drive forward 
improvements in the shareholder value performance of the company.  Data is collected from 
the DataStream database.63  For this reason, I look at the impact on the variables outlined in 
table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 – Operating Performance Variables 
Variable 
Name 
Description Calculation Data Source 
MV MV is the market value of the target firm (Karpoff 
et al, 1996; Opler and Sokobin, 1995).  I use this 
variable to analyse the impact that shareholder 
intervention can have on the size of targets.  
Share price 
multiplied by 
number of shares 
outstanding 
DataStream 
(DS 
Mnemonic 
“MV”)  
DIVYLD DIVYLD is the dividend yield for the target 
company.  Changes in this variable indicate how 
cash returns to shareholders change with the advent 
of activist pressures. Institutional investors are more 
likely to invest in value stocks that pay regular 
dividend income. 
Dividend per share 
divided by share 
price of the 
company 
DataStream 
(W05101 or 
DPS, “P”) 
ROA ROA is the return on assets for the firm (Wahal, 
1996; Opler and Sokobin, 1995, Becht et al, 2008).  
ROA indicates how efficiently the company has 
used its asset base.   
EBIT divided by 
total assets 
DataStream 
(WC18191, 
“TOTASS”) 
ROE ROE is the return on equity for the target firm 
(Strickland et al, 1996).  This ratio indicates how 
efficiently the company has used its equity capital. 
Net income divided 
by shareholders 
equity  
DataStream 
(WC01751, 
WC03501) 
CASH CASH is the value of cash and cash equivalents on 
the balance sheet of the target firm (Del Guercio 
and Hawkins, 1999).   A large cash balance on the 
balance sheet might indicate that the company has a 
lack of value enhancing projects to undertake, and, 
as such, the cash should be returned to the 
shareholders. 
 DataStream 
(WC02001) 
EBITDA/
TA 
EBITDA is a commonly used proxy for cash flow 
in financial research, which I scale using the total 
assets of the firm.   
EBITDA divided 
by total assets.  
DataStream 
(WC18198, 
“TOTASS”) 
BK-MKT BK-MKT is the book to market value of the target 
firm (Smith, 1996; Bizjak and Marquette, 1997).  A 
low value for this ratio indicates that the company 
is valued much more highly by the market than its 
book value, indicating that the stock market is 
valuing the firm‟s growth prospects highly.   
Book value of 
equity (total assets 
minus total 
liabilities) divided 
by market value of 
equity 
DataStream 
(“TOTASS”, 
WC03351, 
“MV”) 
                                                                                                                                                     
However, I report the actual values for these figures in line with Becht et al, (2008) in order to see the 
actual changes brought about by the activist pressure. 
62 See the literature review in chapter 2 as well as Karpoff (2001) for a full explanation of the various 
operating performance variables used in prior research on shareholder activism. 
63 In order to be included, target firms must have share price data for the period from two years before, to 
two years after the targeting occurs, with the exception of firms targeted in 2007 where only data for one 
year after the event is required.  As a result of this criterion the sample was reduced from the original 731 
voting targets to 595.  Furthermore, the private negotiation sample dropped from 214 to 172. 
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Thus, successful change instigated by an activist is likely to be reflected in improved 
operating performance variables, and subsequently higher shareholder returns and thus a 
higher market capitalisation. 
Company Strategy 
Shareholder activists sometimes target what they perceive as a weak strategic direction of 
the firm in order to try and improve its performance if they feel improvements could be 
made (Karpoff, 2001).  In order to study the impact of intervention on the change in target 
firm‟s strategy, I use a number of proxies reflecting the target‟s strategy, both financial and 
operating strategy variables.  Data is collected from the DataStream database.  Firstly, I 
measure the impact on financial strategy by looking at the variables outlined in Table 3.2: 
Table 3.2 – Financial Strategy Variables 
Variable 
Name 
Description Calculation Data Source 
DIVPAY64 DIVPAY is the firm‟s dividend payout rate (Smith, 
1996; Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999).  I use this 
variable to examine the impact on the sources of 
finance used by targeted firms.  A higher payout 
ratio indicates the firm is returning more cash to 
shareholders. It may signal higher operating cash 
flow in the future. 
Dividend per share 
divided by the 
value of earnings 
per share 
attributable to 
ordinary 
shareholders 
DataStream 
(W05101 or 
DPS, W05201 
or EPS) 
LEV LEV is the leverage level of the target firm (Karpoff 
et al, 1996; Strickland et al, 1996; Klein and Zur, 
2008).  This allows me to look at how the firm has 
changed its sources of financing as a result of the 
activist intervention.  An increase in the value of the 
leverage ratio would indicate that the firm is using 
more debt financing as opposed to its own equity to 
benefit from the advantages of debt (such as tax 
advantages).  This may signal higher operating cash 
flow in the future allowing the firm to bear a higher 
level of leverage. 
Total debt 
outstanding (long 
term plus short 
term) divided by 
the total assets of 
the firm 
DataStream 
(WC03255, 
“TOTASS) 
 
I further analyse operating strategy changes at target firms by assessing the impact on 
corporate restructuring as outlined in Table 3.3.  These variables are used to understand 
how the company is changing its strategy in order to maximise shareholder value.  
 
                                                   
64 Dividend payout ratios can be negative if a company makes a loss duing the accounting period but 
continues to pay a dividend from retained earnings.  To counteract this problem, I follow the approach of 
Frankel and Lee (1998) by multiplying the firm‟s total assets by the UK historical ROA, which is 7.6% 
according to Franks et al (2009).  This gives a proxy for earnings and allows a payout ratio to be 
calculated. 
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Table 3.3 – Business Strategy Variables 
Variable 
Name 
Description Data Source 
TOTASS TOTASS is the value of the total assets of the target firm (Becht et al, 
2008).  I analyse the impact on total assets to see if activist pressures has 
any impact on the size of the targets assets base. 
DataStream 
(“TOTASS”) 
EMP EMP is the number of employees employed by the target firm (Becht et 
al, 2008).  I analyse the impact on total assets to see if activist pressures 
has any impact on the size of the targets employee numbers.  This and 
the total assets also allow comparison with the only other UK study by 
Becht et al (2008) who measure the change in the actual number of 
employees and the actual value of assets.   
DataStream 
(WC07011) 
MAVOL MAVOL defined as the number of M&A transactions undertaken by the 
target (Smith, 1996; Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999).  An increase in 
this variable would indicate increased M&A activity after targeting by an 
activist.  
SDC 
Platinum65 
MAVAL MAVAL defined as the value of M&A activity undertaken by targeted 
firms, scaled by the firm‟s total assets (Smith, 1996; Del Guercio and 
Hawkins, 1999).  A negative value indicates net divestment through 
M&A, while a positive value indicates net acquisitions.  When analysed 
in conjunction with the previous variable it allows me to analyse how 
targeted firms M&A activity changes as a result of targeting by an 
activist institution. 
SDC Platinum 
INT/ASS66 INT/ASS is the value of intangible assets scaled by the value of total 
assets.  I use this variable as a further indicator of changing intensity of 
growth-related assets at targeted companies. 
DataStream 
(WC02649, 
“TOTASS”) 
CAPEX/TA CAPEX/TA is the value of capital expenditure scaled by the total assets 
of the firm.  An increased value for this variable would indicate 
increased capital spending at targeted firms. 
DataStream 
(WC04601, 
“TOTASS”) 
RD/SALES RD/SALES is the research and development expenditure scaled by the 
level of sales for the firm, taken.  An improvement in R&D and 
intangible assets indicates the firm is possibly investing in product and 
brand development in future growth opportunities.   
DataStream 
(WC01201, 
WC01001) 
 
Corporate Governance 
I look at changes in the board structure to examine how the corporate governance of 
targeted companies changes as a result of activist pressures.  Poor corporate governance, 
such as a lack of independence of directors can have a direct impact on the ability of the 
company to operate effectively, and maximise shareholder value given its available 
investment opportunities.  Data is collected from the Manifest database.  I analyse the 
impact by using the corporate goverance variables outlined in Table 3.4. 
                                                   
65 M&A data is extracted from the SDC database.  I exclude private targets due to a number of 
discrepancies that I found regarding the timing of the transactions and the deal value when compared with 
other filings data from Perfect Filings and Thomson Financial, as well as from press coverage of the 
deals.  The consequences of this decision are discussed further in the limitations section of chapter 9. 
66 Collecting data on intangible assets and R&D spending can be problematic.  Data was primarily 
collected from Datastream but was supplemented with accounting data from Manifest where datastream 
data wasmissing.  Manifest data was verified by checking other accounting variables such as sales, assets 
and net profit to ensure consistency with that reported in datastream.   
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Table 3.4 – Corporate Governance Variables 
Variable 
Name 
Description Data Source 
BOARD BOARD is the size of the company board (Wu, 2004).  Too large a board 
might make it cumbersome and difficult to undertake decisive decision 
making, while too small a board might give too much power to the 
executive directors and limit sufficient monitoring by the independent 
directors. 
Manifest 
IND
67
 IND is the number of independent directors on the board divided by the 
total size of the board, to give an independence ratio.  If the number of 
independent directors falls, it might indicate a reduced level of 
monitoring amongst the board members (Wu, 2004; Girard, 2000). 
Manifest 
CEODUAL CEODUAL is a measure of CEO duality that equals 1 if the CEO is also 
the Chairman and 0 otherwise.   CEO duality places too much power in 
the hands of the CEO and can compromise the ability of the board to 
monitor effectively.  A reduction in this variable indicates a reduction in 
CEO duality at targeted firms. 
Manifest 
CEOTURN CEOTURN is a measure of CEO turnover that equals 1 if the CEO is 
replaced over the accounting year, or 0 otherwise (Woods, 1996).  A low 
value for CEO turnover might indicate that the CEO is entrenched, 
possibly giving them a large degree of power to operate the company as 
they see fit. 
Manifest 
EXECTEN EXECTEN is the average tenure of the executive directors.  A longer 
tenure indicates that executive directors have been in the job for an 
increasing period of time.  This might limit the spread of new ideas onto 
the board of directors. 
Manifest 
INDTEN INDTEN is the average tenure of the independent directors (Akhigbe et 
al, 1997; Wu, 2004).  Similar to EXECTEN, a longer tenure indicates 
that the independent directors have been in the job for an increasing 
period of time.  This might limit their ability to independently monitor 
the executive members of the board. 
Manifest 
 
Executive Compensation 
I look at the change in executive compensation structures to understand how they are 
affected by pressures from an activist investor.  Executive compensation structures are 
routinely used to mitigate the agency problem that can exist given divorced ownership and 
control.  Data is collected from the Manifest database.  I look at the impact on the executive 
compensation variables outlined in Table 3.5. 
 
 
 
                                                   
67 Independent directors are defined as per the principles set out in the Combined Code (See Combined 
code section A3.1, p7).  Criteria include ensuring the independent director has not been a prior company 
employee, doesn‟t own a substantial shareholding in the company, has no family or other close ties and is 
paid no other fees other than the director fee.  Manifest is also a proxy voting agency and provides a 
further analysis of whther the director is independent, which is included in the database. 
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Table 3.5 – Executive Compensation Variables 
Variable 
Name 
Description Data Source 
CEOCASH CEOCASH is the level of cash compensation paid to the CEO, 
defined as the CEOs cash salary plus the value of the CEOs cash 
bonuses.  A very large level of cash component of the CEO‟s 
compensation package might indicate that the CEOs are not 
adequately rewarded for operating the company in the long term 
interests of the shareholders. 
Manifest 
CEODELTA CEODELTA is the delta of the CEOs equity compensation.  See 
Appendix 3.2 for the calculation methodology for delta.  A low value 
for delta would indicate that the CEO‟s compensation structure is not 
sufficiently linked to the long term shareholder value performance of 
the company. 
Manifest 
CEOTOTAL CEOTOTAL is the total value of the CEOs compensation package, 
defined as the CEOs cash compensation plus any performance related 
compensation awarded.  A package that is too large, especially if it 
largely consists of cash compensation could indicate that the CEO is 
not adequately incentivised to act in the interests of shareholders. 
Manifest 
EXECCASH EXECCASH is the cash compensation paid to the executive directors, 
defined as the executive‟s cash salary plus the value of executive‟s 
cash bonuses.  A large value for the executive directors‟ cash 
compensation might indicate that they are not adequately incentivised 
to look for long term performance improving projects, instead settling 
for an „easy life‟. 
Manifest 
EXECTOTAL EXECTOTAL is the total value of compensation paid to the executive 
directors.  Similar to CEOCASH, a package that is too large, 
especially if it largely consists of cash compensation could indicate 
that the CEO is not adequately incentivised to act in the interests of 
shareholders. 
Manifest 
EXECDELTA EXECDELTA is the delta of the average executive director‟s equity 
compensation.  See Appendix 3.2 for the calculation methodology for 
delta.  Similar to CEODELTA, a poor value for delta would indicate 
that the executive directors‟ compensation structure is not sufficiently 
linked to the shareholder value performance of the company, leading 
to a focus on short term performance. 
Manifest 
INDTOTAL INDTOTAL is the average value of compensation paid to the 
independent directors.  Paying independent directors too high a fee 
can lead to impairment in their ability to monitor the executives and 
act solely in the interests of shareholders.  
Manifest 
 
3.4.4 Multivariate Regressions 
Multivariate regression analysis will be conducted to identify the relationships between the 
changes in target firm characteristics that the activist pressure facilitates and the long term 
change in shareholder value performance.  I regress the post activism two year BHAR onto 
the change in operating performance, firm strategy, corporate governance and executive 
compensation in turn to obtain an understanding which of the changes the activist pressure 
induces increases, or destroys, shareholder value at target firms.  The regression models are 
shown below: 
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BHARs = f (Change in Operating Performance)     (7) 
BHARs = f (Change in Firm Strategy)       (8) 
BHARs = f (Change in Corporate Governance)     (9) 
BHARs = f (Change in Executive Compensation)     (10) 
The regression analysis is conducted using the variables outlined in the prior section.  I 
conduct separate regressions for each of the variable categories in order to obtain an 
understanding of the activist‟s success in driving through shareholder value enhancing 
changes in the targeted firms‟ characteristics. 
3.5 Summary of Methodology and Data 
This chapter outlines the methodology and data that I will use to test the impact of 
shareholder activism on UK companies.  Firstly, an exploratory survey is undertaken to 
discover the scope and magnitude of shareholder engagement in the UK.  I then use 
these results to help guide the direction of the large sample empirical study, which 
focuses on measuring the impact of shareholder activism on targeted firm‟s shareholder 
value and changes to their structural and operating characteristics.  Part II of the thesis 
presents the results of the engagement survey and the empirical analysis of shareholder 
activism by UK institutional investors.  Following on, Part III of the thesis conducts a 
similar analysis of hedge fund activism against UK and European companies. 
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Appendix 3.1: Portfolio Construction for the Calendar 
Time Methodology 
To estimate the Fama French (1993) three-factor model, the SMB and HML portfolios are 
constructed using the approach utilised by Daniel, Titman and Wei (2001).  For each 
calendar month, I only use stocks for which I have the market capitalisation (MV) and 
book-to-market value (B/M). 
All stocks that meet the above criteria are sorted by MV to create tritile portfolios.  The 
portfolio of stocks that have high MV are then further sorted by B/M values to give three 
B/M portfolios within the „Big‟ portfolio of stocks.  A similar process is followed for the 
portfolio of stocks with low MV.  As a result, six portfolios are created, as illustrated in 
table 3A.1. 
Table 3A.1 - Portfolio construction procedure for the Fama French (1993) three-factor model 
Market Capitalisation (MV) Book-to-market (B/M) Portfolio 
Small High SH 
 Medium SM 
 Low SL 
Big High BH 
 Medium BM 
 Low BL 
 
The trading strategies that create the factors are illustrated below.  
SMB = 1/3* ((SL - BL) + (SM - BM) + (SH - BH)) 
HML = 1/2 *((SH - SL) + (BH - BL)) 
The portfolios used to estimate the Carhart (1997) four factor model are constructed using 
the approach of Liew and Vassalou (2000).  Only stocks are used where the past 12 months 
market capitalisation (MV) and book-to-market (B/M) values are available for each 
calendar month.  This criterion allows the calculation of the momentum (MOM) factor, 
which is calculated as the average of the prior 12 months stock returns, excluding the 
current month.  This gives each stock‟s 12 month momentum. 
In order to calculate the factors, the stocks are first sorted by MV to create three tritile 
portfolios based on MV.  The „Big‟ portfolio containing stocks with the largest MV are then 
further sorted by B/M values to give three tritile portfolios within the big MV portfolio.  
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The same procedure is conducted for the „Medium‟ and „Small‟ portfolios to give nine 
portfolios that have been sorted by MV and subsequently B/M.   Each of the B/M portfolios 
are then further sorted based on the stocks‟ MOM, creating tritile portfolios within each of 
the nine B/M portfolios.   
„Up‟ is the top third of stocks with the highest prior 12 month average returns.  „Down‟ is 
the bottom third of stocks with the lowest prior 12 month average returns.  „Medium‟ are 
the remaining third of stocks.  As a result, I end up with 27 portfolios that have been sorted 
on MV, B/M and MOM as illustrated in table 3A.2.  The 27 portfolios are constructed using 
value weightings to account for the small capitalisation of some of the companies within the 
UK market, particularly those listed on AIM. 
The trading strategies used to form the factors are illustrated below. 
SMB = 1/9 *((P1- P19) + (P2 - P20) + (P3 - P21) + (P4 - P22) + (P5 - P23) + (P6 - P24)  
+ (P7 - P25) + (P8 - P26) + (P9 - P27)) 
HML = 1/9 * ((P1- P7) + (P2 - P8) + (P3 - P9) + (P10 - P16) + (P11- P17) + (P12 - P18)  
+ (P19 - P25) + (P20 - P26) + (P21- P27)) 
UMD = 1/9* ((P1- P3) + (P4 - P6) + (P7 - P9) + (P10 - P12) + (P13 - P15)  
 + (P16 - P18) + (P21- P19) + (P22 - P24) + (P25 - P27)) 
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Table 3A.2 - Portfolio construction procedure for the Carhart (1997) four-factor model 
Market Capitalisation (MV) Book-to-market (B/M) Past Year's Return (MOM) Portfolio 
Small High Up P1 
    Medium P2 
    Down P3 
  Medium Up P4 
    Medium P5 
    Down P6 
  Low Up P7 
    Medium P8 
    Down P9 
Medium High Up P10 
    Medium P11 
    Down P12 
  Medium Up P13 
    Medium P14 
    Down P15 
  Low Up P16 
    Medium P17 
    Down P18 
Big High Up P19 
    Medium P20 
    Down P21 
  Medium Up P22 
    Medium P23 
    Down P24 
  Low Up P25 
    Medium P26 
    Down P27 
 
The HML factor is the return from a portfolio that is long high B/M stocks and short low 
B/M stocks.  The effects of size and momentum are controlled for.  Therefore, it is 
effectively a “zero investment strategy that is both size and momentum neutral” (Liew and 
Vassalou, 2000).    Similar interpretations can be given for SMB and UMD. 
The factors are calculated using annual rebalancing, where the MV is from the end of 
December, B/M from the end of June and the 12 months prior year returns from before July.  
If a stock doesn‟t have returns for any month, the proportion of the portfolio is invested in 
the UK market return, proxied as the return on the FTSE All Share. 
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Appendix 3.2: Calculation of Delta and option values 
Estimating Value and Delta of a Single Option 
I calculate the option value based on the Black-Scholes European option pricing formula 
(Black and Scholes, 1973), as modified by Merton (1973) to account for dividend payouts. 
Option Value =  
Where  
Where  
S = price of the underlying stock 
X = exercise price of the option 
T = time to maturity 
R = ln (1+ risk-free rate) 
D = ln (1+ dividend rate), where the expected dividend rate is the per-share dividends 
σ = annualised volatility 
N ( ) = cumulative probability function for the normal distribution 
Delta = the sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 1% change in stock price 
= [∂ (option value) / ∂ (stock price)] × (stock price/100) 
=  
I multiply the sensitivity and delta by the number of options to obtain the total sterling 
values of the change in CEO‟s wealth that will result from a 1% change in the stock price. 
Estimating Value and Delta of a Portfolio of Options 
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The value of the option grants and the delta of the equity components are calculated using 
the grant information from the latest annual report prior to the meeting, taken from the 
Manifest database68.  For current year grants, the value and delta of the options are 
calculated from using the formulae outlined above.  However, for unexercised options, the 
calculation methodology is more difficult.  I don‟t have any information on prior year grants 
that are unexercised but are unexpired.  In order to calculate the delta of these options, a 
number of assumptions have to be made.  Firstly, I assume that no outstanding options exist 
from before the Manifest database coverage began.  For instance, if the Manifest coverage 
started in 2006, we assume there are no grants outstanding from 2005 or 2004.  Secondly, I 
assume that all options are exercised as soon as the performance period is complete, 
assuming they haven‟t expired beforehand.   
I calculate the outstanding options as follows.  Firstly, we sum the number of options 
granted over the previous years to get the total option grants outstanding.  I then sum the 
exercised and expired options from the current year and subtract that from the number of 
options granted in the prior years to find the number of outstanding grants.  A weighted 
average strike price is calculated using the option grant sizes and the strike prices from the 
prior year grants.  Finally, I assume the outstanding options have either 1 or 2 year vesting 
periods remaining.  This number is chosen as most stock options in the sample have a 
vesting period of 3 years.  As a result, the year to maturity is set to 1.5.  I then calculate the 
delta of these options using the Black and Scholes model as outlined previously.  For 
restricted stock or any previously held shares, we calculate the delta by: 
The delta of stock = the number of shares x 1% x stock price 
I compute the delta of the total portfolio of stocks and options by adding the delta of 
restricted stock and shares to the delta of the options portfolio. 
The following example indicates the calculation methodology. 
Calculating value and delta of an option 
 
The following example illustrates the example of how to calculate the value and delta of a 
stock option using the formulae presented above: 
                                                   
68 The Manifest database contains information on the corporate governance structures of companies.  
They collect data from the annual report, including board structure, director information, committee 
details and executive compensation structures.  The data covers over 1,200 UK and 500 EU companies.  
http://www.manifest.co.uk/  
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Stock Price:    £4 
Exercise Price:   £5 
Volatility:    10% 
Risk-free interest rate:   5% 
Time to Expiration (years):  3 
Dividend Yield:   5% 
No of Shares:   100,000 
 
Option Value:   £89,174 
Option Delta:   £78,791 
 
 
Calculating Delta of share portfolio 
 
The following example illustrates the calculation methodology for calculating the delta of a 
share portfolio: 
 
Stock price:   £4 
No of Shares:   100,000 
 
Delta of share portfolio: £4 * 1% * 100,000 = £4,000 
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Appendix 3.3: Shareholder Engagement Questionnaire 
A. Demographics: 
1. Name of fund management organisation: ……………….…………………………………………………………………………….…………………..… 
2. Respondent Name: …………………………………………………. 3.  Respondent’s Position: …………………………………………………………. 
4.   UK equities under management from the UK (as at 31/12/2006):   
< £250m   £251m - £750m    £750m+  
5. Investment Style:  active     passive    
 Shareholder Engagement Policy: 
6. Does your firm have a formal engagement policy?    Yes   No  
a) If No, does your firm plan to introduce one?    Yes   No  
7. Does your firm go beyond the principles/guidelines on engagement  
issued by the ISC?       Yes   No  
8. Does your firm have: 
a) dedicated specialists for corporate governance?    Yes   No  
b) dedicated specialists for SRI?      Yes   No  
9. Do insider trading laws:  
 a) inhibit your firm’s communication with investee companies?   Yes   No  
 b) inhibit your firm’s ability to trade on information obtained  
  from the investee?       Yes   No  
10. If initial engagement fails, would your firm divest rather than  
escalate the engagement?       Yes   No  
11. Would your firm prefer to keep your engagement secret from  
press attention? (when using informal communication only)    Yes   No 
 If you answered YES to Q6, please answer all sections.  If No, please go to section F 
B. Motivation for Engaging: 
12. Do you believe that more engagement will lead to better  
investment performance?      Yes   No  
13. Does frequent communication make for a better investee relationship?  Yes   No  
14. Does your firm have a policy on how you handle conflict of interests   Yes   No  
which arise with engagement?     
(e.g. investee business with other areas of your institution’s operations )  
15. Would your firm conduct SRI-based engagement at the expense  
of financial return?       Yes   No  
16. Does your firm think a reputation for high profile engagement   Yes   No  
facilitates future dialogue? 
17. Do your firm’s clients encourage engagement?    Yes   No  
C. Engagement Process: 
18. By whom is the engagement normally conducted? 
Exclusively Fund Manager  Exclusively Corporate Governance/SRI Specialist   Mixture:  
19. Is voting your firm’s sole form of engagement?    Yes   No  
20. Does your firm publicise the outcome of your engagement once completed?  Yes   No  
a. If so, where is the information made available?     ……….……………………………… 
(e.g. Press, website, annual report) 
21. Does your firm make voting records public (e.g. on the website)?  Yes   No  
 
 
 
 
 
22. Aside from voting, which other alternative engagement processes does your firm use? 
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(please rank in order of deployment, 1 = most used)  
Shareholder Resolution   Public Statement    Joint intervention    
Meeting with executives  Meeting with Chairman/SID  Requisitioning an EGM  
Letter/email   Telephone conversation  No alternative processes 
Other: ………………………………………………………………………………… 
23. With whom is contact normally made? 
CEO  Chairman      Company Secretary      Non-executive Director(s)   Other: ……………… 
24. Would your firm be willing to join a joint engagement shareholder coalition to  Yes   No  
bring more pressure on the investee management/boards?      
25. What areas of investee operation would your firm not normally target? 
Strategy    Executive Compensation  Merger/Acquisition   
Financial Performance   Board/management change  Divestment   
Other ………………………………………… 
D. Costs and benefits of engagement: 
26. How often do you consider your firm’s engagement successful? 
Every time  Usually  Occasionally  Never    
27. How does your firm measure the effectiveness of your firm’s engagement?   
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
28. Which performance metrics does your firm use to assess effectiveness? 
…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
29. Over what time frame is the effectiveness of your firm’s engagement assessed? ……………………………………………… 
30. Do you conduct formal cost/benefit analysis of your firm’s engagement?  Yes   No  
If yes,  a. how are costs estimated?     ……………………………………………… 
         b. how are benefits estimated?    ……………………………………………… 
31. If you estimate costs, does your firm take into account indirect costs?  Yes   No  
(e.g. your institutional management time, etc ) 
E. General Characteristics of Engagement 
Please answer the following statements using the scales provided: 
1 = strongly disagree 2 = disagree  3 = neutral 4 = agree  5 = strongly agree 
32. Engaging with companies could improve investment returns  1           2         3        4        5 
33. We prefer other institutional shareholders to engage first  1           2         3        4        5 
34. Engagement should be left to specialist institutions   1           2         3        4        5 
35. Engagement is more likely to be successful over the long term  1           2         3        4        5 
36. In some circumstances, engagement could damage the target  1           2         3        4        5 
37. Engagement could potentially damage the image of the investor 1           2         3        4        5 
38. Fund managers don’t have necessary skills for successful engagement 1           2         3        4        5 
39. Engagement should be undertaken by engagement specialists  1           2         3        4        5 
40. Fund managers need specific incentives for engagement  1           2         3        4        5 
41. A clear engagement motivation enhances the chance of its success 1           2         3        4        5 
42. Legally mandated engagement is the way forward   1           2         3        4        5 
F. Other Comments: 
If you have anything else you would like to add, please use the space below (and overleaf): 
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………… 
Thank you for taking the time to respond to this questionnaire.  
 If you would be willing to be interviewed as part of this research into shareholder engagement, please tick the box  
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Chapter 4 A Survey of UK Shareholder Engagement  
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Chapter 2 illustrates the way in which shareholder engagement is becoming an increasingly 
important part of institutional investor‟s investment practices.  I decided to conduct a survey 
of the UK shareholder engagement arena in order to help focus the empirical analysis on the 
key areas of the engagement process.  The following section presents the findings of the 
questionnaires and interviews that I held with engaged fund management institution 
Questionnaires were sent out on my behalf by the ISC to 43 institutional investors that they 
had identified as having an engagement programme.  I received responses from thirteen 
institutions (30%) and conducted interviews with four of these respondents.  Of the four, 
two of the interviewees were from specialised engagement institutions.  The remaining two 
were from very large fund management groups. I encouraged the interviewees to talk 
openly about their engagement activities, as well as their views on the UK engagement 
arena as a whole.  I found a number of similarities between these two distinct groups of 
organisation.  However, I also found a number of very distinct differences, in terms of both 
engagement approach and attitude. 
4.2 Shareholder Engagement Questionnaire 
The shareholder engagement questionnaire was prepared in consultation with the 
Institutional Shareholders‟ Committee (ISC).  The survey was sent to the membership lists 
of the National Association of Pension Funds, the Association of British Insurers, the 
Investment Management Association and the Association of Investment Companies 
(together members of the ISC), and I received 13 responses.   Eleven out of the thirteen 
institutions that responded managed assets in excess of £750m, with one specialist 
institution managing funds less than £250m.  Only one institution failed to reveal the size of 
UK equities under their management.   The results of this survey therefore relate more 
closely to the engagement practices of larger institutional investors. 
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All but one of the institutions have a formal engagement policy which defines their 
shareholder engagement practices.  However, only half of these institutions exceeded the 
engagement responsibilities as laid out in the ISC Statement of Principles.  Eight of the 
respondents‟ engagement was encouraged by their clients while 25% stated that their clients 
didn‟t actively encourage them to engage with their investees.  In order to facilitate their 
engagement, three quarters of the institutions employ Corporate Governance Specialists, 
however only two thirds employ SRI Specialists.  This would be explained by the attitudes 
of the institutional investors to SRI issues whereby none of those that answered said they 
would put SRI engagement over and above adequate financial return.  
Institutional investors need to be very careful that their engagement does not lead them to 
break insider trading regulations.  Ten of the respondents indicated that their 
communication with their investee companies is not hindered significantly by insider 
trading laws.  Furthermore, nine of the respondents didn‟t feel that insider trading laws 
inhibited their ability to trade from the information obtained from investee‟s during the 
course of their engagement process.  One respondent explained that the investees would 
usually ask the investors if they wanted to be „taken inside‟ if they felt that the issues in 
question could place them at risk of infringing insider trading regulations.  In this manner, 
the insider trading risk is proactively managed by both the investor and the investee.  
Institutional investors of this nature are traditionally passive investors. Their longstanding 
relationships with the companies they invest in often extended to routinely following the 
opinions and direction of the board of directors.  It is therefore unsurprising that the 
investors make efforts to continue this image.  Two thirds of the respondents state that they 
prefer to keep their engagement and its outcomes private from public attention.  Of the four 
that did publicise their engagement, only one made full disclosure by way of their website 
while the remaining three gave summary details.  However, the others made their voting 
records available directly to their clients upon request.   
Only three of the respondents went on to indicate that they felt a reputation for high profile 
engagement helps to facilitate future dialogue with their investee companies in areas in 
which there could be problems.  Seven of the remaining nine were of the opinion that this 
sort of reputation was of little benefit with one respondent indicating that they felt it could 
actually hinder future communication.  
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All but one of the institutions were of the opinion that engagement with their investees 
would lead to better performance of those investments.  Interestingly therefore, only two of 
the respondents stated that should their engagement fail, they would divest the investment 
rather than escalate their engagement approach.  Those stating they would rather divest, 
class themselves as specialist activist funds as they mainly invest in companies with a view 
to improving their performance via an engagement programme.   
All of the institutions that felt engagement would lead to better investment performance also 
felt that frequent communication would lead to a better relationship with their investee 
companies.  This could help to explain why they therefore continue to hold investments in 
companies with which their engagement has been unsuccessful as they are fearful of 
escalating and harming this relationship.   
Institutional investors are usually part of larger financial services organisations offering 
services ranging from a wide range of services to their clients.  It is therefore 
understandable if the group would be reticent to engage one of its asset management arm‟s 
investee companies for fear of jeopardising other lucrative business with other areas of the 
group‟s operations.  Ten of the twelve respondents indicated that they had a policy in place 
for managing the conflicts of interests should they occur.  Only one investor didn‟t have 
such a policy in place while one of the previously mentioned activist funds states they 
didn‟t have any conflicts of interests as their business is solely to operate an activist fund 
strategy.   
The engagement process is usually conducted at a high level.  As previously stated, a good 
working relationship between the board and its shareholders is often necessary to maximise 
the receptiveness of the board to new ideas and direction.  Two institutions said that all of 
their engagement is solely conducted by their fund manager, while two stated that their 
Corporate Governance or SRI specialists carried out all of their engagement when 
necessary.  One failed to answer while the remaining seven used a mixture of the fund 
manager and specialists to engage where necessary.  One institution indicated that the 
choice of person to conduct the engagement depended upon the issue concerned.  Another 
stated that the choice depended upon the contact at the investee.  If the contact was a high 
level board member, such as the CEO, Chairman or Company Secretary then the fund 
manager would conduct the engagement.  However, if the contact were company 
consultants or brokers, the specialists would carry out the process.  The target company‟s 
Chairman or Company Secretary was the contact most widely used to initiate the 
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engagement process, while some institutions engaged other board members and advisors as 
and when deemed necessary 
The engagement processes favoured by the institutions vary quite widely.  Eleven of the 
twelve respondents indicated that voting doesn‟t solely constitute their engagement 
practices.  The following chart indicates their preferred engagement approaches.  The 
respondents were asked to use a Likert scale to rank their engagement approaches, with 1 
indicating the most preferred and 9 the least used engagement approach.  In Figure 4.1 
below, the lower the bar the more frequently used is the engagement technique. 
Figure 4.1 - Preferred Engagement Routes 
 
The respondents‟ preferred engagement route was to meet executives (2.0) followed by a 
telephone conversation (2.1), letters or emails (2.2) and meeting with the Chairman or 
Senior Independent Director (2.9).  Requisitioning an EGM was the least preferred route 
(7.7) followed by issuing public statements about the target company (6.8).  Interestingly, a 
number of institutions indicated they would be wiling to use focus lists (6.8), albeit as a last 
resort while shareholder resolutions would also be willingly used (5.8) if other alternatives 
had failed.  A handful of respondents stated they would also engage other company 
advisors, such as brokers or consultants as an alternative means of getting their views heard.  
The specialist activist funds indicated they would be willing to employ any of these 
techniques in order to achieve their objectives. 
Nearly all of the institutions that responded to the questionnaire stated that they would be 
willing to join other shareholders in a coalition if it was the most effective method to 
achieve their engagement objectives.  One respondent stated that they would routinely 
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discuss their concerns with other shareholders whilst engaging the target company in order 
to ensure the necessary support, should target management be unreceptive of their 
suggestions. 
Curiously, only two respondents were willing to reveal which area of firm strategy they 
were willing to target, these being strategy, financial performance, executive compensation 
and board change.  The remaining institutions simply failed to answer that question.  One 
did shed light on this, however, by stating at the bottom of the questionnaire that they would 
engage all areas of firm operation if they felt it would have an impact on firm performance. 
The majority of the respondents stated that they believed their engagement is usually 
successful at generating the desired outcomes.  However, two felt that their engagement was 
only occasionally successful while two institutions didn‟t answer.  The lack of success by 
some investors could explain their willingness to join a coalition if it will enhance their 
chances of meeting their objectives.  It also explains why some are unwilling to escalate 
their engagement if they are not confident that doing so will deliver the desired outcome. 
The majority of the respondents indicated that they didn‟t carry out any formal cost/benefit 
analysis on the engagement that they undertook.  Only two institutions routinely assess the 
benefit of their engagement in this manner.  This is an interesting point as the ISC statement 
of principles state that the investors should evaluate the impact of their policies and report 
back to their clients.   A number of respondents went on to say that they observe the 
changes undertaken by the target companies over a time period following their intervention 
(up to 5 years) and compare these to see if the issues they raised are solved by these 
changes.  A handful of the investors, including the specialist activist funds, analyse the 
financial performance of the target companies post engagement using metrics such as the 
share price movement, IRR and comparison against a benchmark universe of companies.  
Only two respondents indicated that they calculate the cost of engaging.  One used the 
funds running cost while another had a dedicated engagement team that solely dealt with 
these issues, making cost estimation straightforward. 
Table 4.1 below shows the results of questions designed to uncover the respondents 
opinions based on a number of standard engagement policy issues such as legally mandated 
engagement.  The scale used was one to five, with one indicating the respondent strongly 
disagrees with the statement and five that they strongly agree.  A score of three indicates 
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they are neutral on the issue in question.  Only one respondent failed to complete this 
section. 
Table 4.1 - Respondents opinions of key areas of engagement policy 
 
Low Average High 
Legally mandated engagement is the way forward 1 1.6 5 
We prefer other institutional shareholders to engage first 1 1.9 3 
Engagement should be left to specialist institutions 1 2.3 5 
Engagement could potentially damage the image of the investor 1 2.6 4 
Fund managers need specific incentives for engagement 2 2.6 4 
In some circumstances, engagement could damage the target 1 2.7 4 
Fund managers don’t have necessary skills for successful engagement 1 2.9 5 
Engagement should be undertaken by engagement specialists 2 3.1 5 
A clear engagement motivation enhances the chance of its success 2 4.1 5 
Engagement is more likely to be successful over the long term 1 4.4 5 
Engaging with companies could improve investment returns 4 4.6 5 
 
All of the investors surveyed agreed that engaging with their investee companies could 
improve their investment returns and were willing to engage without waiting for other 
institutions to do so.  Only the specialist funds indicated that they felt that engagement 
should be left to specialist institutions as they felt that „normal‟ fund managers didn‟t have 
the required skills to successful engage the targets.  Most agreed that engagement was more 
likely to be successful over the longer term and that it was more likely to be successful if a 
clear engagement motivation was planned before the process begins.  They slightly rejected 
the idea that engagement could damage the target or the image of the investor as long as it 
was being undertaken for the correct reasons „with a view to the long term‟.  Finally, all but 
one of the funds agreed strongly that legally mandated engagement is not the best way to 
encourage shareholders to engage their investees.  Only one institution agreed with the 
concept of legally mandated engagement, and interestingly they were the respondent that 
makes full disclosure available on their website.  A possible explanation is that they would 
like other investors to follow their lead and share the cost burden of engaging with 
companies rather than free ride on their successes. 
Finally, one institution explained that: 
 “Our Fund Managers always consider their duty to create a financial 
return for clients.  Our engagement with companies reflects our 
determination to maximise the financial return.  This may mean 
discussing all aspects of a company‟s activities with all senior 
management and non-exec directors of the company.  Often the actual 
vote is the „last‟ part of the engagement.”  
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A second respondent echoed this sentiment with the following statement: 
“Engagement, through the active management of our relationships with 
companies, and the considered use of voting rights in a necessary part 
of good ownership” 
In conclusion, the survey reveals some interesting issues, namely the lack of a structured 
method to analyse the costs and benefits of their engagement process.  Without this, it is 
difficult to assess whether the economic impact of engaging is worthwhile.  Furthermore, 
the lack of disclosure regarding the areas in which the investors target is an area that needs 
further exploration, as is the full reasoning behind the lengths taken to keep their 
engagement private.  I explored the issues of interest that the questionnaire highlighted with 
interview participants. 
4.3 Interviews with engaged investors 
The following section presents the findings of interviews that were held with engaged fund 
management institutions. The interviews were semi-structured and based on a set of pre-
prepared questions. However, the interviewees were encouraged to talk openly about their 
engagement activities, as well as their views on the UK engagement arena as a whole.  
4.3.1Shareholder Engagement vs. Shareholder Activism 
I asked the interviewees if they felt that there was a difference between shareholder 
engagement and shareholder activism.  Three of the four didn‟t feel that there was a real 
difference between the two terms.  One institution said: 
“…I think it‟s a little bit rhetorical the difference between shareholder activism 
and shareholder engagement… I think that in practice there is very little difference 
and I use the two terms interchangeably because if you are talking to Americans 
they won‟t know what shareholder engagement is…” 
This was supported by another interviewee who said: 
“Activism is a very difficult term in Germany for example, engagement‟s better and 
it‟s not such a sensitive term in the UK...” 
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Both of these quotes came from the specialist engagement institutions.69 Only one of the 
respondents, from a more traditional fund management house, thought that there was a 
distinct difference: 
“I would disagree I think.  We certainly don‟t think of ourselves as activists.  We 
are as I said more responsible shareholders and we are acting always in our 
client‟s best interests.  We aim to influence where appropriate to develop corporate 
governance principles and procedures at the companies we invest in. … So I think 
activists to our mind would take a more involved, more active approach and often 
have a specific agenda that they want addressed.  And we certainly wouldn‟t go 
down that route.” 
However, one of the engagement institutions did later go on to say that: 
“I think the terms are used though in different ways in different parts of the world 
so within the UK I think they‟re broadly equivalent but within continental Europe 
and certainly in Germany they are different.  Activism being more aggressive 
perhaps and more short term in nature. …[and institutions are] right to avoid [it] 
when that‟s what activism has come to mean…” 
So it can be seen that the views of those involved in the engagement field can be viewed in 
a different way.  I will discuss the views of the interviewees on hedge fund activism shortly 
in section 4.3.8.  However, the recent activism by hedge funds could be partly responsible 
for giving the „activist‟ term a negative connotation.  But generally, there is little difference 
between shareholder activism and engagement in the views of the respondents. 
4.3.2Motivation for engaging 
Hendry et al (2007) categorise the motivations into three main groups.  Firstly, they believe 
that institutions take an activist stance for economic reasons.  The premise is that by 
addressing the issues that are hindering the performance of investee companies, the 
institutional investor can unlock value and enhance its portfolio return.  In his survey, 
Holland (1998) supports this rationale, stating that the financial institutions he surveyed 
hoped to improve the corporate financial performance of the investees targeted, and 
subsequently their share price performance.  He also states that the financial institutions he 
                                                   
69 However, it was supported by a more mainstream asset manager: “I would say it is all about 
perception…  Shareholder engagement is something I think you will find pretty much everybody in 
Europe and the UK is doing now to some extent or another, and it‟s viewed as a positive.  I think 
shareholder activism with a capital „A‟ has got a certain negative connotation in some markets…” 
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interviewed primarily engaged with their investee companies for the purposes of 
information gathering and not to influence their policy behaviour.  They could use the 
information gathered through the meetings to better inform their trading activities by being 
better informed about the prospects for the investees. Traditional academic research has 
generally highlighted shareholder value enhancements as the rationale for becoming an 
activist investor70.   
Hendry et al (2007) also find that the institutions hoped to generate positive spinoffs as a 
result of their engagement with companies.  The institutions believe that their monitoring 
will force companies to run the company much more carefully and efficiently and improve 
the overall performance of the universe of stocks.  I found similar results from the 
interviews.  Almost unanimously, the interviewees discussed that the purposes of 
shareholder engagement was to improve the performance of target companies with a view 
to improving investment returns.  One of the engagement specialists explained that: 
“…the terminology that we use is not that they are undervalued, but that they are fairly 
valued for the state of the company at that point in time and that there is hidden value 
in the company that through a change programme that we hope to be the catalyst for, 
to use the terminology, then the company will be worth more.” She/ he went on to say 
“…we need to believe that should the changes that we are asking for take place, this 
leads to a 20% increase in the value of the company‟s share price.”  She/ he also said 
“Because at the end of the day we are in the business to invest money on behalf of our 
clients to make money for them.  We‟re not in business of changing the world.”71 
Finally, one of the traditional investment companies talked about the indirect impact on 
share prices: 
“…you just have to aim to improve the overall governance such that over time it will 
be reflected in the company‟s performance and ultimately in the company‟s rating.” 
I was left with the overriding opinion that shareholder value improvements, and 
consequently investment returns, were a very powerful motivation for engagement amongst 
the institutions that were surveyed. 
                                                   
70 See Chapter 5 for a review of the literature on shareholder activism and its effectiveness. 
71 Another said: “We monitor the progress of the engagements then in value terms and there we do look 
at share price relative to the sector” 
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Secondly, Hendry et al (2007) consider political or moral pressures as a rationale for 
engaging investees.  They find that some of their interviewees talked about the duty or 
responsibility that is placed on them to monitor and intervene where necessary if they are 
one of the leading shareholders in a company.  They also state that some of the institutions 
talked about a political environment in which being a „responsible owner‟ is expected by 
society.  They go further by saying that they were left with the impression that investors 
were seeking to act as responsible owners because it was what was expected of them, rather 
than because they wished to do so.   
I did find limited evidence of these motivations within the interviews.  One interviewee 
from one of the traditional institutional investors stated: 
“…it‟s part of what we should be doing anyway… we‟re very interested and on behalf 
of our clients it‟s something we should be doing.” 
Another said that they felt there was external pressure on institutional investors to become 
more engaged in the companies in which they invested: 
“I think also that there is a lot of pressure on institutional investors who have not been 
very interested, or active in corporate governance, to start being more so.  And it‟s just 
a whole lot of pressure coming from this accountability thing, but also about 
performance.” 
The institutional investors also stated that there was increasing pressure from pension fund 
clients to carry out more engagement.  
“…clients are a lot more interested now in a lot of these issues than they used to be, 
SRI, voting, engagement.” 
One interviewee explained how the TUC in particular was encouraging its members to ask 
institutional investors about the engagement process. As a result investors were having to 
become more engaged in order to satisfy the requirements of their clients. 
Finally, Hendry et al (2007) consider competitive forces as the main reason for which 
investors take an activist stance with their investees.  They document evidence that the 
investors feel engaging gives the investor an information advantage over its competitive 
which is vital when trying to beat a benchmark upon which their relative performance was 
judged.  They also uncovered the view that institutional investors‟ clients expected the 
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institutions they mandated to manage the fund to act with a degree of responsibility towards 
the companies they invested in.  Thus, in order to win mandates in a competitive 
environment, institutions were embracing engagement.  As a result, they were doing it 
because they had to, rather than because they believed in it. Thus it appears to be „me-too‟ 
competitive tactic rather than one inspired by conviction. 
I found limited evidence that the engagement function was being carried out for competitive 
reasons.  One institution stated: 
“I think it‟s in the mainstream a lot more certainly than when I started doing it 
… every single questionnaire for potential new client business asks about this 
stuff now where nobody did ten years ago, so everyone‟s thinking about it.”  
However, he did go on to say that: “I think those of us that are doing it because we 
believe in it” 
In summary, I found that the overarching motivation for running an engagement function 
was to increase the value of targeted companies and thus improve investment returns.  I 
found limited evidence of external pressures, as well as limited competitive motivations.  
However, unlike Hendry et al (2007) these were not the main reasons for doing it.  This 
illustrates how the engagement process has evolved, and will continue to do so, from a 
necessary burden on institutions to a valued part of the investment process. 
4.3.3Engagement - the modus operandi 
Both Holland (1998) and Hendry et al (2007) document evidence that private meeting and 
discussions are the favoured methods by which institutional investors hope to influence 
investee companies.  They found no evidence of use of focus lists or of shareholder 
proposals by the institutions that they surveyed.  However, they did document evidence of 
the willingness by these institutions to use public pressure to assist the activism process.  
They found that it could be used both to aid the activism process, especially in situations 
where they feel that their concerns are not being properly conveyed to the board, as well as 
to develop a reputation as an activist.  This would cause investee companies to improve 
their governance without explicit public attention, as well making activist campaigns easier 
as the investee will understand that the investor‟s threats are much more credible.  
Furthermore, both surveys document evidence that investors are willing to both threaten to 
vote against the management of a company if they feel that their concerns are not being 
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addressed.  Many institutions were also becoming more willing to carry through this threat 
where necessary.   
However, Hendry et al (2007) also explain that some institutions are wary of becoming too 
public as it can damage the reputation of the investor if the activist campaign isn‟t 
successful.  During the course of the four interviews, I found overwhelming evidence that 
the „behind-the-scenes‟ negotiation process is the preferred engagement choice.  They all 
explained that engagement was a relationship process: 
“We have long term relationships with a lot, well most of the companies we invest in.  
We‟ve been on the register for a period of years, or we may have held them for some 
years, and then sold and bought back.  You know, we have relationships going back a 
long way.” 
This relationship was emphasised as well in other interviews: 
“…in our view, shareholders and managers, and boards of directors, are all wanting 
the same thing, which is for companies to do well and if they‟re not doing well right 
now to do better.  Often where we have a differing view is more around how that 
improvement in performance is achieved, and also sometimes it is around the 
perception of what is performance…” 
The interview respondents also stated that the change process works most effectively if the 
investor has a well thought out plan. 
“If you approach them with a business case and say this is important to us because 
we‟re investors and it affects value, then you have far more chance of getting change” 
They went on to say: “Our task here is to work with the boards of companies with the 
common goal of a more valuable company.  And as it should be and at its best is a 
consensual and very beneficial process.”72 
The specialist engagement institutions did raise an interesting point.  They believed that 
their approach was more likely to be successfully because the people that they used to do 
the engagement were former businessmen that knew how to run a company. 
                                                   
72 Another stated:  “All of our engagement and dialogue is fairly, it‟s not aggressive, it‟s trying to be 
done in a positive and constructive way.  We don‟t want to bang the table with a list of demands, that‟s 
not our style…” 
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“…one of the things that we have that we believe makes us a company friendly 
shareholder activist is that we have people on our team, on our engagement team, who 
have worked in companies.  They‟re not fund managers, they have never been fund 
managers, they‟re not investment bankers, and they‟re not management consultants; 
they‟re people who have been finance directors and chief executives of real companies 
managing real issues that the companies we go to talk to are grappling with, and that‟s 
hugely important… I think that fund managers can learn to engage with companies but 
they are always doing it from a fund management training and perspective.” 
The other specialist engagement institution raised the same points and emphasised their 
importance to the successful engagement campaigns that they undertake. 
The institutional investors had a general dislike for a public activism approach as it is 
regarded as counterproductive for the coercive engagement approach that was just outlined.  
One interviewee stated that using the press can close the company to the investor‟s views: 
“…we think engagement works best of you keep it private, simply because when it all 
goes wrong, you can save a little face (laughs)…  But also you learn from the company 
and … over time you move together towards a sort of agreed approach to change 
which I think is much more beneficial.” 
“I get quite cross with some of my colleagues who do leak like mad to the press and 
they know who they are, and that annoys me and I don‟t think that is particularly 
helpful…” 
The interviewees stated that they would usually only use the press if there was no other 
avenue open to them.  One of the engagement specialists stated: 
“we don‟t use the press…the reason is if we upset or alienate the company we are 
trying to engage with, or even future companies, we can quite easily do that by using 
the press and so we actually have very strict guidelines internally that we only ever 
talk to the press if there is no other avenue open to us in terms of influencing the 
company, and we‟ve told the company that we are going to do it, so we‟ve alerted them 
in advance.”73 
                                                   
73 This view was supported by the other specialist engagement institution: “…if we have gone as far as 
we can with the company and we still believe that they are just stone walling us and aren‟t being 
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In a similar vein, the institutions wouldn‟t rule out other engagement processes, such as 
requisitioning an EGM but it would only be as a last ditch effort to change the company. 
“We wouldn‟t usually do that but we have done in the past.  We prefer to work with 
companies in dialogue but we wouldn‟t rule anything out.  And we have put resolutions 
to meetings; we have requisitioned EGMs in the past.  We can and do do these things 
but it‟s not a normal approach” 
“we wouldn‟t do that unless we were really, really at the end of the rope so to speak” 
Thus, it is clear that the more adversarial approaches that are favoured by the US 
institutional investors or hedge funds don‟t have a major part to play in UK shareholder 
engagement. 
A coalition can be a very powerful tool for the shareholders, especially if the board is 
potentially unsympathetic to the investors‟ views.  Secondly, if the investor has only a small 
shareholding, a united coalition can provide a much more powerful voice that the company 
cannot ignore.   
“…for non specific governance engagement, its ok to talk, discuss and to swap ideas 
and come to similar conclusions.  So if we think that the performance criteria and 
stock option plan are unsatisfactory, we will lobby in isolation or collectively with 
other fund managers and when they (the company) hear a situation several times there 
are several examples of where those targets have been changed” 
Furthermore, the investors on the whole were not worried about concert party rules.  One (a 
specialist engagement institution) summed it up by saying: 
“We‟re not going to have aggregate positions of 30%.  If we did that would be a 
problem, but it would be a nice problem to have (due to having a large number of 
client mandates) …” 
4.3.4Engagement Resources 
The recent trend in UK corporate governance to encourage institutional investors to engage 
with their investees should have led them to allocate more resources to this area.  
Engagement resources include the actual employees tasked with researching investees and 
                                                                                                                                                     
constructive, then I think we wouldn‟t be put off writing or issuing a press release stating that we believe 
this company could be valued at a much higher rate.” 
 
114 
 
conducting the engagement.  It also includes other supplementary services, such as 
corporate governance research or corporate governance analyst‟s visits to meet with 
companies identified as requiring engagement.  Neither Holland (1998) nor Hendry et al 
(2007) documented evidence regarding the resources that are allocated to the institutional 
investors engagement practices.  However, there are two industry body reports that do 
analyse how engagement resources are changing over time.  The annual engagement 
surveys by the NAPF and IMA have illustrated that institutional investors have been 
increasing the resources they allot to engagement activities since the ISC principles were 
introduced in 2002.  The IMA found a 5.5% increase in the resources allotted by the 
institutions involved in its survey over the period 2005 to 2006, and a 10% per year increase 
for the previous two periods.  This was also confirmed by the NAPF survey, which found 
that a third of firms had increased their engagement resources since 2005.  Both surveys 
also found that firms were increasing the use of paid specialised research agencies to 
provide more information for the engagement process, for instance in cases of voting 
activity. 
From the surveys, I found evidence that institutional investors were dedicating more 
resources to the engagement process.  In order to facilitate their engagement, three 
quarters of the institutions surveyed employ Corporate Governance Specialists and two 
thirds employ SRI Specialists.  However, there was a large gap between the specialist 
institutions and the more traditional fund management companies.  Specialist institutions 
were able to allocate much more resources to the engagement process because it is their 
strategy for making a high return.  The interviewees explained that they felt all 
institutional investors are now engaging with investee companies to some degree.  As an 
interviewee put it: 
“So yes, I think engagement is something that everybody is doing.”   
However, traditional institutional investors‟ engagement teams tended to be quite small in 
comparison to the bespoke engagement houses: 
“Within the team here there are 3.5 people … which is quite big once you discount the 
specialist houses.  It‟s quite a big team.  Within that there‟s one individual whose 
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specific role is to look at the potential impact of social and environmental issues on 
our investments.”74   
However, these engagement teams are far smaller than the specialist companies whose 
teams are generally four or five times this size.  As a result, there was some scepticism 
about the scale of engagement that is being conducted, especially from the specialist 
engagement companies. One interviewee stated: 
“…that the investment industry broadly is not in fact engaging effectively with 
companies… The truth is that the fund manager industry in particular is not putting 
enough effort into this as yet…” 
“The problem is, … that it‟s just generally not done well, you know.  The poor quality 
junior resources applied to engagement…”  The interviewee went on to say “You 
know these are huge fund management companies investing trillions of dollars. I 
would have thought and they‟re getting away with this.  You know. There‟s no way one 
person can cover 4,000 companies worldwide, it‟s just a nonsense.  So there are basic 
problems here” 
“Some will re-brand or pretend that their fund managers are doing the work.  So 
they‟ll say well of course we‟re doing engagement, our fund managers meet companies 
all the time, that‟s engagement isn‟t it?  No, it‟s not.  That‟s information gathering to 
make a better trading decision you would hope.” 
The traditional institutional investors that I interviewed threw up the problems of the costs 
of engagement as a reason that investors might restrict engagement resources. 
“I think there‟s not that many UK institutions that do corporate governance properly 
really, because you need resource and it‟s still seen in a lot of places as a cost centre 
and a bit of a hassle that takes away from the fund manager‟s day job.  And if the fund 
manager is doing it then yes it probably does, which is why you need a separate team, 
but not everybody is resourced that way.” 
                                                   
74 Another house had a slightly larger team but expected it to rise: “It‟s a big team. … .  And I can only 
see it getting bigger over the next few years because we are planning to do a lot more globally over the 
next year or two.” 
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“The problem we have in the industry right now is that everyone wants this stuff but 
nobody really wants to pay for it.  My resources are quite constrained compared to the 
research budget in equity it‟s microscopic quite frankly.  But, those are the guys that 
are making the money every day.  I haven‟t demonstrated that what we are doing 
really translates into dollars.” 
It can be seen that there is a general increase in the resources that are being channelled into 
the institutional investor‟s engagement activities.  However, much larger teams may be 
needed to effectively cover all of the stocks held by some of the larger asset managers.  The 
specialist engagement houses are better able to demonstrate how their activism translates 
into performance gains, thus justifying larger teams that the more traditional institutions 
can‟t.  I will discuss a solution to this in the future of shareholder activism, as well as the 
problems of performance evaluation discussion in section 4.3.6. 
4.3.5 Issues attracting activist attention 
Hendry et al (2007) raise three areas of concern that might attract the attention of an activist 
shareholder.  They are the issues of M&A or investment decisions, Executive pay or 
contracts; and compliance with the corporate governance codes and the way in which the 
company is managed.  Similar areas are considered/identified by Holland (1998).  I probed 
this area in the interviews and did manage to obtain some additional information.  I found 
that the institutional investors were generally willing to engage on issues that had an impact 
on the firm‟s long term financial performance: 
“Can we see something in the company‟s, lets say governance broadly defined to 
include strategy, capital structure, social and environmental risk management, board 
structure, audit, remuneration, you know all the things that you might think would 
impinge upon a company‟s long term performance in all of that which explains the 
poor performance and can we address that in dialogue with the board and CEO level.  
You know, that‟s the process that we go through to identify companies for 
engagement.”   
This respondent went on to say: 
“If we have an engagement with a company it is usually on a variety of different things 
and the engagement itself might change over time.” 
Another interviewee explained the issues as defined as risk: 
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“…we have a group of companies that we have identified as high risk, high 
governance risk.  And the fund managers are aware of which those companies are and 
why they are adjudged high risk and we tend to engage with them more regularly, or 
review them more regularly.”   
Furthermore, one interviewee explained that they identified outliers in their portfolio when 
deciding whom and upon what to engage: 
“…we‟re trying to look at the governance profiles of the companies we are invested in 
to focus on who we think the underperformers are, the negative outliers, and that 
drives who we engage with, with the analysts, to try and encourage best practice and 
to bring about change.” 
On issues of SRI, the institutions were a little more dismissive.  SRI has become a much 
more publicly sensitive issue with the rise in media attention to climate change and other 
environmental issues.  One interviewee explained: 
“The line we take is we don‟t specifically engage on SRI unless our clients tell us to, 
but we recognise that social and environmental are non financial issues but as 
governance issues have the potential to impact the share price, the reputation can be 
at risk.” 
Interviewees explained the influence that the press is having in this area: 
“…it‟s a huge press/media issue, hugely topical and again another area that clients 
are asking more about…” before going on to say “…maybe one of the [news]papers 
will have a story about supply chain issues for one of the big supermarkets and that 
might generate some client interest and we may have a conversation with clients on the 
back of that.”75   
Another interviewee felt that SRI was best left to SRI specialists: 
“We think that, you know the true SRI funds a very specialist thing … best in class 
funds are still quite specialist.” 
                                                   
75 Another stated: “It was unimaginable that four or five years ago you would hear climate change 
mentioned on just about ever news programme, and in every newspaper … and so I think that it is a 
an initiative much higher up the agenda, very broadly and therefore it becomes part of the 
considerations for looking at companies as well…” 
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One of the specialist engagement houses stated that SRI was just part of the engagement 
process, but if it didn‟t translate in value enhancements they wouldn‟t engage on it: 
“…[it‟s] very important to our engagement policy to the extent that they impact on the 
values of the company concerned.  If they don‟t impact on the value then we will not 
consider them…”76 
The above quotes emphasise that the institutions will engage on a wide variety of areas as 
long as they will likely enhance the value of the target companies.  However, SRI is still a 
relatively small part of the engagement process. 
4.3.6 Performance Evaluation 
All of the interviewees felt that they were usually successful.  However, they all also said 
that there were on occasion instances in which they had to abandon the engagement process 
if they felt that they weren‟t going to obtain the desired changes.  Furthermore, one of the 
specialists did say that he/she had been forced to drop some engagements because the target 
companies had been taken over or stock market movements had moved the share price 
above their target. 
During the interviews, I found that the traditional asset managers had difficulty in linking 
their engagement to performance improvements.  Rather than measure the performance in 
terms of share price improvements, they preferred to look at whether their desired changes 
had been implemented by the investees. 
“I think we realise the limitations of measuring what we‟re actually doing because 
governance changes over really quite a long time period and I think we have to be 
aware of that really for us it‟s all about seeing the overall governance, quality of the 
governance, if you like, improving over time.  Like you know, more better quality non 
execs, like the Chairman‟s not sitting on the audit committee.  Like they have a proper 
nominations process.  That‟s I think one way of looking at outcomes for us” 
However, the specialist engagement institutions had a much more in depth methodology for 
evaluating performance.  In addition to the share price measures that I discussed earlier, 
                                                   
76 This was supported by one of the traditional asset managers: “Purely we don‟t have the aim or the 
objective of bringing about social and environmental change (it) is not what we‟re about.  It‟s an overlay 
to the existing process because really we want to tick the box for performance, that‟s what most of our 
clients are (concerned) about…” 
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they also continually measure their engagement relative to the engagement plan that they 
originally started with.  One specialist said: 
“…we keep a running sheet of the engagement actions taken to date and the 
engagement actions to come.  And so we can assess on that roughly how far down the 
engagement programme we are, but the milestones are quite difficult to set because 
really you are moving the goal posts all the time (as the engagement progresses and 
evolves)…”77 
One of the main sections on the ISC principles was that the institutions must monitor and 
evaluate their engagement process.  On the whole, I found evidence that the engaged 
investors were carrying out this process.  However, the different approaches to performance 
evaluation are influenced by the difference in engagement approaches.  Specialists who 
purchase stocks for a specific engagement purpose are able to easily measure the changes 
by way of company performance changes as well as share price improvements.  However, 
for institutions that engage with companies already within their portfolio, they have to 
measure performance by more subtle factors, such as changes to remuneration schemes or 
changes in board composition.  This process of performance evaluation allows the 
institutions to then report more effectively on their engagement activities. 
4.3.7 Transparency and Disclosure 
The 2007 Fair Pensions Survey78 is an annual survey that looks at UK institutional 
investors‟ performance in the fields of engagement, responsible investment (RI) and 
transparency.  It was very critical of institutional investors for their lack of disclosure on 
their voting and engagement activities.  In the interviews, I asked the interviewees why they 
didn‟t make full public disclosure.  One of the institutions said that they didn‟t think the 
cost of creating a website in order to disclose their engagement activities was a good use of 
client funds. 
                                                   
77 The other engagement institution had a similar process: “It‟s then monitored in value terms relative to 
the sector share price, and a share price relative to a target is set and a period over which that should be 
achieved along with the objectives within the engagement.  So, very, very vigorous and subject to monthly 
review of the progress.  The other engagements, more structural also have controls and we review them 
weekly but we review them on the basis of what is happening on a rolling basis and we will cut the 
engagements out of the list where we feel we‟re not getting any worth, but we have less rigorous controls 
on those.” 
78 “UK Pension Scheme Transparency Survey on Environmental, Social and Governance Issues,” 
December 2007, www.fairpensions.org 
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“I‟m very wary in the US for our mutual funds by law you have to report every single 
bit of engagement and every single proxy vote and how you voted on every single fund.  
It costs us $2m a year and the website gets I think about a 150 hits a year, mostly from 
journalists and single issue groups.  I‟m not sure that‟s the best use of our resources.  
I‟d rather be using those resources to bring about change for our client, that‟s what I 
want to do.” 
However, one non specialist institution disagreed with this viewpoint. 
“It‟s not that difficult.  We‟re doing all of the reports internally for clients anyway.  
From our perspective it was not that difficult.  You just need to set up a process each 
month to make sure the information is summarised and put on the web and its not… for 
us it wasn‟t a big job…” 
The other institutions said that they made their own disclosure to their clients.  It was then 
their clients‟ decision regarding whether they made disclosure or not. 
I actually advised against public disclosure of voting, but they wanted to do it.  The 
reason we don‟t make engagement public of course is that that would disrupt 
engagement activities and we want to be able to work with the companies that we‟re 
currently working with, and with the next companies…But it‟s not a matter of public 
interest, it‟s a matter of client interest and we report fully to our clients… 
Thus the rationale is that disclosure of engagement activities could harm the institutions‟ 
relationships with firms, which make the engagement successful.   
I also asked questions regarding the prospect of mandatory voting disclosure or 
engagement.  All four institutions were unanimously against mandated engagement or 
voting disclosure.  They felt that the only possible outcome of this move would be to force 
all institutions to adopt a „box-ticking‟ approach to satisfy the regulatory regime.   
“I think disclosure and transparency is a good thing in principle, but I think you need 
to ask what is it that you are trying to achieve.  It is just swamping everybody with 
data, or is providing information to people about what you have done and what you 
have achieved.  And I think mandatory disclosure of voting only tells people that you 
have voted a lot, or didn‟t vote much” 
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“It‟s rather like mandatory voting per se.  It encourages unthinking voting I think and I 
don‟t think it‟s necessary.  The UK has done a great job I think on sorting out 
regulatory approaches best practice to these things.  I think the institutions themselves 
need to look a bit more closely, as we have said several times, at the quality of the 
work they are doing.  But the best practice approach is probably the best approach.”  
The result would be that the activities of those institutions that are currently engaging 
because they feel it is a worthwhile activity would be diluted. 
“…if anything it dilutes the impact of those shareholders that have paid for the 
research, have given it a lot of thought, have in house expertise, met with the 
company…”79 
“It may happen.  But if you do require disclosure are you going to get any better 
quality?  I mean the US has disclosure on voting and it‟s appalling the quality of the 
work done out there.  So I don‟t think disclosure will make any difference to the quality 
of that.  It may lead to an acceptance of a low level of activity being alright.  So I don‟t 
think it is the solution. … I think that would be unfortunate because once you start 
introducing rules everybody starts to get a bit more twitchy and we go down the route 
where they go in the US where everybody does an information dump to their website 
every month that is a completely full, sort of, disclosure of everything and you would 
find it much more difficult to actually use it. You wouldn‟t be able to see the wood for 
the trees because exactly, it would just be box ticking.” 
Thus, I found that the institutions opposed mandated disclosure because it would hinder 
their ability to continue to engage with investees because it was a valued part of their 
investment process. 
4.3.8 Hedge Funds as activists 
I found a general wariness of the recent rise in hedge fund activism, mainly caused by the 
potential different outcomes that the hedge funds sought relative to those of the more 
traditional institutional investors.  There was a general concern that hedge funds tend to 
                                                   
79 This view was shared by another interviewee: “It would just be going through the motions and it 
would probably undermine those of us that are trying to do it properly really.  If they‟re not 
interested, you know if investors aren‟t interested then there‟s no point forcing it.  I do think 
gradually, gradually there will be more, increasing interest in this area.  There‟s always going to be 
some.” 
 
122 
 
conduct their activist campaigns publicly.  A representative from one of the engagement 
institutions told us: 
“On the downside we would argue that nearly all hedge funds run their shareholder 
engagement campaigns in the public domain, and we don‟t do that broadly speaking 
and we think there are several reasons why that is detrimental to long term 
shareholder value.”80 
The institutions also generally viewed hedge funds as having a different activism horizon 
and process from their traditional approach.  Hedge funds were viewed as having more 
short term horizons: 
“I think its their time frame as such often leads them to push for changes that we 
would not necessarily have identified as the most obvious changes…”81 
However, not all of the hedge fund‟s activities were viewed negatively.  One interviewee 
explained: 
“I actually think you need hedge funds.  Hedge funds provide vital liquidity in the 
market.… When [Hedge Fund] does unlock some value at [Company] I would love to 
capture some of that, you know there is a free rider effect there as well so I think there 
is a role to play (by hedge funds).” 
Another interviewee further identified the role of a hedge fund activism in a situation where 
the company would be hard to change using traditional engagement: 
“Everyone just said there is no way we‟re ever going to bring about any change in this 
company, we‟re just wasting our time, and [Hedge Fund] did it by saying your strategy 
is crap and you‟re up for sale…. And if they hadn‟t taken that aggressive stance 
nothing would have changed at [Company] for generations...” 
It is clear that the traditional institutional investors are wary of the potential damage that a 
hedge fund campaign can have, either through press leakages or by calling for short term 
                                                   
80 This view was also shared by another institution: “the other thing that a lot of companies are nervous 
about, particularly the larger ones, is about whether what they discuss with us will end up in the press 
and again this is where hedge funds have not done the broader shareholder activism case or cause a lot 
of good because they are not always as responsible when it comes to acting with confidentiality, not to 
say that they do anything illegal but they breach confidences” 
81 Another interviewee supported this view: “…there are of course hedge funds around which do have a 
different investment horizon and therefore take actions which may be contrary to our clients interests so 
we have to be very wary of that.” 
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changes that might not be in the long term shareholders interests.  However, hedge funds 
can also play a vital role in changing companies at which a traditional engagement approach 
might be futile. Hedge funds also create opportunities for the traditional funds to free-ride 
on them. 
4.3.9 Future of Shareholder Activism in the UK 
I also asked the interviewees how they felt the shareholder engagement arena in the UK 
would develop.  One non specialist institution expected that a lot of the engagement would 
be carried out overseas. 
“Possibly more focussed overseas though because a lot of the big battles have been 
fought in the UK.  You know we don‟t have two year (CEO) contracts anymore, for 
example.  We have on the whole a balance between execs and non execs.  So there are 
maybe not that many easy targets to go for, whereas I think maybe overseas there are, 
looked at from a UK context.  Whereas looked at from a local market context a lot of 
these companies are doing the right thing but we would certainly still see room for 
improvement.” 
A number of the institutions questioned also thought that here would be an increase in the 
specialist engagement institutions in the UK. 
“…a lot more third party boutiques doing that stuff.  If a client of mine wants a higher 
degree of service than he‟s getting from me, there‟s no reason why he can‟t outsource 
that bit and say ok, I‟m going to give XYZ the engagement and we‟ll work with those.  I 
can see that in the model of the future, I can see that happening. Specialist managers 
doing a specialist process, it‟s an interesting option and you‟ll see more and more of 
that I think.” 
I think more specialist engagement funds would be a good idea.  I think hedge funds 
will get bored with this strategy in time because a true hedge fund is a market anomaly 
arbitrageur, and that is much more short term than engagement is.   
A couple of the institutions also said that they felt that pension funds would be the driving 
force of the institutions‟ future engagements. 
“Well I think pension funds will end up driving it, because they‟re closest to the people 
whose interests they represent.  I think pension fund trustees, because some of them are 
pensioners within the pension fund they are trustees of, but also because they are part 
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of unions and so on, I think they probably have a much closer connection with the 
interests of pension scheme members, and therefore are more likely to say/to feel 
comfortable saying „our membership believes this is an important thing to do.”82 
Thus, it can be seen that the future of the shareholder engagement environment will be 
driven by the pension funds as their members become more aware of the impact that this 
process can have.  There will also be a place for more engagement institutions.  As one 
engagement institution specialist stated: 
“The great thing for the pension funds is that if they wanted to do this themselves, they 
would not be able to build a resource like we have here as it would be too expensive.  
And even if they did try and do that, all they would be doing is replicating the work we 
are doing here because pension funds want the same thing, fiduciary duty says that 
they want a more valuable pension fund and we can provide that” 
Thus the future will involve a combination of more pension fund pressure and engagement 
activities through specialist engagement houses that have the resources to bring about real, 
value enhancing change at the companies they target. 
4.4 Conclusions 
Shareholder engagement has become a very hot topic in recent years, not least through the 
publication of the Myners Review in which the case for increased engagement was put 
forward.  The ISC Statement of Principles in 2002 were an attempt to head off any moves to 
legally mandate institutional investors to engage with their investee companies, instead 
offering a voluntary framework.   
UK industry bodies, such as the IMA do not like to call their investors activists due to the 
negative connotation that it can have.  Interestingly, I found that the terms engagement or 
activism are generally used interchangeably.  Only one interviewee explicitly stated they are 
not an activist.  Most felt that the investees understood them enough to not view them as 
                                                   
82 This view was supported by another interviewee: “When the man in the street continues raising his 
awareness and writes to his trustee saying what are you doing about this?  And the trustee is going to 
look at those letters and write to us saying what are you doing about this?  Start doing X or we‟re going 
to Y.  That‟s when we‟ll get that step change. But at the moment, by and large, most pensioners and 
employees and us in the street have our eyes on the money and the bottom line, and until we demonstrate 
that what we‟re doing is explicitly part of the money they‟re going to get, that‟s what we need.  It‟s a lot 
better than it was, I think its evolving but we‟re not quite there yet.  That‟s what will really unlock change 
and if we prove it works which I don‟t think we have yet…” 
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aggressive activists.  However, in Continental Europe, the term activist may cause problems 
because of the negative connotations it has there. 
I also found some evidence that investee companies were increasingly wary of being 
targeted by an „activist‟.  The interviewees attributed this to the hedge fund activism 
movement and the damage they are doing to „engaged investors‟.  Hedge funds were 
blamed for being too high profile and in some instances breaking confidences.  Thus it was 
harder to form a relationship to bring about change where necessary.  The interviewees 
were also wary of hedge fund activists.  None of the interviewees would coordinate 
activism with hedge funds for fear of damaging their reputation.  It was also raised that they 
were wary of hedge funds trying to glean information from traditional institutions for their 
own purposes and serve their own interests that might not be aligned with those of 
traditional institutional investors.   
I found that respondents only had limited teams for conducting corporate governance 
screening, often employing as few as 3 or 4 individuals to cover an equity investment 
universe of more than 1,000 stocks.  There are fewer still SRI specialists and those that exist 
often perform other roles within the equity research function.  From the interviews, I found 
that the general consensus was that SRI engagement is better left to specialist SRI houses 
and that general institutional investors would not pursue SRI based engagement too 
vigorously if shareholder value might be put at risk.  This would continue to be the case 
until SRI issues (such as climate change) become more high profile placing more pressure 
to engage on these issues would feed through the investment chain from the public (as 
pension investors) to the fund managers (through investment mandates).  In this regard, the 
pension fund trustees would be the driving force for engagement on SRI, as well as other 
corporate governance issues within the UK. 
The Fair Pensions Report in 2007 states that voluntary voting disclosure is not working and 
regulation is the way forward.  However, my survey of engaged investors shows that this 
approach would more probably do more harm than good to the engagement process.  
Interviewee and survey respondents unanimously feared legally mandated engagement and 
voting disclosures as they felt it would hinder those that currently engage „because they 
believe in it‟ rather than to tick boxes for the regulators.  Much of the corporate governance 
and voting work would be contracted out to voting and research agencies.  Furthermore, 
they agreed that detailed disclosure of voting would not be widely used, except for special 
interest groups.  In this regard, the TUC was cited as a body that was possibly not using 
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client disclosure reports for the manner in which they were intended all of the time (i.e. they 
were being used for political purposes not for the benefits of their member‟s investments). 
Finally, the interviewees agreed that the future of activism probably lay in the hands of 
specialist engagement institutions unless they can obtain the necessary funding to expand 
their own departments significantly.  I found some evidence that the interviewees were 
unable to link their engagement efforts with improved investment performance.  This was 
limiting their ability to increase efforts in the engagement area.  However, they all expected 
the overall level of engagement to increase voluntarily without the need to legally mandate 
the institutions to do it anyway. 
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Chapter 5 - Impact of Shareholder Activism in the UK on 
Operating Performance and Shareholder Value 
 
 
5.1  Introduction 
As the literature review in Chapter 2 states, the impact of shareholder activism on target 
companies is mixed.  There are as many studies finding a positive impact on target firms as 
there are negative.  However, thus far only Becht et al (2008) study the impact in the UK.  
They find a positive impact on target firms when using a sample of companies targeted by 
the Hermes UK Focus Fund.  However, this fund could be seen as very much operating in 
the mould of a hedge fund.  They take concentrated positions in a small number of 
companies in which they push for change in order to derive an improvement in the target 
company‟s shareholder value performance. 
In this chapter I assess the impact of shareholder activism in the UK with a large sample of 
institutional investors in contrast to the focus on a single investor in Becht et al (2008).  The 
literature review in chapter 2, as well as the survey results from chapter 4 indicates that the 
UK shareholder – director relationship is much less confrontational than in the US.  As a 
result, engagement by UK investors assumes different forms from those in the US. There is 
no focus lists published.  Private negotiation is the preferred approach for UK institutional 
shareholders.  This approach may be supplemented by targeted shareholder voting at annual 
and extraordinary general meetings (AGMs and EGMs) where the shareholders feel it is 
necessary to abstain or vote against company resolutions in order to get their concerns 
recognised by investee management.  I use the following hypotheses to test the impact of 
UK activism: 
H1: Firms targeted by shareholder activists generate more long term shareholder 
value following targeting than a control group of non-targeted firms 
H2: Firms targeted by shareholder activists enjoy improved operating performance 
after targeting relative to a control group of non-targeted firms. 
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H3: Firms targeted by private negotiation generate long term improvements in 
shareholder value and operating performance than firms targeted using other methods 
H4: Targeting through shareholder resolutions generates shareholder value losses. 
H5: Firms targeted repeatedly over the sample period perform worse than those only 
targeted once. 
H6: Firms targeted through shareholder activism exhibit worse operating performance 
relative to the control firms at the time of targeting. 
5.2 Sample Selection and Test methodology 
In order to test the above hypotheses, I build three samples following the sampling criteria 
outlined in chapter 3. These samples are defined in Table 5.1.  I compile a sample of 595 
companies targeted by voting (against or abstentions) at 1668 of their annual general 
meetings (AGMs) and extraordinary general meetings (EGMs); a sample of 172 companies 
that were targeted 249 times by activist institutions through private negotiation; and a 
sample of 29 companies that faced 29 EGMs requisitioned by activist institutions. 
[INSERT Table 5.1 HERE] 
5.2.1 Test Methodology 
Shareholder Value Impact 
Chapter 3 defines the test methodology that I employ to assess the impact of shareholder 
activism in the UK.  Over the short term,83 I measure CARs over an 11 day (-5, +5) 
windows centred on the announcement date, Day 0.  Over the long term, I measure BHARs 
covering 12, 24 and 36 month windows.   For the short and long term analysis, I calculate 
abnormal returns using matched control firms as well as the FTSE All Share return.84  I also 
calculate calendar time portfolio returns and regressions using the Carhart (1997) four 
factor model over the long term.  As a robustness check I calculate calendar time portfolio 
returns using the Fama French (1993) model, as well as GARCH model abnormal returns.  I 
                                                   
83 Short term CARs are not calculated for the negotiation sample.  See Chapter 3 for an explanation why. 
84 The Long term results using the FTSE All Share return benchmark give similar results to the control 
group returns and as such are not reported. 
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also calculate calendar time regressions using the Fama French (1993) and Carhart (1997) 
benchmark models as outlined in chapter 3. The results of the robustness checks can be 
found in the appendices at the end of this chapter. 
Change in Target firm Characteristics  
In order to assess the drivers of changes in shareholder value I analyse the impact of each 
type of activism on the targets‟ operating performance.  Changes are calculated relative to 
the change in the control firm, and the median industry firms to give an abnormal change 
over the sample period.  I subsequently calculate the t and Wilcoxon z statistics for the 
mean and median abnormal performance changes to test whether these changes are 
significantly different from zero.  See chapter 3 for a full explanation of the variables and 
methods of analysis used. 
5.3 Results 
5.3.1 Sample descriptive statistics  
Table 5.2 presents data on descriptive statistics for firms targeted by institutional investors 
over the sample period.  I report mean and median values for firm characteristics 30 days 
before the targeting occurs.  For firms targeted by private negotiation, I report the figures at 
the start of the quarter in which they are entered into our portfolio.  For firms targeted more 
than once the reported figures are at the time of the first targeting.  I discuss median values 
unless specified. 
[INSERT Table 5.2 HERE] 
Panel A of Table 5.2 reports descriptive statistics for the sample of firms targeted by 
shareholder resolutions.  Targeted firms have negative prior returns (mean prior 2 year  
BHAR -6.45% vs. 9.02%, p-value 0.09) but are larger than control firms when measured 
using market value (£20.85m vs. £18.10m, p-value 0.00) and have lower levels of 
EBITDA/TA (-0.16 vs. 0.01, p-stat 0.04).  However, they do hold more cash in hand 
(£8.81m vs. £8.01m, p-value 0.03) than control firms.  Target firms also have larger 
negative ROA (-15.86% vs. 2.53%, p-value 0.00).  This is consistent with the poor cash 
flows generated by the company.  Finally, target firms have lower book to market ratios 
than the control firms (0.61 vs. 0.66, p-value 0.10). The remainder of the other variables are 
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not significant.  These statistics indicate that one month prior to targeting, despite being 
larger than control firms the targets of shareholder resolutions are performing poorly 
compared to their matched control firms.  This result is consistent with prior US research as 
outlined in chapter 2.  Furthermore, firms targeted using shareholder resolutions are 
hoarding marginally more cash than the control sample.  This is consistent with US 
literature, particularly research into hedge fund targeting which shows that firms are cash 
rich at the time of targeting by an activist shareholder. 
Panel B reports similar descriptive statistics for the sample of firms targeted by private 
negotiation.  Over the two years prior to targeting, target firms generate a higher abnormal 
return than the control sample (3.99% vs. 1.73%, p-value 0.05).  Target firms have higher 
cash balances on the balance sheet (£56.1m vs. £42m, p-value 0.00).  However, the cash 
flow is marginally smaller when measured using EBITDA as a proportion of total assets 
(0.08 vs. 0.09, z-stat -0.39).  Furthermore, Target firms generate higher dividend yields for 
investors (2.4% vs. 2.23%, p-value 0.04); marginally lower ROA (6.8% vs. 6.91%, p-value 
0.05).  The remainder of the other variables are not significant.  These results indicate that 
targets of institutional investors‟ privately negotiated activism are performing marginally 
better than control firms at the time of targeting.  This contradicts the findings of previous 
US research into activism of this type in which poor performance was highlighted as the 
main reason for targeting (see the results of Nesbitt, 1994; Huson, 1997 and Nelson, 2006 
as highlighted in Appendix 2.1).  As I highlighted in chapter 2, UK institutional investors 
enjoy a much friendlier relationship with their investee‟s boards than their US counterpart.  
Therefore UK investors might use negotiation as a preventative tool designed to prevent 
companies with reasonable performance from suffering a downturn in fortune. 
Panel C reports descriptive statistics for the sample of firms targeted by voting activity.  
Targets have more cash on their balance sheets than control firms (£23.59m vs. £15.86m, p-
value 0.01).  Target firms also have slightly lower book to market values than the control 
firms (mean 0.61 vs. 0.62, p-value 0.09).  None of the other variables are significant.  These 
results indicate that firms that are targeted by voting activity is directed against firms that 
have high cash balances, but are generally average performing when measured by book to 
market ratios.  Again, this contrasts with the US findings by incumbent research which 
indicates that targets of activism are performing poorly when compared to matched control 
firms.  This result provides further proof that UK institutional investors might take a pre-
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emptive stance on their engagement programme, choosing to address any concerns that they 
might have about the company before they manifest into larger issues and poor 
performance. 
To summarise, target firms are generally average performers compared to the control firms 
around the time of targeting through both private negotiation and voting activity.  This 
result is inconsistent with the incumbent literature and gives an indication that UK 
institutional investors take a more preventative stance on their engagement programmes 
than their US counterparts.  However, firms targeted using shareholder resolutions are 
performing poorly compared to their matched control firms when the targeting occurs.  This 
is consistent with prior research into shareholder activism and is intuitive as targeting by 
shareholder resolutions is a severe activism strategy in the UK and will likely be reserved 
for the most extreme cases.85 I also find evidence that target firms have larger cash balances 
that a control firm, which is consistent with US findings, particularly the findings of 
research studying hedge fund activism as outlined in chapter 2 (see for instance Klein and 
Zur, 2008). 
5.3.2 Change in Operating Performance 
Table 5.3 presents data on the change operating performance for firms targeted by 
institutional investors over the sample period.  I report mean and median values for 
abnormal changes relative to the control groups and the median firm in the target‟s 2-digit 
SIC industry.  I discuss median values in this analysis unless stated otherwise.  A score of 
1.0 indicates a 100% increase in the variable.  Values are not statistically significant unless 
stated. 
[INSERT Table 5.3 HERE] 
Panel A of Table 5.3 reports change statistics for firms targeted through the medium of 
shareholder resolutions.  Targets have a negative mean abnormal change in dividend yield 
relative to control firms (-0.57, sig. 1%).  ROA declines relative to the control firms (-1.88, 
sig. 1% and the abnormal change in ROA is also negative relative to the median industry 
firms (-1.36, sig. 1%) ROE increases relative to the industry median firms (mean 0.43, sig. 
1%).  Furthermore, cash flow when measured by EBITDA/TA declines against control 
firms (-2.02, sig. 1%). However, relative to the median industry firms EBITDA/TA 
increases (mean 1.82, sig. 5%).  None of the other variables are significant.  In general, I 
                                                   
85 See literature review in chapter 2 for detailed analysis of prior research findings. 
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find that firms targeted by shareholder resolutions underperform both the control firms and 
the median industry firms.  Intuitively, this sounds plausible.  Shareholder resolutions are 
one of the more severe forms of activism in the UK and as such their use would indicate 
serious problems with the target company.  This is consistent with the findings of prior 
research in which shareholder proposals by US activists are shown to have little or negative 
impacts on target firms‟ operating performance. 
Panel B reports similar results for firms targeted by private negotiation.  The MV of 
targeted firms outperforms the median industry firms with an abnormal change of 1.15 (sig. 
1%).  Targets enjoy a small negative abnormal change relative to the median industry group 
(-0.13, sig. 1%).  I find a negative abnormal change in dividend yield against the industry 
median firms (-0.05, sig. 1%) and a similar level of performance for ROE versus both 
benchmarks (Control Groups (CG): -0.06, sig. 1%; Industry Median (IM): -0.76, sig. 1%).  
When measured using ROA, targets underperform the sample of industry median firms (-
0.37, p-value 010).  Target firms generate a negative abnormal change in cash on the 
balance sheet versus both the control firms (-1.07, sig. 1%).  The result is similar when 
measured as EBITDA/TA, (-0.32, sig. 1%).  None of the other variables are significant.  To 
summarise, we find that firms targeted by private negotiation generally underperform both a 
matched sample of control firms and the median industry firms over the sample period.  
However they experience reductions in cash balances after targeting by an activist.  A 
possible explanation is that the engagement by institutions is distracting for management 
due to the more involved process that it entails (Lipton and Rosenblum, 1991).  The reduced 
cash might be accounted for by the decline in cash flow and general operating performance 
of the targets.  The fall in dividend yield indicates that little if any of the cash reduction was 
a result of cash returns to shareholders. 
Finally, Panel C reports operating performance changes for the sample of firms targeted 
through voting activity.  I find that target firms outperform the control firms on MV (0.45, 
sig. 1%).  They outperform the benchmark of industry median firms on dividend yield 
(0.06, sig. 10%).  Target firms outperform the control firms when measured by ROA (0.03, 
sig. 1%) and ROE (0.15, sig. 1%).  However, on both these variables the abnormal change 
relative to the industry medians is negative (ROA: -0.33, sig. 1%; ROE: -0.42, sig. 10%).  
However, when cash flow is measured by EBITDA/TA, the abnormal change is negative 
relative to both benchmarks (CG: -0.04, z-stat -1.3, sig. 10%; IM: -0.39, sig. 10%).  Finally, 
the abnormal change in book to market values is also negative against the industry median 
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firms (-0.55, sig. 1%).    None of the other variables are significant.  To summarise, I find 
that target firms generally outperform the control firms over our sample period.  However, 
when the abnormal change is measured relative to the industry medians, my findings are 
mixed. A possible reason is that the voting activity is a sign that although there are 
problems with the company, they are not severe enough to inhibit its long term growth).  
Alternatively, the results could indicate that the public nature of targeted voting is powerful 
in forcing targeted firm management to address the concerns raised by the activists about 
the way in which the company is operating.  My results are consistent with the incumbent 
research as outlined in chapter 2.  Thus this section shows that targeting by activist 
shareholders has a negative impact on operating performance when conducted using 
shareholder resolutions or private negotiation, but targeted voting has positive results. 
5.3.3 Shareholder Value  
I report the shareholder value performance of the target companies relative to a number of 
benchmarks as outlined earlier.  In order to make the presentation of the results clearer, I 
split the results by the subsamples analysed.  For the purposes of this discussion, I focus on 
the median abnormal return over the 11 day window (-5, +5)86 for the short term analysis, 
and the median abnormal returns over the 3 year window (+1, +36) for the long term 
analysis.  Returns over the other windows are reported in the tables. 
Shareholder Resolutions 
Table 5.4 reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the target 
firms in the Resolutions sample.  Values are not statistically significant unless stated. 
[INSERT Table 5.4 HERE] 
Panel A of Table 5.4 reports short term CARs for the targets relative to the control firms 
and the FTSE All Share index for the requisition date, proxy mailing date and for the 
meeting date at which the shareholder proposal is submitted.  Relative to the control group, 
I find a positive abnormal return of 0.81% (sig. 1%) surrounding the requisition date for an 
EGM.  This abnormal return grows to 2.46% (sig. 1%) surrounding the date at which the 
proxy forms are posted to the shareholders of the targeted company.  When using the FTSE 
All Share as the benchmark we find a negative return of -1.46% (sig. 10%) over the 11 day 
                                                   
86 The returns observed over the 3 day (-1,+1) and 7 day (-3,+3) windows are consistent with htose for the 
11 day window and as such are not reported. 
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windows surrounding the meeting date.  None of the other variables are significant.  My 
results are consistent with the prior research from the US looking into shareholder proposal 
targeting.   
A possible reason for these results is that the stock market reacts positively to news that a 
shareholder is targeting the company.  As previously stated, a shareholder resolution is seen 
as a severe form of activism in the UK.  As such the market might be reacting to news that 
the shareholders are trying to address serious problems at the company.  However, all of the 
proposals in the sample were defeated.  The negative stock price reaction around the 
meeting date might indicate that the stock market is reacting badly to the news that the 
underperformance at the company is likely to continue.  This theory is supported by the data 
presented on the operating performance of the targets 30 days prior to targeting in which I 
showed that they underperform relative to a sample of matched control firms. 
Panel B of Table 5.4 reports the results of the long term BHAR analysis for firms targeted 
by shareholder resolutions.  Over the 3 year period after the meeting at which the 
shareholder proposal was submitted, I find that targeted companies underperform a sample 
of control firms by -1.51% (sig. 5%).  None of the other variables are significant.  This 
supports my theory that the stock market has reacted negatively to the news that the 
resolution was defeated.  The results regarding the change in operating performance and 
strategic variables also support this theory as they highlighted the continued 
underperformance of targeted companies relative to the control sample and the median firm 
in their industry. 
To summarise, I document positive abnormal returns surrounding the requisitions date and 
mailing date for the proxy forms over the short term.  However, over the long term I find 
negative abnormal returns which are consistent with the continued underperformance of the 
target firms‟ operating performance relative to the control firms and the median firm from 
the target‟s industry.  This result is consistent with prior research in the US which found 
negative returns for firms targeted through shareholder proposals (Wahal, 1996; Del 
Guercio and Hawkins, 1999) 
Private Negotiation 
I only analyse the impact of shareholder activism through private negotiation over the long 
term due to the lack of a defined event date as highlighted in the earlier section on data 
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collection in chapter 3.  Table 5.5 reports the results of the long term analysis for the sample 
of firms targeted by private negotiation.  I split the main sample into two subsamples 
depending on whether the engagement by the institutional investor was on only one issue, 
or whether they had more wide ranging concerns over the company‟s direction.  Values are 
not statistically significant unless stated. 
[INSERT Table 5.5 HERE] 
Panel A of Table 5.5 reports the BHARs using the returns on the matched control firms as 
the benchmark.  I find no significant returns relative to the control groups.   Panel B reports 
the results of the calendar time portfolio returns using the Carhart (1997) four factor model.  
For the complete sample of firms targeted by private negotiation I document a negative 
abnormal return of -3.47% (sig. 1%).  Firms targeted on only one issue generate negative 
returns of -3.56% (sig. 1%).  None of the other variables are significant.   
To summarise, I find that the sample of firms targeted through private negotiation generate 
negative abnormal returns when measured against the Carhart (1997) four factor model.  
This is inconsistent with prior research by Becht et al (2008) who study the returns to 
shareholders targeted by the Hermes UK Focus Fund.  It is also inconsistent with prior US 
research (Carleton et al, 1998). However, the results are consistent with my earlier findings 
that the change in target firms‟ operating performance as a result of targeting through 
private negotiation is poor compared to benchmark firms.  A possible explanation for these 
results is that the issues causing concern for the institutional investors are proving difficult 
to address through this softer form of activism.   
Targeted Voting 
In order to accurately analyse the impact of institutional investors‟ targeted voting activity 
on target companies, I split the main sample into a number of subsamples.  This allows 
analysis regarding the manner in which different voting behaviour manifests itself into 
shareholder value changes.  I report the results for each subsample group separately, before 
bringing the results together in a summary at the end of the section. 
Full Sample 
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Table 5.6 reports the shareholder value impact of the complete voting sample.  Due to the 
size of the sample, I subsample further by meeting type (AGM or EGM) and by voting 
direction (votes against or abstention votes).  Values are not statistically significant unless 
stated. 
[INSERT Table 5.6 HERE] 
Panel A of Table 5.6 presents the results of the short term analysis for our complete sample 
of voting events.  For the sample of firms targeted at AGMs, I find a marginal positive 
return of 0.01% (sig. 1%) while the sample of firms targeted at EGMs over the sample 
period return 0.76% (sig. 1%) relative to the control firms.  Firms targeted by votes against 
generate a positive abnormal return of 0.05% (sig. 1%) while those that are targeted by 
abstention votes generate a negative abnormal return of -0.01% (sig. 1%).  When measured 
using the FTSE All Share as the benchmark, the complete sample of voting events generates 
a positive abnormal return of 0.19% (sig. 1%).  Firms targeted at AGMs produce a positive 
abnormal return of 0.22% (sig. 1%) while those targeted at EGMs generate a return of 
1.80% (sig. 1%) relative to the FTSE All Share benchmark.  Furthermore, I find that firms 
targeted by votes against generate a positive abnormal return of 0.10% (sig. 5%) while 
firms targeted by abstention votes generate a positive abnormal return of 0.25% (sig. 5%).  
These results indicate a positive stock market reaction to the targeted voting activity UK 
institutional investors.  
Panel B reports the abnormal returns for the complete voting sample for the long term 
windows.  Relative to the control group, the sample of targeted firms generated an abnormal 
return of -2.63% (sig. 1%) over the three years from the time of the final targeting.  For 
firms targeted at an AGM, the abnormal return was -3.96% (sig. 1%).  Firms targeted using 
votes against the resolutions generated abnormal returns of -3.95% (sig. 1%) while those 
targeted at EGMs returned -4.10% (sig. 1%) relative to the control firms.  These results are 
consistent with our theory that firms targeted at an EGM will perform worse than firms 
targeted at an EGM due to the negative signals that it purveys.  However, the negative 
abnormal returns are indicative that the stock market perceives firms targeted through 
voting activity to have sustained problems. 
Panel C reports the calendar time portfolio returns using the Carhart (1997) benchmark 
model.  For the complete sample, I find a negative abnormal return of -3.81% (sig. 1%).  
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Firms targeted at an AGM generated a negative abnormal return of -3.88% (sig. 1%) while 
firms targeted at an EGM produced negative abnormal returns of -7.52% (sig. 1%).  
Targeting through votes against produce negative abnormal returns of -4.57% (sig. 1%) 
while firms targeted through abstention votes produce negative returns of -6.92% (sig. 1%). 
Overall, I find that our sample of firms targeted by voting activity generally produce 
positive abnormal returns over the short term when measured relative to the control firms 
and FTSE All Share.  These results support the findings of Becht et al (2008).  However, 
over the long term the abnormal returns are negative relative to both benchmarks used.  
These results are consistent with prior US literature (see Chapter 2).  They might indicate 
that the stock market reacts positively to the news that an institutional investor is targeting a 
company.  However, over the longer term the underperformance is not properly addressed, 
as the negative ROA and ROE relative to the median industry firms documented earlier 
suggests. 
Targeting on Single or Multiple Issues 
Table 5.7 reports the results of the shareholder value impact of targeting by voting activity 
where only one issue or multiple issues are targeted at each meeting.  As in the previous 
analysis, I subsample the results into the meeting type and voting direction.  Results are not 
statistically significant unless stated. 
[INSERT Table 5.7 HERE] 
Panel A of Table 5.7 reports the short term impact of targeting on only one issue.  When 
using the control groups as the benchmark, I find that the complete sample of meetings at 
which only one issue was subject to targeted voting generates an abnormal return of 0.08% 
(sig. 1%).  For firms that were targeted at an AGM, I find a positive abnormal return of 
0.05% (sig. 1%) while targeting at an EGM produces an abnormal return of 0.76% (sig. 
1%).  Targeting by voting against a single issue resolution generates a return of 0.22% (sig. 
1%) while abstaining from voting produced an abnormal return of -0.02% (sig. 1%).  When 
I use the FTSE All Share as the benchmark, the complete sample of firms targeted on only 
one issue generates an abnormal return of 0.26% (sig. 1%).  Voting activity at an AGM 
produces a positive abnormal return of 0.37% (sig. 1%) whereas EGM targeting generates a 
larger abnormal return of 1.80% (sig. 1%).  I further find that voting against a resolution 
generates an abnormal return of 0.41% (sig. 1%) compared to an abnormal return of 0.26% 
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3) for targeting by abstaining from voting.  This results suggest that the stock market reacts 
more positively to news that an institutional investor has targeted a company using voting 
activity at an EGM, or has voting against a resolution.  It confirms my earlier findings that 
the market is in favour of targeted voting activity. 
Panel B reports the results of the long term analysis of voting on only one issue at a 
meeting.  Relative to the control groups, the sample of all events surrounding single issue 
voting activity generates a negative abnormal return of -3.41% (sig. 1%).  For targeting at 
an AGM, I record an abnormal return of -3.38% (sig. 1%).  Voting against the resolution 
produces an abnormal return of -2.99% (sig. 1%) whereas abstaining generates -4.21% (sig. 
1%).  For firms targeted on more than one issues, I document a negative abnormal return of 
-5.33% (sig. 1%).   These results suggest that the stock market reacts negatively to firms in 
which activists have more widespread concerns.  
Panel C reports the long term abnormal returns using the Carhart (1997) four factor 
benchmark.  For the complete sample we find an abnormal return of -4.24% (sig. 1%).  
Voting at an AGM generates -4.27% (sig. 1%) while EGMs produced an abnormal return of 
-7.52% (sig. 5%).  Voting against a resolution returns -2.72% (sig. 1%) while abstaining 
from voting generates -6.08% (sig. 1%).  The abnormal return for multiple issues is -3.15% 
(sig. 1%).  These results are consistent with my earlier findings that voting activity is unable 
to improve the performance of targeted firms over the long term. 
Overall I find that firms targeted on only one issue outperform those firms where the 
institutional investors have voted on more than one issue at the meeting.  This is consistent 
with the theory that multiple targeting signifies more deep rooted problems at the target 
company.  The results of this section support my earlier findings that voting activity is 
unable to improve the target firms‟ long term performance.  They are also consistent with 
the negative abnormal returns documented by existing research. 
One-off or Repeat Targeting 
A number of firms in my sample are targeted repeatedly over the sample period.  In order to 
test the impact of this, I analyse the short term impact of each sequential targeting.  I also 
test the long term performance depending on the number of times they are targeting.  For 
the long term analysis I test from the final targeting in the sequence.  Results are not 
statistically significant unless stated. 
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[INSERT Table 5.8 HERE] 
Panel A of Table 5.8 reports the short term abnormal returns.  For the first targeting in the 
sequence, I find an abnormal return of -0.06% (sig. 1%).  For the third targeting in the 
sequence, the target firms generate an abnormal return of 0.28% (sig. 1%).  If I substitute 
the FTSE All Share for the control firm benchmark, we find that the first targeting in the 
sequence produces an abnormal return of 0.72% (sig. 1%).  For the second time in the 
sequence, we find an abnormal return of 0.32% (sig. 1%).  None of the other results are 
significant.  The positive abnormal returns for the sequential targeting might indicate that 
the market is reacting to news that the company will finally be spurred into action to rectify 
the problems that the activist is identifying, and that the activist is prepared to continue its 
engagement programme until the company reforms. 
Panel B reports the long term analysis for the repeat targeting.  I find that firms targeted 
only one generate an abnormal return of 3.17% relative to the control firms (sig. 1%).  
Relative to the control firms, companies targeted twice over the sample period produce a 
negative abnormal return of -8.87% (sig. 1%).  Firms targeted four times underperform by -
3.95% (sig. 5%).  These results support are consistent with prior research as documented in 
chapter 2 that suggest that firms that are repeatedly targeted are unwilling to make the 
changes necessary to appease the activists and hence the market gives them a negative 
premium as a result.   
Panel C reports returns relative to the Carhart (1997) four factor model.  For firms targeted 
once, I find a positive return of 3.82% (sig. 10%).  For those firms targeted twice, we find a 
negative abnormal return of -0.43% (sig. 1%) while those firms targeted twice generate a 
negative abnormal return of -6.91% (sig. 1%).  Firms targeted three times underperform by 
-2.47% (sig. 5%) The results from Panel C support the results from Panel B that firms 
targeted repeatedly perform poorly over the longer term from the time of the final targeting.   
The short term reaction suggests that the stock market approves of sustained efforts to 
change companies targeted through voting activity.  However, over the long term my results 
indicate that firms repeatedly targeted over the sample period significantly underperform 
relative to the benchmarks used.  This would indicate that these firms are perceived by the 
stock market to be resistant to change and as such any problems they have are unlikely to be 
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rectified.  The results support the incumbent literature‟s findings for repeat targeting against 
US companies. 
Multivariate Regression 
Table 5.9 reports the results of the multivariate regressions to indicate which operating 
performance changes help to generate the abnormal returns.  I regress the two year post 
targeting BHAR onto the change in operating performance for each of our main samples. 
[INSER Table 5.9 HERE] 
Across all three samples I find a positive relationship between changes in ROA and the 
abnormal returns generated by the targeted companies.  This is intuitively plausible as 
improvements in the operating performance of the company should generate better returns 
for shareholders.  Furthermore, I also find a negative relationship between book to market 
values and the abnormal return for firms targeted through shareholder resolutions and 
private negotiation.  Finally, I find a negative relationship between EBITDA/TA and the 
two year BHAR for firms targeted through private negotiation.  The remainder of the results 
are not statistically significant.  The results give limited evidence that improved operating 
performance will lead to improved share price performance over the longer term.  This 
finding is consistent with US research which found improved shareholder value 
performance at firms in which the activist was successful in improving the long term 
operating performance (see chapter 2). 
5.3.4Robustness Check 
I test the robustness of the long term results using two further benchmarks.  I test the 
robustness of the Carhart (1997) calendar time portfolio return using the Fama French 
(1993) three factor model.  I further test the robustness of the results using a GARCH (1, 1) 
model.  Furthermore, I also calculate calendar time regressions using the Fama French 
(1993) and Carhart (1997) benchmark models as outlined in chapter 3.  The results of this 
analysis can be seen in the Appendices tables as described in the following section.  See 
chapter 3 for a full explanation of these methodologies. 
Table 5A.1 reports the Fama French (1993) (FF3) and the GARCH results for the sample of 
firms targeted through shareholder resolutions.  Table 5A.2 presents the results of the 
calendar time regressions for the same sample.  I find no statistically significant results for 
this sample of firms using either of these benchmark models. 
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[INSERT Table 5A.1 AND Table 5A.2 HERE] 
Table 5A.3 reports the results of the FF3 and GARCH methodology for the sample of firms 
targeted through private negotiation.  Results are not statistically significant unless stated. 
[INSERT Table 5A.3 HERE] 
Panel A of Table 5A.3 reports long term abnormal returns when the FF3 model is used as 
the benchmark.  For the full sample of firms I find a negative abnormal return over the three 
year window (mean: -3.05%, sig. 1%; median -1.76%, sig. 1%7).  For the sample of firms 
targeted on only one issue I find a larger negative abnormal return (mean -4.22% sig. 1%; 
median -1.76%, sig. 1%) over the three years post targeting by an institutional investor.  
However, for firms in which institutional investors have more widespread concerns the 
median negative abnormal return grows to -2.40% (sig. 10%).  When measured relative to 
the GARCH model I find no statistically significant returns for any of the samples analysed.   
Table 5A.4 reports the results of the calendar time regressions for the complete sample of 
firms targeted through private negotiation.  The reported alpha is the mean monthly 
abnormal return for the specified test window.  
[INSERT Table 5A.4 HERE] 
I find that firms targeted through negotiation produce a negative alpha of -0.85 (sig. 10%) 
over the three year window, while the sample of firms targeted through this medium on 
only one issue produce a negative alpha of -0.87 (sig. 10%).  I find no other significant 
results using this methodology.   These results of the robustness checks support my earlier 
findings which indicated firm‟s targeted through private negotiation exhibit negative long 
term abnormal returns. 
Table 5A.5 reports the results of the FF3 and GARCH methodology for the sample of firms 
targeted through voting activity.  Results are not statistically significant unless stated. 
[INSERT Table 5A.5 HERE] 
Panel A of Table 5A.5 reports long term abnormal returns when the FF3 model is used as 
the benchmark.  I find a negative abnormal return over the three year window for the 
sample of all firms targeted through voting activity (median -3.55%, sig. 1%).  For the 
sample of firms targeted at an AGM, I find a negative median abnormal return of -3.41% 
(sig. 1%), while the negative abnormal return for the sample of firms targeted through 
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EGMs is larger (mean -6.54%, sig. 1%; median -5.51%, sig. 1%).  For firms targeted 
through votes against I find a negative median abnormal return of -3.52% (sig. 1%) while 
the abstention votes return a median abnormal return of -5.11% (sig. 1%).   
Panel B reports the results when the GARCH model is used as the benchmark.  Over the 
three years post targeting, the full sample of firms generates a positive mean abnormal 
return of 8.76% (sig. 5%).  However, the median abnormal return for the same window is 
negative (-4.9%, sig. 1%).  I find a similar picture for firms targeted an AGM (mean 9%, 
sig. 5%; median -5%, sig. 1%).  For EGM targeting I find a large negative abnormal return 
of -16% (sig. 10%) which indicates that targeting through this type of meeting is seen as a 
very severe measure for the activist to take. Targeting by voting against produces a positive 
mean abnormal return of 15% (sig. 1%).  However, for abstention votes, which are 
perceived to be a less severe type of voting activity the median abnormal  return is negative 
(-8%, sig. 1%).  These results might indicate that although EGM voting is a signal that the 
target firm is resistant to change, abstention votes are not powerful enough to force 
management to reform.   
Table 5A.6 reports the results of the calendar time regressions for the complete sample of 
firms targeted through voting activity.  The reported alpha is the mean monthly abnormal 
return for the specified test window. 
[INSERT Table 5A.6 HERE] 
For the sample of firms targeted through an abstention vote I find a positive alpha of 0.81% 
(sig. 5%) over the first year post targeting.  This return falls over the following year to 
0.62% (sig. 10%).  The remainder of the results are not statistically significant.  This result, 
in contrast to the earlier findings indicates that abstention voting is positively viewed by the 
stock market as a sign that the problems raised by activists are not too severe. 
Table 5A.7 reports the results of the FF3 and GARCH methodology for the sample of firms 
targeted through voting activity on only one or multiple issues.  Results are not statistically 
significant unless stated. 
[INSERT Table 5A.7 HERE] 
Panel A of Table 5A.7 reports long term abnormal returns when the FF3 model is used as 
the benchmark.  For the full sample of firms targeted only on one issue I find a negative 
median abnormal return of -0.48% (sig. 1%).  Firms targeted on a single issue at an AGM 
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produce a negative median abnormal return of -4.65% (sig. 1%) while targeting at an EGM 
produces a larger negative abnormal return over the 3 year window (mean -6.51%, sig. 1%; 
median -5.51%, sig. 10%).  This is consistent with my earlier results.  Furthermore, firms 
targeted through abstention votes generate a negative median abnormal return of -3.39 (sig. 
1%) while voting against a resolution of only one issue causes the negative median 
abnormal return to be larger (median -4.77%, sig. 1%).  Firms targeted on more than one 
issue produce a negative abnormal return that is much larger than the abnormal return for 
firms only targeted on one area of concern (median -5.09%, sig. 1%).  Again, this is 
consistent with my main results. 
When I use the GARCH model as the benchmark (Panel B), I find that the full sample of 
firms targeted on only one issue produce a positive mean abnormal return of 8.03% (sig. 
10%).  However, the median abnormal return is negative (-4.82%, sig. 1%).  Single issue 
targeting at an AGM produces a similar result (mean 8.03% sig. 10%; -4.82%, sig. 1%).  
However, when institutional investor pressure is exerted at an EGM the result is a large 
negative median abnormal return of -15.95% (sig. 10%).  Consistent with the findings of the 
full voting sample presented in Table 5A.5, relative to this benchmark voting against a 
resolution produces a large positive abnormal return (mean 15.87%, sig. 1%) while 
abstaining from voting on only one issue at any meeting generates a large negative 
abnormal return (-7.36%, sig. 1%).  Finally, institutional investor action on more than one 
issue again produces a negative median abnormal return (-7%, sig. 10%) which is consistent 
with my previous findings.  
Table 5A.8 reports the results of the calendar time regressions for the sample of firms 
targeted on single or multiple issues through voting activity.  The reported alpha is the mean 
monthly abnormal return for the specified test window. 
[INSERT Table 5A.8 HERE] 
When using the FF3 model, for the full sample of firms targeted on only one issue I find an 
alpha of 0.61 (sig. 10%) over the first year after targeting.  For firms targeted in this manner 
at an AGM, I find an identical result due to the similarity of the sample sizes.  For the 
sample of firms targeted on only one issue in which the institutional investor abstained, the 
alpha is 0.93 (sig. 5%) over the first year after the meeting.  However, the alpha reduces in 
size over the longer term, dropping to 0.69 (sig. 10%) over the 2 year window post 
targeting.  When the Carhart (1997) model is used, I find that firms targeting on only one 
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issue through an abstention vote produces an alpha of 0.69 (sig. 10%) indicating a positive 
return from this particular targeting type.  These results are consistent with my earlier 
findings. 
Table 5A.9 reports the results of the FF3 and GARCH methodology for the sample of firms 
targeted once or repeatedly through voting activity.  Results are not statistically significant 
unless stated. 
[INSERT Table 5A.9 HERE] 
Panel A of Table 5A.9 reports long term abnormal returns when the FF3 model is used as 
the benchmark.  For firms targeted only once I find a positive abnormal return over the 
three year window of 2.51% (sig. 1%).  For firms repeatedly targeted I find large negative 
abnormal return.  Targeting a firm two times over the sample period produces a negative 
abnormal return of -4.69% (sig. 1%).  Targeting three times produces a larger negative 
return (mean -9.1%, sig. 5%).  However, the negative abnormal return for firms targeted 
four times is much lower (mean -2.44%, sig. 1%; median -2.69%, sig. 1%) before 
increasing again if the firm is targeted five times over the sample period (mean -8.79%, sig. 
1%).  These results are consistent with my main results, and those of the incumbent 
research, suggesting that firms that have to be repeatedly targeted are viewed as resistant to 
change and as such allocated a negative premium by the markets. 
When I use the GARCH model as the benchmark (Panel B) I find significant negative 
abnormal returns for all subsamples.  Firms targeted only once produce a negative median 
abnormal return of -7.10% (sig. 10%).  However, consistent with my main analysis repeat 
targeting causes very large negative returns over the sample period.  These results also 
confirm that repeat targeting is consistent with deep rooted problems at the target firm that 
are proving difficult to change for the activist institution. 
 Table 5A.10 reports the results of the calendar time regressions for the sample of firms 
targeted repeatedly through voting activity. The reported alpha is the mean monthly 
abnormal return for the specified test window.  
[INSERT Table 5A.10 HERE] 
Firms targeted twice produce an alpha of -0.81 (sig. 10%) over the two year period post 
targeting, falling to -0.10 (sig. 5%) over the three year window.  For firms targeted four 
times, I find an alpha of -1.30 (sig. 1%) over the two year period post targeting, falling 
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slightly to -1.28 (sig. 1%) over the three year window.  Finally, targeting for the fifth time 
produces a similar alpha of an alpha of -1.07 (sig. 5%) over the two year period post 
targeting, falling to -1.04 (sig. 1%) over the three year window.  When I use the Carhart 
(1997) model, firms targeted twice (panel B) produce an alpha of -0.76 (sig. 10%) for the 
three year window post targeting.  For firms targeted four times (panel D) the negative 
alpha over the two year window grows to -1.04 (sig. 5%) and to -1.02 (sig. 5%) for the three 
year window.  Firms targeted five times produces a negative alpha of -0.86 (sig. 10%) over 
the two year window.  The remainder of the results using this model are not statistically 
significant.  These results are consistent with the results already outlined in which firms 
targeted repeatedly exhibit large negative returns over the long term.  Furthermore, 
generally the results of the robustness checks support the findings presented from the main 
empirical analysis. 
5.4 Summary of Results 
This chapter analyses the recent phenomenon of shareholder activism in the UK and 
empirically assesses its impact of target firms shareholder value and operating performance.  
Until now, only one study by Becht et al (2008) has attempted to assess the impact of 
activism in the UK.  However, these clinical study analyses engagements by only one 
specialist institutional investor and as such their results are not generalisable across all 
institutional investors.  They do report positive abnormal returns as high as 7% for targets 
of this activism over the short term. The study does not report the long term performance 
effects of such engagement. 
Several US studies have analysed the impact of activist intervention on the valuation of 
target companies, with mixed results.  For detailed reviews of the impact of traditional 
institutional activism the literature review in chapter 2.  US researchers find evidence that 
US activists target companies with poor prior operating performance.  In contrast, I find that 
UK institutional investors generally target companies with average operating performance 
relative to that of the control sample.  The exception is firms targeted by shareholder 
resolutions.  As such, I generally find no support for hypothesis 6 in that target firms are not 
operating poorly compared to the control group at the time of targeting.  My results might 
indicate a pre-emptive approach to activism is followed by UK shareholder activists.  
Furthermore, I find operating performance at targeted firms declines as a result of activist 
pressures.  The exception is limited improvements in operating performance of firms 
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targeted through voting activity.  As such, I find no evidence to support hypothesis 2 that 
firms enjoy improved operating performance as a result of activist targeting. 
Activism by traditional investors generally has little or no impact on target firm shareholder 
value according to US research.  In my research using both event studies and portfolio 
analysis and a UK sample of institutional investors engaging with investee companies in a 
variety of ways, I find similar results to those reported by US researchers.  I find that firms 
targeted by institutional activists in the UK generally outperform a control sample portfolio 
and the FTSE All Share over the short term around the meeting dates. This outperformance 
is not carried through to the long term when we use the same benchmarks, or when I 
measure the impact relative to more sophisticated multifactor models.  This is consistent 
with several US studies.  Therefore, I find no evidence to support hypothesis 1.  
In US studies, firms targeted by shareholder proposals exhibited significant negative returns 
over the long term (Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1998; Prevost and Rao, 2000).  In my sample 
I find support for hypothesis 4 in that UK firms targeted by shareholder resolutions 
significantly underperformed all of the tested benchmarks over the three year period from 
the meeting date.  This results indicates that firms targeted by this strategy have significant 
problems that are proving difficult to address.  This result is supported by the poor 
operating performance of the targets both at the time of targeting and over the longer term. 
In contrast to Becht et al (2008), I find that firms targeted by private negotiation earn 
negative abnormal returns over the long term.  I also find no improvement in the operating 
performance of target firms.  My results are also in contrast with US studies measuring the 
impact of private negotiation (Akhigbe et al, 1997; Huson, 1997; Opler and Sokobin, 1995; 
Carleton et al, 1998).   My results suggest that private negotiation is not aggressive enough 
to force targeted companies to reform.  Alternatively, the negotiation process could be 
distracting for target management as suggested by Lipton and Rosenblum (1991).  Thus, I 
find no support for hypothesis 3 which states private negotiation improves shareholder 
value and operating performance at target firms. 
Finally, I find support for hypothesis 5 in that firms targeted repeatedly by voting activity 
over the sample period exhibit significantly large negative abnormal returns over the long 
term.  This result is consistent with prior research analysing repeat targeting against US 
companies.  Overall, I find evidence that shareholder activism in the UK is met with a 
positive short term announcement effect, indicating the stock market is hopeful any issues 
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at target firms will be addressed.  However, over the long term both operating performance 
and shareholder value changes are negative.  This suggests activism by UK institutional 
investors is ineffective.  The following chapter looks at the impact on target firm strategy, 
corporate governance and executive compensation. 
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Table 5.1 - Summary of Activism Samples 
This table reports the aggregate number of meeting at which companies were targeted by votes against, or 
abstentions by an institutional investor on any issue.  For the voting sample, the first row lists the number 
of companies in the targeting sample by the year in which they were first targeted.  The second row lists 
the number of companies in the sample regardless of the number of times they have previously been 
targeted.  The table also reports the number of companies targeted by shareholder resolutions, and the 
number of companies targeted by an institutional investor through private negotiation.  An engagement is 
defined as each instance a firm is targeted through meetings or other informal approaches.  The sample 
period runs from January 2002 to the end of June 2007. 
 
    2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
         All Meetings Voted (voted against or abstained from voting) 
            No of Companies (First) 188 116 125 92 62 12 595
No of Companies (All) 188 226 326 364 337 150 1591 
No of Meetings 188 234 341 394 356 155 1668 
         Shareholder Resolutions 
              No of Meetings 4 3 4 4 8 6 29
         Private Negotiation 
              No of Companies 
   
71 67 34 172
No of Engagements     121 83 45 249 
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Table 5.2- Operating Performance Statistics 
This table reports operating performance statistics for the targets of shareholder activism in our three main samples.  
We also report similar statistics for our matched control firms.  Control firms are matched by industry (2-digit SIC) 
and within ±20% of target market value one month prior to targeting.  Where no adequate match can be found, the 
conditions are relaxed to find a firm within 50% of target market value in the year prior to targeting. Panel A reports 
statistics for the sample of firms targeted by shareholder resolutions over our sample period from January 2002 to 
June 2007.  Panel B reports statistics for the sample of firms targeted by shareholder activists through private 
negotiation.  Panel C reports statistics for the sample of firms targeted through voting behaviour.  PRERET is the 2 
year BHAR for the firm over the two years prior to the targeting date, calculated using a market model.  MV is the 
market value of the firm 30 days prior to the targeting date, calculated as share price of the firm multiplied by the 
number of outstanding shares.  The following accounting variables are from the most recent annual accounting 
statement prior to the targeting date.  DIVYLD is the dividend yield for the company 30 days prior to the targeting 
date, defined as the dividend per share divided by the share price of the company.  ROA is the return on assets for the 
firm, defined as EBIT divided by total assets.  ROE is the return on equity for the firm, defined as net profit after tax 
divided by total shareholders‟ equity.  ROS is the return on assets for the firm, defined as EBIT divided by total sales.  
CASH is the value of cash on the balance sheet of the firm.  BK-MKT is the book to market value of the 30 days 
prior to the targeting date, defined as the book value of equity divided by the market value of the company.  
EBITDA/TA is the value of EBITDA divided by total assets.  All values are in percent, except for MV and CASH 
which are reported in £millions.  We report P-values for the t-statistic and Wilcoxon z-statistic for the mean and 
median differences between the target and control samples.   
  N Mean Median Mean Median t-stat z-Stat 
        
  
Target Sample Control  Sample 
          Panel A: Resolutions Sample (N= 29) 
             PRERET 19 -6.45 -4.38 9.02 4.91 0.09 0.46 
MV 24 100.68 20.85 96.03 18.1 0.24 0.00 
DIVYLD 20 2.08 0 1.73 1.52 0.31 0.39 
ROA 21 -15.42 -15.86 -2.47 2.53 0.26 0.00 
ROE 20 -39.92 -28.98 -4.48 2.45 0.64 0.25 
ROS 16 -25.05 -12.88 -13.31 3.43 0.18 0.23 
CASH 21 8.81 2534 8.01 3.54 0.03 0.13 
BK-MKT 20 0.56 0.61 0.82 0.66 0.49 0.10 
EBITDA/TA 21 -0.16 -0.16 -0.07 0.01 0.73 0.04 
        Panel B: Negotiation Sample (N=172) 
   
  
        PRERET 170 2.53 3.99 5.42 1.73 0.58 0.05 
MV 172 1820.98 754.14 1426.65 682.02 0.43 0.41 
DIVYLD 168 2.41 2.4 2.12 2.23 0.04 0.04 
ROA 163 7.13 6.8 6.7 6.91 0.00 0.05 
ROE 155 15.71 17.2 16.2 17.2 0.08 0.87 
ROS 162 -11.68 10.70 36.24 10.72 0.45 0.11 
CASH 155 190.74 56.1 138.57 42 0.03 0.00 
BK-MKT 164 0.43 0.38 0.47 0.38 0.87 0.46 
EBITDA/TA 164 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.56 0.35 
        Panel C: Voting Sample (N=595) 
   
  
        PRERET 590 -4.55 -1.49 3.75 2.13 0.27 0.24 
MV 584 1815.03 251.08 1156.79 224.27 0.76 0.81 
DIVYLD 555 2.74 2.59 2.73 2.78 0.31 0.73 
ROA 566 4.57 4.79 2.56 4.36 0.79 0.35 
ROE 548 8.45 10.14 6.9 9.27 0.29 0.57 
ROS 531 13.16 11.13 13.73 9.29 0.17 0.25 
CASH 536 98.72 23.59 76.51 15.86 0.49 0.01 
BK-MKT 565 0.61 0.5 0.62 0.52 0.09 0.75 
EBITDA/TA 565 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.04 
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Table 5.3- Change in Operating Performance 
This table reports the change operating performance statistics for the targets of shareholder activism in our three main samples over the period from 2 years prior to targeting, to two years post targeting.  We 
report the raw change, as well as the abnormal change over and above the change in the control firms over the sample period.  We also report the abnormal change relative the change in median firm in the 
targets 3-digit SIC code.  Control firms are matched by industry (2-digit SIC) and within ±20% of target market value one month prior to targeting.  Where no adequate match can be found, the conditions are 
relaxed to find a firm within 50% of target market value in the year prior to targeting. Panel A reports statistics for the sample of firms targeted by shareholder resolutions over our sample period from January 
2002 to June 2007.  Panel B reports statistics for the sample of firms targeted by shareholder activists through private negotiation.  Panel C reports statistics for the sample of firms targeted through voting 
behaviour.  MV is the market value of the firm, calculated as share price of the firm multiplied by the number of outstanding shares.  DIVYLD is the dividend yield for the company, defined as the dividend per 
share divided by the share price of the company.  ROA is the return on assets for the firm, defined as EBIT divided by total assets.  ROE is the return on equity for the firm, defined as net profit after tax divided 
by total shareholders‟ equity.  ROS is the return on assets for the firm, defined as EBIT divided by total sales.  CASH is the value of cash on the balance sheet of the firm.  BK-MKT is the book to market value, 
defined as the book value of equity divided by the market value of the company.  EBITDA/TA is the value of EBITDA divided by total assets.  All values are in percent, except for MV and CASH which are 
reported in millions.  The figures a, b, c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test.   
  
  N 
Year - 2 Year + 2 %  Change (-2,+2)   Vs Controls   Vs Ind Median 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A: Resolutions Sample     
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 MV 20 97.26 13.70 50.34 21.86 -0.48 0.60 -0.11 -0.32 -0.46 0.91 
DIVYLD 19 1.75 0.00 0.52 0.00 -0.70 0.00 -0.57
a
 0.00 -0.56 0.00 
ROA 23 -15.37 -9.80 -9.06 0.82 0.41 1.08 -2.45 -1.88
a
 0.03 -1.36
a
 
ROE 22 -24.07 -10.69 -15.42 0.83 0.36 1.08 2.33 -3.24 0.43
a
 -0.58 
ROS 16 -18.55 -1.68 -9.60 4.01 0.48 3.39 0.37
c
  2.45 0.58  2.67 
CASH 23 16.04 4.21 2.17 1.65 -0.86 -0.61 -0.40 -1.26 -1.35
a
 -1.48
a
 
BK-MKT 19 0.78 0.70 0.92 0.81 0.18 0.16 0.01 0.12 -0.88 -1.40 
EBITDA/TA 23 -0.15 -0.10 -0.10 0.01 0.31 1.11 -0.97
a
 -2.02
a
 1.82
b
 -1.57 
Panel B: Negotiation Sample     
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 MV 161 1493.33 538.52 2366.77 1215.82 0.58 1.26 -0.50 -0.73 0.49 1.15
a
 
DIVYLD 157 3.01 2.95 2.74 2.41 -0.09 -0.18 -0.01 -0.03 0.07 -0.05
a
 
ROA 167 5.28 4.87 6.97 7.59 0.32 0.56 -0.29 0.35 -1.18 -0.37
c
 
ROE 157 9.78 10.94 23.54 17.94 1.41 0.64 0.08 -0.06
a
 -0.75 -0.76
a
 
ROS 167 -56.89 8.51 14.91 10.31 1.26 0.21 0.87  0.12 0.74  0.01 
CASH 159 137.54 39.00 401.57 74.60 1.92 0.91 0.85 -1.07
a
 -0.41 -1.63 
BK-MKT 158 0.54 0.44 0.48 0.41 -0.10 -0.07 0.19 0.25
b
 -2.46 -1.49 
EBITDA/TA 169 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.21 0.26 0.09 0.18 -0.51 -0.32
a
 
Panel C: Voting Sample     
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 MV 514 1264.30 232.02 2825.72 373.30 1.23 0.61 1.28 0.45
a
 1.48 0.83 
DIVYLD 497 2.99 2.79 2.97 2.35 0.00 -0.16 0.05 0.08 -1.11 0.06
c
 
ROA 545 4.70 5.44 6.62 7.01 0.41 0.29 0.12 0.03
a
 -2.11
a
 -0.33
a
 
ROE 524 8.16 10.99 12.44 15.02 0.52 0.37 -0.19 0.15
a
 -1.08 -0.42
c
 
ROS 558 -6.59 10.08 25.72 10.56 4.90 0.05 2.17  -0.04 1.87  0.01 
CASH 535 84.92 20.02 80.98 25.38 -0.05 0.27 0.14 0.25 0.21 0.15 
BK-MKT 504 0.64 0.55 0.49 0.38 -0.24 -0.31 -0.03 -0.16 -0.84 -0.55
a
 
EBITDA/TA 563 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.67 0.20 -0.71 -0.04
c
 -0.7
a
 -0.39
c
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Table 5.4- Abnormal Returns for Resolutions Sample  
This table reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the target firms in our Resolutions sample.  Panel A reports short term CARs while Panel B reports long 
term BHARs.  We calculate abnormal returns as the target firm return minus the control firm return.  We also calculate abnormal returns relative to the FTSE all share benchmark.  
Control firms are matched by industry (2-digit SIC) and within ±20% of target market value one month prior to targeting.  Where no adequate match can be found, the conditions are 
relaxed to find a firm within 50% of target market value in the year prior to targeting.  Panel C reports calendar time portfolio returns relative to the Carhart (1997) four factor benchmark.  
The figures a, b, c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test.   
 
  Requisition Date (n=22) Mailing Date (n=25) Meeting Date (n=25) 
  mean  median   % (+) mean  median   % (+) mean  median   % (+) 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel A: Short Term CARs   
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  Control Groups     
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  (-5,5) 0.06 0.81a 0.55 1.62 2.46a 0.56 -1.17c -0.20 0.40 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  FTSE All Share     
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  (-5,5) 5.44a 6.04 0.67 2.93 1.66 0.60 -0.63 -0.02c 0.33 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel B: Long Term BHARs   
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  Control Groups     
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12)   
  
  
  
-1.80
a
 -1.17
a
 0.13 
(1,24)   
  
  
  
-0.46 -1.14b 0.29 
(1,36)   
  
  
  
-3.89 -1.51b 0.33 
          0.38 0.72   
 
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel C: Long Term C4 Returns     
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
    
(1,12)   
  
  
  
1.54 2.47 0.53 
(1,24)   
  
  
  
2.34 1.16 0.60 
(1,36)         -2.73 2.92 0.53 
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Table 5.5- Abnormal Returns for Negotiation Sample  
This table reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the target firms in our private negotiation sample.  Panel A reports long term BHARs relative to the 
control firms Control firms are matched by industry (2-digit SIC) and within ±20%  of target market value one month prior to targeting.  Where no adequate match can be found, the 
conditions are relaxed to find a firm within 50% of target market value in the year prior to targeting.  Panel B reports calendar time portfolio returns relative to the Carhart (1997) four 
factor benchmark.  The figures a, b, c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test.   
 
  Full Sample (n=158) Single Issue (n=136) Multiple Issue (n=36) 
  mean median % (+) mean median % (+) mean median % (+) 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel A: BHARs   
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  Control Groups     
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12) 0.42 -0.98 0.49 0.78 0.25 0.51 -0.93 -2.18 0.42 
(1,24) 1.55 -4.18 0.46 1.81 -3.62 0.47 0.59 -6.15 0.42 
(1,36) 1.69 3.63 0.53 1.32 4.80 0.55 3.08 0.05 0.50 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel B: C4 Returns     
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12) -3.35 -1.48 0.49 -2.65 2.59 0.52 -6.37 -8.87 0.37 
(1,24) -2.95
a
 -1.17
a
 0.37 -3.44a -1.38a 0.35 -1.28 -1.21 0.43 
(1,36) -4.19
a
 -3.47
a
 0.33 -5.91a -3.56a 0.31 -2.79 -2.42 0.40 
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Table 5.6- Abnormal Returns for Full Voting Sample  
This table reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the target firms in our voting sample.  Panel A reports short term CARs while Panel B reports long term 
BHARs.  We calculate abnormal returns as the target firm return minus the control firm return.  We also calculate abnormal returns relative to the FTSE all share benchmark.  Control 
firms are matched by industry (2-digit SIC) and within ±20% of target market value one month prior to targeting.  Where no adequate match can be found, the conditions are relaxed to 
find a firm within 50% of target market value in the year prior to targeting.  Panel C reports calendar time portfolio returns relative to the Carhart (1997) four factor benchmark.  The 
figures a, b, c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test.   
 
  Full Sample (n=1642) AGM (n=1586) EGM (n=85) Against (n=971) Abstain (n=671) 
  Mean median  % (+) mean median  % (+) mean median  % (+) mean median  % (+) mean median  % (+) 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel A: CARs   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Control Groups     
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  (-5,5) -0.12 0.00a 49.94 -0.05 0.01a 50.04 0.48b 0.76a 61.18 -0.13 0.05a 50.77 -0.10 -0.01a 48.73 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  FTSE All Share     
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  (-5,5) 0.22b 0.19a 51.21 0.22b 0.22a 51.29 1.49a 1.80a 63.10 0.12c 0.10b 50.71 0.37 0.25b 51.97 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel B: BHARs   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Control Groups     
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12) -0.58 -1.55a 45.80 -0.55 -1.34a 44.68 -2.63 -0.33 47.67 -0.36 -1.63a 46.43 -0.87 -1.83a 44.89 
(1,24) 1.18 -0.73a 47.83 1.04 -1.80a 46.95 0.29 1.97 54.65 1.70 -1.68a 47.36 0.11 -2.09a 46.37 
(1,36) 1.18 -2.63a 48.22 2.13 -3.96a 44.52 -1.23 -2.90 46.51 2.22 -3.95a 44.47 2.00 -4.10a 44.59 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel C: C4 Returns     
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12) -4.22a -2.08a 41.93 -4.13a -2.13a 41.86 -3.01b -3.85 46.99 -4.38a -1.70a 42.83 -3.47a -2.67a 40.63 
(1,24) -3.98 -2.69a 43.75 -3.49 -2.78a 43.07 -3.14a -1.96b 39.76 -4.32 -3.06a 37.54 -8.01a -6.57a 36.38 
(1,36) -4.64 -3.81a 41.64 -4.59 -3.88a 41.51 -7.02a -7.52a 37.35 -5.48 -4.57a 34.52 -7.39a -6.92a 34.49 
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Table 5.7- Abnormal Returns for Single and Multiple Issue Voting Samples  
This table reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the target firms in our voting samples of firms targeted on single or multiple issues.  Panel A reports short term CARs while Panel B 
reports long term BHARs.  We calculate abnormal returns as the target firm return minus the control firm return.  We also calculate abnormal returns relative to the FTSE all share benchmark.  Control firms are 
matched by industry (2-digit SIC) and within ±20% of target market value one month prior to targeting.  Where no adequate match can be found, the conditions are relaxed to find a firm within 50% of target 
market value in the year prior to targeting.  Panel C reports calendar time portfolio returns relative to the Carhart (1997) four factor benchmark.  The figures a, b, c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 
and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test.   
 
 
  Single Issues 
 
Multiple Issues 
 
Full Sample (n=1293) AGM (n=1194) EGM (n=85) Against (n=735) Abstain (n=558) 
 
Full sample (n=349) 
  Mean median  % (+) mean median  % (+) mean median  % (+) mean median  % (+) mean median  % (+) 
 
mean median  % (+) 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  Panel A: CARs   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  Control Groups     
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  (-5,5) -0.14 0.08a 50.91 -0.04 0.05a 50.97 0.48b 0.76a 61.18 0.02 0.22a 52.79 -0.13 -0.02a 48.57 
 
-0.40 -0.37 46.13 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  FTSE All Share     
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  (-5,5) 0.39a 0.26a 52.49 0.32a 0.37a 52.43 1.49a 1.8a 63.10 0.35a 0.41a 52.61 0.29 0.26b 52.18 
 
-0.15 -0.34 46.81 
                                
 
  
  Panel B: BHARs   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  Control Groups     
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  (1,12) -0.49 -1.56a 46.49 -0.45 -1.49a 46.10 -2.63 -0.33 47.67 -0.18c -1.44a 47.07 -0.77 -1.84a 44.84 
 
-1.05 -1.88 44.96 
(1,24) 1.91 -1.42a 47.78 1.96 -1.34a 47.80 0.29 1.97 54.65 2.97 -1.02b 48.29 0.65 -1.65a 47.15 
 
-2.35
a
 -4.27 43.80 
(1,36) 2.76 -3.41a 45.56 2.97 -3.38a 45.17 -1.23 -2.90 46.51 3.85 -2.99a 45.29 1.83 -4.21a 45.02 
 
-0.99
a
 -5.33
a
 42.07 
                                
 
  
  Panel C: C4 Returns       
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  (1,12) -4.21a -1.56a 41.92 -4.14a -1.66a 41.69 -2.01b -3.85 46.99 -5.26a -1.51a 42.31 -3.96a -1.91a 40.87 
 
-5.71
a
 -8.26
c
 42.81 
(1,24) -3.65 -2.64a 37.98 -2.95 -2.81a 37.30 -3.14a -1.96c 39.76 -1.49 -0.91a 38.03 -2.67a -2.17a 36.31 
 
-4.83
a
 -5.39
a
 36.23 
(1,36) -5.19 -4.24a 34.96 -4.78 -4.27a 34.36 -4.02a -7.52b 37.35 -3.89 -2.72a 34.62 -7.56a -6.08a 34.03 
 
-5.13
a
 -3.15
a
 35.03 
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Table 5.8- Abnormal Returns for Firms Targeted Once and Repeatedly Targeted through Voting  
This table reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the target firms in our voting sample of firms repeatedly targeted over our sample period.  Panel A reports short term CARs while 
Panel B reports long term BHARs.  We calculate abnormal returns as the target firm return minus the control firm return.  We also calculate abnormal returns relative to the FTSE all share benchmark.  Control 
firms are matched by industry (2-digit SIC) and within ±20% of target market value one month prior to targeting.  Where no adequate match can be found, the conditions are relaxed to find a firm within 50% of 
target market value in the year prior to targeting.  Panel C reports calendar time portfolio returns relative to the Carhart (1997) four factor benchmark.  The figures a, b, c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 
0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test.   
 
  Targeted Once 
 
Repeatedly Targeted 
 
Full sample (n=175) 
 
First (n=421) Second (n=419) Third (n=292) Fourth (m=197) Fifth (n=93) 
  mean  median   % (+) 
 
mean  median   % (+) mean  median   % (+) mean  median   % (+) mean  median   % (+) mean  median   % (+) 
 
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel A: CARs   
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Control Groups   
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  (-5,5) -0.50 -0.16 44.57 
 
-0.23 -0.06a 48.46 -0.30 0.00a 49.88 0.34 0.28a 54.45 0.40 0.25 54.31 -0.50 0.17 52.69 
 
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  FTSE All Share   
 
    
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  (-5,5) -0.45 -0.36 45.34  0.62a 0.72a 56.40 0.10 0.32b 52.76 0.16 -0.02 49.45 0.62 0.42 54.05 -0.13 -0.67 38.71 
 
                                      
Panel B: BHARs 
                                         Once 
 
      Two (n=131) Three (n=94) Four (n=99) Five (n=56) 
  mean  median   % (+) 
 
      mean  median   % (+) mean  median   % (+) mean  median   % (+) mean  median   % (+) 
 
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Control Groups   
 
    
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12) -3.31 -3.99a 42.94 
 
    -2.59 -4.62a 44.27 3.84 0.71 52.13 -0.25 -2.46b 41.41 -0.74 0.37 55.36 
(1,24) 0.79 2.19b 57.65 
 
    -6.46b -7.22a 38.17 6.98 0.31 51.06 -1.48 -3.95b 39.39 1.49c -2.65 46.43 
(1,36) 5.43 3.17a 55.88        -7.04a -8.87a 37.40 4.12 -1.03 47.87 -0.11 -3.95b 40.40 1.79 -0.95 48.21 
 
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel C: C4 Returns   
 
    
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
    
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12) -4.86a -1.13a 48.10 
 
    -7.36c -4.13 45.97 -6.29c -0.21 42.39 -2.18b -0.08 49.48 -5.04a -2.15 35.71 
(1,24) 2.63
a
 3.06
c
 51.50 
 
    -8.98 -3.33a 33.06 -7.32c -4.32a 33.70 -5.75a -2.32c 38.14 -8.68a -7.05 35.71 
(1,36) 3.89
a
 3.82
c
 53.62        -5.60 -0.43a 33.87 -8.76a -6.91a 31.52 -1.65a -2.47b 37.11 -9.80a -5.57 35.71 
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Table 5.9- Multivariate Regressions 
This table reports the multivariate regressions for the targets of shareholder activism in our three main samples over 
We regress the operating performance changes over the sample period onto the two year post activism BHAR.  See 
Chapter 3 for a definition of the variables used in this analysis.  The figures a, b, c indicates statistical significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test.   
 
  Resolutions Negotiation Voting 
 
      
INTERCEPT 1.90 0.06 -0.08 
MV -0.02 -0.08 -0.10 
DIVYLD 0.12 -0.12 0.19 
ROA 0.13
b
 0.19
a 
0.07
c
 
ROE 0.03 -0.12 0.16 
ROS 0.17 -0.23 0.19 
CASH 0.11 0.06 -0.14 
BK-MKT -2.60
a
 -0.14
b
 -0.47 
EBITDA/TA 9.89 -0.11a 0.87 
 
      
ADJ. R 0.26 0.16 0.13 
F STAT 10.99 1.77 1.26 
N 25 163 515 
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Appendix 5A – Robustness Check Results Tables 
 
Table 5A.1- Abnormal Returns for Resolutions Sample  
This table reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the target firms in our Resolutions 
sample.  Panel A reports calendar time portfolio returns relative to the Fama French (1993) three factor benchmark.  
Panel B reports similar results using a GARCH (1, 1) benchmarking model. We report P-Values for the t-statistic and 
Wilcoxon z-statistic for the mean and median differences between the target and benchmarks. 
   
  
Requisition Date 
(n=22) Mailing Date (n=25) Meeting Date (n=25) 
  mean  median  
 % 
(+) mean  median  
 % 
(+) mean  median  
 % 
(+) 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel A: FF3 Portfolio Returns   
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12)   
  
  
  
0.15 1.49 0.53 
(1,24)   
  
  
  
1.34 2.03 0.53 
(1,36)         1.93 2.42 0.57 
 
  
  
  
  
    
Panel B: GARCH Returns     
  
    
 
  
  
  
  
    
(1,12)   
  
  
  
-1.48 -1.16 0.38 
(1,24)   
  
  
  
2.96 -1.85 0.44 
(1,36)         5.11 -0.24 0.44 
 
Table 5A.2- Resolutions Sample Calendar Time Regressions  
This table reports the results of the calendar time regressions for the resolutions sample.  The first column reports the 
coefficients using the Fama French (1993) factors as the benchmark over the holding periods covering 12, 24 and 36 
months from the targeting date, using the following regression:  
(Rp - Rf)t = α + β1(RM - Rf)t + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + εt 
where (Rp - Rf)t is the average monthly return on the portfolio of targeted stocks less the return on the one-month 
risk-free rate in calendar month t; (RM - Rf)t is the return on the FTSE All Share return index less the return on the 
one-month risk-free rate in calendar month t; SMBt is the difference between the value-weighted average return on 
the small-cap portfolios and large-cap portfolios; and HMLt is the difference between the value-weighted average 
return on the high book-to-market portfolios and low book-to-market portfolios.  The second column reports similar 
coefficient results using the Carhart (1997) factors as the benchmark, using the following regression:  
(Rp - Rf)t = α + β1(RM - Rf)t + β2SMBt + β3HMLt β4UMDt + εt 
The factors are the same as for the Fama French (1993) model with the exception that UMDt is the difference between 
the value weighted average return on the high past-year stock-return portfolios and low past-year stock-return 
portfolios.  The figures a,b,c indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-
tail test.   
 
Holding Period 
Fama French (1993) Carhart (1997) 
α β1 β2 β3 R
2
 α β1 β2 β3 β4 R
2
 
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) -1.61 0.27 0.03 0.21 0.01 -1.3 0.3 0.38 -0.47 1.37
b
 0.08 
(1,24) -0.31 0.39 0.6 0.19 0.04 -0.17 0.28 0.44 -0.64 0.7 0.07 
(1,36) -0.23 0.48c 0.62c 0.32 0.06 0.05 0.33 0.31 -0.65 0.51 0.07 
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Table 5A.3- Abnormal Returns for Negotiation Sample  
This table reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the target firms in our private 
negotiation sample.  Panel A reports calendar time portfolio returns relative to the Fama French (1993) three factor 
benchmark.  Panel B reports similar results using a GARCH (1,1) benchmarking model. The figures a,b,c indicate 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 
  Full Sample (n=158) Single Issue (n=136) Multiple Issue (n=36) 
  mean median 
% 
(+) mean median 
% 
(+) mean median 
% 
(+) 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel A: FF3 Portfolio Returns   
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12) -2.99 -1.04 0.48 -3.70 -0.84 0.50 -0.41 -5.05 0.43 
(1,24) -2.14
a
 -1.88 0.43 -2.97a -2.06 0.42 -3.98 -1.80 0.43 
(1,36) -3.05
a
 -1.76
a
 0.37 -4.22a -1.76a 0.37 -5.55 -2.40c 0.34 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel B: GARCH Returns     
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12) 2.31 0.95 0.53 4.34b 5.24 0.57 -4.35 -3.23 0.43 
(1,24) -0.19 2.27 0.51 -1.39 0.89 0.50 3.23 2.85 0.52 
(1,36) -2.66 -6.91 0.44 -4.96 -1.43 0.43 4.19 -2.31 0.49 
 
Table 5A.4- Negotiation Sample Calendar Time Regressions  
This table reports the results of the calendar time regressions for the negotiation sample.  The first column reports the 
coefficients using the Fama French (1993) factors as the benchmark over the holding periods covering 12, 24 and 36 
months from the targeting date, using the following regression:  
(Rp - Rf)t = α + β1(RM - Rf)t + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + εt 
where (Rp - Rf)t is the average monthly return on the portfolio of targeted stocks less the return on the one-month 
risk-free rate in calendar month t; (RM - Rf)t is the return on the FTSE All Share return index less the return on the 
one-month risk-free rate in calendar month t; SMBt is the difference between the value-weighted average return on 
the small-cap portfolios and large-cap portfolios; and HMLt is the difference between the value-weighted average 
return on the high book-to-market portfolios and low book-to-market portfolios.  The second column reports similar 
coefficient results using the Carhart (1997) factors as the benchmark, using the following regression:  
(Rp - Rf)t = α + β1(RM - Rf)t + β2SMBt + β3HMLt β4UMDt + εt 
The factors are the same as for the Fama French (1993) model with the exception that UMDt is the difference between 
the value weighted average return on the high past-year stock-return portfolios and low past-year stock-return 
portfolios.  The figures a,b,c indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-
tail test.   
 
Holding Period 
Fama French (1993) Carhart (1997) 
α β1 β2 β3 R
2
 α β1 β2 β3 β4 R
2
 
 
  
    
  
     Panel A: Complete     
     
 
        
     (1,12) -0.22 0.61
a
 0.06 0.26 0.24 0.00 0.71a 0.33 0.19 -0.82c 0.31 
(1,24) -0.66 0.66a -0.09 0.36c 0.37 -0.38 0.70a 0.13 0.23 -0.68c 0.37 
(1,36) -0.85
c
 0.69
a
 -0.07 0.38b 0.45 -0.54 0.70a -0.04 0.24 -0.55c 0.43 
 
             
Panel B: Single Issue               
 
             
(1,12) 0.00 0.54a 0.13 0.28 0.21 0.21 0.63a 0.26 0.06 -0.92b 0.30 
(1,24) -0.65 0.63a 0.04 0.40c 0.37 -0.34 0.66a 0.08 0.13 -0.78b 0.38 
(1,36) -0.87
c
 0.64
a
 -0.06 0.41b 0.45 -0.53 0.64a -0.10 0.20 -0.62b 0.42 
 
             
Panel C: Multiple Issue               
 
             
(1,12) -0.91 0.94a -0.04 0.27 0.3 -0.52 1.00a 0.45 0.53 -0.33 0.32 
(1,24) -0.70 0.79a -0.16 0.28 0.3 -0.44 0.88a 0.26 0.51 -0.20 0.31 
(1,36) -0.75 0.87a -0.11 0.27 0.44 -0.55 0.93a 0.12 0.35 -0.23 0.43 
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Table 5A.5- Abnormal Returns for Full Voting Sample  
This table reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the target firms in our voting sample.  Panel  A reports calendar time portfolio returns relative to the Fama French (1993) three 
factor benchmark.  Panel B reports similar results using a GARCH (1,1) benchmarking model. The figures a,b,c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 
  Full Sample (n=1642) AGM (n=1586) EGM (n=85) Against (n=971) Abstain (n=671) 
  mean median  % (+) mean median  % (+) mean median  % (+) mean median  % (+) mean median  % (+) 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel A: FF3 Portfolio Returns   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12) -5.66a -1.10a 46.69 -5.71a -1.03a 46.61 -1.58 -1.02 48.19 -3.73a -7.13a 43.58 -1.76c -3.92a 38.74 
(1,24) -3.89 -2.72a 37.00 -4.79 -2.73a 37.00 -4.75a -2.00b 42.17 -5.19b -2.94a 36.25 -5.67 -4.67a 38.11 
(1,36) -4.69 -3.25a 41.36 -4.57 -3.41a 34.31 -6.54a -5.51a 37.35 -4.59 -3.52a 34.41 -6.78 -5.11a 34.17 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel B: GARCH Returns     
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12) 4.70b 1.66 0.53 0.04b 0.02 0.53 0.04 0.03 0.57 0.06a 0.03 0.55 0.04c 0.01 0.51 
(1,24) 7.58
b
 -0.16
c
 0.50 0.07b -0.06a 0.50 0.10c -0.01 0.47 0.10a 0.03 0.53 0.06c -0.02a 0.47 
(1,36) 8.76
b
 -4.90
a
 0.47 0.09b -0.05a 0.47 0.04 -0.16c 0.37 0.15a 0.03 0.52 0.04 -0.08a 0.43 
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Table 5A.6 - Full Voting Sample Calendar Time Regressions  
This table reports the results of the calendar time regressions for the full voting sample.  The first column reports the 
coefficients using the Fama French (1993) factors as the benchmark over the holding periods covering 12, 24 and 36 months 
from the targeting date, using the following regression:  
(Rp - Rf)t = α + β1(RM - Rf)t + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + εt 
where (Rp - Rf)t is the average monthly return on the portfolio of targeted stocks less the return on the one-month risk-free 
rate in calendar month t; (RM - Rf)t is the return on the FTSE All Share return index less the return on the one-month risk-free 
rate in calendar month t; SMBt is the difference between the value-weighted average return on the small-cap portfolios and 
large-cap portfolios; and HMLt is the difference between the value-weighted average return on the high book-to-market 
portfolios and low book-to-market portfolios.  The second column reports similar coefficient results using the Carhart (1997) 
factors as the benchmark, using the following regression:  
(Rp - Rf)t = α + β1(RM - Rf)t + β2SMBt + β3HMLt β4UMDt + εt 
The factors are the same as for the Fama French (1993) model with the exception that UMDt is the difference between the 
value weighted average return on the high past-year stock-return portfolios and low past-year stock-return portfolios.  The 
figures a,b,c indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test.   
 
Holding Period 
Fama French (1993) Carhart (1997) 
α β1 β2 β3 R
2
 α β1 β2 β3 β4 R
2
 
 
  
    
  
     Panel A: Full (n=1642)   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) 0.58 0.73
a
 0.62
a
 -0.16 0.53 0.55 0.70a 0.34 -0.36c -0.2 0.39 
(1,24) 0.36 0.71a 0.54a -0.05 0.44 0.39 0.65a 0.20 -0.26 -0.17 0.34 
(1,36) 0.16 0.70a 0.45a 0.00 0.39 0.17 0.65a 0.14 -0.16 -0.19 0.33 
 
  
    
  
     Panel B: AGM (n=1586)   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) 0.58 0.73
a
 0.62
a
 -0.16 0.53 0.55 0.70a 0.34c -0.36c -0.2 0.39 
(1,24) 0.36 0.71a 0.54a -0.05 0.44 0.39 0.65a 0.20 -0.26 -0.17 0.34 
(1,36) 0.16 0.70a 0.45a 0.00 0.39 0.17 0.65a 0.14 -0.16 -0.19 0.33 
 
  
    
            
Panel C: EGM (n=85)   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) 0.08 0.98
a
 0.89
a
 0.19 0.39 0.43 0.94a 0.46 -0.3 -0.69c 0.34 
(1,24) 0.05 0.92a 0.67a 0.24 0.34 0.35 0.85a 0.31 -0.18 -0.43 0.31 
(1,36) -0.20 0.86a 0.48b 0.24 0.32 -0.01 0.78a 0.11 -0.03 -0.29 0.28 
 
  
    
  
     Panel D: Votes Against (n=971)   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) 0.39 0.75
a
 0.69
a
 -0.06 0.49 0.49 0.68a 0.27 -0.39c -0.19 0.36 
(1,24) 0.17 0.72a 0.57a 0.02 0.40 0.26 0.65a 0.17 -0.25 -0.19 0.32 
(1,36) -0.06 0.70a 0.44a 0.06 0.36 0.00 0.64a 0.09 -0.12 -0.23 0.31 
 
  
    
            
Panel E: Abstention (n=671)   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) 0.81
b
 0.71
a
 0.55
a
 -0.29
b
 0.56 0.61 0.71a 0.43b -0.33 -0.21 0.41 
(1,24) 0.62
c
 0.71
a
 0.51
a
 -0.15 0.47 0.57 0.67a 0.25 -0.28 -0.15 0.37 
(1,36) 0.44 0.70a 0.45a -0.09 0.43 0.41 0.66a 0.21 -0.2 -0.13 0.31 
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Table 5A.7- Abnormal Returns for Single and Multiple Issue Voting Samples  
This table reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the target firms in our single and multiple issues voting sample.  Panel A reports calendar time portfolio returns relative to the Fama 
French (1993) three factor benchmark.  Panel B reports similar results using a GARCH (1,1) benchmarking model. The figures a,b,c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, 
using a 2-tail test. 
  Single Issues 
 
Multiple Issues 
 
Full Sample (n=1293) AGM (n=1194) EGM (n=85) Against (n=735) Abstain (n=558) 
 
Full sample (n=349) 
  mean median 
 % 
(+) mean median 
 % 
(+) mean median 
 % 
(+) mean median 
 % 
(+) mean median 
 % 
(+) 
 
mean median 
 % 
(+) 
                                
 
  
  Panel A: FF3 Portfolio 
Returns   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  (1,12) -5.39a -1.98a 40.24 -5.29a -1.91a 40.31 -1.58 -1.02 48.19 -4.43a -2.80a 41.31 -4.44 -1.81a 38.97 
 
-5.23
a
 -4.71 46.41 
(1,24) -3.72 -2.89a 36.89 -3.56 -2.88a 36.89 -7.75a -2.00 42.17 -5.23c -1.77a 34.90 -6.76 -2.87a 39.54 
 
-8.46 -1.47a 37.43 
(1,36) -1.31 -0.48a 33.91 -7.54 -4.65a 34.04 -6.54a -5.51c 37.35 -6.49 -4.77a 33.19 -4.86 -3.39a 35.17 
 
-6.97 -5.09a 35.33 
                                
 
  
  Panel B: GARCH Returns       
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  (1,12) 4.28c 2.03 53.11 4.28c 2.03 53.11 3.94 3.16 56.63 7.20a 3.50 56.33 2.10 0.46 50.71 
 
6.00
a
 1.00 51.00 
(1,24) 6.95
b
 -0.16
c
 49.72 6.95b -0.16c 49.72 10.49c -0.89 46.99 11.39a 4.03 54.63 3.63 -2.86a 46.05 
 
10.00
a
 0.00 49.00 
(1,36) 8.03
c
 -4.82
a
 46.97 8.03c -4.82a 46.97 3.84 -15.95c 37.35 15.87a 5.14 52.93 2.18 -7.36a 42.51 
 
11.00
a
 -7.00
c
 46.00 
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 Table 5A.8- Single Issue Voting Sample Calendar Time Regressions  
This table reports the results of the calendar time regressions for the single and multiple issue samples.  The first column 
reports the coefficients using the Fama French (1993) factors as the benchmark over the holding periods covering 12, 24 and 
36 months from the targeting date, using the following regression:  
(Rp - Rf)t = α + β1(RM - Rf)t + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + εt 
where (Rp - Rf)t is the average monthly return on the portfolio of targeted stocks less the return on the one-month risk-free 
rate in calendar month t; (RM - Rf)t is the return on the FTSE All Share return index less the return on the one-month risk-free 
rate in calendar month t; SMBt is the difference between the value-weighted average return on the small-cap portfolios and 
large-cap portfolios; and HMLt is the difference between the value-weighted average return on the high book-to-market 
portfolios and low book-to-market portfolios.  The second column reports similar coefficient results using the Carhart (1997) 
factors as the benchmark, using the following regression:  
(Rp - Rf)t = α + β1(RM - Rf)t + β2SMBt + β3HMLt β4UMDt + εt 
The factors are the same as for the Fama French (1993) model with the exception that UMDt is the difference between the 
value weighted average return on the high past-year stock-return portfolios and low past-year stock-return portfolios.  The 
figures a,b,c indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test.   
 
 
Holding Period 
Fama French (1993) Carhart (1997) 
α β1 β2 β3 R
2
 α β1 β2 β3 β4 R
2
 
 
  
    
  
     Panel A: Full (n=1293)   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) 0.61
c
 0.72
a
 0.62
a
 -0.18 0.53 0.54 0.69a 0.34c -0.34 -0.24 0.38 
(1,24) 0.38 0.71a 0.55a -0.06 0.44 0.39 0.66a 0.21 -0.25 -0.18 0.39 
(1,36) 0.17 0.70a 0.46a -0.01 0.39 0.17 0.65a 0.15 -0.14 -0.19 0.33 
 
  
    
  
     Panel B: AGM (n=1194)   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) 0.61
c
 0.72
a
 0.62
a
 -0.18 0.53 0.54 0.69a 0.34c -0.34 -0.24 0.38 
(1,24) 0.38 0.71a 0.55a -0.06 0.44 0.39 0.66a 0.21 -0.25 -0.18 0.34 
(1,36) 0.17 0.70a 0.46a -0.01 0.39 0.17 0.65a 0.15 -0.14 -0.19 0.33 
 
  
    
  
     Panel C: EGM (n=85)   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) 0.08 0.98
a
 0.89
a
 0.19 0.39 0.43 0.94a 0.46 -0.3 -0.69c 0.34 
(1,24) 0.05 0.92a 0.67a 0.24 0.34 0.35 0.85a 0.31 -0.18 -0.43 0.31 
(1,36) -0.20 0.86a 0.48b 0.24 0.32 -0.01 0.78a 0.11 -0.03 -0.29 0.28 
 
  
    
  
     Panel D: Votes Against (n=735)   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) 0.34 0.74
a
 0.67
a
 -0.06 0.50 0.40 0.68a 0.25 -0.36 -0.23 0.36 
(1,24) 0.12 0.73a 0.58a 0.02 0.42 0.21 0.66a 0.17 -0.23 -0.2 0.33 
(1,36) -0.09 0.71a 0.46a 0.07 0.37 -0.04 0.65a 0.11 -0.1 -0.23 0.31 
 
  
    
  
     Panel E: Abstention (n=558)   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) 0.93
b
 0.70
a
 0.57
a
 -0.31
b
 0.56 0.69c 0.71a 0.45b -0.32 -0.25 0.4 
(1,24) 0.69
c
 0.68
a
 0.51
a
 -0.17 0.46 0.62 0.64a 0.26 -0.28 -0.16 0.35 
(1,36) 0.48 0.68a 0.46a -0.10 0.42 0.43 0.64a 0.21 -0.21 -0.15 0.34 
 
  
    
  
     Panel F: Multiple Issues 
(n=349)   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) 0.47 0.77
a
 0.64
a
 -0.11 0.46 0.59 0.72a 0.34c -0.46b -0.04 0.37 
(1,24) 0.29 0.72a 0.52a 0.00 0.39 0.38 0.65a 0.16 -0.32 -0.12 0.33 
(1,36) 0.12 0.70a 0.39b 0.02 0.35 0.17 0.64a 0.08 -0.21 -0.16 0.32 
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Table 5A.9- Abnormal Returns for Firms Targeted Once and Repeatedly Targeted through Voting  
This table reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the target firms in our voting sample of firms repeatedly targeted over our sample period.  Panel A reports calendar time portfolio 
returns relative to the Fama French (1993) three factor benchmark.  Panel B reports similar results using a GARCH (1,1) benchmarking model. The figures a,b,c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 
  Targeted Once 
 
Repeatedly Targeted 
  Once 
 
Two (n=131) Three (n=94) Four (n=99) Five (n=56) 
  mean  median   % (+) 
 
mean  median   % (+) mean  median   % (+) mean  median   % (+) mean  median   % (+) 
 
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel A: FF3 Returns   
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12) -7.91
a
 -1.68
b
 40.14 
 
-1.49 -3.45 45.16 -4.92 -8.70 44.57 -6.78 -1.69 48.45 -9.68a -1.05 33.93 
(1,24) 4.36 2.59
b
 58.78 
 
-5.49 -2.79a 36.29 -5.26c -2.41 40.22 -4.36a -4.67c 36.08 -9.30a -1.38 33.93 
(1,36) 5.78 2.51
a
 57.41 
 
-9.59 -4.69a 33.06 -9.10a -5.58 38.04 -2.44a -2.69a 32.99 -8.79a -6.09 33.93 
 
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel B: GARCH Returns   
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
    
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12) -1.00 0.82 51.00 
 
-2.00 -3.00 47.00 3.00 0.00 48.00 -3.00 -1.00 45.00 -5.00 -4.00 43.00 
(1,24) -0.18 -4.53 45.00 
 
-12.00
a
 -12.00
a
 35.00 3.00 -2.00 46.00 -11.00a -9.00b 38.00 -7.00 -5.00 45.00 
(1,36) 1.37 -7.10c 43.00 
 
-12.00
a
 -13.00
a
 36.00 -1.00 -4.00c 40.00 -11.00a -10.00b 38.00 -6.00 -3.00 46.00 
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Table 5A.10- Repeat Targeting Voting Sample Calendar Time Regressions  
This table reports the results of the calendar time regressions for the repeat targeting sample.  The first column reports 
the coefficients using the Fama French (1993) factors as the benchmark over the holding periods covering 12, 24 and 
36 months from the targeting date, using the following regression:  
(Rp - Rf)t = α + β1(RM - Rf)t + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + εt 
where (Rp - Rf)t is the average monthly return on the portfolio of targeted stocks less the return on the one-month 
risk-free rate in calendar month t; (RM - Rf)t is the return on the FTSE All Share return index less the return on the 
one-month risk-free rate in calendar month t; SMBt is the difference between the value-weighted average return on 
the small-cap portfolios and large-cap portfolios; and HMLt is the difference between the value-weighted average 
return on the high book-to-market portfolios and low book-to-market portfolios.  The second column reports similar 
coefficient results using the Carhart (1997) factors as the benchmark, using the following regression:  
(Rp - Rf)t = α + β1(RM - Rf)t + β2SMBt + β3HMLt β4UMDt + εt 
The factors are the same as for the Fama French (1993) model with the exception that UMDt is the difference between 
the value weighted average return on the high past-year stock-return portfolios and low past-year stock-return 
portfolios.  The figures a,b,c indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-
tail test.   
 
Holding Period 
Fama French (1993) Carhart (1997) 
α β1 β2 β3 R
2
 α β1 β2 β3 β4 R
2
 
 
  
    
  
     Panel A: Firms 
Targeted Once (n=175)   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) 0.27 0.83
a
 0.96
a
 -0.14 0.50 0.24 0.80a 0.46c -0.50c -0.44 0.34 
(1,24) 0.09 0.68a 0.61a 0.00 0.30 0.09 0.61a 0.19 -0.3 -0.38 0.25 
(1,36) -0.12 0.68a 0.51a 0.01 0.29 -0.15 0.63a 0.21 -0.14 -0.39 0.27 
 
  
    
  
     Panel B: Firms 
Targeted Two Times 
(n=131)   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) 0.03 0.59
a
 0.24 0.05 0.25 0.18 0.60a 0.12 -0.49b -0.29 0.33 
(1,24) -0.81
c
 0.52
a
 0.13 0.21 0.23 -0.59 0.47a -0.06 -0.16 -0.2 0.23 
(1,36) -0.10
b
 0.49
a
 0.13 0.28 0.21 -0.76c 0.44a -0.05 -0.04 -0.28 0.19 
 
  
    
  
     Panel C: Firms 
Targeted Three Times 
(n=94)   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) -0.03 0.64
a
 0.17 0.23 0.31 0.26 0.61a 0.06 -0.32 -0.27 0.34 
(1,24) -0.19 0.67a 0.05 0.25 0.35 0.04 0.68a 0.15 -0.01 -0.23 0.35 
(1,36) -0.41 0.67a -0.01 0.27c 0.37 -0.18 0.70a 0.16 0.09 -0.44c 0.39 
   
    
            
Panel D: Firms 
Targeted Four Times 
(n=99)   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) -0.66 0.49
a
 -0.36 0.11 0.26 -0.50 0.62a 0.19 0.19 0.08 0.23 
(1,24) -1.30
a
 0.49
a
 -0.26 0.27 0.29 -1.04b 0.60a 0.16 0.33 -0.25 0.26 
(1,36) -1.28
a
 0.47
a
 -0.26 0.28 0.30 -1.02b 0.59a 0.16 0.33 -0.14 0.25 
 
  
    
  
     Panel E: Firms 
Targeted Five Times 
(n=56)   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) -0.89 0.44
b
 -0.33 0.23 0.29 -0.61 0.55b 0.03 0.03 0.24 0.21 
(1,24) -1.07
b
 0.48
a
 -0.23 0.32 0.38 -0.86c 0.63a 0.15 0.29 0.11 0.32 
(1,36) -1.04
b
 0.45
a
 -0.31 0.28 0.37 -0.80 0.62a 0.15 0.34 0.03 0.3 
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Appendix 5B – Abnormal returns around event dates 
The following table documents abnormal returns around the event dates for the shareholder resolutions 
and targeted voting samples. I calculate abnormal returns as the target firm return minus the control firm 
return.  Control firms are matched by industry (2-digit SIC) and within ±20% of target market value one 
month prior to targeting.  Where no adequate match can be found, the conditions are relaxed to find a firm 
within 50% of target market value in the year prior to targeting.  The figures a, b, c indicate statistical 
significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test.   
 
    Resolutions   Voting 
Day N Mean Median N Mean Median 
-20 25 -0.16 -0.05 1642 0.00 0.00 
-19 25 -1.13 -0.16 1642 -0.04 0.00 
-18 25 0.07 0.02 1642 0.05 0.00 
-17 25 0.88 0.75 1642 -0.02 0.00 
-16 25 0.95 -0.10 1642 -0.01 -0.02 
-15 25 1.57c -0.03 1642 -0.01 -0.06 
-14 25 0.71 0.14 1642 0.02 0.00 
-13 25 0.45 0.39 1642 0.04 0.00 
-12 25 1.06 0.20 1642 0.06 0.00 
-11 25 -0.70 -0.12 1642 0.09 0.00 
-10 25 0.40 0.12 1642 0.08b 0.00 
-9 25 3.09a 0.15 1642 -0.01 0.00 
-8 25 -1.04b 0.10 1642 0.01 0.00 
-7 25 0.76 0.04 1642 0.09 0.00 
-6 25 1.08 0.17 1642 0.02 0.00 
-5 25 0.36 0.06 1642 0.14a 0.00 
-4 25 -0.64 -0.09 1642 -0.01 0.00 
-3 25 -0.19 0.00 1642 0.03 0.00 
-2 25 1.45 0.15 1642 0.01 0.00 
-1 25 -0.84 -0.17 1642 0.03 0.00 
0 25 -0.82 0.05 1642 0.13a 0.18a 
1 25 1.18 0.00 1642 -0.01 0.00 
2 25 -0.54 -0.09 1642 -0.08c -0.10a 
3 25 0.72 0.13 1642 0.03 0.00 
4 25 -0.34 0.01c 1642 0.00 -0.05 
5 25 -0.94c -0.71c 1642 -0.05 -0.07 
6 25 -0.26 0.05 1642 -0.01 -0.06 
7 25 -1.16b 0.17 1642 -0.03 -0.03 
8 25 -0.50 0.00 1642 -0.09 -0.02 
9 25 0.45 0.06 1642 -0.01 -0.07 
10 25 0.26 0.05 1642 -0.16a -0.14a 
11 25 -0.04 -0.04 1642 0.08c 0.00b 
12 25 0.39 0.08 1642 0.02 0.00 
13 25 -0.24 0.00 1642 0.01 0.00 
14 25 -0.75 -0.11b 1642 -0.06 -0.06 
15 25 -0.10 -0.03 1642 0.01 -0.11c 
16 25 -0.40 -0.04 1642 -0.03 -0.02 
17 25 -0.17 -0.04 1642 0.05 0.00 
18 25 -0.34 -0.01 1642 0.02 0.00 
19 25 -0.20 -0.01 1642 0.00 0.00 
20 25 -0.58c -0.10 1642 0.00 0.00 
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Chapter 6 Impact of Shareholder Activism on Strategy, 
Corporate Governance, Executive Compensation and 
Shareholder Value 
 
6.1  Introduction 
Chapter 4 presented the results of the survey that I conducted with fund managers which 
indicated that fund managers in the UK generally directed their attention at three main 
areas.  These are firm strategy, corporate governance and executive compensation.  The 
literature review in chapter 2 indicates that activist pressure can have a positive impact on 
the strategic direction of targeted US firms.  This result is supported by Becht et al (2008) 
who find activism by HUKFF leads to restructuring at target firms when measured by asset 
size and the number of employees.  The incumbent literature also shows limited impact on 
corporate governance and executive compensation as a result of activists‟ pressure. 
Academic research has generally found a positive link between corporate governance 
standards and firm performance.  Gompers et al, (2003) find that firms with strong 
shareholder rights have an abnormal return of 8.5% over the period 1990 to 1999.  This 
result is also supported in a study by Black et al (2006) where analysis of 526 Korean firms 
finds that by improving governance standards from worst to best practices, the firm‟s 
exhibit a boost in Tobin‟s Q of 42 percent over a 3 year period.  Finally, Cremers and Nair 
(2005) find that over the period 199-2001, firms with improved governance exhibit annual 
returns of between 10 and 15% per year.  The conclusion to be drawn is that in general, 
raising governance standards generally leads to improved firm performance. 
There is quite a rich vein of literature that has looked at the impact of different executive 
compensation structures on firm performance.  Brickly, et al (1985), Mehran (1995), and 
Hall and Liebman (1998) all analyse the impact of CEO equity based compensation on 
market performance and find a positive relationship exists.  In relation to this, a weak 
relationship was found in 1971 by Mason when looking at firms with higher pay-
performance sensitivity and their stock price.  Murphy (1985) finds that in a sample of US 
firms between 1964 and 1981, for each 10% real return obtained, the firm will raise total 
compensation levels by 2.1%.  The result is statistically significant but very small.  Gibbons 
and Murphy (1990) agree with this view and find higher CEO bonuses when performance 
improves, but find that when industry performance improves, the relationship is negative.  
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Finally, Jensen and Murphy (1990) find that there is a statistically significant relationship 
between executive wealth and shareholder wealth.  However, this relationship is not 
significant economically.  However, Jensen and Murphy (1990) finds no significant 
relationship and this view is supported by Gompers and Lerner in 1999.  To confuse matters 
even further, Hallock and Murphy (1999) conclude that there is very little evidence that 
higher pay - performance sensitivity improves corporate performance. 
In this chapter I analyse the impact of targeting by institutional investors on the area of 
strategy, corporate governance or executive compensation.  In order to do this, I compile 
subsamples of voting, private negotiation and shareholder resolutions that targeted these 
specific issues.  The hypotheses used to analyse this impact are outlined below: 
H1: Firms targeted on issues of strategy experience improvements in their 
strategic variables structures relative to control firms. 
H2: Firms targeted by an activist institution on issues of strategy show 
improvements in shareholder value over the three years after targeting occurs  
H3: Firms targeted on issues of corporate governance experience improvements in 
their corporate governance structures relative to control firms. 
H4: Firms targeted by an activist institution on issues of corporate governance 
show improvements in shareholder value over the three years after targeting 
occurs  
H5: Firms targeted on issues of executive compensation experience improvements 
in their executive compensation structures relative to control firms. 
H6: Firms targeted by an activist institution on issues of executive compensation 
show improvements in shareholder value over the three years after targeting 
occurs  
H7: Firms targeted on only one issue at a meeting or during an engagement 
perform better than those targeted on multiple issues. 
H8: Target firms have poor strategy, corporate governance or executive 
compensation charecteristics compared to the control group at the time of 
targeting. 
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6.2 Sample Selection and Test methodology 
In order to test the above hypotheses, we build nine sub samples following the sampling 
criteria outlined in chapter 3. These samples are defined in Table 6.1.  For the voting 
samples, I compile a sample of 79 companies targeted on an issue of strategy; 390 targeted 
on an issue of corporate governance; and 491 companies targeted on an issue of executive 
compensation.  For the private negotiation samples, I compile a sample of 46 companies 
targeted on an issue of strategy; 81 targeted on an issue of corporate governance; and 92 
companies targeted on an issue of executive compensation.  I also compile a sample of 29 
companies targeted by shareholder resolutions.  All of these resolutions are targeting 
corporate governance. 
 [INSERT Table 6.1 HERE] 
6.2.1 Test Methodology 
Shareholder Value Impact 
Chapter 3 defines the test methodology that I employ to assess the impact of shareholder 
activism in the UK.  Over the short term,87 I measure CARs over an 11 day (-5, +5) 
windows centred on the announcement date, Day 0.  Over the long term, I measure BHARs 
covering 12, 24 and 36 month windows.   For the short and long term analysis, I calculate 
abnormal returns using matched control firms as well as the FTSE All Share return.88  I also 
calculate calendar time portfolio returns and regressions using the Carhart (1997) four 
factor model over the long term.  As a robustness check I calculate calendar time portfolio 
returns using the Fama French (1993) model, as well as GARCH model abnormal returns.  I 
also calculate calendar time regressions using the Fama French (1993) and Carhart (1997) 
benchmark models as outlined in chapter 3. The results of the robustness checks can be 
found in the appendices at the end of this chapter. 
Change in Target firm Characteristics  
In order to assess the drivers of changes in shareholder value I analyse the impact of each 
type of activism on the targets‟ strategy, corporate governance and executive compensation.  
Changes are calculated relative to the change in the control firm, and the median industry 
firms to give an abnormal change over the sample period.  I subsequently calculate the t and 
                                                   
87 Short term CARs are not calculated for the negotiation sample.  See Chapter 3 for an explanation why. 
88 Consistent with Chapter 5 the FTSE All share returns are not presented for the long term analysis 
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Wilcoxon z statistics for the mean and median abnormal changes to test whether these 
changes are significantly different from zero.  See chapter 3 for a full explanation of the 
variables used. 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1Sample Strategic Performance 
Table 6.2 presents data on strategic variables for firms targeted by institutional investors 
over the sample period.  I report mean and median values for firm characteristics 30 days 
before the targeting occurs.  For firms targeted by private negotiation, I report the figures at 
the start of the quarter in which they are entered into our portfolio.  For firms targeted more 
than once the reported figures are at the time of the first targeting.   
[INSERT Table 6.2 HERE] 
Panel A reports strategic variable statistics for firms targeted through voting activity.  
Target firms have a larger employee base than control firms at the time of targeting (median 
0.84 vs. 0.60, p-value 0.09) and a marginally larger R&D expenditure (median 0.03 vs. 
0.02, p-value 0.03).  The remainder of the results are not statistically significant.  Panel B 
reports statistics for the firms targeted through private negotiation.  Targets have slightly 
lower levels of intangible assets (median 0.08 vs. 0.10, p-value 0.01) while have higher 
capital expenditure (mean 0.06 vs. 0.04, p-value 0.04) than control firms.  The remainder of 
the results are not statistically significant.  These results suggest that there is little 
significant difference between targeted firms and control firms.  However, there is scope for 
the activist to change the level of spending on R&D and capital expenditure at targets of 
private negotiation.  It also supports the theory presented in the previous chapter that 
activist UK institutions undertake preventative engagement designed to ensure target firms 
strategy doesn‟t deteriorate in the future. 
6.3.2 Sample Corporate Governance 
Table 6.3 presents data on corporate governance variables for firms targeted by institutional 
investors over the sample period.  I report mean and median values for firm characteristics 
30 days before the targeting occurs.  For firms targeted by private negotiation, I report the 
figures at the start of the quarter in which they are entered into our portfolio.  For firms 
targeted more than once the reported figures are at the time of the first targeting.   
[INSERT Table 6.3 HERE] 
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Panel A of Table 6.3 reports the corporate governance statistics of companies targeted 
through voting activity.  I find little significant difference between targeted firms and the 
control firms except in the area of the independence of the company board.  I find that 
targeted firms have an average board independence of 0.58, compared to 0.59 (p-value 
0.09) for the independence of the boards of the control firms. 
Panel B reports statistics for the firms targeted through private negotiation.  Similar to the 
voting samples, I find very little statistically significant difference between the two sets of 
companies.  The only area in which a difference exists is the tenure of the boards‟ executive 
directors.  Targeted firms executive directors have a tenure of 4.66 years compared to 5.31 
years (p-value 0.03) for control firms 
Finally, Panel C of Table 6.3 reports statistics for the sample of firms targeted through 
shareholder resolutions.  The only statistically significant difference that I find is within the 
comparable sizes of the two groups of companies‟ board of directors.  Targeted firms have a 
median board size of 4 directors while control firms have a board size of 3 (p-value 0.04).  
To summarise, I find little statistical difference between the corporate governance practices 
of firms in any of our three samples.  These results might give supporting evidence to my 
findings in Chapter 5 in which I suggested UK institutional investors might pre-emptively 
target investee companies to try and prevent problems from arising that might impact on 
future performance.  The results are also consistent with evidence presented in section 2.2 
that the UK corporate governance standards are generally of a very high standard. 
6.3.3 Sample Executive Compensation 
Table 6.4 presents data on executive compensation variables for firms targeted by 
institutional investors over the sample period.  I report mean and median values for firm 
characteristics 30 days before the targeting occurs.  For firms targeted by private 
negotiation, I report the figures at the start of the quarter in which they are entered into our 
portfolio.  For firms targeted more than once the reported figures are at the time of the first 
targeting.   
[INSERT Table 6.4 HERE] 
Panel A reports variables for the sample of firms targeted through voting.  Target firms 
have a larger value for CEO delta than control firms (mean £47.84k vs. £46k, p-value 0.01) 
indicating that target firms compensation is more responsive to changes in the stock price.  
Furthermore, total CEO compensation is slightly higher at target firms (£532.64k vs. £531k, 
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p-value 0.04).  The remainder of the variables are not statistically significant.  These results 
suggest that activists are attempting to limit the growth in the overall level of compensation 
paid to the CEO of targeted companies. 
For firms targeted through private negotiation (Panel B) I find that target firms have a 
higher level of CEO cash compensation (median £632.91k vs. £595k, p-value 0.01).  The 
only other statistically significant difference between the two sets of companies is that the 
delta of the executive's compensation is much lower for target companies than for control 
firms (median £13.93k vs. £109.4k, p-value 0.10).  These results are consistent with prior 
US research as presented in Chapter 2 that suggests activist investors target companies with 
high levels of CEO compensation and where the overall executive compensation package is 
not sufficiently biased towards performance related components. 
6.3.4 Change in Company Strategy 
Table 6.5 presents data on the change in strategic variables for firms targeted by 
institutional investors over the sample period.  I report mean and median values for 
abnormal changes relative to the control groups and the median firm in the target‟s 2-digit 
SIC industry.  I discuss median values in this analysis.  A score of 1.0 indicates a 100% 
increase in the variable.   
[INSERT Table 6.5 HERE] 
Panel A of Table 6.5 reports the change in strategic variables for firms targeted by voting 
activity.  Target firms‟ total assets falls relative to both the control firms (median -0.47, sig. 
10%) and the median industry firms (median -0.06, sig. 5%).  Target firms employee 
numbers increases relative to the median industry firms (median 0.28, sig. 10%) while the 
volume of M&A activity also rises relative to the median industry firms (mean 0.06, sig. 
1%).  The remainder of the variables show no statistically significant difference between the 
two sets of companies.  For firms targeted through private negotiation (Panel B), the level 
of total assets rises relative to the control firms (mean 0.82, sig. 10%).  Furthermore, the 
number of employees employed by the target firms falls relative to the median industry 
firms (mean -0.59, sig. 1%).  Finally, the value of capital expenditure rises relative to the 
median industry firms (median 0.29, sig. 10%).  The remainder of the variables show no 
statistically significant difference between the two sets of companies.  Our results support 
those found by the incumbent literature which documents an impact on target firms‟ 
strategy.  Furthermore, the fall in employee numbers as a result of activist pressure also 
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supports the results found by Becht et al (2008).  The results indicate that activism is more 
effective in targeting business rather than financial strategy. 
6.3.5Change in Corporate Governance 
Table 6.6 presents data on the change in corporate governance for firms targeted by 
institutional investors over the sample period.  I report mean and median values for 
abnormal changes relative to the control groups and the median firm in the target‟s 2-digit 
SIC industry.  I discuss median values in this analysis.  A score of 1.0 indicates a 100% 
increase in the variable.   
[INSERT Table 6.6 HERE] 
Panel A of Table 6.6 reports statistics for the firms targeted by institutional investors 
through the medium of voting activity.  I find a reduction in the median size of target 
company boards relative to both benchmark groups (CG: -0.23, sig. 5%; IM: -0.20, sig. 
1%); while the independence of the board falls relative to the median industry firms (mean -
0.15, sig. 1%).  The only other statistically significant change that I find is an increase in the 
tenure of executive directors relative to the control firms (median 0.35, sig. 10%).  These 
results indicate that the corporate governance standards at firms targeted through voting 
activity declines.  This would be consistent with my early suggestion that that UK corporate 
governance standards are very high and the activist was attempting to prevent a decline in 
standards at target companies. 
Panel B of Table 6.6 reports similar change statistics for the sample of firms targeted 
through private negotiation.  I document an increase in the average size of target boards 
relative to the median industry firms (mean 0.18, sig. 10%).  However, relative to the 
control group benchmark the size of the board declines slightly (mean -0.05, sig. 5%).  At 
the same time, I find a slight increase in the independence of target company boards relative 
to the control firms (mean 0.02, sig. 5%).  I find no significant change in any of the 
remaining corporate governance variables for firms targeted through private negotiation.  
My results indicate a slight deterioration in the standards of corporate governance at the 
targets of private negotiation.   These results are consistent with Wu (2004). 
Panel C of Table 6.6 reports the change in corporate governance variable for firms targeted 
through shareholder resolutions.  The only significant change that I find is an increase in the 
median tenure of independent directors relative to the control firms (0.35, sig. 5%).  This 
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result suggests UK activists are successful in using voting to improve the independent 
director monitoring of the board. 
To summarise, I find little significant change in the composure of target firms‟ corporate 
governance over and above a small change in the size of target company boards relative to 
our benchmark samples.  This result is consistent with the incumbent shareholder activism 
literature. 
6.3.6 Change in Executive Compensation 
Table 6.7 presents data on the change in executive compensation variables for firms 
targeted by institutional investors over the sample period.  I report mean and median values 
for abnormal changes relative to the control groups and the median firm in the target‟s 2-
digit SIC industry.  I discuss median values in this analysis.  A score of 1.0 indicates a 
100% increase in the variable.   
[INSERT Table 6.7 HERE] 
Panel A reports the change in executive compensation statistics for firms targeted through 
voting.  The only statistically significant change to target firms‟ executive compensation 
structures is in the cash value of CEO compensation.  Relative to the median industry firms, 
CEO‟s cash component of the compensation falls by -0.21 (sig. 1%).  This supports my 
third hypothesis stating that targeting on the issues of compensation will lead to a change in 
the composition of these structures at target firms. The remainder of the variables show no 
statistically significant changes over the sample period. 
For firms targeted through private negotiation (Panel B) I find an abnormal increase in the 
value of CEO cash compensation relative to the control firms (median 1.45, sig. 5%).  
Similarly, the value of the executive director‟s cash compensation rises relative to the 
control firms (mean 0.76, sig. 10%) while the delta of executive directors compensation 
falls relative to the control firms (median -2.12, sig. 5%).  The remainder of the variables 
show no statistically significant changes over the sample period.  My results indicate that 
there is some limited improvement in executive compensation structures at firms targeted 
by institutional investors through voting activity.  This is consistent with the limited 
findings of incumbent literature.  However, targeting through private negotiation is not able 
to stop the level of executive compensation from rising and becoming less performance 
related.  It might also suggest that more public activism strategies, such as voting against 
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remuneration reports are necessary to force the company to address concerns relating to the 
size and construction of executive compensation packages. 
6.3.7 Shareholder Value  
I report the shareholder value performance of the target companies relative to a number of 
benchmarks using the same format as Chapter 5.  
Shareholder Resolutions 
Table 6.8 reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the target 
firms in the Resolutions sample.  Values are not statistically significant unless stated. 
[INSERT Table 6.8 HERE] 
Panel A of Table 6.8 reports short term CARs for the targets relative to the control firms 
and the FTSE All Share index for the requisition date, proxy mailing date and for the 
meeting date at which the shareholder proposal is submitted.  Relative to the control group, 
I find a positive abnormal return of 0.81% (sig. 1%) surrounding the requisition date for an 
EGM.  This abnormal return grows to 2.46% (sig. 1%) surrounding the date at which the 
proxy forms are posted to the shareholders of the targeted company.  When using the FTSE 
All Share as the benchmark I find a negative return of -1.46% (sig. 10%) over the 11 day 
windows surrounding the meeting date.  None of the other variables are significant.  These 
results indicate the stock market reacts favourably to news that activist‟s are targeting the 
firm on an issue of corporate governance.  However, the long term negative returns indicate 
that targeting a company using resolutions on an issue of corporate governance has no 
impact, as illustrated by the poor changes to corporate governance illustrated in section 
6.3.5 
Panel B of Table 6.8 reports the results of the long term BHAR analysis for firms targeted 
by shareholder resolutions.  Over the 3 year period after the meeting at which the 
shareholder proposal was submitted, we find that targeted companies underperform a 
sample of control firms by -1.51% (sig. 5%).  None of the other variables are significant.  
This supports our theory that the stock market has reacted negatively to the news that the 
resolution was defeated.   
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Panel C reports the results of the calendar time portfolio returns using the Carhart (1997) 
multi-factor benchmark model.  We find no significant abnormal returns using this 
methodology. 
To summarise, we document positive abnormal returns surrounding the requisitions date 
and mailing date for the proxy forms over the short term.  However, over the long term we 
find negative abnormal returns.  This result is consistent with prior research in the US 
which found negative returns for firms targeted through shareholder proposals (Wahal, 
1996; Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999) 
Private Negotiation 
I only analyse the impact of shareholder activism through private negotiation over the long 
term due to the lack of a defined event date as explained in chapter 3.  Table 6.9 reports the 
results of the long term analysis for the sample of firms targeted by private negotiation.  I 
split the main sample into subsamples depending on whether the engagement by the 
institutional investor was on only one issue, or whether they had more wide ranging 
concerns over the company‟s direction.  Values are not statistically significant unless stated. 
[INSERT Table 6.9 HERE] 
Panel A reports the long term BHARs for target firms relative to the control group 
benchmark.  For the sample of firms targeted on only the issue of strategy produces a 
positive mean abnormal return of 7.23% (sig. 10%) over the two year window when 
measured relative to the control group return.  The remainder of the results are not 
statistically significant.  This result is consistent with prior US research.  It indicates that 
efforts to improve the company‟s strategy help to generate long term returns for the activist.  
They are also consistent with the restructuring efforts undertaken by the firm as illustrated 
in Table 6.5. 
Panel B reports the results of the calendar time portfolios where the Carhart (1997) four 
factor benchmark is used.  Over the three year window, for firms targeted on only the issue 
of strategy I document a negative abnormal return (mean -6.22%, sig. 1%).  Targeting on 
corporate governance issues generates a negative abnormal return using this model over the 
three year window (mean -3.52%, sig. 1%; median -3.11%, sig. 1%).   For firms targeted on 
only the issue of executive compensation I document a negative abnormal return (mean -
7.15%, sig. 1%; median -4.53%, sig. 1%).   The remainder of the results are not statistically 
176 
 
significant.  These results are consistent with my earlier findings that activists have no 
impact when trying to improve corporate governance or executive compensation.  They also 
support the literature presented in the introduction of this chapter which highlights the link 
that exists between good standards of corporate governance, executive compensation and 
firm performance. 
Targeted Voting 
I split the voting sample into subsample in a similar manner to the previous chapter.  I 
report the results for each subsample group separately, before bringing the results together 
in a summary at the end of the section. 
Targeting on Single or Multiple Issues 
Table 6.10 reports the results of the shareholder value impact of targeting by voting activity 
where only one issue or multiple issues are targeted at each meeting.  Results are not 
statistically significant unless stated. 
[INSERT Table 6.10 HERE] 
Panel A reports the short term CARs.  Relative to the control firms, companies targeted on 
only strategic issues produce a positive median abnormal return over the short term 11 day 
window of 0.60% (sig. 1%).  However, if the company is targeted on a corporate 
governance issue, the median abnormal return is negative relative to the control firms (-
0.13%, sig. 5%).  Relative to the FTSE All Share, the positive abnormal return for strategic 
targeting increases substantially (mean 2.00%, sig. 1%; median 2.43%, sig. 1%).  These 
results support our findings in the prior section that firms targeted through voting produce 
positive abnormal returns over the short term.  They also support the findings of the voting 
sample which showed that targeting on strategic issues produces positive returns. 
Panel B reports the results of the long term analysis relative to the control firms. For firms 
targeted on more than one issue, I document a negative abnormal return over the three year 
window (mean -0.99%, sig. 1%; median -5.33%, sig. 1%).  I also find negative median 
abnormal returns over the three years post targeting for samples of firms targeted on 
corporate governance (-3.17%, sig. 1%) and executive compensation (-3.69%, sig. 1%).    
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These results are consistent with the private negotiation results presented in the previous 
section 
Finally, Panel C reports the long term results relative to the Carhart (1997) four factor 
benchmark.  Similar to the control group benchmark, the abnormal return for multiple issue 
targeting is negative over the three year post targeting window (mean -5.13%, sig. 1%; 
median -3.15%, sig. 1%).  Over the same window, I find that firms targeted on issues of 
corporate governance produce a negative median abnormal return of -4.57% (sig. 1%), 
while those targeted on issues of executive compensation also produce a negative abnormal  
return (mean -5.16%, sig. 5%; median -3.71%, sig. 1%). 
The results presented in this section support the findings of chapter 5.  Firms that are 
targeted on only one issue generate negative abnormal returns that are smaller than those 
generated by firms targeted on more than one issue.  These results indicate that firms 
targeted on more than one issue have deep rooted problems that are difficult to change. 
However, targeting on issues of corporate governance or executive compensation produce 
large negative abnormal returns over the longer term.  This is intuitive as poor corporate 
governance or executive compensation has a direct impact upon the ability of the directors 
to effectively manage the company. 
One-off or Repeat Targeting 
A number of firms in our sample are targeted repeatedly over the sample period.  In order to 
test the impact of this, I analyse the short term impact of each sequential targeting.  I also 
test the long term performance depending on the number of times they are targeting.  For 
the long term analysis I test from the final targeting in the sequence.  Results are not 
statistically significant unless stated. 
[INSERT Table 6.11 HERE] 
Panel A reports short term CARs.  Firms targeted only once over the sample period on an 
issue of strategy produce a positive median abnormal return of 0.40% (sig. 1%) relative to 
the control firms for the 11 day window around the targeting date.  When measured relative 
to the FTSE All share the outperformance of firms targeted only once on strategic issues 
grows to a mean abnormal return of 0.70% (sig. 10%).  This result supports my prior 
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findings that attempts to improve the strategic direction of the company are viewed 
favourably by the stock market. 
Firms targeted repeatedly on issues of strategy produce a larger abnormal return than those 
targeted only once relative to the control firms (mean 1.25%, sig. 1%; median 0.66%, sig. 
1%) and the FTSE All share (mean 1.62%, sig. 5%; median 1.41%, sig. 5%).  For the 
sample of firms repeatedly targeted over the sample period on issues of corporate 
governance I find a negative median abnormal return of -0.19% (sig. 5%) relative to the 
control firms for the 11 day window surrounding each sequential targeting.   Relative to the 
control firms, firms targeted repeatedly on an issue of executive compensation produce a 
median abnormal return of 0.05% (sig. 1%) over the 11 day window.  When measured 
relative to the FTSE All Share, the positive abnormal return increases (median 0.27%, sig. 
10%; mean 0.22%, sig. 1%) for this subsample.    This indicates positive stock market 
reaction to sustained attempts to improve the poor strategy or executive compensation in 
place at target companies.  The findings are also consistent with my findings from the 
previous chapter.  
Panel B reports the results of the long term analysis relative to the control firms.  For firms 
only targeted once on a corporate governance concern, I find a positive mean abnormal 
return relative to the control groups of 3.94% (sig. 5%) over the 3 year window post 
targeting.  However, the median abnormal return for this sample is negative (-4.30%, sig. 
10%) relative to the same benchmark.  Firms targeted only once on an issue of executive 
compensation produces a negative median abnormal return of -3.92% (sig. 5%) over and 
above the control firms return.  For repeat targeting, I find repeatedly targeting firms with 
strategy concerns produces a positive mean abnormal return of 1.83% (sig. 10%) over the 
three years after targeting ceases relative to the control firms.    However, for firms 
repeatedly targeted on issues of corporate governance, median abnormal return relative to 
the control groups is -4.62% (sig. 1%).  A similar picture exists for firms repeatedly 
targeted on executive compensation, where repeated targeting produces slightly larger 
negative abnormal returns relative to the control group (mean -1.50%, sig. 5%, median -
5.17%, sig. 1%).  These results indicate positive stock market reaction to news that an 
activist is omitted to changing the strategy of targeted firms.  However, it also illustrates 
that the stock market is fearful that repeat targeting on issued of corporate governance of 
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executive compensation indicates entrenched problems that are not easy to address.  My 
results are consistent with prior US research. 
Finally, Panel C reports similar results relative to the Carhart (1997) benchmark.  For firms 
targeted only once, the median abnormal return is -1.41% (sig. 5%) where strategic issues 
are the concern.  If corporate governance issues attract investor attention repeatedly targeted 
firms produce a median three year abnormal return of -3.34% (sig. 1%).  The final targeted 
on executive compensation issues over the sample period generates a larger negative 
abnormal return (mean -3.81%, sig. 1%, median -2.7%, sig. 1%).  The remainder of the 
results are not statistically significant.  These results support the theory that repeatedly 
targeted firms have larger problems than firms only targeted once in the eyes of investors.  
As a whole, the results presented in this subsection provide strong supporting evidence for 
my findings in chapter 5.  Repeat targeting, except if the issue is one of strategy, is 
indicative of deep rooted problems with the management structure of targeted firms. 
Multivariate Regression 
Table 6.12 reports the results of the multivariate regressions to indicate which firm 
characteristic changes help to generate the abnormal returns.  I regress the two year post 
targeting BHAR onto the change in characteristic for each of our sub samples. 
[INSERT Table 6.12 HERE] 
The left hand section of Table 6.12 reports the multivariate regressions for the strategic 
issue sub samples.  I find a positive relationship between divided payout rates and the two 
year BHAR for both of the samples.  Furthermore, I also find a statistically significant 
negative relationship between the long term share price performance and changes in both 
total assets and the number of employees employed by the company.  These results indicate 
that attempts to restructure the firm, or increase the dividend payout lead to appreciations in 
the firm‟s shareholder value.  This result is consistent with existing research as presented in 
Chapter 2.  For firms targeted through negotiation I uncover a negative relationship between 
the leverage ratio and the share price.  Finally, firms targeted through voting activity also 
exhibit a negative relationship between both CAPEX/TA and RD/SALES, indicating lower 
strategic expenditure is viewed favourable by the stock market.  Overall these results 
provide limited evidence that improvements in the company‟s strategic direction generate 
positive abnormal returns over the longer term.  This is consistent with prior research in 
which a link is found between improved strategic direction and firm performance. 
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The middle section of Table 6.12 reports the multivariate regressions for the corporate 
governance issue sub samples.  For the sample of firms targeted through shareholder 
resolutions I find a positive relationship between changes in board size and the targeted 
firms‟ long term share price performance.  Furthermore, I find a positive relationship 
between the number of independent directors employed by the board for both the 
shareholder resolutions and voting samples.  This would indicate that increased 
independence of the board is welcomed by investors.  Firms targeted through negotiation 
exhibit a negative relationship between CEO duality and the two year BHARs, indicating 
that reduced CEO duality is welcomed by investors.  Finally, I find a negative relationship 
between the tenure of executive directors and BHARs for both the resolutions and voting 
samples.  Overall, I find evidence that the stock market reacts positively to improvements in 
the corporate governance structures of targeted companies.  This is consistent with 
academic research showing that improved corporate governance standards leads to 
improvements in the firms performance (see introduction of this chapter). 
The right hand section of Table 6.12 reports the multivariate regressions for the executive 
compensation sub samples.  I find a negative relationship between the value of the cash 
component of the CEO‟s pay and the two year BHAR, indicating reduced CEO pay is 
welcomed by investors.  Furthermore, I find a small positive relationship between the value 
of the directors‟ cash components for firms targeted through private negotiation.  However, 
for the same sample the relationship between overall executive director pay and the two 
year BHAR is negative.  I find a similar negative relationship for firms targeted by voting.  
Overall, I find limited positive relationships between changes in executive compensation 
and the post activism BHAR as a result of targeting by an activist investor on issues of 
executive compensation.  These results support the findings of incumbent research that links 
improved executive compensation structures to improved firm performance.  The results of 
the regressions covering all three issues of strategy, corporate governance and executive 
compensation indicate that improvements in these areas are positively related to improved 
shareholder value. 
6.3.8 Robustness Check 
Similar to the previous chapter, I test the robustness of the long term results using two 
further benchmarks.  I test the robustness of the Carhart (1997) calendar time portfolio 
return using the Fama French (1993) three factor model.  I further test the robustness of the 
results using a GARCH (1,1) model.  Furthermore, I also calculate calendar time 
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regressions using the Fama French (1993) and Carhart (1997) benchmark models as 
outlined in chapter 3.  The results of this analysis can be seen in the Appendices tables as 
described in the following section.   
Table 6A.1 reports the Fama French (1993) (FF3) and the GARCH results for the sample of 
firms targeted through shareholder resolutions.  Table 6A.2 reports the results of the 
calendar time regressions for the shareholder resolutions sample.  I find no statistically 
significant results for this sample of firms using either of these benchmark models. 
[INSERT Table 6A.1 AND Table 6A.2 HERE] 
Table 6A.3 reports the results of the FF3 and GARCH methodology for the sample of firms 
targeted through private negotiation.  Results are not statistically significant unless stated. 
[INSERT Table 6A.3 HERE] 
Panel A reports long term abnormal returns when the FF3 model is used as the benchmark.  
Firms targeted on more than one issue produces a median negative abnormal return of -
2.40% (sig. 10%).  For the sample of firms targeted on only the issue of strategy, target 
firms generates a negative abnormal return (mean -5.20%, sig. 10%), while the sample of 
firms targeted on only the issue of corporate governance produces a negative mean 
abnormal return of -1.08% (sig. 1%) over the three years post targeting by an institutional 
investor.  Finally, the sample of firms targeted on only the issue of executive compensation 
generates negative abnormal returns (mean -5.69%, sig. 5%; median -3.07%, sig. 1%).  The 
remainder of the results are not statistically significant.  These results are consistent with 
my findings as presented earlier. 
Table 6A.4 reports the results of the calendar time regressions for sub samples of firms 
targeted through private negotiation using the Fama French (1993) three factor and Carhart 
(1997) four factor benchmarks.  The reported alpha is the mean monthly abnormal return 
for the specified test window.  
[INSERT Table 6A.4 HERE] 
Over the three years after targeting, firms targeted on only the issue of executive 
compensation produces a negative alpha of -1.06 (sig. 10%) when modelled using the FF3 
benchmark. I find no other significant results using this methodology.  This result is 
consistent with my main findings that targeting on executive compensation is not effective 
at improving compensation structures at target firms. 
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Table 6A.5 reports the results of the FF3 and GARCH methodology for the sample of firms 
targeted through voting activity on only one or multiple issues.  Results are not statistically 
significant unless stated. 
[INSERT Table 6A.5 HERE] 
Panel A reports long term abnormal returns when the FF3 model is used as the benchmark.  
Firms targeted on more than one issue produce a large negative abnormal return over the 
three year window (median -5.09%, sig. 1%).  For the sample of firms targeted only on the 
issues of strategy I find a negative median abnormal return (-2.94%, sig. 5%) over the three 
year window.  For the sample of firms targeted only on the issue of corporate governance I 
find a negative median abnormal return of -3.61% (sig. 1%).  Finally, the sample of firms 
targeted only on the issue of executive compensation generates a negative median abnormal 
return (mean -9.63%, sig. 10%0; median -4.75%, sig. 1%) over the three year window.   
When I use the GARCH model as the benchmark (Panel B), I find that institutional investor 
action on more than one issue again produces a negative median abnormal return (-7%, sig. 
10%) which is consistent with out previous findings.  I find that firms targeted on only the 
issue of corporate governance produce a positive mean abnormal return of 2.13% (sig. 1%), 
while firms targeted on only the issue of executive compensation produce a negative 
median abnormal return of -7.56% (sig. 1%).  These results generally support my earlier 
findings that targeting on these issues is interpreted by the stock marker as signs of poor 
management or strategic direction. 
Table 6A.6 reports the results of the calendar time regressions for the sample of firms 
targeted through voting activity on only one or multiple issues using the Fama French 
(1993) three factor and Carhart (1997) four factor benchmarks.  The reported alpha is the 
mean monthly abnormal return for the specified test window.  
[INSERT Table 6A.6  HERE] 
When using the FF3 model, the sample of firms targeted on only issues of corporate 
governance produces an alpha of 0.95 (sig. 5%) over the first 12 months after targeting 
occurs.  Over the 2 year period, the alpha falls to 0.82 (sig. 5%) while it declines further to 
0.59 (sig. 10%) over the three year window.    When using the C4 model, I find the same 
sample generates a positive alpha of 0.75 (sig. 10%) over the two years after targeting. We 
find no other significant results using this methodology.  This model gives some evidence 
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that targeting the corporate governance structure of UK firms is viewed favourably by the 
stock market. 
Table 6A.7 reports the results of the FF3 and GARCH methodology for the sample of firms 
targeted once or repeatedly through voting activity.  Results are not statistically significant 
unless stated. 
[INSERT Table 6A.7 HERE] 
Panel A reports long term abnormal returns when the FF3 model is used as the benchmark.  
I find that firms targeted only once on issues of strategy produce a negative median 
abnormal return of -4.58% (sig. 5%).  Targeting only once on issues of executive 
compensation produces a negative median abnormal return of -3.85% (sig. 1%).  For firms 
repeatedly targeted on issues of strategy, the negative median abnormal return is -3.94% 
(sig. 1%). Firms targeted repeatedly on corporate governance issues produce a negative 
median abnormal return over the 36 month window of -2.27% (sig. 1%) using the FF3 
benchmark.  For firms repeatedly targeted on executive compensation issues, the negative 
abnormal return is larger (mean -6.72%, sig. 1%; median -2.41%, sig. 1%).  These results 
are consistent with my earlier findings that repeat targeting generates negative returns. 
When we use the GARCH model (Panel B), I find a negative median abnormal return of -
1.90% (sig. 5%) over the three year window after targeting for the sub sample of firms 
targeted only once on an issue of strategy.  For one-off targeting by institutional investors 
on an issue of corporate governance, the median negative abnormal return increases to -
3.53% (sig. 5%).  Finally I find a negative mean abnormal return of -7.07% (sig. 5%) over 
the three year window after the final targeting where firms have been repeatedly targeted on 
issues of executive compensation.  Again, these results support my earlier findings. 
Table 6A.8 reports the results of the calendar time regressions for the sub samples of firms 
targeted repeatedly through voting activity using the Fama French (1993) three factor and 
Carhart (1997) four factor benchmarks.  The reported alpha is the mean monthly abnormal 
return for the specified test window.  
[INSERT Table 6A.8 HERE] 
Using the FF3 model, the sample of firms repeatedly targeted on corporate governance 
issues produces an alpha of 0.75 (sig. 5%) over the 12 month window after the final 
targeting in the sequence.  For the similar subsample of firms repeatedly targeted on 
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executive compensation issues, we find a negative alpha over the two and three year 
windows of -0.74 (sig. 5%) and -0.85 (sig. 5%) respectively.  When the C4 model is used, I 
find a positive alpha for the subsample of firms repeatedly targeted on strategic issues of 
0.61 (sig. 10%) over the two year window.  This might indicate that strategic issues need 
more than one instance of targeting to bring about the desired changes.  Finally, for firms 
repeatedly targeted on executive compensation issues, we find a negative alpha of -0.61 
(sig. 10%) over the three year windows from the time of the final targeting in the sequence.  
These results indicate that in cases where activists have to repeatedly target firms the stock 
market interprets these results as an indication that the target firm is resistant to change.  
The results are also consistent with prior literature. 
The robustness checks that I carry out generally support the findings of my main analysis.  
That is, that over the longer term, the abnormal returns are generally negative, indicating 
that firms attracting the attentions of institutional investor activism are continued to be 
viewed as „bad‟ firms by the stock market. 
6.4 Summary of Results 
The purpose of this chapter was to analyse the impact of activism by UK institutional 
investors on target firms‟ where the issue of focus was problems with the firm‟s strategy, 
corporate governance or executive compensation.  Prior research has shown little impact on 
the strategic variables of target firms when measured by asset size, employee levels or 
dividend structures (Carleton, Nelson and Weisbach, 1998; Del Guercio and Hawkins, 
1998).  I find no support for hypothesis 8 because there is little significant difference 
between targeted firms and the control group at the time of targeting.  In my sample of 
firms targeted on the issue of company strategy I find limited but small changes in the 
number of employees employed by the firm two years after targeting occurs.  Furthermore, 
I find a small reduction in leverage and R&D spending for firms targeted through private 
negotiation over the two years after targeting occurs. It could be that taking a softer 
approach is more likely to derive changes as it doesn‟t have the more public pressure of 
voting activity to help drive about the desired strategic changes.  This result supports 
hypothesis 1. 
According to US research, Board composition is one area in which shareholder intervention 
has positive effects.  Boards generally become more independent and diverse once 
intervention occurs.  However, there is little evidence of significant changes in CEO 
turnover rates or executive compensation structures as a result of activist pressure.  I find no 
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support for hypothesis 3 because I find little significant change in the composure of target 
firms‟ corporate governance over and above a small change in the size of target company 
boards relative to our benchmark samples.  
Prior research from the US shows little impact upon target firms‟ executive compensation 
structures as a result of targeting by an activist investor (Daily et al, 1996; Johnson and 
Shackell, 1997).  In my sample of firms targeted by UK activist shareholders, targeting 
through voting activity reduces the CEO‟s cash component of the compensation by -0.21 
(p-value 0.00) relative to the median industry firm.  However, firms targeted through 
private negotiation suffer an increase in the levels of compensation for both executive and 
CEO pay relative to both benchmarks.  As a result, I find little support for hypothesis 5. 
The impact on shareholder value is mixed.  Firms targeted through shareholder resolutions 
show a small announcement effect around the requisition of an EGM aimed at targeting 
corporate governance concerns. However over the longer term, targeted firms underperform 
a matched sample of control firms.   The negative abnormal returns surrounding shareholder 
proposals is consistent with US research which shows large negative abnormal returns 
associated with this type of activism (Guercio and Hawkins, 1998; Prevost and Rao, 2000) 
Targeted firms shareholder value is negative relative to all of the benchmarks for firms 
targeted through private negotiation.  However, for firms targeted through voting activity I 
generally find positive abnormal returns over the short term.  This would indicate that the 
market reacts positively to the activist pressures in the hopes that the problems with the 
executive compensation structures at the target firms will be addressed.  However, over the 
longer term the abnormal returns are negative.  This would indicate that the concerns 
haven‟t been addressed and the market fears that the poor strategy, governance or 
compensation structures might hinder the future prospects of the company.  This is 
supported by the limited improvement in the actual structures of targeted firms over the 
sample period.  As such I find no support for hypotheses 2, 4 or 6 in which I expected 
targeting on any of the three issues studied to lead to improvements in shareholder value.  I 
do, however, find support for hypothesis 7 because I find that firms targeted repeatedly are 
generally subject to negative abnormal returns over the three years post targeting.  This is 
consistent with US research (Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1998; Prevost and Rao, 2000).  In 
the following section we look at the impact of hedge funds‟ activism against companies 
from across the UK and EU.  
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Table 6.1 - Summary of Activism Samples 
This table reports the number of companies targeted by votes against, or abstentions by an institutional 
investor on an issue of strategy, corporate governance or executive compensation.  The table also reports 
the number of companies targeted by shareholder resolutions, and the number of companies targeted by 
an institutional investor through private negotiation.  An engagement is defined as each instance a firm is 
targeted through meetings or other informal approaches.  The sample period runs from January 2002 to 
the end of June 2007. 
 
  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
 
  
     
  
All Meetings Voted    
    
  
    
    
  
Strategy 7 5 20 23 21 3 79 
Corporate Governance 134 70 70 65 39 12 390 
Executive Compensation 67 126 128 87 71 12 491 
 
  
     
  
Shareholder Resolutions   
    
  
    
    
  
Strategy   
     
0 
Corporate Governance 4 3 4 4 8 6 29 
Executive Compensation             0 
    
    
  
Private Negotiation   
     
  
 
  
     
  
Strategy   
  
19 10 17 46 
Corporate Governance   
  
33 38 10 81 
Executive Compensation     39 35 18 92 
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Table 6.2- Strategic Variables Statistics 
Table 3 reports strategic variable statistics for the targets of shareholder activism in our samples.  We also report 
similar statistics for our matched control firms.  Control firms are matched by industry (2-digit SIC) and within ±20% 
of target market value one month prior to targeting.  Where no adequate match can be found, the conditions are 
relaxed to find a firm within 50% of target market value in the year prior to targeting. Panel A reports statistics for the 
sample of firms targeted through voting activity over the sample period from January 2002 to June 2007.  Panel B 
reports statistics for the sample of firms targeted by shareholder activists through private negotiation.  DIVPAY is the 
firm‟s dividend payout rate.  TOTASS is the value of the total assets of the firm scaled by sales.  EMP is the number 
of employees employed by the firm scaled by sales.  LEV is the leverage level of the firm, calculated as the total debt 
outstanding divided by the total value of the firm.  INT/ASS is the value of intangible assets divided by the value of 
total assets.  CAPEX/TA is the value of capital expenditure divided by the total assets of the firm.  RD/SALES is the 
value of research and development divided by the level of sales for the firm.    All of the variables are ratios with the 
exception of TOTASS which is in millions and EMP which is in thousands.  We report P-values for the t-statistic and 
Wilcoxon z-statistic for the mean and median differences between the target and control samples.   
  N Mean Median Mean Median T-Stat Z-Stat 
        
  
Target Sample Control  Sample 
          Panel A: Voting Sample (N=79) 
             DIVPAY 56 0.47 0.42 0.44 0.41 0.54 0.29 
TOTASS 70 2228.16 224.20 3116.30 167.63 0.61 0.58 
EMP 62 4.12 0.84 5.34 0.60 0.45 0.09 
LEV 70 0.29 0.22 0.28 0.27 0.83 0.59 
INT/ASS 70 0.17 0.10 0.22 0.10 0.17 0.21 
CAPEX/TA 70 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.64 0.95 
RD/SALES 20 0.24 0.03 0.09 0.02 0.36 0.03 
        Panel B: Negotiation Sample (N=46) 
             DIVPAY 30 0.42 0.39 0.31 0.29 0.11 0.33 
TOTASS 36 2558.32 1141.93 2563.56 804.11 0.92 0.19 
EMP 35 9.43 6.07 8.90 3.05 0.88 0.36 
LEV 36 0.43 0.44 0.34 0.31 0.21 0.59 
INT/ASS 36 0.19 0.08 0.20 0.10 0.89 0.01 
CAPEX/TA 36 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.29 
RD/SALES 19 0.25 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.20 0.61 
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Table 6.3- Corporate Governance Variables Statistics 
This table reports strategic variable statistics for the targets of shareholder activism in our three main samples.  We 
also report similar statistics for our matched control firms.  Control firms are matched by industry (2-digit SIC) and 
within ±20% of target market value one month prior to targeting.  Where no adequate match can be found, the 
conditions are relaxed to find a firm within 50% of target market value in the year prior to targeting. Panel A reports 
statistics for the sample of firms targeted by voting activity over our sample period from January 2002 to June 2007.  
Panel B reports statistics for the sample of firms targeted by shareholder activists through private negotiation.  Panel 
C reports statistics for the sample of firms targeted through shareholder resolutions.  The following accounting 
variables are from the most recent annual report prior to targeting.  BOARD is the size of the company board.  IND is 
the number of independent directors on the board. CEODUAL is a measure of CEO duality that equals 1 if the CEO 
is also the Chairman and 0 otherwise.  CEOTURN is a measure of CEO turnover that equals 1 if the CEO is replaced 
over the accounting year, or 0 otherwise.  EXECTEN is the average tenure of the executive directors.  INDTEN is the 
average tenure of the independent directors.  We report P-values for the t-statistic and Wilcoxon z-statistic for the 
mean and median differences between the target and control samples.   
  N Mean Median Mean Median T-Stat Z-Stat 
        
  
Target Sample Control  Sample 
  
        Panel A: Voting Sample (N=390) 
     
        BOARD 325 5.89 6.00 6.23 6.00 0.96 0.89 
IND 325 0.58 0.50 0.59 0.50 0.09 0.22 
CEODUAL 325 0.10 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.14 0.16 
CEOTURN 325 0.10 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.95 0.57 
EXECTEN 273 5.34 4.28 5.18 4.28 0.11 0.43 
INDTEN 301 4.90 4.29 4.48 3.91 0.74 0.84 
        Panel B: Negotiation Sample (N=29) 
     
        BOARD 69 4.97 4.00 4.41 3.00 0.33 0.62 
IND 69 0.59 0.75 0.59 0.67 0.49 0.12 
CEODUAL 69 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.66 0.32 
CEOTURN 69 0.10 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.21 0.64 
EXECTEN 60 4.66 3.76 5.31 4.16 0.03 0.99 
INDTEN 63 3.80 3.46 4.14 3.76 0.51 0.94 
        Panel C: Resolutions Sample (N=81) 
     
        BOARD 16 3.94 4.00 2.67 3.00 0.15 0.04 
IND 16 0.62 0.63 0.46 0.33 0.47 0.87 
CEODUAL 16 0.19 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.64 0.33 
CEOTURN 16 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.44 
EXECTEN 13 3.97 2.41 7.28 7.17 0.15 0.31 
INDTEN 15 3.05 3.03 3.21 1.87 0.74 0.17 
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Table 6.4- Executive Compensation Variables Statistics 
This table reports strategic variable statistics for the targets of shareholder activism in our three main samples.  We also 
report similar statistics for our matched control firms.  Control firms are matched by industry (2-digit SIC) and within ±20% 
of target market value one month prior to targeting.  Where no adequate match can be found, the conditions are relaxed to 
find a firm within 50% of target market value in the year prior to targeting. Panel A reports statistics for the sample of firms 
targeted by shareholder resolutions over our sample period from January 2002 to June 2007.  Panel B reports statistics for 
the sample of firms targeted by shareholder activists through private negotiation.  Panel C reports statistics for the sample of 
firms targeted through voting behaviour.  CEOCASH is the level of cash compensation paid to the CEO.  CEODELTA is the 
delta of the CEOs equity compensation.  CEOTOTAL is the total value of the CEOs compensation package.  EXECCASH is 
the cash value paid to the executive directors.  EXECTOTAL is the total value of compensation paid to the executive 
directors.  EXECDELTA is the delta of the average executive director‟s equity compensation.  INDTOTAL is the average 
value of compensation paid to the independent directors.  All variables are reported in thousands.  We report P-values for the 
t-statistic and Wilcoxon z-statistic for the mean and median differences between the target and control samples.   
 
N Mean Median Mean Median T-Stat Z-Stat 
        
  
Target Sample Control  Sample 
          Panel A: Voting Sample (N=481) 
             CEOCASH 239 596.04 460.00 659.69 499.00 0.47 0.12 
CEODELTA 124 47.84 6.38 46.00 5.18 0.01 0.96 
CEOTOTAL 240 675.80 532.64 698.64 531.00 0.61 0.04 
EXECCASH 360 428.35 331.62 426.16 332.15 0.33 0.99 
EXECTOTAL 362 560.15 405.23 608.53 395.63 0.21 0.80 
EXECDELTA 186 43.65 6.99 108.14 9.88 0.22 0.70 
INDTOTAL 406 48 38.00 44.95 36.25 0.64 0.32 
        Panel B: Negotiation Sample (N=92) 
     
        CEOCASH 42 765.22 632.91 634.79 594.00 0.13 0.01 
CEODELTA 27 47.80 16.01 64.54 4.25 0.73 0.32 
CEOTOTAL 42 930.71 696.00 763.82 663.41 0.59 0.12 
EXECCASH 66 645.04 510.82 521.69 445.00 0.45 0.47 
EXECTOTAL 66 820.93 600.31 649.82 581.13 0.70 0.33 
EXECDELTA 36 60.61 13.93 253.74 109.40 0.75 0.10 
INDTOTAL 78 65.32 45.50 50.09 38.63 0.22 0.58 
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Table 6.5- Change in Strategic Variables 
This table reports the change strategic variables for the targets of shareholder activism in our three main samples over the period from 2 years prior to targeting, to two years post 
targeting.  We report the raw change, as well as the abnormal change over and above the change in the control firms over the sample period.  We also report the abnormal change relative 
the change in median firm in the targets 3-digit SIC code.  Control firms are matched by industry (2-digit SIC) and within ±20% of target market value one month prior to targeting.  
Where no adequate match can be found, the conditions are relaxed to find a firm within 50% of target market value in the year prior to targeting. Panel A reports statistics for the sample 
of firms targeted by shareholder resolutions over our sample period from January 2002 to June 2007.  Panel A reports statistics for the sample of firms targeted by shareholder activists 
through voting activity.  Panel B reports statistics for the sample of firms targeted through private negotiation.  DIVPAY is the firm‟s dividend payout rate.  TOTASS is the value of the 
total assets of the firm scaled by sales.  EMP is the number of employees employed by the firm scaled by sales.  MAVAL is the value of M&A deals undertaken by the firm.  MAVOL is 
the number of M&A deals undertaken by the firm.  LEV is the leverage level of the firm, calculated as the total debt outstanding divided by the total value of the firm.  INT/ASS is the 
value of intangible assets divided by the value of total assets.  CAPEX/TA is the value of capital expenditure divided by the total assets of the firm.  RD/SALES is the value of research 
and development divided by the level of sales for the firm.    All variables are ratios with the exception of TOTASS and MAVAL which are in millions and EMP which is in thousands.  
We report P-values for the t-statistic and Wilcoxon z-statistic for the mean and median differences between the target and control samples.   
 
  
N 
Year - 2 Year + 2 
% Change % Vs 
% Vs Ind Median 
 
(-2,+2) Controls 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
 
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Panel A: Voting Sample     
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 DIVPAY 50 0.45 0.45 0.50 0.46 0.10 0.03 0.25 0.24 0.16 0.19 
TOTASS 74 1814.68 158.95 3210.04 415.52 0.77 0.61 0.37 -0.47c 0.28 -0.06b 
EMP 66 3.82 0.68 6.04 1.55 0.58 0.26 0.42 -0.26 0.28c -0.16 
MAVAL 15 0.02 0.19 0.01 0.09 -0.75 -0.53 0.95 -0.18 0.53 0.07 
MAVOL 15 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 -0.11 0.00 0.06a 0.00 
LEV 74 0.27 0.18 0.35 0.28 0.29 0.53 0.31 0.08 0.18 0.25 
INT/ASS 74 0.13 0.04 0.17 0.05 0.37 0.47 0.03 -0.14 0.09 -0.01 
CAPEX/TA 74 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.20 -0.48 0.10 -0.02 0.18 -0.12 
RD/SALES 22 0.88 0.07 0.59 0.03 -0.33 -0.59 -0.75 -0.26 -0.39 -0.03 
 
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Panel B: Negotiation Sample     
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 DIVPAY 27 0.37 0.37 0.38 0.45 0.01 0.23 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.15
TOTASS 35 2174.62 997.40 4906.41 2785.25 1.26 1.79 0.82 -0.92c 0.64 -0.32 
EMP 34 11.36 5.75 17.01 7.54 0.50 0.31 -0.83 0.12 -0.59a 0.02 
MAVOL 26 0.29 0.00 0.48 0.00 -0.66 0.00 -0.13c 0.00 -0.08 0.00 
MAVAL 26 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.61 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.05 0.00 
LEV 35 0.46 0.44 0.65 0.54 0.43 0.23 0.24 0.46 0.19 0.36 
INT/ASS 35 0.14 0.04 0.22 0.11 0.55 0.20 0.52 0.60 0.47 0.18 
CAPEX/TA 35 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.04 -0.39 -0.07 -0.26 0.32 -0.18 0.29c 
RD/SALES 17 0.26 0.05 0.13 0.03 -0.50 -0.40 -0.16 0.41 -0.09 0.37 
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Table 6.6- Change in Corporate Governance Variables 
This table reports the change strategic variables for the targets of shareholder activism in our three main samples over the period from 2 years prior to targeting, to two years post targeting.  We report the raw 
change, as well as the abnormal change over and above the change in the control firms over the sample period.  We also report the abnormal change relative the change in median firm in the targets 3-digit SIC 
code.  Control firms are matched by industry (2-digit SIC) and within ±20% of target market value one month prior to targeting.  Where no adequate match can be found, the conditions are relaxed to find a firm 
within 50% of target market value in the year prior to targeting. Panel A reports statistics for the sample of firms targeted through voting behaviour over our sample period from January 2002 to June 2007.  
Panel B reports statistics for the sample of firms targeted by shareholder activists through private negotiation.  Panel  C reports statistics for the sample of firms targeted by shareholder resolutions.  BOARD is 
the size of the company board.  IND is the number of independent directors on the board. CEODUAL is a measure of CEO duality that equals 1 if the CEO is also the Chairman and 0 otherwise.  CEOTURN is 
a measure of CEO turnover that equals 1 if the CEO is replaced over the accounting year, or 0 otherwise.  EXECTEN is the average tenure of the executive directors.  INDTEN is the average tenure of the 
independent directors.    We report P-values for the t-statistic and Wilcoxon z-statistic for the mean and median differences between the target and control samples.   
 N 
Year - 2 Year + 2 
% Change % Vs 
% Vs Ind Median 
 
(-2,+2) Controls 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
 
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Panel A: Voting Sample     
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 BOARD 307 6.80 6.00 5.71 5.00 -0.16 -0.17 -0.12 -0.23b -0.15 -0.20a 
IND 307 0.57 0.50 0.55 0.60 -0.03 0.20 -0.11 -0.13 -0.15a -0.15 
CEODUAL 307 0.11 0.00 0.03 0.00 -0.73 0.00 -0.64 0.00 -0.36 0.00 
CEOTURN 307 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.00 -0.63 0.00 -1.02 0.00 -0.48 0.00 
EXECTEN 276 5.46 4.33 6.33 5.00 0.16 0.16 0.47 0.35c 0.26 0.36 
INDTEN 295 5.01 4.38 4.97 4.20 -0.01 -0.04 0.04 0.02 0.08 -0.06 
 
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
Panel B: Negotiation Sample     
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 BOARD 70 6.79 6.50 5.04 5.00 -0.26 -0.23 -0.05b 0.01 -0.08 0.03c
IND 70 0.59 0.62 0.79 0.70 0.35 0.14 0.02b 0.04 0.05 0.06 
CEODUAL 70 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CEOTURN 70 0.11 0.00 0.08 0.00 -0.33 0.00 0.67 0.00 0.35 0.00 
EXECTEN 67 5.16 4.24 6.97 5.38 0.35 0.27 0.20 -0.01 0.18 -0.06 
INDTEN 67 4.22 3.78 4.14 3.79 -0.02 0.00 -0.02 0.06 -0.04 0.04 
 
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Panel C: Resolutions Sample     
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 BOARD 13 5.77 5.00 4.57 4.00 -0.21 -0.20 -0.08 0.30 -0.05 0.24
IND 13 0.63 0.60 0.59 0.50 -0.05 -0.17 0.17 0.17 0.36 0.25 
CEODUAL 13 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
CEOTURN 13 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 -1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
EXECTEN 12 4.28 3.18 2.69 2.64 -0.37 -0.17 -1.35 -1.57 -1.25 -1.23 
INDTEN 13 3.49 3.33 1.98 1.62 -0.43 -0.51 0.45 0.35b 0.32 0.25 
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Table 6.7- Change in Executive Compensation Variables 
This table reports the change strategic variables for the targets of shareholder activism in our three main samples over the period from 2 years prior to targeting, to two years post 
targeting.  We report the raw change, as well as the abnormal change over and above the change in the control firms over the sample period.  We also report the abnormal change relative 
the change in median firm in the targets 3-digit SIC code.  Control firms are matched by industry (2-digit SIC) and within ±20% of target market value one month prior to targeting.  
Where no adequate match can be found, the conditions are relaxed to find a firm within 50% of target market value in the year prior to targeting. Panel A reports statistics for the sample 
of firms targeted by shareholder resolutions over our sample period from January 2002 to June 2007.  Panel B reports statistics for the sample of firms targeted by shareholder activists 
through private negotiation.  Panel C reports statistics for the sample of firms targeted through voting behaviour.  CEOCASH is the level of cash compensation paid to the CEO.  
CEODELTA is the delta of the CEOs equity compensation.  CEOTOTAL is the total value of the CEOs compensation package.  EXECCASH is the cash value paid to the executive 
directors.  EXECTOTAL is the total value of compensation paid to the executive directors.  EXECDELTA is the delta of the average executive director‟s equity compensation.  
INDTOTAL is the average value of compensation paid to the independent directors.   All values are reported in thousands.  We report P-values for the t-statistic and Wilcoxon z-statistic 
for the mean and median differences between the target and control samples.   
 
  
N 
Year - 2 Year + 2 
% Change % Vs 
% Vs Ind Median 
 
(-2,+2) Controls 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
 
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Panel A: Voting Sample     
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 CEOCASH 266 552.90 396.04 702.02 472.50 0.27 0.19 -0.23 -0.11 -0.21a -0.09 
CEODELTA 125 12.73 2.98 184.56 4.81 13.49 0.62 1.03 -1.46 0.56 -0.25 
CEOTOTAL 267 608.52 456.00 808.66 510.39 0.33 0.12 -0.28 -0.35 -0.15 -0.09 
EXECCASH 372 378.36 282.53 458.65 340.39 0.21 0.20 -0.22 -0.07 -0.13 -0.13 
EXECTOTAL 375 434.96 316.93 531.73 386.14 0.22 0.22 -0.53 -0.38 -0.46 -0.28 
EXECDELTA 170 16.67 4.03 116.24 3.46 5.97 -0.14 -1.16 -1.96 -0.68 -0.67 
INDTOTAL 382 41.87 31.28 58.84 40.83 0.41 0.31 0.03 0.11 0.18 0.19 
 
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 Panel B: Negotiation Sample     
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
    
 
  
 
  
 
  
 
  
 CEOCASH 53 668.60 468.00 1183.33 1009.44 0.77 1.16 1.17 1.45b 1.25 1.02
CEODELTA 31 56.65 14.36 33.57 8.19 -0.41 -0.43 -2.53 -12.90 -0.98 -1.45 
CEOTOTAL 55 782.79 582.11 1560.54 1023.28 0.99 0.76 -0.14 -0.90 -0.18 -0.57 
EXECCASH 76 499.78 377.54 702.11 663.98 0.40 0.76 -0.40c 0.61 -0.32 0.35 
EXECTOTAL 78 563.59 419.87 892.92 749.63 0.58 0.79 -0.14 0.09 -0.06 -0.14 
EXECDELTA 39 46.57 4.88 27.80 15.22 -0.40 2.12 -1.02 -2.12b 0.94 -1.29 
INDTOTAL 77 57.90 39.00 70.22 52.00 0.21 0.33 -0.04 0.13 0.08 0.08 
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Table 6.8- Abnormal Returns for Resolutions Sample  
This table reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the target firms in our resolutions 
sample for firms targeted on the issue of corporate governance.  Panel A reports short term CARs while Panel B 
reports long term BHARs.  We calculate abnormal returns as the target firm return minus the control firm return.  We 
also calculate abnormal returns relative to the FTSE all share benchmark.  Control firms are matched by industry (2-
digit SIC) and within ±20% of target market value one month prior to targeting.  Where no adequate match can be 
found, the conditions are relaxed to find a firm within 50% of target market value in the year prior to targeting.  Panel 
C reports calendar time portfolio returns relative to the Carhart (1997) four factor benchmark.  The figures a,b,c 
indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 
  Requisition Date (n=22) Mailing Date (n=25) Meeting Date (n=25) 
  mean  median  
 % 
(+) mean  median  
 % 
(+) mean  median  
 % 
(+) 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel A: Short Term CARs   
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  Control Groups     
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  (-5,5) 0.06 0.81a 0.55 1.62 2.46a 0.56 -1.17c -0.20 0.40 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  FTSE All Share     
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  (-5,5) 5.44a 6.04 0.67 2.93 1.66 0.60 -0.63 -0.02c 0.33 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel B: Long Term BHARs   
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  Control Groups     
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12)   
  
  
  
-1.80
a
 -1.17
a
 0.13 
(1,24)   
  
  
  
-0.46 -1.14b 0.29 
(1,36)   
  
  
  
-3.89 -1.51b 0.33 
          0.38 0.72   
 
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel C: Long Term C4 
Returns 
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
    
(1,12)   
  
  
  
1.54 2.47 0.53 
(1,24)   
  
  
  
2.34 1.16 0.60 
(1,36)         -2.73 2.92 0.53 
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Table 6.9- Abnormal Returns for Negotiation Sample  
This table reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the target firms in our private negotiation samples where firms are targeted on an issue of strategy, 
corporate governance or executive compensation.  Panel A reports long term BHARs relative to the control firms. Control firms are matched by industry (2-digit SIC) and within ±20% 
of target market value one month prior to targeting.  Where no adequate match can be found, the conditions are relaxed to find a firm within 50% of target market value in the year prior 
to targeting.  Panel B reports calendar time portfolio returns relative to the Carhart (1997) four factor benchmark.  The figures a,b,c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 
0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test.   
 
 
Multiple Issue (n=36) 
 
Strategy (n=24) 
Corporate Governance 
(n=47) 
Executive Compensation 
(n=65) 
 
mean median % (+) 
 
mean median % (+) mean median % (+) mean median % (+) 
 
  
      
  
  
  
  Panel A: BHARs   
      
  
  
  
  
 
  
      
  
  
  
  Control Groups   
      
  
  
  
  
 
  
      
  
  
  
  (1,12) -0.93 -2.18 0.42  3.52 4.29 62.50 -0.65 0.24 51.06 0.74 -2.57 46.15 
(1,24) 0.59 -6.15 0.42  7.23c 4.12 54.17 -1.82 -6.00 44.68 2.69 -1.65 47.69 
(1,36) 3.08 0.05 0.50  6.77 -0.57 45.83 -2.90 -3.72 42.55 3.98 -0.05 49.23 
 
  
      
  
  
  
  Panel B: C4 Returns   
      
  
  
  
  
 
  
      
  
  
  
  (1,12) -6.37 -8.87 0.37  -1.46 2.86 52.17 -6.23b -5.67 43.48 -3.31 3.77 53.33 
(1,24) -1.28 -1.21 0.43  -4.67b -3.91 43.48 -7.76a -5.29a 28.26 -4.66a -3.76a 31.67 
(1,36) -2.79 -2.42 0.40  -6.22a -6.01 34.78 -3.52a -3.11a 28.26 -7.15a -4.53a 26.67 
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Table 6.10- Abnormal Returns for Voting Samples  
This table reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the target firms in our voting sample where firms are targeted on an issue of strategy, corporate 
governance or executive compensation..  Panel A reports short term CARs while Panel B reports long term BHARs.  We calculate abnormal returns as the target firm return minus the 
control firm return.  We also calculate abnormal returns relative to the FTSE all share benchmark.  Control firms are matched by industry (2-digit SIC) and within ±20% of target market 
value one month prior to targeting.  Where no adequate match can be found, the conditions are relaxed to find a firm within 50% of target market value in the year prior to targeting.  
Panel C reports calendar time portfolio returns relative to the Carhart (1997) four factor benchmark.  The figures a,b,c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively, using a 2-tail test.   
 
  Multiple Issue (n=349) 
 
Strategy (n=59) Corporate Governance (n=400) 
Executive 
Compensation (n=836) 
  mean median % (+) 
 
mean median % (+) mean median % (+) mean median % (+) 
 
  
      
  
  
  
  Panel A: CARs   
      
  
  
  
  
 
  
      
  
  
  
  Control Groups   
      
  
  
  
  
 
  
      
  
  
  
  (-5,5) -0.40 -0.37 46.13 
 
0.88 0.60a 68.97 -0.03 -0.13b 47.86 -0.12 0.06a 51.19 
 
  
      
  
  
  
  FTSE All Share   
 
    
 
  
      
  
  
  
  (-5,5) -0.15 -0.34 46.81 
 
2.00
a
 2.43
a
 70.37 0.29 0.11 50.96 0.22 0.28a 51.87 
 
  
      
  
  
  
  Panel B: BHARs   
      
  
  
  
  
 
  
      
  
  
  
  Control Groups   
 
    
 
  
      
  
  
  
  (1,12) -1.05 -1.88 44.96 
 
-0.91 -1.35 45.76 -0.56 -2.49a 44.50 -0.28 -1.21a 46.77 
(1,24) -2.35
a
 -4.27 43.80 
 
10.50 5.43 55.93 3.94 -0.83a 48.50 0.51 -1.65a 46.89 
(1,36) -0.99
a
 -5.33
a
 42.07 
 
10.71 0.05 50.85 5.59 -3.17a 46.75 1.28 -3.69a 44.14 
 
  
      
  
  
  
  Panel C: C4 Returns   
 
    
 
  
      
  
  
  
  (1,12) -5.71a -8.26c 42.81 
 
-1.30 -1.98 41.18 -8.48c -1.01a 41.51 -3.13a -1.17 46.20 
(1,24) -4.83
a
 -5.39
a
 36.23 
 
-3.56 -2.01 41.18 -6.59 -2.98a 36.93 -2.47a -2.54a 38.73 
(1,36) -5.13
a
 -3.15
a
 35.03 
 
-4.56 -4.35 39.22 -7.32 -4.57a 32.08 -5.16b -3.71a 36.99 
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Table 6.11- Abnormal Returns for Repeat Targeting Voting Samples  
This table reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the target firms in our voting sample where firms are repeatedly targeted on an issue of strategy, 
corporate governance or executive compensation.  Panel A reports short term CARs while Panel B reports long term BHARs.  We calculate abnormal returns as the target firm return 
minus the control firm return.  We also calculate abnormal returns relative to the FTSE all share benchmark.  Control firms are matched by industry (2-digit SIC) and within ±20% of 
target market value one month prior to targeting.  Where no adequate match can be found, the conditions are relaxed to find a firm within 50% of target market value in the year prior  to 
targeting.  Panel C reports calendar time portfolio returns relative to the Carhart (1997) four factor benchmark.  The figures a,b,c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test.   
 
  Targeted Once 
 
Repeat Targeting 
 
Strategy (n=22) 
Corporate Governance 
(n=66) 
Executive 
Compensation (n=98) 
 
Strategy (n=37) 
Corporate Governance 
(n=334) 
Executive 
Compensation (n=828) 
  mean median 
% 
(+) mean median 
% 
(+) mean median 
% 
(+) 
 
mean median 
% 
(+) mean median 
% 
(+) mean median 
% 
(+) 
 
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel A: CARs   
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  Control Groups   
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  (-5,5) 0.37 0.40
a
 59.09 -0.21 -0.40 43.28 -0.85 -0.24 42.72 
 
1.25
a
 0.66
a
 66.18 -0.21 -0.19
b
 47.28 -0.14 0.05
a
 51.06 
 
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  FTSE All Share       
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  (-5,5) 0.70c 1.02 60.00 0.28 -0.18 48.33 -1.07 -0.85 41.67 
 
1.62
b
 1.41
b
 60.32 0.07 -0.03 49.35 0.27
c
 0.22
a
 51.66 
 
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel B: BHARs   
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  Control Groups       
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12) 2.33 -1.39 45.45 -4.83 -7.74a 34.85 -4.18 -2.49b 45.92 
 
-1.61 -2.87 47.27 -1.42 -1.28
b
 46.79 -0.41 -1.54
a
 46.44 
(1,24) 4.80 8.52 59.09 4.33 -6.29
c
 45.45 -4.97 -4.44
b
 43.88 
 
3.26
b
 1.94 52.73 -1.33 -1.86
a
 45.83 -2.51 -4.47
a
 41.16 
(1,36) 0.74 -0.70 50.00 3.94
b
 -4.30
c
 45.45 -1.67 -3.92
b
 43.88 
 
1.83
c
 1.63 50.91 -0.15 -4.62
a
 43.59 -1.50
b
 -5.17
a
 40.90 
 
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel C: C4 Returns       
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
   
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12) -4.69c -2.40c 23.53 -3.99c -0.27 50.00 -7.57a -3.82c 39.08 
 
-3.51 0.68 50.94 -5.82 -3.88 46.98 -1.24
a
 2.95
b
 52.99 
(1,24) -6.21
c
 -2.46 29.41 -5.63
b
 -6.35 41.07 -4.36
b
 -3.77
b
 36.78 
 
-2.86 -1.76 43.40 -3.95 -2.77
a
 38.93 -4.50
a
 -1.55
a
 41.03 
(1,36) -1.41
b
 -0.91 35.29 -6.45 -1.92 42.86 -3.56 -2.00
b
 37.93 
 
-3.56 -2.01 39.62 -7.36 -3.34
a
 35.23 -3.81
a
 -2.76
a
 38.59 
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Table 6.12- Multivariate Regressions 
This table reports the multivariate regressions for the targets of shareholder activism in our three sub samples of firms targeted on an issue of strategy, corporate governance or executive 
compensation.  We regress the operating performance changes over the sample period onto the two year post activism BHAR.  See Chapter 3 for a definition of the variables used in this 
analysis.  The figures a, b, c indicates statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test.   
 
  Strategy Corporate Governance Executive Compensation 
  Resolutions Negotiation Voting Resolutions Negotiation Voting Resolutions Negotiation Voting 
          INTERCEPT 
 
-1.95 0.25 -0.42 0.11 0.17 
 
0.35 -0.69 
DIVPAY 
 
3.28
a
 1.43
b
 
      
TOTASS 
 
-0.07
b
 -0.09
c
 
      
EMP 
 
-0.14
c
 0.03
c
 
      
MAVOL 
 
-0.32 -0.07 
      
MAVAL 
 
-0.08 -0.14 
      
LEV 
 
-0.62
a
 -2.99 
      
INT/ASS 
 
2.20 1.82 
      
CAPEX/TA 
 
-27.23 -42.34c 
      
RD/SALES 
 
0.61 -0.76c 
      
          BOARD 
   
0.19
b
 -0.09 -0.05 
   
IND 
   
1.53
c
 0.14 0.28b 
   
CEODUAL 
   
0.24 -0.47a 0.13 
   
CEOTURN 
   
-0.8 -0.21b -0.24 
   
EXECTEN 
   
-0.21
c
 0.13 -0.20b 
   
INDTEN 
   
0.24 -0.03 -0.03 
   
          CEOCASH 
       
-0.19 -0.20a 
CEODELTA 
       
-0.31 -0.51 
CEOTOTAL 
       
0.02 -0.13 
EXECCASH 
       
0.08
b
 0.06 
EXECTOTAL 
       
-0.67
c
 -0.29
c
 
EXECDELTA 
       
0.09 0.02 
INDTOTAL 
       
-0.06 0.09 
          ADJ. R 
 
0.53 0.67 0.27 0.15 0.16 
 
0.31 0.1 
F STAT 
 
2.62 0.57 0.62 1.29 0.82 
 
7.47
b
 1.29 
N 
 
43 78 23 75 341 
 
79 346 
198 
 
Appendix 6A – Robustness Check Results Tables 
 
Table 6A.1- Abnormal Returns for Resolutions Sample  
This table reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the target firms in our resolutions 
sample.  Panel A reports calendar time portfolio returns relative to the Fama French (1993) three factor benchmark.  
Panel B reports similar results using a GARCH (1,1) benchmarking model. We report P-Values for the t-statistic and 
Wilcoxon z-statistic for the mean and median differences between the target and benchmarks. 
   
  
Requisition Date 
(n=22) Mailing Date (n=25) Meeting Date (n=25) 
  mean  median  
 % 
(+) mean  median  
 % 
(+) mean  median  
 % 
(+) 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel A: FF3 Portfolio Returns   
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12)   
  
  
  
0.15 1.49 0.53 
(1,24)   
  
  
  
1.34 2.03 0.53 
(1,36)         1.93 2.42 0.57 
 
  
  
  
  
    
Panel B: GARCH Returns     
  
    
 
  
  
  
  
    
(1,12)   
  
  
  
-1.48 -1.16 0.38 
(1,24)   
  
  
  
2.96 -1.85 0.44 
(1,36)         5.11 -0.24 0.44 
 
Table 6A.2- Resolutions Sample Calendar Time Regressions  
This table reports the results of the calendar time regressions for the resolutions sample.  The first column reports the 
coefficients using the Fama French (1993) factors as the benchmark over the holding periods covering 12, 24 and 36 
months from the targeting date, using the following regression:  
(Rp - Rf)t = α + β1(RM - Rf)t + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + εt 
where (Rp - Rf)t is the average monthly return on the portfolio of targeted stocks less the return on the one-month 
risk-free rate in calendar month t; (RM - Rf)t is the return on the FTSE All Share return index less the return on the 
one-month risk-free rate in calendar month t; SMBt is the difference between the value-weighted average return on 
the small-cap portfolios and large-cap portfolios; and HMLt is the difference between the value-weighted average 
return on the high book-to-market portfolios and low book-to-market portfolios.  The second column reports similar 
coefficient results using the Carhart (1997) factors as the benchmark, using the following regression:  
(Rp - Rf)t = α + β1(RM - Rf)t + β2SMBt + β3HMLt β4UMDt + εt 
The factors are the same as for the Fama French (1993) model with the exception that UMDt is the difference between 
the value weighted average return on the high past-year stock-return portfolios and low past-year stock-return 
portfolios.  The reported alpha is the mean monthly abnormal return for the test window.  The figures a,b,c indicate 
statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test.   
 
Holding Period 
Fama French (1993) Carhart (1997) 
α β1 β2 β3 R
2
 α β1 β2 β3 β4 R
2
 
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) -1.61 0.27 0.03 0.21 0.01 -1.3 0.3 0.38 -0.47 1.37
b
 0.08 
(1,24) -0.31 0.39 0.6 0.19 0.04 -0.17 0.28 0.44 -0.64 0.7 0.07 
(1,36) -0.23 0.48c 0.62c 0.32 0.06 0.05 0.33 0.31 -0.65 0.51 0.07 
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Table 6A.3- Abnormal Returns for Negotiation Sample  
This table reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the target firms in our private negotiation samples where firms are targeted on an issue of strategy, 
corporate governance or executive compensation.  Panel A reports calendar time portfolio returns relative to the Fama French (1993) three factor benchmark.  Panel B reports similar 
results using a GARCH (1,1) benchmarking model. The figures a,b,c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 
  
Multiple Issue (n=36) 
 
Strategy (n=24) 
Corporate Governance 
(n=47) 
Executive Compensation 
(n=65) 
  mean median 
% 
(+) 
 
mean median 
% 
(+) mean median % (+) mean median % (+) 
 
  
      
  
  
  
  Panel A: FF3 Portfolio Returns   
      
  
  
  
  
 
  
      
  
  
  
  (1,12) -0.41 -5.05 0.43  -5.89 -2.98 39.13 -6.59 3.49 54.35 -4.65 -6.04 45.00 
(1,24) -3.98 -1.80 0.43  -5.00a 2.70 52.17 -6.13a -2.21 39.13 -3.52b -3.39b 36.67 
(1,36) -5.55 -2.40c 0.34  -5.20c -0.65 39.13 -1.08a -1.43 36.96 -5.69b -3.07a 30.00 
 
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel B: GARCH Returns   
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12) -4.35 -3.23 0.43  6.73 1.91 62.50 3.77 5.91 60.87 3.84 -0.85 50.00 
(1,24) 3.23 2.85 0.52  5.84 7.33 58.33 -1.61 -2.55 47.83 -5.98 -6.43 43.33 
(1,36) 4.19 -2.31 0.49  0.24 -3.58 45.83 -4.39 -5.81 43.48 -7.87 -12.27 40.00 
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Table 6A.4- Negotiation Sample Calendar Time Regressions  
This table reports the results of the calendar time regressions for the negotiation sample where firms are targeted on 
an issue of strategy, corporate governance or executive compensation.  The first column reports the coefficients using 
the Fama French (1993) factors as the benchmark over the holding periods covering 12, 24 and 36 months from the 
targeting date, using the following regression:  
(Rp - Rf)t = α + β1(RM - Rf)t + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + εt 
where (Rp - Rf)t is the average monthly return on the portfolio of targeted stocks less the return on the one-month 
risk-free rate in calendar month t; (RM - Rf)t is the return on the FTSE All Share return index less the return on the 
one-month risk-free rate in calendar month t; SMBt is the difference between the value-weighted average return on 
the small-cap portfolios and large-cap portfolios; and HMLt is the difference between the value-weighted average 
return on the high book-to-market portfolios and low book-to-market portfolios.  The second column reports similar 
coefficient results using the Carhart (1997) factors as the benchmark, using the following regression:  
(Rp - Rf)t = α + β1(RM - Rf)t + β2SMBt + β3HMLt β4UMDt + εt 
The factors are the same as for the Fama French (1993) model with the exception that UMDt is the difference between 
the value weighted average return on the high past-year stock-return portfolios and low past-year stock-return 
portfolios.  .  The reported alpha is the mean monthly abnormal return for the test window.  The figures a,b,c indicate 
statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test.   
Holding Period 
Fama French (1993) Carhart (1997) 
α β1 β2 β3 R
2
 α β1 β2 β3 β4 R
2
 
 
             
Panel A: Multiple Issue 
(n=36) 
             
 
             
(1,12) -0.91 0.94a -0.04 0.27 0.30 -0.52 1.00a 0.45 0.53 -0.33 0.32 
(1,24) -0.70 0.79a -0.16 0.28 0.30 -0.44 0.88a 0.26 0.51 -0.20 0.31 
(1,36) -0.75 0.87a -0.11 0.27 0.44 -0.55 0.93a 0.12 0.35 -0.23 0.43 
 
  
    
  
     Panel B: Single Issues   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     Strategy (n=24)     
 
             
(1,12) -0.09 0.22 -0.10 0.55c 0.13 0.28 0.31 0.20 0.49 -1.32a 0.25 
(1,24) -0.18 0.29c -0.04 0.44b 0.18 0.13 0.32b 0.09 0.28 -0.94a 0.25 
(1,36) -0.53 0.39a 0.00 0.50b 0.28 -0.17 0.39b 0.01 0.31 -0.76b 0.28 
 
  
    
  
     Corporate Governance 
(n=47) 
    
 
             
(1,12) 0.02 0.53a 0.18 0.13 0.23 0.59 0.59a 0.29 -0.29 -0.20 0.29 
(1,24) -0.40 0.61a -0.08 0.23 0.33 -0.20 0.68a 0.12 -0.01 -0.57 0.35 
(1,36) -0.62 0.67a -0.08 0.27 0.44 -0.32 0.65a -0.14 -0.05 -0.32 0.42 
 
  
    
  
     Executive Compensation 
(n=65) 
    
 
             
(1,12) -0.02 0.63a 0.18 0.26 0.20 0.10 0.72a 0.24 0.07 -1.12b 0.32 
(1,24) -0.98 0.75a 0.15 0.47b 0.36 -0.60 0.75a 0.09 0.17 -0.91b 0.38 
(1,36) -1.06
c
 0.70
a
 -0.08 0.42c 0.38 -0.74 0.72a -0.01 0.32 -0.85b 0.41 
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Table 6A.5- Abnormal Returns for Voting Samples  
This table reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the target firms in our voting samples where firms are targeted on an issue of strategy, corporate 
governance or executive compensation..  Panel A reports calendar time portfolio returns relative to the Fama French (1993) three factor benchmark.  Panel B reports similar results using 
a GARCH (1,1) benchmarking model. The figures a,b,c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 
  Multiple Issue (n=349) 
 
Strategy (n=59) 
Corporate Governance 
(n=400) 
Executive 
Compensation (n=836) 
  mean median % (+) 
 
mean median % (+) mean median % (+) mean median % (+) 
 
  
      
  
  
  
  Panel A: FF3 Portfolio Returns   
      
  
  
  
  
 
  
      
  
  
  
  (1,12) -5.23a -4.71 46.41 -9.75b -6.10 41.18 -3.51c -1.76a 36.02 -7.89a -8.87a 42.24 
(1,24) -8.46 -1.47a 37.43  -1.80c -0.98 39.22 -6.58 -2.61a 37.63 -8.31 -7.70a 36.40 
(1,36) -6.97 -5.09a 35.33  -3.29 -2.94b 33.33 -5.31 -3.61a 33.60 -9.63a -4.75a 34.29 
 
  
   
  
 
    
  
  
  Panel B: GARCH Returns   
 
        
 
  
   
  
 
    
  
  
  (1,12) 6.00a 1.00 51.00 1.33 4.27 61.54 8.31a 4.01 56.68 2.62a 0.49a 50.92 
(1,24) 10.00a 0.00 49.00  1.03 -0.55 50.00 3.17a 1.42 57.22 2.37a -2.95a 46.24 
(1,36) 11.00a -7.00c 46.00  5.97 -1.82 46.15 2.13a 1.99 57.22 2.59 -7.56a 42.29 
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Table 6A.6- Voting Sample Calendar Time Regressions  
This table reports the results of the calendar time regressions for the voting sub samples firms are targeted on an issue 
of strategy, corporate governance or executive compensation.  The first column reports the coefficients using the 
Fama French (1993) factors as the benchmark over the holding periods covering 12, 24 and 36 months from the 
targeting date, using the following regression:  
(Rp - Rf)t = α + β1(RM - Rf)t + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + εt 
where (Rp - Rf)t is the average monthly return on the portfolio of targeted stocks less the return on the one-month 
risk-free rate in calendar month t; (RM - Rf)t is the return on the FTSE All Share return index less the return on the 
one-month risk-free rate in calendar month t; SMBt is the difference between the value-weighted average return on 
the small-cap portfolios and large-cap portfolios; and HMLt is the difference between the value-weighted average 
return on the high book-to-market portfolios and low book-to-market portfolios.  The second column reports similar 
coefficient results using the Carhart (1997) factors as the benchmark, using the following regression:  
(Rp - Rf)t = α + β1(RM - Rf)t + β2SMBt + β3HMLt β4UMDt + εt 
The factors are the same as for the Fama French (1993) model with the exception that UMDt is the difference between 
the value weighted average return on the high past-year stock-return portfolios and low past-year stock-return 
portfolios.  .  The reported alpha is the mean monthly abnormal return for the test window.  The figures a,b,c indicate 
statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test.   
 
Holding Period 
Fama French (1993) Carhart (1997) 
α β1 β2 β3 R
2
 α β1 β2 β3 β4 R
2
 
 
             
Panel A: Multiple Issue 
(n=349) 
             
 
             
(1,12) 0.47 0.77a 0.64a -0.11 0.46 0.59 0.72a 0.34c -0.46b -0.04 0.37 
(1,24) 0.29 0.72a 0.52a 0.00 0.39 0.38 0.65a 0.16 -0.32 -0.12 0.33 
(1,36) 0.12 0.70a 0.39b 0.02 0.35 0.17 0.64a 0.08 -0.21 -0.16 0.32 
 
  
    
  
     Panel B: Single Issues   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     Strategy (n=59)     
 
             
(1,12) 0.24 0.56a 0.83a 0.11 0.22 0.59 0.49a 0.49c -0.30 -0.11 0.15 
(1,24) 0.30 0.60a 0.46b 0.12 0.22 0.48 0.55a 0.24 -0.07 0.01 0.18 
(1,36) 0.10 0.54a 0.32 0.14 0.19 0.24 0.52a 0.21 0.01 -0.02 0.17 
 
  
    
  
     Corporate Governance 
(n=400) 
    
 
             
(1,12) 0.95
b
 0.70
a
 0.59
a
 -0.34
a
 0.59 0.59 0.73a 0.47b -0.23 -0.35 0.40 
(1,24) 0.82
b
 0.72
a
 0.59
a
 -0.20
c
 0.54 0.75c 0.69a 0.34c -0.28 -0.27 0.38 
(1,36) 0.59
c
 0.72
a
 0.54
a
 -0.15 0.50 0.53 0.69a 0.29 -0.16 -0.23 0.37 
 
  
    
  
     Executive Compensation 
(n=836) 
    
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) 0.41 0.75a 0.65a -0.08 0.47 0.51 0.70a 0.25 -0.41c -0.18 0.36 
(1,24) 0.13 0.71a 0.51a 0.00 0.37 0.21 0.64a 0.14 -0.26 -0.15 0.31 
(1,36) -0.08 0.69a 0.41b 0.06 0.34 -0.02 0.63a 0.08 -0.15 -0.19 0.30 
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Table 6A.7- Abnormal Returns for Repeat Voting Samples  
This table reports the long term mean and median abnormal returns for the target firms repeatedly targeted in our voting samples on an issue of strategy, corporate governance or 
executive compensation.  Panel A reports calendar time portfolio returns relative to the Fama French (1993) three factor benchmark.  Panel B reports similar results using a GARCH (1,1) 
benchmarking model. The figures a,b,c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 
  Targeted Once 
 
Repeat Targeting 
 
Strategy (n=22) 
Corporate Governance 
(n=66) 
Executive 
Compensation (n=98) 
 
Strategy (n=37) 
Corporate Governance 
(n=334) 
Executive 
Compensation (n=828) 
  mean median 
% 
(+) mean median 
% 
(+) mean median 
% 
(+) 
 
mean median 
% 
(+) mean median 
% 
(+) mean median 
% 
(+) 
 
  
  
  
  
  
      
  
  
  
  Panel A: FF3 Portfolio 
Returns   
  
  
  
  
      
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
      
  
  
  
  (1,12) -5.52 -3.77 35.29 -5.40c -2.28 39.29 -1.53b -1.28 40.91 -5.83c -3.82a 45.28 -4.98b -2.65 45.48 -1.42a -2.39 47.83 
(1,24) -9.93 -6.58
c
 29.41 -2.62 -1.10 46.43 -5.64 -2.39
b
 35.23  -2.20 -1.54
a
 45.28 -4.41 -1.72
a
 39.13 -4.72
a
 -1.10
a
 38.04 
(1,36) -8.67 -4.58
b
 23.53 -2.90 -1.07 44.64 -4.65 -3.85
a
 32.95  -6.43 -3.94
a
 35.85 -5.90 -2.27
a
 36.45 -6.72
a
 -2.41
a
 36.41 
    
  
  
  
  
      
  
  
  
  Panel B: GARCH Returns       
    
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
      
  
  
  
  (1,12) -1.19 5.26 61.11 1.31 -2.86 46.43 -4.12 -0.07 48.89 0.33 2.65 56.60 3.60c 0.00 50.00 0.52 -0.41 48.11 
(1,24) -3.05 3.39
b
 50.00 7.97 -2.48 48.21 -6.06 -8.14
b
 38.89  1.56 1.08 58.49 5.27 0.97
b
 51.00 -5.44
c
 -5.98
a
 42.16 
(1,36) -1.84 -1.90
b
 50.00 1.62 -3.53
b
 46.43 -3.38 -9.38 40.00  2.27 -1.67 45.28 4.14 -0.12 49.67 -7.07
c
 -9.74 37.57 
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Table 6A.8- Repeat Targeting Voting Samples Calendar Time Regressions  
This table reports the results of the calendar time regressions for the repeat targeting voting subsamples.  The first 
column reports the coefficients using the Fama French (1993) factors as the benchmark over the holding periods 
covering 12, 24 and 36 months from the targeting date, using the following regression:  
(Rp - Rf)t = α + β1(RM - Rf)t + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + εt 
where (Rp - Rf)t is the average monthly return on the portfolio of targeted stocks less the return on the one-month 
risk-free rate in calendar month t; (RM - Rf)t is the return on the FTSE All Share return index less the return on the 
one-month risk-free rate in calendar month t; SMBt is the difference between the value-weighted average return on 
the small-cap portfolios and large-cap portfolios; and HMLt is the difference between the value-weighted average 
return on the high book-to-market portfolios and low book-to-market portfolios.  The second column reports similar 
coefficient results using the Carhart (1997) factors as the benchmark, using the following regression:  
(Rp - Rf)t = α + β1(RM - Rf)t + β2SMBt + β3HMLt β4UMDt + εt 
The factors are the same as for the Fama French (1993) model with the exception that UMDt is the difference between 
the value weighted average return on the high past-year stock-return portfolios and low past-year stock-return 
portfolios.  The reported alpha is the mean monthly abnormal return for the test window.   The figures a,b,c indicate 
statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test.   
Holding Period 
Fama French (1993) Carhart (1997) 
α β1 β2 β3 R
2
 α β1 β2 β3 β4 R
2
 
 
  
    
  
     
Panel A: Targeted Once   
    
  
        
    
  
     Strategy (n=22)   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) 0.50 0.33 0.89b -0.08 0.13 0.64 0.25 0.45 -0.58 0.21 0.08 
(1,24) -0.43 0.36
c
 0.29 0.16 0.05 -0.23 0.33
c
 0.15 -0.05 -0.03 0.04 
(1,36) -0.63 0.30
c
 0.08 0.13 0.04 -0.51 0.30 0.06 0.03 -0.06 0.03 
 
  
    
  
     Corporate Governance (n=66)   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) 0.66 0.59a 0.51b -0.24 0.22 0.44 0.59a 0.25 -0.28 -0.40 0.15 
(1,24) 0.60 0.62
a
 0.43
c
 -0.04 0.19 0.58 0.58
a
 0.15 -0.21 -0.41 0.18 
(1,36) 0.20 0.65
a
 0.42
b
 0.01 0.23 0.16 0.62
a
 0.17 -0.01 -0.42 0.22 
 
  
    
  
     Executive Compensation (n=98)   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) -0.23 1.08a 1.24a -0.06 0.53 -0.13 1.02a 0.59c -0.59c -0.53 0.37 
(1,24) -0.17 0.76
a
 0.74
a
 -0.03 0.32 -0.20 0.69
a
 0.31 -0.34 -0.34 0.25 
(1,36) -0.25 0.76
a
 0.61
a
 -0.02 0.30 -0.30 0.71
a
 0.35 -0.22 -0.34 0.28 
 
  
    
  
     Panel B: Repeatedly Targeted   
    
  
        
    
  
     Strategy (n=37)   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) 0.08 0.54a 0.64a 0.08 0.27 0.35 0.53a 0.50b -0.23 -0.41 0.24 
(1,24) 0.40 0.61
a
 0.56
a
 0.11 0.33 0.61
c
 0.56
a
 0.31
c
 -0.24 -0.23 0.29 
(1,36) -0.14 0.67
a
 0.46
a
 0.21 0.34 0.07 0.60
a
 0.14 -0.13 -0.36 0.31 
 
  
    
  
     Corporate Governance (n=334)   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) 0.75b 0.74a 0.61a -0.27b 0.58 0.58 0.73a 0.45b -0.31 -0.20 0.41 
(1,24) 0.59 0.73
a
 0.58
a
 -0.14 0.51 0.58 0.69
a
 0.29 -0.29 -0.19 0.38 
(1,36) 0.43 0.72
a
 0.49
a
 -0.09 0.45 0.40 0.68
a
 0.21 -0.19 -0.18 0.36 
 
  
    
  
     Executive Compensation (n=828)   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) -0.21 0.64a 0.11 0.16 0.33 0.01 0.63a 0.08 -0.13 -0.12 0.33 
(1,24) -0.74
b
 0.62
a
 -0.03 0.25
c
 0.35 -0.51 0.63
a
 0.04 0.10 -0.20 0.32 
(1,36) -0.85
b
 0.59
a
 -0.01 0.28
c
 0.34 -0.61
c
 0.60
a
 0.03 0.14 -0.26 0.31 
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Chapter 7 Corporate Governance Convergence in Germany 
through Shareholder Activism 
 
 
7.1  Introduction 
Corporate governance is defined as the “set of mechanisms through which outside investors 
protect themselves against expropriation by the insiders” (La Porta et al, 2000, P3).  This 
definition, with a focus on shareholders‟ and lenders‟ investment risk, does not, however, 
describe the broad range of corporate governance systems around the world which 
encompass the rights of other stakeholders. One broad classification of corporate 
governance regimes identifies two archetypal regimes – market-centred and bank-centred. 
Another divides them into stakeholder-centred and shareholder-centred regimes. A third 
scheme divides them into insider-dominated and outsider-dominated systems. The US and 
UK system of corporate governance is market-, shareholder-, and outsider-centred system 
and is henceforth called the Anglo-American system. At the other extreme are bank-, 
stakeholder- or insider-centred systems. In these latter, banks play a role as providers of 
capital as well as monitors of executive behaviour and performance. In many countries they 
also include employee representatives on the board of directors thereby integrating 
employees into the corporate governance system in an effort to marry the interests of labour 
and capital. Germany is an exemplar of such a system89 (Barca and Becht, 2001).  The 
contrast between the Anglo-American and German models of corporate governance is 
indeed striking.  They differ in the ownership structure, structure of corporate boards, the 
monitoring mechanisms, corporate law and regulatory rules. They differ in terms of 
structure, content and practice of corporate governance.  
The Anglo-American model (hereafter the AA model) is characterised by diffused stock 
ownership, reliance on the stock market pricing signal as a monitoring mechanism, an 
active market for corporate control, an independent board of directors with fiduciary duty to 
shareholders, and above all the primacy of shareholder interests and shareholder wealth 
maximisation as the objective of corporate management. On the other hand, the German 
model is characterised by large block shareholders, inter-locking share ownership among 
                                                   
89 Stakeholder centred governance may also include other stakeholder constituencies such as government 
as an investor. But we exclude these constituencies from our discussion in this paper. 
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banks, insurance companies and other industrial holding companies, a two-tier board with a 
formal separation of the executive or management board from the supervisory board, 
employee representation under the codetermination system, bank monitoring and the 
absence of a vigorous market for corporate control and hostile takeovers (Goergen et al, 
2008).  
The relative merits of these two systems have been widely debated within the corporate 
governance literature.90 Porter (1992) argues that the bank-centred model, prevalent in 
Japan and Germany, is preferable since it encourages managers to focus on long term 
performance of the company whereas the American model caused managerial myopia by 
forcing them to focus on short term earnings growth. However, the bank-centred model may 
allow managerial entrenchment to the detriment of the shareholders‟ interests and thereby 
reduce the prospect of raising risk (equity) capital in the future (Hellwig, 2000). 
Alternatively, the AA model‟s strength is the exposure to the financial markets, in particular 
stock market, and the monitoring mechanisms that it brings. Shareholders can use stock 
market price signals to continually monitor management performance. An active corporate 
takeover market, an important characteristic of stock-market centred systems, helps to 
ensure that the managers perform well, given that poorly performing companies are 
vulnerable to being taken over by better performing rivals who are able to reallocate 
resources in a more efficient manner (Jensen, 1993).91  
Recently, however, the disparate national corporate governance systems have been 
undergoing a degree of convergence in response to a number of forces. In general the 
convergence is towards the AA model due to the putative deficiencies of alternative models 
(Hansman and Kraakman, 2004).  For example, companies with bank-centred systems 
accessing capital markets in the UK and USA to raise equity capital by dual listing or 
American or Global Depository Receipts (ADRs/ GDRs) have adapted the corporate 
governance norms of the AA model. In the process of raising equity capital from investors, 
in particular institutional investors from the US and the UK, companies from the non-AA 
model countries have had to modify their corporate governance rules and practices to 
conform to the expectations of such investors. Corporate governance models, originating in 
the UK in the early 1990s, e.g. The Cadbury Code of 1992, have now been adapted by 
many other countries like Germany. In the market for corporate control, the European 
                                                   
90 See Shleifer and Vishny, 1997. 
91 For a detailed explanation of the corporate control market and its merits, see works by Franks and 
Harris, 1989; Sudarsanam et al, 1996; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003; Goergen and Renneboog, 2003.  
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Union (EU) has sought to create a more level playing field between hostile bidders and their 
targets with the adoption of the 13th Company Law Directive on Takeovers in 2004. This 
long debated Directive acknowledges and sanctifies the role of the market for corporate 
control as an essential mechanism for enforcing good corporate governance. However, there 
are still impediments to hostile takeovers, as we note below. 
While these developments seem to point to the future dominance of the AA model of 
corporate governance, this convergence is still a long way off according to many scholars.92 
Whether the AA model will emerge as the unchallenged paradigm depends on a host of 
factors that can promote or impede the convergence of other models to the AA model. That, 
inspite of the observed trends towards convergence, other models persist and will continue 
to persist is the subject of a lively debate on „convergence versus persistence‟. Scholars 
have identified a number of barriers to formal convergence. Legal or formal convergence 
may be difficult in certain countries because the changes may be opposed by powerful 
vested interests that will be disadvantaged by the changes. Changes may also not happen 
because of institutional inertia. The payoffs from the new structures may not offset the costs 
of change to all the stakeholders (Gordon and Roe, 2004).  
In this chapter we focus on functional convergence of the corporate governance system 
between the AA model and the German model. Functional convergence brings about 
changes in governance practice at company level and changes the content of governance 
rather than its form (see Section II below on different modes of convergence). We aim to 
illustrate that the presence of Anglo-American shareholders on Continental European 
company‟s shareholder registers provides the conduit through which convergence towards 
the AA model can occur. Our focus is on what happened to the governance of a German 
company, Deutsche Boerse (DB), as a result of a takeover transaction involving its bid for 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE) in 2005. The transaction led to a series of events in 
which shareholders of DB rebelled against the decision of the DB management and 
supervisory boards to pursue the takeover bid considered by these shareholders as 
potentially value destroying. Thus the battle cry of the rebels was „shareholder value‟ 
reflecting the ideological orientation of these UK and US-based institutional shareholders 
and hedge funds93. The rebellion was successful, the bid was aborted and the CEO of DB 
                                                   
92 See for instance Lane (2003); Cernat (2004); Edwards (2004). 
93 See section 2.4 on p28 for a discussion of hedge fund activism 
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and the chairman of the supervisory board that supported the CEO until the end were 
removed. Thus the denouement was a triumph of shareholder activism.  
This chapter analyses this case, describes the clash of governance paradigms, and 
exemplifies functional convergence leading to the acceptance of the primacy of shareholder 
value. It describes the developments in ownership structure of DB and the globalisation of 
its equity ownership, both preparing the ground for greater shareholder activism, and the 
changes in product markets, which compelled the firm to attempt a cross-border merger 
with LSE. These set the scene for the battle over the LSE bid. 
The case throws light on factors that contribute to functional convergence. It is a cautionary 
tale for managers of firms that accept changes in ownership structure and its globalisation 
without understanding the governance implications that overseas investors can bring. It also 
shows that functional convergence can be effective even when the formal governance 
structures are intact. It moreover illustrates how shareholder activism, a long cultivated 
practice in the US94 and more recently in the UK,95 was successfully deployed by small 
institutional shareholders to rally other investors in their charge against the well entrenched 
top management of DB. The case also highlights the role of hedge funds96 in leading this 
charge and as a force for governance convergence. 
We conjecture that the DB supervisory board was too slow to adapt to the change in its 
shareholder makeup, leaving it vulnerable to revolt. The board‟s failure to actively engage 
the shareholders and win their „buy-in‟ for the deal also exemplifies the lack of foresight in 
DB when opening up its shareholder base to overseas investment funds. These may have 
been symptoms of complacency or inertia, which prevented the DB management from 
realising that the rules of the corporate governance game had changed with ownership 
diffusion and the advent of Anglo-American institutional investors.   
Overall, the case raises a number of important issues regarding the corporate governance 
regime in Germany, the challenges posed by overseas investors, and the international 
convergence of corporate governance regimes.  The chapter discusses issues surrounding 
the governance of German companies as regards the relative balance of power between 
                                                   
94 See the literature review in Chapter 2 for a discussion of US shareholder activism.  The impact of US 
activism on target company shareholder value is presented in section 2.5.1 on p34. 
95 See section 2.2 on p10 for a discussion of the evolving role of UK shareholders as activists.  
96 See section 2.4 on p28 and section 2.5.6 on p52 for a discussion of hedge fund activism and its impact 
on targeted companies. 
210 
 
managers and shareholders. The case also illustrates the globalisation of the concept and 
practices of shareholder activism. 
The remainder of the chapter continues as follows. Section II sets out the debate over 
convergence versus persistence of national governance regimes and identifies the forces 
supporting each. Section III examines the German corporate governance system, contrasting 
it with the Anglo-American system, followed by a discussion of the merger offer in section 
IV.  Section V analyses the intervention by shareholders, while section VI draws 
conclusions and highlights the implications of the DB example for corporate governance in 
general. 
7.2 Diversity, convergence and persistence of corporate governance 
systems 
7.2.1 Forces of persistence 
As noted in the Introduction, national corporate governance (CG) systems are varied. They 
have developed over time and reflect the political, cultural, legal and ideological evolution 
of nations. Both their structures and the characteristics of these structures are therefore path 
dependent (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). Path dependency signifies that the current systems 
may have evolved in response to the challenges faced by these countries in the past and 
therefore may be efficient equilibrium solutions to these challenges. There may, therefore, 
be several optimal CG systems („multiple equlibria‟). If they are already efficient in their 
local contexts (local optimum) there is no incentive for change. Thus the current structures 
will persist and will not be amenable to change.  It is also possible that those who reap rents 
from currently inefficient structures will be unwilling to accept change and forfeit their 
rents. For instance, the German governance regime has a strong labour influence due to the 
law of codetermination on company boards.97  Moves to change this structural characteristic 
would probably be met with strong trade union and political opposition. That would make 
convergence towards a solely shareholder based supervisory board unlikely to happen, at 
least in the short term. 
The corporate governance system is itself part of a larger ecosystem of political, economic, 
business, legal and social institutions (Schmidt and Spindler, 2004). Once again, corporate 
governance systems have co-evolved with these other subsystems. Change to one 
                                                   
97 Under codetermination, a proportion of the supervisory board represents the employees of the 
company.  This is explained in more depth in the following section. 
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subsystem may entail changes to other subsystems, thereby raising the cost of change due to 
systemic complementarity. For this reason corporate governance structures may persist. 
Thus path dependency and complementarity may raise the switching costs so high that the 
status quo persists. Over time, a network of complementary subsystems interlinked to one 
another develops.  As each new institution grows and finds its place, the sum of the network 
is greater than the additional benefit afforded by the new link (Milgrom and Roberts, 1994). 
As a result, in order to change the governance regime, multiple complementary institutions 
need to be changed. A time lag will exist between the initial change and the benefits 
accruing as the change follows a „domino effect‟ throughout the network (Milgrom and 
Roberts, 1994).  As a result, the cost of changing the institutional foundation of the national 
corporate governance regime often outweighs the benefits that it would bring. 
7.2.2 Forces of convergence 
While there are arguments explaining immobility or inertia, there are also factors that 
challenge the absolute inefficiency (due to rent seeking) and relative inefficiency (due to 
local optimum rather than global optimum) of legacy systems. Hansmann and Kraakman 
(2004) proclaim the triumph of the shareholder-centred ideology of corporate law among 
the business, governments and legal elites in key commercial jurisdictions. In their view, 
rival models, centred on labour interests or managerial interests, to the shareholder-centred 
model are inefficient and would lose out in competition. They observe a globalisation of the 
shareholder model („we are all shareholders now‟) and diffusion of equity ownership and 
the outreach of pension funds and mutual funds from the UK and the US with their credo of 
shareholder value maximisation. They observe many trends in corporate law reform in 
countries like Germany where historically the stakeholder model has prevailed. They 
„expect that the reform of corporate governance practices will generally precede the reform 
of corporate law for the simple reason that governance practice is largely a matter of private 
ordering that does not require legislative action‟ (p51). They suggest functional 
convergences may outpace formal convergence. 
Globalisation of financial markets coupled with leaps in communications and information 
technologies that allow closer monitoring of firms by shareholders is driving national 
corporate governance systems to converge towards one single efficient form (Gilson, 2001).  
The development and liberalisation of international financial markets have allowed capital, 
predominantly from the US and UK, to seek out profitable destinations for their investments 
in other countries (Lane, 2003).  As a result, US and UK investment institutions have 
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become common on European shareholder registers, bringing with them their primary goal 
of maximising shareholder value.  Additionally, some European firms have sought stock 
market listings on overseas exchanges in the US and UK, leading them to adapt some, if not 
all, of the corporate governance standards in practice in those countries (Coffee, 2000). 
Furthermore, globalisation of, and the increased competition in, product markets have led 
corporations to seek out alternative sources of finance on international stock markets such 
as the London Stock Exchange (LSE) or the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to grow 
their businesses and compete globally, thereby diffusing their equity ownership 
internationally (Gilson, 2001). The trend in overseas listings of domestic firms is also a 
catalyst in functional corporate governance convergence. Many firms that choose to 
secondary-list both in the US and UK often integrate some of the governance practices from 
these systems within their own practices as well as adopt accounting standards requiring 
more extensive disclosures.  For firms listing in the US, this can be a requirement, such as 
using US accounting standards (GAAP) and more transparent disclosure and reporting 
(Goergen et al, 2008). The entrance of overseas competitors into domestic product markets 
has also forced domestic companies to adapt and adopt some of the „foreigners‟‟ approaches 
in order to compete successfully. Among these is the acceptance of the shareholder value 
enhancement criterion in investment and financing decisions. Anglo-American firms do not 
have the same stakeholder pressures, such as from labour unions, as faced by German firms, 
allowing them more freedom to compete.  As a result, the pressures they bring are forcing 
changes to corporate governance practice in the nations in which they choose to invest. 
Functional convergence 
The speed of convergence depends on the forces of convergence as well as whether the 
focus of change is governance practice or governance structure. Convergence is not a uni-
dimensional concept. Gilson (2001) lists three broad types of convergence – formal or 
structural, functional and contractual. He argues that the first happens through changes in 
the formal structure of corporate governance system in a country. This requires changes in 
corporate law and the institutions of corporate governance. Another mode of convergence is 
informal or functional. This changes the functional attributes of the corporate governance 
structures but leaves those structures intact. Functional convergence occurs “when existing 
governance institutions are flexible enough to respond to the demands of changed 
circumstances without altering the institutions‟ formal characteristics”. It is convergence in 
practice i.e. change in corporate governance in practice rather than change in formal 
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institutions98. A third mode of convergence is through contracts that may circumvent rigid 
structures. Goergen and Renneboog (2008) cite the actions of cross –border mergers, (re) 
incorporations and cross-listings as forces that can lead to contractual convergence of 
corporate governance.99  Examples include changes to the listing conditions imposed by 
stock exchanges such as the Code of Best Corporate Governance Practice on the London 
Stock Exchange.  
Functional convergence may be speedier and less threatening to existing vested interests. 
Gilson (2001) uses the example of German supervisory board reform to illustrate functional 
convergence in an area in which formal change is politically unpopular. He points out that 
even under codetermination conditions in which employees and shareholder representatives 
have equal membership, the Chairman still has a casting vote as a shareholder 
representative.  In this situation, the formal structure of employee representation remains, 
but the AA model of shareholder interests is also influential. 
7.3 Corporate governance structure in Germany 
7.3.1Ownership structure 
Prior to the First World War, Germany had one of the most developed stock markets with 
over 1200 listed equities, double the number of the New York Stock Exchange.  In the 
period from 1905 to 1914 there were over 300 IPOs (Eube, 1998).  However, at the time of 
the DB takeover attempt for LSE in 2005, the German market had slipped to number 5 in 
the world.  It was a third of the size of its London target in terms of listings (866 versus 
2,692) and less than half the size by equity market capitalisation (£603bn versus 
£1,374bn).100  In the intervening years, the German economy had developed into a bank 
based system in which large block shareholders were common and had a large influence on 
the way in which corporations were managed.  Stock market equity issuance was common 
only amongst a small proportion of companies, with retained profits a large source of the 
financing for German firms to fund their business. 
                                                   
98 Functional convergence of national governance systems may be manifested in removal of 
underperforming management.  As Gilson (2001) states, “any successful system must find a way to 
replace poorly performing senior managers” (p339).  Despite the fundamental difference between a bank 
based regime and one centred on the stock market, senior manager tenure is directly related to the 
performance of the firm (Dietl, 1998). 
99 See Goergen and Renneboog (2008) for a discussion of contractual corporate governance. 
100 Data taken from the World Federation of Exchanges. http://www.world-exchanges.org/  
214 
 
According to Franks and Mayer (2001), over half of firms in their sample of German 
companies have a large block holder controlling in excess of 50% of voting stock.  Gorton 
and Schmidt (2000a) also find that control is highly concentrated amongst owners.101  Becht 
and Boehmer (2003) further explain that only 20% of companies with a large controlling 
owner have a second registered block holder.  This second block is also much smaller at 
only 7.4%.  Edwards and Nibler (2000) report that 40% of German companies have a 
family controlling 57% of the equity in that company.  By contrast, in UK companies, 
individual blockholders account for only 2.4% of company shares on average (Renneboog, 
2000; Barca and Becht, 2001).  
Mutual equity investments were commonplace amongst firms, especially those in non-
financial sectors in order to influence companies with which a firm conducted business, 
while cross-directorships were also commonplace (Windolf, 2002).  Faccio and Lang 
(2002) report that Germany has a larger proportion of corporate equity controlled by other 
firms than any other country in Europe. Becht and Boehmer (2003) also report that around 
80% of equity listed on the German market was held by other German firms.  More 
recently, since 2002, these mutual investments have tended to be divested due to changes in 
the capital gains tax legislation in Germany102.  This has allowed the opportunity for 
overseas investors, such as those that purchased stakes in DB, to take positions in German 
companies should the shareholding be offered for sale on the open market rather than as a 
block sale to another blockholder.  
German companies are also different from UK and US corporations in that ownership can 
be dispersed, but voting power can be concentrated in just a handful of shareholders 
(Goergen et al, 2008).  This is possible due to the use of ownership pyramids, proxy voting 
and dual class shares.103  Franks and Mayer (2001) report that a majority of German 
companies are controlled through ownership pyramids in which control is maintained by a 
concentrated group of shareholders, while cash-flow rights are dispersed amongst many 
minority investors.  Furthermore, in the German regime, banks are able to wield significant 
power through their position as proxy voters. Many of the shares in German companies are 
unregistered bearer shares.  As a result, they are usually deposited with a bank, which is 
                                                   
101 See Becht and Boehmer (2003) and Goergen et al (2008) for a summary of the literature regarding 
ownership and control amongst German companies. 
102 Traditionally, when companies sold a cross-shareholding they would have been forced to pay 40% 
capital gains tax on the sale.  The 2002 tax change has abolished this condition (see Goergen et al, 2008 
for details). 
103 See Goergen et al, 2008 for a full explanation of these ownership mechanisms. 
215 
 
then responsible for voting the shares.  Franks and Mayer (1998) find that German banks 
often directly control a small proportion of a company‟s equity.  However, under the proxy 
voting system they can be responsible for voting an equity proportion many times that of 
their own direct holding.  Finally, dual class shares with multiple voting rights for one class 
have long been a feature of the German regime.  Under this mechanism, one set of shares 
has more voting rights than the other (A versus B shares) (Faccio and Lang, 2002).  
However, in May 1998 issuance of this type of share was outlawed by changes to German 
legislation.  As a point of contrast, in the US and UK, the one-share-one-vote principle is 
practiced whereby each share has equal voting rights.  
Block shareholders have the incentive to monitor managers and ensure alignment between 
their interests with those of managers. Where managers act to satisfy block shareholder 
interests, especially where the block holder is also a majority owner, minority or diffused 
shareholders may find their interests sacrificed in the process. Given the ownership 
structure of German companies, noted above, minority shareholders face a significant 
likelihood of expropriation by managers for the benefit of controlling shareholders. In the 
case of DB at the time of the LSE bid there were no controlling block shareholders and 
ownership had become diffused. Therefore, the paper focuses on shareholder activism 
directed at the management rather than at controlling block shareholders. 
To summarise the above discussion on ownership and control of German companies, it is 
worth remembering for later discussion that German corporations are used to operating with 
large and friendly controlling blockholders.  The nature of these owners also meant that 
they would have been very long term investors.  As a result, the contrasting type of 
investors that they would later be exposed to in the form of Anglo-American investment 
funds and hedge funds would have brought with them an unfamiliar investment style.  This 
might have contributed to the events that were seen during the DB takeover offer for LSE. 
7.4 Corporate Governance in Germany 
The corporate governance regime of Germany is based on the stakeholder model whereby 
consideration is given by management to key stakeholders when running the company.  The 
direction given to the management from the German governance regime is to run the 
organisation for the benefit of the company rather than for maximisation of shareholder 
interests.  This is at odds with the shareholder model that exists in the US and UK whereby 
shareholder value maximisation is regarded as the primary objective of the directors of the 
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company. In Germany, governance practices stem from the German Stock Corporation Act 
(1965), German Codetermination Act (1976) and the German Corporate Governance Code 
(2005)104.   
German companies operate a dual board system, unlike the Anglo-American model of a 
unitary board.  A management board (MB) („Vorstand‟) made up of inside directors runs 
the company on a day-to-day basis while a supervisory board (SB) („Aufsichtsrat‟) consists 
of external directors105 and is responsible for ensuring the management board fulfil their 
responsibilities to the stakeholders.  Under the German Stock Corporation Act 1965, the 
management have the sole responsibility to run the company and shareholders have no 
direct basis in law to instruct managers to act in their interests.  Furthermore, the 
shareholders are not able to directly appoint or remove directors from the management 
board, as this right is solely held by the supervisory board members.  Management boards 
also have limited obligations as far as disclosure of information is concerned.  They are not 
obliged to disclose information outside of the general shareholders‟ meeting 
(„Hauptversammlung‟), even if shareholders explicitly request it.  Management board 
members are appointed for a five year term and can only be dismissed by the supervisory 
board for „due cause‟.  Loss of trust in the capability of the directors is not an acceptable 
reason for the supervisory board members to use in order to remove directors before their 5 
year term has expired.  As a result, Rieckers and Spindler (2004) describe the governance 
system in Germany as “managerialism subject to limits and controls – limits by the legal 
framework and controls set by the various stakeholder groups.”   
The SB of a German company is responsible for ensuring that the MB discharges its 
responsibilities sufficiently.  The size of the SB is determined by the size of the company 
and by codetermination rules as laid down in the German Codetermination Act (1976) 
(Krahnen and Schmidt, 2004). Codetermination in Germany means that a company‟s 
supervisory board must contain directors who represent the employees of the company.  SB 
members serve terms usually lasting four or five years (Krahnen and Schmidt, 2004). 
Without codetermination, the SB must contain at least three directors. Where 
codetermination is relevant (depending on which of the three forms of codetermination 
applies), the board must consist of at least 12 directors.  Under the one-third form of 
                                                   
104 The German Corporate Governance Code as amended in 2005 is a voluntary code that utilises a 
„comply or explain‟ principle similar to that found in the UK Combined Code on Corporate Governance 
(updated in 2006). Firms either comply with the Code or explain why they are not complying. 
105 The composition of the external directors is explained later in this section.  
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codetermination, employee representatives must account for a third of the members if the 
company employs more than 500 workers.  Codetermination doesn‟t apply to companies 
that employ less than 500 people.  
Under the full-parity system (only applicable to the mining and steel industries) shareholder 
and employee representatives must be equal in number with an extra neutral individual 
appointed by a majority of the shareholder and employee representatives. Under the quasi-
parity model that is applicable to non-mining and steel industries where the company 
employs more than 2,000 workers, employee and shareholder representatives again have an 
equal membership of the board.  However, in this model the Chairman is a shareholder 
appointed individual and has the casting vote.  The Vice-Chairman is usually an employee 
representative.  Shareholder representatives are appointed at the shareholder meeting by the 
shareholders. However, a majority vote is not sufficient to remove them before the end of 
their 5 year term.  Employee representatives on the SB are appointed by the employees and 
must include representatives of any unions active within the company (Krahnen and 
Schmidt, 2004).  They also serve similar terms to shareholder representatives.  However, 
they cannot be voted off the SB by the shareholders. 
As a result of the insulation by the SB of the management from shareholders, the legal 
protection afforded to them against direct influence on their decisions, and the presence of a 
large employee representation on the SB, the German corporate governance model is known 
as an „insider system‟.  In contrast, the Anglo-American model is termed „outsider system‟ 
because the directors only represent shareholders. Perhaps owing to the presence of labour 
interests on boards, the gap between director and employee pay is much closer under the 
German stakeholder regime than it is in the US or the UK (Rieckers and Spindler, 2004).   
Minority shareholder protection in Germany is weak in relation to the standards found in 
the Anglo-American model as a result of the stakeholder model and the presence of large 
controlling blockholders (Goergen and Renneboog, 2003).  The SB only offers limited 
protection to minority shareholders because a large block holder could use their voting 
power to appoint shareholder representatives that might not be sympathetic to the interests 
of diverse minorities.  Furthermore, as is illustrated later in the case, the shareholder 
structure can change dramatically during the term shareholder representatives serve.  A key 
point to bear in mind for the DB case is that shareholders are not afforded a vote on 
takeovers under the German regime, unlike the mandatory vote on large deals in the UK 
and in the case of certain mergers in the US (Sudarsanam, 2003 and Bruner, 2004).  In 
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Germany, the MB need only obtain approval from the SB rather than directly from the 
shareholders (Krahnen and Schmidt, 2004). 
The insider model can lead to a great degree of complacency amongst the members of the 
MB.  The shareholders are unable to directly influence them and the MB has no real 
obligation to disclose information outside of the shareholders meeting (Krahnen and 
Schmidt, 2004).  The legal protection they are afforded ensures that their 5 year terms are 
often completed.  As will be seen in the DB case, entrenched management could sometimes 
steadfastly ignore the demands of shareholders.  Coping with such demands is one of the 
challenges managers of insider systems face as their countries embrace capital market 
reform and convergence towards a more shareholder focussed corporate governance system. 
7.4.1Trend towards formal convergence in Germany 
It could be argued that the forces of convergence on the German corporate governance 
regime towards the shareholder model were already present before the DB takeover offer 
for LSE (Gordon, 1999) and the functional convergence it triggered.106  For instance, during 
the late 20th century financial market reform began to take place with the introduction of 
three successive Financial Market Promotion Acts (FFG I in 1990, FFG II in 1994 and FFG 
III in 1998).107  These acts started to open up financial markets to investors.  Banks and 
other large industrial block holders had previously been deterred from selling their equity 
stakes due to punitive capital gains tax legislation. The relaxation of this law in the early 
21st century has led to large banks and companies significantly reducing their cross 
holdings.  The IPO of Deutsche Telekom in 1996, Europe‟s biggest ever flotation of 714 
million shares was more than 5 times oversubscribed with just fewer than 2 million German 
individuals applying for shares (Gordon, 1999).  This privatisation marked the start of a 
privatisation boom that signalled the shift back towards financial markets from the bank 
based system that had prevailed for so long.  In 1997, there were only 11 IPOs. Only 3 years 
later this figure had reached 143 (Goergen et al, 2004).   
The Takeover Code of 1995 and the subsequent Takeover Act of 2002 also went a long way 
towards addressing the lack of a developed market for corporate control in Germany.  The 
lack of any form of corporate control market had been partly instrumental in allowing 
                                                   
106 Goergen et al (2008) provide an extensive discussion on the convergence of the German corporate 
governance system towards the Anglo-American model.  
107 FFG I is the First Financial Market Promotions Act (Erstes Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz ), FFG II is 
the Second Financial Market Promotions Act (Zweites Finanzmarktförderungsgesetzt), and FFG 3 is the 
Third Financial Market Promotions Act (Drittes Finanzmarktförderungsgesetz). 
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management complacency to develop.  In stock market-based regimes, underperforming 
managers faced the threat of being removed in a hostile takeover.  Jenkinson and Mayer 
(1994) report that over the period 1984 to 1989 there were on average 40 hostile bids per 
annum in the UK.  However, since World War II, Franks and Mayer (1998) report only 
three hostile takeovers in Germany.  The hostile takeover of Mannesmann by Vodafone was 
the fourth. The successful hostile bid by Vodafone for its German rival and the role of 
German shareholder and employee representatives in supporting the bid can be given as an 
example of convergence towards a model where change in corporate control could be used 
as an alternative to bank monitoring of executives.  The threat of hostile takeover, in the 
Anglo-American regime is regarded as disciplining the management into acting in the 
shareholders interests and can thus substitute for other forms of monitoring such as a 
strongly independent board108. However, in the case of Germany, the continued weakness of 
this market despite reforms to the takeover code is cited as evidence that convergence is not 
actually underway (Goergen et al, 2008).109  
7.4.2 Trends in contractual governance 
However, there is recent evidence of contractual convergence in Germany with the 
introduction of the Corporate Governance Code in Germany in 2005.  This is a voluntary 
code with a „comply or explain‟ system modelled on the UK.  It also draws quite 
extensively on the models of corporate governance utilised in the Anglo-American regime 
(Goergen et al, 2008).  The Cromme Code (2002)110 is also a code of best practice which 
summarises the disclosure changes present in Germany as well as the responsibilities of the 
Management and Supervisory Boards.  It also expressly allows for adoption of international 
financial reporting standards (IFRS) by German companies.  It is a EU requirement after 
2005 that EU listed companies report consolidated accounts using IFRS. 
The financial market reforms (FFG 1, 2 and 3) allowed overseas investment funds to enter 
the German market, bringing with them a different focus on shareholder value and with it a 
number of challenges for the established corporate governance regime in Germany. The 
German managers would have to adapt to the new regime. The DB case discussed below 
                                                   
108 Empirical evidence that hostile takeover targets are relatively poor performers is not conclusive. 
Indeed, Franks and Mayer (1996),and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006) for the UK and Kini et al (2004) 
for the US find that the pre-bid stock return performance of hostile and friendly bid targets is not 
significantly different. 
109 See Goergen et al (2008) for an explanation of the reforms to the German takeover code. One of the 
important impediments to hostile takeovers in Germany is the power of block shareholders. 
110 See Hopt (2004) 
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illustrates how daunting this adaption proved to be to its managers. Over the following 
sections we outline the takeover process and then draw some conclusions on what it meant 
for the German corporate governance system.  From the preceding discussion, it is 
debatable as to how far convergence of the German governance regime had progressed 
towards the Anglo-American model. Shareholder revolt over DB‟s bid for LSE was a 
dramatic and high profile lesson in the perils of the new governance regime for DB‟s  
management and supervisory boards.  The governance practice that the revolt brought about 
also illustrates that legal and contractual convergence does not always prepare managers for 
governance challenges in practice. 
7.5 The Takeover Bid and Shareholder Revolt 
7.5.1 The Offer 
On 13th December 2004, the CEO of Deutsche Boerse AG (DB hereafter) announced that it 
was seeking to purchase the London Stock Exchange and made a bid priced at 530p a share 
in cash for the company. The bid valued the LSE at £1.3bn, at a 23% premium to the 
closing price of LSE shares two days earlier. However, the LSE responded that the bid 
undervalued the company and rejected it immediately. We describe below the strategic and 
financial logic of the cash bid.  
7.5.2The strategic logic of the bid 
The London Stock Exchange and Deutsche Boerse are amongst the largest stock exchanges 
in the world.  At the end of 2003, only the New York Stock Exchange, Tokyo Stock 
Exchange and NASDAQ were larger in terms of equity listing capitalisation than both of 
the European rivals.  A summary of the exchanges is provided in Table 7.1.  
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Table 7.1 - Summary Characteristics for London Stock Exchange and Deutsche Boerse 
111 
 LSE  DB 
Key Systems   
Cash Market SETS Xetra 
Derivatives EDX Eurex 
Clearing LCH Clearnet Eurex Clearing 
Settlement Crestco Clearstream 
Employees 519 3,262 
   
Market Value (£bn) 1.1 2.93 
Market Capitalisation of listed 
equities (£bn) 
1,374 603 
Equities Listed 2,692 866 
Value of Share Trading (£bn) 2,233 676 
Turnover (£mn) 226 836 
Profit after tax (£mn) 53 145 
Liquidity Ratio 3.62 1.21 
Leverage Ratio 0.24 0.70 
Assets (£mn) 480 6,089 
 
The LSE is the national stock exchange for the UK.  It is the larger of the two exchanges 
when measured by either listing volumes or listing value.  However, it is by far the smaller 
of the exchanges in terms of its market capitalisation. It is also much less profitable (when 
measured in profit after tax) indicating it is not leveraging the throughput on its platform 
profitably.  Despite its small size and low profitability, it is less leveraged than DB but has 
stronger liquidity. The size and strength of DB are surprising given the relatively low 
number of equities listed on it. The LSE has benefited from a buoyant market in secondary 
listings for oversees companies looking to raise finance from European investors.112 This 
therefore makes it the natural target for consolidation by one of the larger exchanges.  DB 
has far more widely implemented derivatives trading platforms.  A merger could allow LSE 
market participants to access these platforms and reduce the potential cost to LSE of 
developing its fledgling system, EDX, as well as opening up additional revenue streams for 
the DB.   
7.5.3The value creation logic 
The conditional offer from DB and the value creation logic are shown in Table 7.2.  
                                                   
111 Data sourced from World Federation of Exchanges (http://www.world-exchanges.org/) and the 2005 
London Stock Exchange and 2005 Deutsche Boerse Annual Reports.  
112 The LSE had 334 foreign listings in 2004, rising to 351 and 343 in 2005 and 2006 respectively.  Over 
the same three years, the NYSE had 459, 452 and 451 overseas listing on its exchange.  DB had 116, 159, 
105 and Euronext 293, 334 and 256 overseas listings respectively.  Source data taken from the World 
Federation of Exchanges, http://www.world-exchanges.org/    
222 
 
Table 7.2 - Expected synergies 
113
 
Source of synergy Value 
Cost Synergies €75m 
Revenue Synergies € 25m 
Revenue Dis-synergies114 €15m 
Trading Fee Reduction 10% 
Other Fees Reductions 10% (IT services) 
Total Synergy €100m115 
Clearing and Settlement 
LCH.Clearnet Contracts offered in 
exchange for fee reduction 
As the above table shows, DB looked to derive significant synergies from a unified IT 
infrastructure, head office costs and revenue increases as a result of a wider exchange with 
larger trading volumes.  To address concerns regarding corporate governance at the newly 
formed exchange, DB outlined the executive structure that would be set up should its bid 
prove successful.  Post-acquisition, LSE would have a unitary board consisting of 15 
directors (two from LSE, two from DB, eleven independent directors and customer 
representatives) plus the LSE chairman. This board would be responsible for operational 
changes, although approval would be required from DB‟s management board as well. The 
board members responsible for equities, derivatives and clearing for the new group would 
operate from London.  These plans were outlined to assuage fears that contributed to the 
collapse of the earlier116 merger discussions in 2000 that the control of the group would be 
too Germany-centred and would not represent the investors in London.   
DB planned to improve revenue streams by cross selling products to participants on each 
exchange.  Merger would also help reduce the development cost of new IT systems.  
Trading platforms are associated with a high fixed cost of development and a reduction in 
the number of trading platforms not only reduces the aggregate development cost but also 
spreads it over a much wider number of terminals (McAndrews and Stefanadis, 2002).  This 
will help reduce trading costs for participants further, whilst also reducing the enlarged 
entity‟s own cost base.  Finally, LSE was seen as the key European player in the fight to 
attract liquidity from other European and international exchanges. The combined exchange 
                                                   
113 Summary created from Deutsche Bank (13th December 2004, 17th January 2005, 7th March 2005, 9th 
May 2005), ING Financial (9th February 2005), Citigroup (13th December 2004, 9th February 2005) and 
Societe Generale analyst reports (2nd March 2005) and Q1 2005 Deutsche Boerse shareholder 
presentation  
114 Revenue dis-synergies are the likely revenue losses due to cannibalisation by the exchanges as a result 
of the takeover. 
115 The €100m synergy was to be realised per annum by 2008.  Source: Deutsche Bank analyst report, 17th 
January 2005. 
116 The iX merger in 2000 was the first attempted merger between the LSE and Deutsche Boerse. 
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would be the dominant player in Europe, and the potential to attract further partners from 
smaller exchanges would be high.  This was a key strategic consideration for DB.     
Consolidation was inevitable and an enlarged exchange would be in pole position to attract 
future partners, such as OMX Nordic Exchange, the Scandinavian stock exchange group or 
national exchanges.  There is also the potential threat of an attempted takeover by one of the 
American exchanges as they seek to gain access to the European market.  Alternatively, 
they might decide to set up their own European exchange.  A consolidated „super exchange‟ 
would be better equipped to fight off such a threat.  Consolidation would allow liquidity to 
be added quickly and cheaply although would likely come under the scrutiny of antitrust 
regulators117.   
7.5.4Industry Opinion 
The proposed takeover sparked a lot of debate within the capital markets regarding the 
merits of such a deal.  Analysts, market participants and regulatory bodies all became 
involved in the unfolding bidding saga.  A number of analysts released reports documenting 
their opinion of the proposed acquisition.  It is worth noting that Deutsche Bank owned 
shares in DB and a number of the supervisory board members of DB were also board 
members of Deutsche Bank.118   
With the exception of Deutsche Bank, the analyst opinion was that the acquisition would 
destroy value for DB shareholders as the 530p offer price was too high.  A share buyback 
was mooted by the analysts as a more favourable alternative strategy to enhance shareholder 
value for DB shareholders.  However, it must be remembered here that shareholder value 
maximisation is not the primary objective for a German company.  Deutsche Bank analysts 
were very receptive to the idea of the merger and argued that the bid would create 
substantial value for all parties involved.119 
The takeover proposal sparked debate amongst industry bodies within the City (of London) 
regarding the probable implications of the acquisition of the LSE by an overseas bidder.  
Amongst the first to raise their concerns was the Association of Private Client Investment 
                                                   
117 Since the failed takeover attempt analysed in this paper a round of consolidation in global stock 
markets has occurred.  Euronext has merged with NYSE; NASDAQ has purchased OM; and the LSE 
merged with Borsa Italiana.   
118 Deutsche Bank Annual Report, 2005.  http://deutsche-boerse.com  
119 “It‟s iX-mas time again,” Deutsche Bank Analyst Report, 13th December 2004; “XO,” Deutsche Bank 
Analyst Report, 17 January 2005 
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Managers and Stockbrokers.120  It was unhappy that LSE was likely to fall into overseas 
ownership and felt that a combination of two of the largest exchanges might have an 
adverse impact on competition and trading conditions for members of the exchanges.  This 
view was later supported by the companies listed on the Alternative Investment Market 
(AIM) because of fears about the regulatory changes foreign ownership might trigger.  The 
Primary Market Association, which represented investment banks that issue securities such 
as HSBC, Deutsche Bank and Morgan Stanley raised concerns that DB owned the 
Clearstream settlement business, which could lead to a conflict of interest and 
uncompetitive pricing.  These sentiments were echoed by investors in LSE who were 
worried that ownership by DB would stifle competition and lock them into agreements with 
the DB‟s own clearing and settlement services.  DB sought to reassure LSE members and 
regulators by offering assurances that the exchange would continue to be operated and 
regulated from London if they were successful. 
The proposed acquisition by DB of LSE was referred to the Competition Commission (CC) 
on 29th March 2005 by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) for an investigation of the 
competition implications. The CC completed its enquiry and issued its final report on 7th 
November 2005. The CC enquiry concluded that the takeover would only lead to a 
substantial lessening of competition (SLC) in the area of clearing services.  The takeover 
proposals gained conditional approval from the CC under the proviso that the eventual 
winner would undertake measures to limit or prevent a substantial lessening of competition 
in the area of clearing services.  The CC also stated that a newly consolidated exchange 
would need to be carefully monitored by regulators to ensure that it didn‟t abuse its 
dominant position.  The regulatory concerns along with much scepticism over the value 
creation potential bid provided the backdrop to the shareholder campaign against the DB 
bid. 
7.5.5Shareholder Revolt 
The initial offer proposal was made to the LSE on 13th December 2004. However, the 
shareholder‟s didn‟t voice concerns until a month later, when on 16th January 2005, a small 
hedge fund based in London, The Children's Investment Fund Management (TCI), called 
for the management of DB to drop the acquisition plans and consider alternative ways to 
generate value for shareholders.  Over the coming weeks, Atticus Capital, Fidelity 
                                                   
120 Letter to The Competition Commission, 22nd April 2005.  http://www.competition-
commission.org.uk/Inquiries/ref2005/lse  
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Investments and Merrill Lynch, amongst others, joined TCI in voicing their disapproval of 
the offer. Not only did they manage to defeat the merger plans, but they also succeeded in 
forcing the resignation of the high profile Chairman of the SB (Rolf Breuer, formerly 
chairman of Deutsche Bank) and the CEO, Werner Seifert of DB. 
Since the IPO of DB to the Frankfurt exchange in 2001, the composition of DB‟s 
shareholders changed dramatically, as shown in Tables 7.3 and 7.4. 
Table 7.3 - Proportion (%) of Deutsche Boerse shareholders by region of origin at year end
121
 
Investor origin 2006 * 2005 * 2004 * 2003 * 2002 * 2001 * 2000 * 
Germany 16 10 35 41 47 68 100 
United Kingdom 29 42 24 24 23 12 0 
United States 48 27 26 26 22 12 0 
Other countries 7 21 15 9 8 8 0 
* As of 31.12. 
 
Table 7.4 – Ownership (%) by type of Deutsche Boerse shareholders  
Investor type 2006 * 2005 * 2004 * 2003 * 2002 * 2001 * 2000 * 
Private investors 2 3 4 4 2 2 0 
Institutional investors 98 97 93 93 76 47 0 
Strategic investors
122
 0 0 3 3 22 51 100 
As of 31.12. 
 
Tables 7.3 and 7.4 show the changing ownership structure of DB following the reform of 
German financial markets (see section III).  At the time of the previous merger attempt in 
2000, all of the equity in the DB was held by German strategic investors, mainly wealthy 
German families, banks or corporations (81.9% of the equity was held by German banks, 
10.1% by regional exchanges and 5.3% by specialists). However, demutualisation of the 
exchange through DB‟s IPO123 in 2001 and the gradual shift to UK and US institutional 
investors brought with it a different type of owner.  During the stock market listing in 
February 2001, 25% of the equity was offered to the public, reducing the stake of the four 
largest German banks to 25.1% from 32.1%, still leaving them with enough power to block 
strategic decisions if necessary.  However, in October 2002, Deutsche Bank sold its 9.3% 
stake to institutional investors, removing the blocking power of long term German strategic 
investors. 
The major institutional shareholders in DB (as at 1st March 2005) are listed in Table 7.5. 
                                                   
121 Deutsche Boerse Shareholder Presentation and Annual Report, 2005.  http://deutsche-boerse.com  
122 Strategic investors are classified as wealthy German families, banks or other German corporations. 
123 DB planned to use the funds generated by the IPO to undertake acquisitions that would make DB 
Europe‟s premier stock exchange.  (See: “Deutsche Borse Grows Rich and Hungry”, Business Week, 
19th February 2001). 
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Table 7.5 - Major institutional shareholders in Deutsche Boerse
124
 
Institution % of Shares Country of Origin Type of Investor 
TCI Fund Management 5.8 UK Hedge Fund 
Atticus Capital 5.4 US Hedge Fund 
Capital Research 4.9 US Mutual Fund 
Fidelity Management 4.4 US Mutual Fund 
Union Investments Privatfonds 4.1 Germany Mutual Fund 
Harris Associates 2.6 US Hedge Fund 
Pioneer Investment Management 2.2 Ireland Hedge Fund 
Merrill Lynch 2.0 US Investment Bank 
Helaba Invest 1.9 Germany Bank 
Norges Bank 1.2 Norway Bank 
Thornburg Management 1.1 US Mutual Fund 
Nordea Bank 1.1 Luxembourg Bank 
Henderson Global 1.0 UK Mutual Fund 
The changing shareholder composition to a US/UK ownership concentration did not in 
itself represent convergence of the German corporate governance regime towards the 
US/UK model.  Despite being interested primarily in shareholder value maximisation, their 
interests were still second to the interests of DB and its stakeholders as a whole.  However, 
the new shareholder base composed of US and UK investment funds did lay the foundations 
for subsequent functional convergence.  The hedge funds present were amongst the most 
high profile and successful activist shareholders from the US and the UK and were not 
frightened of embarking on long and hostile campaigns to exert pressure in the exercise of 
their rights.  Given their experience and willingness to actively oppose management where 
they deemed necessary, it was only a matter of time before functional convergence through 
the enforcement of shareholder rights started to influence the structure of the German 
corporate governance model.  The funds introduced a new mechanism to the German 
market for triggering governance changes by exercising their rights as shareholders.   
Shareholder activism 
The activist investors originate from two camps, hedge funds and traditional institutional 
investors (also called traditional funds hereafter).  They bring with them different 
investment styles and objectives and this is usually seen as a barrier to effective cooperation 
in activism.  The perceived focus on short term financial gain of the hedge fund world is at 
odds with the long investment holding periods of traditional institutions.  As a result, 
traditional funds are often wary of hedge fund motives when it comes to seeking support for 
                                                   
124 Source: Deutsche Boerse Annual reports 2005, Shareholder presentations and regulatory filings.  
www.deutsche-borse.com.  Accessed, March 2007.  
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an activist campaign125.  A description of the main activists in each category is outlined 
below. 
Hedge Funds 
Much of the vocal activism in the intervention campaign originated from the hedge funds.  
This was led by a fund called (TCI). Formed in 2003 by former money manager 
Christopher Hohn, the $3bn hedge fund operated mainly by taking large bets on Asian and 
European equities and took its name from the children‟s charities to which it donated 0.5% 
of assets under management on an annual basis. In 2005, TCI generated an impressive 
return in excess of 40% that compared very favourably to the 3.9% generated by the S&P 
Hedge Fund Index.  On the back of this performance the fund received the Fund of the Year 
award from EuroHedge126  as the top performing hedge fund in Europe.  The fund actively 
engaged with all of its investee companies when it felt that there was additional value to be 
unlocked.  Policies such as these and the intervention at DB have given the fledgling fund a 
reputation as a leading light for the activist cause. By the time the DB CEO resigned, TCI 
held approximately 8% of the shares in DB. 
TCI was supported by Atticus Capital.  The US fund, managed by David Slager announced 
its opposition the day after TCI, and became increasingly vocal as the saga continued.  
Atticus held 5.4% of the issued share capital at the time of the takeover battle.  Harris 
Associates, a hedge fund based in Chicago was the third hedge fund to oppose the DB‟s 
plans to buy LSE.  It held approximately 2.6% of the equity of the Boerse at the time of the 
offer.  This grew to 4.5% by the time of the CEO‟s resignation.  Harris had gained a 
reputation as an activist investor through its high profile interventions at many of the 
companies that it invested in.  In recent times its interventions had been responsible for the 
removal of the Saatchi brothers from the company, Saatchi & Saatchi, they had founded, the 
pressure on the Wal-Mart CEO and in removing the Tompkins CEO after it became 
apparent his wife and housekeeper were on the company payroll. 
Traditional Institutional Investors 
The hedge funds were supported in their intervention by a number of traditional funds such 
as pension funds, mutual funds and insurance companies.  This is unusual given their 
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traditional investment practice of holding equities for many years and passively supporting 
management.  The major institutional support for the hedge funds came from Fidelity 
Investments, the world‟s leading fund management business with over $1.2 trillion in assets 
under management.  Fidelity had been a very passive investor in terms of shareholder 
activism.  It would much rather allow other institutions to act, and in this mould it preferred 
to free ride on the benefits generated by the actions of other investors127.  That it chose to 
join the activist funds in targeting the DB management is a strong indication of the depth of 
the problems at the German exchange.  At the time of the takeover, Fidelity held a 4.5% 
stake in DB.  Fidelity was joined by Merrill Lynch Investment Management.  It held 
approximately 2% of the equity in Deutsche Boerse.  Merrill was the advisor to LSE and 
advised it to reject the offer from Deutsche Boerse.  Merrill Lynch held 2m shares in LSE 
until the DB bid, at which time it divested its shareholding in the LSE. 
As can be seen, the activist investors come from both new and traditional investment funds.  
However, they have different investment strategies and approaches to activism. It is, 
therefore, interesting to see them join forces to fight for a common cause as effectively as 
they did.  The hedge funds were the forerunners in the takeover fight, while the traditional 
mutual funds supported them using their substantial shareholdings and reputations to make 
management take note of the shareholders‟ opinions. 
7.5.6 Why did they revolt? 
The shareholder revolt at DB initially occurred because of the perception that the offer for 
the London Stock Exchange would ultimately prove to be value destructive. However, it 
subsequently also encompassed a number of concerns regarding the governance of DB, as 
well as the communication between the Boerse and its shareholders and its receptivity to 
their concerns. 
7.5.7 Proposed Acquisition Value 
The shareholders‟ intervention was initially triggered by their unhappiness over the terms of 
DB‟s takeover proposal.  TCI felt that the offer price was too high and gave away too much 
of the synergy benefits to the shareholders of LSE.  Under these conditions, it was not the 
best strategy to unlock value for shareholders and a share buyback would be the most 
appropriate route.  TCI‟s manager Christopher Hohn said “repurchase of the company‟s 
                                                   
127 “Funds Ranked on Support for Corporate Governance Proposals in 2005”, The Corporate Library 
Blog, 7th January 2006. 
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own shares by Deutsche Boerse would be far superior in value creation.”128 The 
shareholders were in agreement with DB‟s strategy that consolidation would benefit the 
long term future for both Deutsche Boerse and LSE. However, they were not willing to 
support this principle at all costs.   
The activist‟s valuation fears were understandable given the negative picture painted by UK 
acquisition research. Upon announcement of the intended acquisition, target shareholders 
usually receive a significant announcement abnormal return ranging from 22% to 38%.  
However, in the same deals, bidder shareholder returns suffer small negative returns 
between -1% and -6%, or at best no impact on the share price (Franks and Harris, 1989; 
Sudarsanam et al, 1996; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003; Goergen and Renneboog, 2003). 
Over the long term, the negative returns incurred by bidder shareholders are much larger.  
For the period up to 5 years post acquisition, negative returns range from -5% to -18% 
(Limmack, 1991; Gregory, 1997; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003).  Poorly structured 
compensation contracts also tempt managers to undertake highly risky and potentially value 
destroying acquisitions (Sudarsanam and Huang, 2006). The activists demanded that the 
takeover proposal be put to shareholder vote but DB‟s SB was unwilling to accept the 
demand. 
7.5.8 Corporate Governance 
The persistent refusal of the DB executive board to put the takeover to a shareholder vote 
inevitably switched the activists‟ focus from a takeover to the wider issue of corporate 
governance.  Atticus Capital fund manager David Slager said that “The acquisition appears 
to us to be motivated by empire building.  If they were purely motivated by shareholder 
interests, they would put the acquisition to a vote.”129  Harris Associates told the FT in 
March 2005 that in its opinion, shareholders should have the right to vote on major 
acquisitions.  This view was also shared by the mutual funds that joined the hedge funds in 
calling for the removal of the CEO and supervisory board at an extraordinary general 
meeting.     
TCI aired its complaints that the supervisory board of DB was unrepresentative of the 
investors of the company and had been set up to aid the CEO in his attempts to buy the 
London Exchange. Table provides a comparison of the board structures of DB and LSE. 
                                                   
128 “Börse rebel threatens to derail LSE bid”, The Guardian, 17th Januray 2005 
129 “Deutsche Boerse faces increasing shareholder opposition to LSE bid – update 4”, 
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Many of the members of the board were selected from German companies or shareholders 
of DB (see below). This view was given added weight by the supervisory board‟s continued 
support of the acquisition plans even after shareholders called for a vote on the merger.  
Both Fidelity Investments and Merrill Lynch articulated their dissatisfaction with the 
performance of DB‟s management for continuing with the acquisition plan in the face of 
strong investor pressure.  The supervisory board was in place to ensure that the management 
was acting in the best interests of shareholders, they argued.  However, by allowing the 
CEO to continue with his proposal, and even back his plans to launch a hostile takeover if 
the LSE continued to reject its 530p offer price, the activists believed the supervisory board 
was failing in its fiduciary duty to shareholders.  
7.5.9 Corporate Governance of Deutsche Boerse 
As a German enterprise, the corporate governance system of DB follows the dual board 
structure mandated by German law.  As a publicly listed company with over 500 
employees, codetermination regulations decreed that a third of DB‟s board must be 
representatives of the employees of the company.  In contrast, the LSE governance system 
follows the Anglo- American model of a unitary board with independent directors to 
represent shareholder interests. The different structures are outlined in Table 7.6. 
Table 7.6 – Summary of governance structures in DB and LSE 
 
The DB supervisory board has 21 representatives, 14 of which are designated to represent 
the interests of shareholders.  However, as table 7.7 below illustrates, only 5 of these 
representatives were „non-German‟ as at December 2004, just before the takeover attempt. 
This is despite a majority of the shareholders in DB being overseas investors.  By December 
 LSE Deutsche Boerse 
Board 
characteristic 
Unitary Two –tier 
Board 
Structure 
Independent Chairman, two executive 
directors, six non-executive directors 
6 person executive board.  Supervisory 
board consisting 21 directors - 14 
shareholder representatives and 7 
employee representatives. 
Shareholder representatives mainly 
selected from traditional German 
investors – members of German banks or 
other supervisory boards 
Board 
Committees 
Remuneration, Audit, Nomination Audit and Finance, Technology, 
Personnel, Strategy, Clearing and 
Settlement  
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2005, when the Board was supposed to be more representative, only one extra overseas 
representative had been added.130   
Table 7.7 – Summary of DB shareholder representative nationalities 
Shareholder Representatives 2004 2005 
German  16 15 
Non-German 5 6 
 
The dual board system, along with the large unwieldy size of the supervisory board can 
make for an inefficient decision making structure (Rieckers and Spindler, 2004). In the 
LSE, this additional level of decision making is removed as both executive and non-
executive directors sit on the same board.  The LSE‟s shareholders are better able to directly 
influence the way the company is run through removal or replacement of the directors, 
either at the annual meeting or by submitting a shareholder resolution and requisitioning an 
Extraordinary General Meeting (EGM) to force a shareholder vote.  In this way, changing 
shareholder composition is quickly reflected in changes to the structure of the board, 
ensuring that their views are listened to.  Interestingly, DB‟s supervisory board 
characteristics did not match the change in shareholder nationality, with 12 of the 14 
shareholder representatives still emanating from the boards of major German banks such as 
Deutsche Bank.131 This possibly made the management board complacent as they felt well 
protected by the friendly supervisory board as alleged by the activists.    
The activists‟ condemnation of the poor governance in DB is understandable as academic 
research in the US indicates that improved governance standards lead to better economic 
performance. Gompers et al (2003) empirically investigate the link between good corporate 
governance and the firm‟s equity value. They report that firms with strong shareholder 
rights have an average annual abnormal return of 8.5% over the period 1990 to 1999.  
Malatesta and Walkling (1988) and Comment and Schwert (1995) find that governance 
changes aimed at anti-takeover protection produce negative abnormal returns to 
shareholders.  They also identify an improvement in firm value of 11.4% for each 1 percent 
increase in shareholders‟ rights.  A similar picture is reported in the EU.  Drobetz et al. 
(2004) study the period 1998-2002 and find an excess return of 16.4% when following a 
long term strategy of improved corporate governance at German companies. De Jong et al. 
(2005) study the Netherlands and reveal a positive relationship between governance 
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their associated directorships.  www.deutsche-borse.com  
131 See Deutsche Boerse annual reports for Supervisory Board members and their directorships. 
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standards and firm value. Thus it was imperative for long term shareholder value creation 
that DB‟s poor corporate governance standards, such as not listening to shareholders 
concerns, were improved. 
7.5.10 Communication with Shareholders 
The activists were dismayed by the indifference towards their concerns from the DB 
management.  They were also perplexed that the DB board was oblivious of the threat 
posed by them to the takeover bid and to the SB and MB themselves. It wasn‟t until a 
couple of days before the offer was rescinded by DB, in April 2005, that Rolf Breuer, 
Chairman of SB, attempted to open discussions with investors to allay their concerns and 
reassure them that the takeover of the LSE would enhance the long term value of Deutsche 
Boerse.  However, by this time the ill feeling felt by the activists was running far too deep.  
They had already started to call for a complete restructuring of the board at the Boerse.  A 
number of the activist investors involved had even commenced a strategy of nominating 
potential new directors for restructured management and supervisory boards.132  The 
Chairman of the supervisory board was ultimately responsible for meeting with 
shareholders and entering into dialogue with them.  Unfortunately, it was the CEO Werner 
Seifert that undertook this responsibility. This was catastrophic for the management of the 
Boerse, as he was the champion of the takeover strategy.  Fidelity Investments‟ 
participation in the call for the management to be restructured was caused by a loss of 
confidence in the governance and management structure in place in DB.   
The high acquisition price was merely the catalyst for activist pressure to be directed at DB.  
Ultimately it was poor governance, inadequate communication and an arrogant insensitivity 
to shareholder concerns that caused the investors to escalate their activities.  
7.5.11 Paths followed 
The intervention by the activists was a very high profile process, with much of the dialogue 
played out in the international press.  However, there was also substantial amount of 
dialogue that occurred in private that wasn‟t reported in the media. The sequence of events 
that unfolded since the announcement of DB‟s bid is shown in Table 7.8. 
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Table 7.8 – Public announcements and other events during the offer period and stock price 
reaction
133
 
Date Event 
Share Prices (per share) 
LSE (Pence) DB (€) 
27th Nov 2004  LSE shares rise by 8.2% in a week to 413.5p a share on rumours of a 
450p a share offer from DB 
413.5 44.45 
13th Dec 2004  LSE opens discussions with DB on possible takeover 540 42.95 
DB makes £1.35bn, 530p a share cash offer for LSE.  Offer is at a 
23% premium to closing price 2 days earlier 
(30.54%c) (-2.86%a) 
14th Dec 2004  LSE rejects DB offer as too low 544 43.9 
LSE announces it will open discussions with DB and tries to tempt 
other suitors to enter an auction. 
(27.21%c) (-2.36%) 
15th Dec 2004  European Commission announces it would look into any proposed 
deal to acquire LSE by one of the other 2 main exchanges. 551 43.65 
LSE shares rise on expectations that a revised offer will be made.   
18th Dec 2004  DB offers Clara Furse seat on new combined board on condition that 
LSE accepts the £1.3bn bid. 
556 44.1 
6th Jan 2005  DB demands LSE sets out detailed timetable for takeover 
negotiations given its mounting frustrations at the lack of progress in 
the bid 
583 44.72 
(-0.8%) (-0.79%) 
16th Jan 2005 TCI announces dislike of takeover proposals 585 42.34 
17th Jan 2005  DB Supervisory Board backs its CEO in wake of pressure from its 
investors to call off the deal. 
580 45.2 
(-2.98%b) (-2.55%) 
27th Jan 2005  DB formally reveals details of a conditional 530p a share offer for 
LSE 
579 47.15 
(-0.88%) (3.27%a) 
20th Feb 2005 Activists announce plan to force resignation of DB CEO 572 
(-2.14%) 
51.23 
(1.63%) 
1st Mar 2005 DB obtains injunction against activists 533 
(-1.38%) 
54.91 
(2.61%a) 
7th Mar 2005 DB withdraws LSE offer 497 
(11.18%d) 
55.04 
(-0.9%) 
27th Apr 2005 Lord Levene resigns 460 
(0.24%) 
57.04 
(-0.62%) 
9th May 2005 DB CEO and Chairman announce their resignations 462 
(-0.43%b) 
59.95 
(4.78%) 
 
The activists‟ distaste for the merger plan hit the press on 16th January 2005 with a 
statement from TCI. In it, TCI outlined its objections to the bid and called for a £350m 
share buyback as an alternative strategy to create value for shareholders.  This statement 
was followed up a day later by a report134 from Atticus Capital in which it called for the bid 
to be scrapped and substantial cash returned to shareholders. Further statements by the 
hedge funds and institutional investors involved were designed to highlight the flaws in 
both DB‟s takeover plan, as well as the way it was communicating with shareholders.  
These „name and shame‟ techniques were designed to bring public attention to the issues 
under scrutiny and force the company management to either completely drop, or 
substantially alter, the bid to allay the investors‟ concerns.  This public pressure was being 
                                                   
133 Abnormal returns are measured using a market model over a 3 day window (-1,1).  The symbols a,b,c, 
and d denote statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, 0.01 and 0.001 levels, respectively. 
134 Ft.com, 17th January 2005. 
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applied in conjunction with behind-the-scenes „private negotiation‟.  Although information 
on this strategy is limited, reports135 suggest that TCI boss Christopher Hohn was 
communicating with DB management on a daily basis by email and letter.  Presumably, the 
other activist investors were also following a similar path as they tried to make their point to 
both the DB CEO and its supervisory board.   
However, the name and shame policy would appear to have been largely ineffective.  DB 
continued to pursue merger negotiations with LSE and on 24th January 2005 told its 
shareholders to be patient and that it planned to meet them to discuss the merger at „the 
earliest opportunity.‟ However, the shareholders viewed the statement as a stalling tactic 
designed to buy the management time to continue discussions with LSE regarding 
acceptable terms for the offer.  DB was continuing to ignore the wishes of its shareholders.  
As a result, the activist fund TCI increased its equity holdings in the company to just over 
5%.  It reaffirmed its demands for a share buyback and restated calls for the takeover to be 
scrapped.  The activist investors stated that if the Boerse continued to pursue merger talks, 
they would hold the supervisory board accountable.  The threat appeared to have little 
impact, as three days later DB made a formal offer for LSE priced at 530p a share.  In 
response to the new offer, the shareholders called for a vote on any merger plans before 
they are completed.  This demand was also rejected by the supervisory board.136  
The supervisory board‟s refusal to allow investors a vote on the merger sparked full scale 
escalation of the campaign by the activist shareholders. On 20th February 2005, the ten 
largest shareholders in DB announced that they planned to force the resignation of the CEO, 
Werner Seifert, over his refusal to listen to shareholders concerns.137 Three days later, DB 
announced positive annual results but in the process confirmed its intention to continue with 
the acquisition despite growing unrest amongst its shareholders.  As a result, Fidelity 
Investments called for an extraordinary general meeting in which the activists planned to 
remove not only the CEO, but also the Chairman of the supervisory board, and replace the 
remaining members.  Lord Rothschild, Chairman of Rothschilds Investment Bank, was 
selected by TCI as the candidate to replace DB‟s chairman Rolf Breuer should they succeed 
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in ousting him from the company.138  Lord Rothschild had previously been recruited by the 
activists to lead their battle against DB management. 
On 1st March 2005, DB obtained an injunction through the German courts that would 
prevent dissident shareholders from completely scuppering its plans to buy the LSE.  At the 
same time, its CEO called for shareholders to engage in peace talks with the Chairman in an 
attempt to find a way out of the problem that had arisen. This was rejected out of hand by 
Fidelity Investments.  On 7th March 2005, DB announced it was withdrawing its offer for 
LSE due to the fierce unrest amongst the majority of its shareholders.  The collapse of the 
bid did not appease the activists.  They continued to call for the resignation of the CEO, and 
on 27th April 2005, Lord Levene resigned from his position on the supervisory board after 
the CEO refused to bow to the activists demands. 
On 9th May 2005, the CEO Werner Seifert announced that he was resigning with immediate 
effect.  At the same time, Chairman Rolf Breuer announced that he would stand down at the 
end of the year.  DB announced that the resignations were accepted in order to sooth the 
shareholder unrest and to benefit the long term future of the company.  The resignations 
came just 16 days before the AGM in which Morgan Stanley and TCI had submitted a 
shareholder proposal with the intention to vote off Chairman Rolf Breuer.  Hohn‟s 
statement highlighted the ill feeling from investors with the role Breuer had played in 
attempting to force through the takeover. They were also unhappy that Breuer was 
Chairman of Deutsche Bank and therefore had a conflict of interest, as the bank also owned 
shares in Deutsche Boerse.  Furthermore, DB had asked the Office of Fair Trading in 
London for guidance on the possible regulatory implications of a takeover of LSE and thus 
the investors thought the board might still be considering a further takeover approach. 
The activist interventions and announcements had a largely positive impact on the DB share 
price,139 with an understandably negative impact on that of the LSE as it became 
increasingly likely the offer would fail.  The abnormal return of 11.18% enjoyed by the LSE 
around 7th March occurred due to rumours of a possible offer by a rival to DB, Euronext, or 
the presence of a possible third bidder, later revealed as Macquarie Bank. 
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Werner Seifert subsequently wrote a book140 detailing the experiences that he had during 
the takeover battle.  In it, he attacked the activist funds as being short termist in their 
outlook.  Although this accusation could be valid when aimed solely at the hedge funds, the 
presence of mainstream investment institutions like Fidelity and Merrill Lynch in the 
activist coalition goes some way to invalidate this accusation.  Both these companies 
operate funds based on long term investment strategies and look for value over the longer 
term.  Their support for the hedge funds indicated the lack of long term value creation from 
the DB bid for LSE. Seinfert also claimed to have had the support of the majority of 
shareholders of DB.  However, again this claim is suspect given its unwillingness to offer 
the shareholders a chance to vote on the merger proposal.141 
The activists‟ success was due to the systematic and relentless approach that they followed 
to force DB to drop the bid for LSE.  Despite the inhibitions placed on them by the German 
governance regime in terms of their limited ability to influence the management board, they 
could have divested their shareholding and used the „wall street walk‟ as a form of raising 
their activist voice.  However, buoyed by their successes in other campaigns they waged a 
relentless fight in support of their fundamental right as company owners to prevent a value 
destructive acquisition.  This was a cultural shock in Germany, as shareholder power had 
rarely so publicly asserted itself.  The traditional culture of large and friendly blockholders 
and understanding banks supporting management would have allowed the bid to have 
progressed regardless of the value and governance problems that is so endemically 
represented.   
7.6 Conclusions 
The resignation of two high profile board members of the Deutsche Boerse following a 
shareholder revolt against the LSE takeover bid can be seen as a major coup for governance 
activism by hedge funds and mainstream institutional investors.  It is remarkable enough 
that the activists were led by such a small investor as TCI.  But it is even more impressive 
given that the governance regime in Germany very much protects the boards of companies 
in issues such as takeovers.  The effectiveness of the shareholder revolt was a surprise for 
many commentators as shareholders traditionally had little impact on strategic decisions of 
                                                   
140  Seifert W G and Voth H J, 2006, “Invasion der Heuschrecken”, Published by Econ.  Only available in 
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141 “Rebel Deutsche shareholder calls for vote on LSE bid”, Finextra.com, 17th January 2005. 
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this kind at German companies, even though shareholder voting levels are traditionally low.  
"It definitely came as a surprise that the critical shareholders so clearly prevailed,"142 says 
Herbert Bayer, a member of the German exchange's supervisory board.   
Initially, the shareholders simply wanted to prevent a bid strategy that they believed was not 
the most effective route to create value.  However, the full scale war that erupted became 
much more important – the enhancement of long term performance by removal of a poor 
governance structure.  The share price appreciation of DB following the activists‟ 
intervention would indicate the markets supported the challenge to DB‟s weak governance.  
It was also a warning that German boards could no longer ignore the rights of shareholders 
especially in companies which no longer enjoyed the protection of powerful block 
shareholders.   
The success of such a high profile shareholder activism campaign in a governance regime 
that is characterised by highly entrenched management illustrates that the impact of 
functional convergence was beginning to be felt in Germany.  The activist shareholders 
effectively faced the same barriers to direct action that had been in place in Germany for the 
last few decades.  For instance, they still had no ability to directly influence the behaviour 
of the management board, or to push through a vote on the takeover.  However, they 
managed to have their views heard and wishes respected.  Although after this episode, the 
institutional form of the German corporate governance system remained largely unaltered, 
the content of that governance will have been influenced to encourage the emergence of 
new practices more sensitive to shareholder interests. For instance, German managers are 
likely to have a better understanding of the need for greater transparency and 
responsiveness to shareholder concerns.  Furthermore, German companies may become 
aware of the need to ensure that the supervisory board better reflects the changed 
shareholder base.  
The Deutsche Boerse example also illustrates that a small issue of a particular corporate 
decision can rapidly escalate into a much more serious problem with wider ramifications.  
Had the Boerse management listened to the investors concerns, they might still have been 
able to pursue the takeover in a manner that the shareholders supported.  However, their 
inability to compromise or communicate with their shareholders was ultimately the cause of 
the bid‟s failure and the subsequent board changes.  Poor governance at the company 
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allowed the CEO to pursue his own agenda to the detriment of the firm‟s owners‟ interests.  
Ultimately, Seifert and Breuer paid the price for their own mistakes, bordering on hubris. 
The intervention also has wider implications for governance regimes across Europe.  Until 
recently, most shareholder activism was performed within the boundaries of the United 
States where activists have been operating widely for the past twenty five years.  However, 
the shift in focus of Anglo-American activists to targets in continental Europe marks a 
turning point in governance regimes there.  Hedge funds may be a potential solution to the 
problem of insensitive, overconfident and entrenched firm management due to a lack of 
adequate monitoring by the shareholders. 
The emergence of, and success of a shareholder activism campaign, also illustrates the 
functional convergence of corporate governance regimes even though the legislative 
foundations remain relatively unchanged.  Given the stakeholder focus and the lack of 
shareholder rights in Germany, relative to Anglo-American markets, the activists faced 
heavy odds against a successful campaign.  However, the reforms of the German capital 
markets have allowed shareholder interests to assume a more critical role in the corporate 
governance arena, facilitating convergence of the governance regime to the Anglo-
American model in the process.  In this respect, the case highlights a valuable mechanism 
by which the forces of convergence can be promoted.  
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Chapter 8 Hedge Fund Activism in the UK and Europe 
 
 
 
8.1  Introduction 
As the literature review in Chapter 2 explains, hedge funds are taking an increasing role in 
shareholder activism.  A handful of recent papers have assessed hedge fund activism and 
reported a positive impact on target performance around the filing of a Schedule 13D by an 
activist hedge fund reporting a block of shares has been purchased by an activist hedge fund 
in a company with the intention to affect a change in the target.  Boyson and Mooradian 
(2007) study the impact of hedge funds‟ activism between 1994 and 2005.  They find a 
positive abnormal return of 2% and 8% over the short term, with significant long term 
improvements also reported.  This is supported by Klein and Zur (2007), who document a 
10.3% abnormal return as opposed to a non hedge fund activist return of 5.2% and control 
firm return of 2.9%.  Similar findings for US activism by hedge funds are recorded by Brav 
et al (2008), Bratton (2007), Briggs (2007) and Clifford (2008).  Analysis is also undertaken 
of the impact of such share acquisition on investee firm operating performance, with 
positive results reported.143  Boyson and Mooradian (2007) and Clifford (2008) also attempt 
to analyse the impact of a hedge fund activist on the hedge fund‟s performance relative to 
non-activist hedge funds. 
However, thus far there has been no published study of the impact of hedge fund activists 
on companies located within the UK or mainland Europe.  In this chapter we assess the 
impact of hedge fund activism within the EU region using two samples of European 
companies in which one or more activist hedge funds takes a stake in, or wages a campaign 
against the company. We use the following hypotheses to test the impact of hedge fund 
activism within the EU: 
H1: There is a positive announcement effect associated with an activist hedge fund 
disclosing a stake in the target company. 
H2: Firms targeted by hedge fund activists generate significant long term shareholder 
value improvements 
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H3: Firms targeted by hedge fund activists enjoy improved operating performance after 
targeting relative to a control group of non-targeted firms. 
H4: Firms targeted by more than one activist hedge fund generate larger abnormal returns 
than those targeted by only one. 
H5: Targetd firms have lower pre-targeting performance than the control group.  
The above hypotheses are tested using a similar methodology to the empirical analysis of 
traditional institutional investor activism reported in the previous chapters of this thesis.  
The test methodology is briefly outlined in the following section. 
8.2 Sample Selection and Test methodology144 
We test the impact of hedge fund activism using two samples of firms targeted by activist 
hedge funds over the sample period 2000 to 2007. We identify the activist hedge funds 
through a search of news articles in the Factiva database.  We use a keyword search to 
identify known activist hedge funds.  Using this approach, we build a sample of 106 known 
activist hedge funds.  We use this sample to identify UK and European companies targeted 
by activists over our sample period. 
Firstly, we build a sample of companies in which an activist hedge fund purchases a stake in 
a company over the sample period. We search for each of our known activists in turn to 
reveal any substantial shareholding filings that indicate the hedge fund has purchased a 
stake in a UK company.  Using this approach, we find a sample of 370 UK companies that 
are targeted by 39 activist hedge funds.  We call this sample „Filings‟.  The yearly 
breakdown is highlighted in Table 8.1.  This table shows that the instances of activist hedge 
funds purchasing stakes in target companies increases as the sample period passes.  We 
limit this sample to UK companies as we don‟t have access to databases of filings data for 
European countries.  The Perfect Filings database that we use only includes regulatory 
filings for the UK. 
[INSERT TABLE 8.1 HERE] 
Secondly, we conduct a further search of the Factiva, Proquest newspaper and Google 
databases using the activist hedge fund sample that we identified earlier to find a sample of 
activist hedge fund campaigns that were conducted against European (including UK) 
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activism in the UK. 
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companies.  Using this approach, we find a sample of 101 companies that were targeted by 
activist hedge funds over the same 2000 to 2007 sample period.  We call this sample 
„Press‟.  Again, the yearly breakdown of the activist campaigns is shown in Table 8.1.  
Table 8.2 describes the main issues that the activists in the Press sample targeted.   
[INSERT TABLE 8.2 HERE] 
Table 8.2 lists the main issues that hedge fund activists targeted companies from the Press 
sample. I cannot present similar information for the Filings sample because the sample 
could be targeted on more than one issue.  For example, if the activist wants the target to 
abandon a takeover offer and instead return cash to shareholders in the form of a share 
buyback, the targeting would be featured in both the M&A and „Other issue‟ category.  
There were 49 instances in the sample where firms were targeted on an M&A issue, such as 
to force the target to drop a takeover bid, or to force a bidder to improve the offer terms.  In 
57 cases firms were targeted on issues of corporate governance, such as attempts to remove 
directors or gain a seat on the board.  Finally, 61 cases involved other issues, such as 
attempts to change the firms capital structure; change the business strategy; or to force the 
target to sell off underperforming assets.  These targeting strategies are consistent with the 
findings of prior studies as outlined in section 2.4. 
Table 8.2 also indicates how often the hedge fund activist was successful in achieving their 
objectives.  For hedge funds targeting firms involved in M&A deals, the hedge fund 
activists were completely successful in 42% of cases.  In a further 18% of cases the activists 
were partially successful.  This includes cases where the activist‟s objective was to force the 
company to abandon a takeover but had to settle for making the company improve the offer 
terms.  For targeting on corporate governance the hedge funds were successful in 22% of 
cases and enjoyed partial success in a further 13%.  These cases include occasions in which 
the hedge fund tried to obtain board seats but was only successful in removing an existing 
director. Finally, the subsample of cases in which the activist targeted other issues showed 
the activist was completely successful in 39% of cases, and partially successful in a further 
24%.  These instances included cases where the activist attempted to force the company to 
increase leverage and conduct a share buyback to return cash to shareholders, but the 
company increased the cash dividend with no increase in leverage.  These results indicate 
that the hedge fund enjoyed complete or partial success in over half of the cases I study, 
with the exception of the corporate governance subsample where the success rate was a 
third.  My results concerning targeting success are consistent with the incumbent literature 
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where it has been shown that hedge fund activists are successful in between 40% and 60% 
of cases.  See section 2.4 for a discussion of these papers. 
8.2.1 Test Methodology145 
Shareholder Value Impact 
I measure the effect of hedge fund activism using a number of metrics.  Firstly, I analyse the 
impact on the company‟s share prices over both the short and long term.  Over the short 
term, I measure the impact on shareholder value by calculating cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) using an 11 day (-5, +5) windows centred on the announcement date, Day 0 
surrounding the filing date for the UK filings sample, or the press publication date for the 
sample of activism campaigns uncovered from the press search.   
I also calculate buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs) to test the shareholder value 
impact over the long term (Barber and Lyon 1997; Lyon et al 1999).  I calculate BHARs 
over 12, 24 and 36 month windows from the time of targeting by activist hedge funds.  For 
the short and long term analysis, I calculate BHARs relative to the return on a matched 
control firm146 as well as the FTSE All Share return.  I use it as it is a broad based index for 
the UK stock market.  For the sample of European companies targeted by hedge fund 
activists, we substitute their main stock market indices for the FTSE All Share benchmark.  
For instance, for German targets I use the return on the DAX indices and for French targets 
I use the return on the CAC 40. 
For the long term analysis, I also use multi-factor benchmark models to further test the 
validity of the abnormal returns generated.  I calculate calendar time portfolio returns and 
using Carhart (1997) four factor model.  As a robustness check I calculate calendar time 
portfolio returns and using the Fama French (1993) three factor model, and calendar time 
regressions using the Fama French (1993) three factor and Carhart (1997) four factor 
models. However, the Press sample contains companies from different European countries.  
A way to use the calendar time regression approach is to estimate these two multifactor 
models for each sample European country and then construct value-weighted factor models 
for the whole sample, where the weight is the monthly stock market value of each sample 
                                                   
145 See Chapter 3 for a more in depth explanation of the test methodology I employ.  
146 Control firms are selected using the same criteria as used for the empirical analysis of shareholder 
activism by institutional investors presented in part II.  However, for the European countries matching is 
more difficult due to the relatively small number of listed equities.  Obtaining an adequate control sample 
is identified by Karpof (2001) as a contributing factor for the poor returns found in existing US literature 
studying traditional institutional investor activism.  (See Appendix 3B for the control samples used in 
prior research).    
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country.  However, Griffin (2002) argues that Fama-French factors are country specific and 
a country-weighted factor models have a poor power in explaining cross-sectional stock 
returns.  Thus I am only able to calculate results based on the multifactor models for the UK 
Filings sample.  I also use a GARCH model similar to that used in the analysis in Part II of 
the thesis to test how well specified the multifactor model calendar time portfolio returns 
are.  The results of the Fama French (1993) three factor model and GARCH model can be 
found in the appendices at the end of this chapter. 
Change in Target firm Characteristics  
In order to assess the drivers of changes in shareholder value I analyse the impact of each 
type of activism on the targets‟ strategy, corporate governance and executive compensation.  
Changes are calculated relative to the change in the control firm, and the median industry 
firms to give an abnormal change over the sample period.  I subsequently calculate the t and 
Wilcoxon z statistics for the mean and median abnormal changes to test whether these 
changes are significantly different from zero.  See chapter 3 for a full explanation of the 
variables used. 
8.3 Results 
8.3.1 Sample descriptive statistics  
Table 8.3 presents data on descriptive statistics for firms targeted by activist hedge funds 
over the sample period.  I report mean and median values for firm characteristics 30 days 
before the targeting occurs.   
[INSERT TABLE 8.3 HERE] 
Panel A of Table 8.3 reports descriptive statistics for the sample of companies compiled 
from filings data.  At the time of targeting, hedge funds target firm‟s that are larger than 
matched control firms when measured in terms of their market capitalisation (median MV 
£128m vs. £115m, p-value 0.04).  Targeted firms have a lower dividend yield than control 
firms (mean 2.46% vs. 4.98%, p-value 0.02) at the time of targeting.  Furthermore, targets 
have a larger median cash balance at the time of targeting (£11.74m vs. £10.87m, p-value 
0.06).  They also have a lower cash flow when measured as EBITDA/TA (mean 0.03 vs. 
0.13, p-value 0.06). Although their performance is poor, they have accumulated a large cash 
balance allowing them scope to undertake non-value creating investments. 
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Panel B reports similar information for the sample of firms that are targeted by hedge funds 
whose campaign was featured in press articles.  Similar to the sample of firms targeted 
through filings, target firms are larger than control firms at the time of targeting by an 
activist hedge fund (mean MV £1,325m vs. £961m, p-value 0.02).  Consistent with the 
Filings sample; target firms also have smaller dividend yields than control firms (mean 
3.48% vs. 6.72%, p-value 0.02).  Finally, target firms have a larger book to market value 
than matched control firms (mean 0.68 vs. 0.42, p-value 0.08) which indicates that the 
target firms are not valued as highly as the control firms at the time of targeting by the 
activist hedge fund.   
The descriptive statistics report similar results for my earlier analysis of institutional 
investor activism in the UK.  For both targeting types I find evidence that targeted firms are 
larger than control firms at the time that the targeting occurs.  Furthermore, there is some 
limited evidence that they are also performing poorly when compared to the control firms.  
This contradicts the findings from Part II of the thesis in which I found that firms targeted 
through private negotiation were performing better than matched control firms at the time of 
targeting.  These results suggest that hedge fund activists target firms in which they can 
bring about changes that will lead to improvements in operating performance with a view to 
improving shareholder value.  I find evidence of larger cash balances on the balance sheet 
of target firms at the time of the hedge fund pressure, which is consistent with the findings 
of prior US research indicating that hedge fund activists target cash rich firms with a view 
to returning unused cash to shareholders. 
8.3.2 Sample strategic variable statistics  
Table 8.4 presents data on descriptive statistics for firms targeted by activist hedge funds 
over the sample period.  I report mean and median values for firm characteristics 30 days 
before the targeting occurs.   
[INSERT Table 8.4 HERE] 
Panel A of Table 8.4 reports data on the strategic variables of target firms for the Filings 
sample.  I find little statistical difference between the targeted firms and the control group at 
the time a hedge fund activist purchases a stake in the target company.  Target firms employ 
fewer people than control firms (median 1,420 vs. 2,130, p-value 0.10) whilst employing a 
lower level of leverage (median 0.33 vs. 0.42, p-value 0.04) than control firms at the time 
the activist purchases their stake.  Hedge funds often campaign to force the target firms to 
245 
 
lever up and use the cash raised to buy back shares.  They argue that the low gearing 
represents inefficient financing structure of the target firms.  I find no other significant 
difference between the two groups of companies. 
Panel B reports similar statistics for the Press sample.  Targeted firms pay a smaller 
proportion of their earnings as dividends at the time of targeting (median 0.21 vs. 0.26, p-
value 0.08) which could help to explain the lower dividend yield figures we presented 
earlier.  This result might support the findings of prior research which indicates that hedge 
fund activists target firms in which there is scope to raise the dividends to return cash to 
shareholders. Furthermore, in contrast to the filings sample I find targets of press campaigns 
have a larger employee base than the control groups at the time of targeting (mean 4,980 vs. 
3,870, p-value 0.03) which supports the earlier findings that the target firms are larger in 
size than the control firms.  Finally, target firms have a larger ratio of intangible assets to 
total assets at the time of targeting than the matched control firms (mean 0.19 vs. 0.09, p-
value 0.00).  I find no other significant difference between the two groups of companies.  
My findings support the existing US based research into the impact of hedge fund activism.  
I find evidence that hedge funds target underleveraged, cash rich firms where there is scope 
to increase leverage and increase cash payouts to shareholders. 
8.3.3 Change in Operating Performance 
Table 8.5 presents data on the change in operating performance of firms targeted by activist 
hedge funds over the sample period.  I report mean and median values for abnormal 
changes relative to the control groups and the median firm in the target‟s 2-digit SIC 
industry.  A score of 1.0 indicates a 100% increase in the variable.  Values are not 
statistically significant unless stated. 
[INSERT Table 8.5 HERE] 
Panel A of Table 8.5 reports change statistics for the Filings sample.  I find an increase in 
target firms‟ mean ROS relative to both the control firms (0.36, sig. 10%) and the median 
industry firms (1.90, sig. 1%).  I find a similar improvement in target firm‟s median ROA 
over the sample period relative to the control firms of 0.12 (sig. 10%).  I also document an 
abnormal increase in the mean ROE of target firms relative to both the control group (0.06, 
sig. 10%) and the median industry firms (1.31, sig 1%).  Finally, the target firm‟s median 
book to market value declined slightly relative to the control group book to market value (-
0.06, sig. 10%) which supports the other results in indicating that target firms‟ operating 
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performance improves and its valuation increases over the four year period surrounding the 
act of an activist hedge fund purchasing a stake in the company.  These results are 
consistent with my findings that hedge funds target underperforming companies where there 
is scope for operating performance improvements. 
Panel B reports change statistics for the Press sample.  I find a significant increase in the 
mean ROS of targeted firms relative to the median industry firms (1.55, sig. 1%) following 
hedge fund targeting.  Furthermore, I also document evidence that mean ROA increases 
relative to the control firms (0.73, sig. 5%), whilst the ROE also increases significantly 
relative to the median industry benchmark (2.49, sig. 1%) as a result of the activist pressure.  
Finally, the book to market value declines relative to both the control group (median -0.40, 
sig. 5%) and the median industry firms (median -0.47, sig. 10%), which further supports my 
findings that the operating performance of companies targeted by an activist hedge fund 
improves along with their stock market valuation over the four year period surrounding the 
activist‟s pressure.  My findings are in contrast to the findings in Part II where I found that 
firms targeted by institutional investor activists generally underperformed the control 
groups and industry median firms over the four year period surrounding the activist 
targeting.  These findings might indicate that a more aggressive activist strategy is required 
in order to improve the operating performance of UK and European firms.  My results also 
support the existing hedge fund activism literature where improvements in operating 
performance are found as a result of targeting by an activist hedge fund. 
8.3.4 Change in strategic variables 
Table 8.6 presents data on the change strategy for firms targeted by activist hedge funds 
over the sample period.  I report mean and median values for abnormal changes relative to 
the control groups and the median firm in the target‟s 2-digit SIC industry.  A score of 1.0 
indicates a 100% increase in the variable.  Values are not statistically significant unless 
stated. 
[INSERT Table 8.6 HERE] 
Panel A of Table 8.6 reports change statistics for the Filings sample.  I find limited change 
in the strategy variables of target firms compared to our two benchmark groups.  I find a 
small increase in the asset base of target firms when measured by total assets relative to 
both the control group (median 0.17, sig. 10%) and the median industry firm (median 0.24, 
sig. 10%).  The only other statistically significant change is an increase in the number of 
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employees employed by target firms relative to the change in employees for the median 
industry firms (mean 0.21, sig. 5%).  This contrasts with the results for traditional fund 
activism as outlined in Chapter 6.  I find no other significant difference between the two 
groups of companies. 
Panel B reports change statistics for the Press sample.  I find evidence that target firms 
increase their dividend payout rate relative to both the control group (mean: 1.94, sig 1%; 
median: 0.82, sig. 10%) and the median industry firm (mean 0.95, sig. 1%).  Furthermore, I 
find a decline the employee numbers of target firms relative to the control group 0f -0.35 
(sig. 10%).  This finding differs from the result for the Filings sample above.  The only 
other change is an increase in the median leverage of target firms of 0.63 (sig. 10%) relative 
to the median industry firms over the four year window surrounding the activists‟ 
campaign.  I find no other significant difference between the two groups of companies.  
Thus I find little change in the strategic direction of targeted firms as a result of targeting by 
an activist hedge fund. The exception is that firms in the Press sample appear to increase 
leverage and dividend payout rates consistent with the findings of existing research in this 
area.  The different results exhibited by the Press and Filings samples might indicate that 
aggressive, press based activism is necessary to force a target company to change its 
strategy as the activist hopes. 
8.3.5 Shareholder Value  
I report the shareholder value performance of the target companies relative to a number of 
benchmarks as outlined earlier.  In order to make the presentation of the results clearer, I 
split the results by the subsamples analysed.  For the purposes of this discussion, I focus on 
the median abnormal return over the 11 day window (-5, +5) for the short term analysis, and 
the median abnormal returns over the 3 year window (+1, +36) for the long term analysis.   
Filings Sample 
Table 8.7 reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the target 
firms in our sample drawn from filings data.  I split the sample depending upon the number 
of hedge funds purchasing stakes in the target company.  Values are not statistically 
significant unless stated. 
[INSERT Table 8.7 HERE] 
Panel A of Table 8.7 reports short term CARs relative to the control group and the FTSE 
All Share.  The complete sample of firms in which a hedge fund purchased a stake 
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generated an abnormal return relative to both the control group (mean 3.81%, sig. 1%; 
median 1%, sig. 1%) and the FTSE All Share (mean 4.97%, sig. 1%; median 1.57%, sig. 
1%).  When I split the sample by the number of hedge funds targeting each company I 
obtain similar results.  The sample of firms targeted by only one hedge fund activist 
generates larger returns relative to both the control group (mean 4.93%, sig. 1%; median 
1.46%, sig. 1%) and the FTSE All Share (mean 6.80%, sig. 1%; median 2.05%, sig. 1%).  
Firms targeted by two activist hedge funds produce the lowest returns when measured to the 
control groups (median 0.52%, sig. 10%) and the FTSE All Share (mean 2.09%, sig. 1%; 
median 1.24%, sig. 10%).  Finally, firms that are targeted by three or more activist hedge 
funds generate similar returns to those targeted by only one hedge fund when compared to 
the control groups (mean 3.33%, sig. 1%; median 1%, sig. 0.71%) and the FTSE All Share 
(mean 4.11%, sig. 1%; median 1.17%, sig. 1%). There is no clear indication that targeting 
by several funds adds more short term value than that by a single fund. It could be that the 
stock market believes that having two activist hedge funds on the share register might 
distract the target firm‟s management and hinder its performance in the process.  This might 
be particularly relevant if the different hedge funds have contrasting views regarding the  
Panel B reports the long term results of activist hedge funds purchasing stakes in UK 
companies.  Over the three year window after the hedge fund purchases a stake, target 
companies generate substantial positive abnormal returns relative to the control firm‟s 
return (mean 14.31%, sig. 1%; median 13.05%, sig. 1%).  Targeting by only one activist 
hedge fund produces the smallest positive abnormal return, however it is still substantial 
(mean 11.78%, sig. 5%).  Furthermore, the positive abnormal returns increases as the target 
companies attract the attentions of two (mean 14.63%, sig. 1%; median 12.96%, sig. 5%) or 
more than three (mean 15.87%, sig. 1%; median 14.19%, sig. 1%) activist hedge funds.  
These results are in contrast to the short term returns in which the largest abnormal return 
was found for the sample of firms targeted by only one activist hedge fund.  They could 
indicate that the stock market wrongly interpreted the presence of more activists as 
distracting.  Instead, it is possible that the stock market believes that disciplining effect of a 
larger group of activists is required to improve shareholder value of underperforming 
companies. 
Panel C reports abnormal returns for the filings sample relative to the Carhart (1997) four 
factor benchmark model.  The complete sample of firms in which activist hedge funds 
purchase stakes produce significant positive abnormal returns over the three year post 
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purchase period (mean 8.35%, sig. 1%; median 7.74%, sig. 1%).  Similar to the control 
group benchmark we find the abnormal returns generated by companies targeted by activist 
hedge funds increases as the number of hedge funds increases.  Companies targeted by only 
one activist produce the lowest abnormal return over the three year window (mean 7.87%, 
sig. 5%; median 6.57%, sig. 1%).  The largest abnormal return is for the sample of 
companies targeted by three or more activists (mean 11.87%, sig. 1%; median 11.23%, sig. 
1%).  This result is consistent with my proposition that the stock market reacts positively to 
the disciplining effect that a larger group of activists might bring. 
The shareholder value results for the Filings sample support my earlier operating 
performance results in indicating that the presence of an activist hedge fund on the share 
register of targeted companies has a positive impact on both its short and long term 
performance.  As such it would appear to indicate that a hedge fund purchasing a stake acts 
as a catalyst for the company to change without the activist having to necessarily agitate for 
change at the company in which it now holds the ownership position.  However, some of 
the share price impact could be due to the effects of a substantial shareholding transaction 
rather than the news of activist pressure by a hedge fund.  Similar results are found by 
existing US researchers.   
Press Sample 
Table 8.8 reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the target 
firms in our sample drawn from press articles.  I split the sample depending upon the region 
that he targeted company is located.  Values are not statistically significant unless stated. 
[INSERT Table 8.8 HERE] 
Panel A of Table 8.8 reports short term CARs for the press sample.  I find a small positive 
announcement effect surrounding hedge fund targeting of UK companies relative to both 
the control group (mean 2.67%, sig. 1%; median 1.72%, sig. 1%) and the companies main 
stock market benchmark (FTSE All Share) (mean 3.24%, sig. 1%; median 2.37%, sig. 1%).  
For the subsample of European firms I find similar results.  However, the abnormal returns 
that I uncover are larger for the European sample relative to both the matched control group 
(mean 3.263, sig. 10%; median 2.86%, sig. 5%) and the target‟s main stock market indices 
(mean 5.67%, sig. 1%; median 3.46%, sig. 1%).  I interpret these results as a signal that the 
stock markets in which the target companies are listed are pleased that an activist is 
attempting to address perceived problems at the targeted firms. 
250 
 
Panel B reports the results of the long term BHAR analysis.  Relative to the control firms, I 
find a positive median abnormal return of 7.82% (sig. 1%) (mean 5.47%, sig. 1%) over the 
three year window.  The median abnormal return falls slightly when measured relative to 
the country specific benchmark, however (median 6.83%, sig. 1%).  For the subsample of 
European firms targeted by hedge fund activists, I uncover a positive median abnormal 
return of 7.82% (sig. 5%) when measured using the control group benchmark.  However, 
similar to the sample of UK firms, the median abnormal return declines to 5.10% (sig. 1%) 
when the country specific benchmark is used.  These results are consistent with my short 
term results that indicate that the stock market of targeted companies welcomes the 
activist‟s attempts to improve the company. 
Table 8.9 reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the target 
firms in my sample drawn from press articles.  I split the sample depending upon the issue 
upon which the hedge fund activist is targeting.  Values are not statistically significant 
unless stated. 
[INSERT Table 8.9 HERE] 
Panel A of Table 8.9 reports short term CARs relative to the control groups and the country 
specific benchmarks.  For the sample of firms targeted during an M&A process, I document 
a mean short term announcement effect of 4.19% (sig. 5%) relative to the control groups.  
However, when measured relative to the country specific benchmark, the abnormal return 
falls in a similar manner to my other samples (median 2.18%, sig. 10%).  When the issue of 
targeting is corporate governance, the target firms generate a mean abnormal return of 
2.67% (sig. 1%) relative to the control firms, and a median abnormal return of 2.19% (sig. 
5%) when measured using the country specific benchmark.  Finally, for the sample of firms 
targeted on other issues (such as capital structure) I obtain a similar picture.  When 
measured relative to the control groups, this sample generates a median abnormal return of 
2.48% (sig. 5%), while the country specific benchmark produces a positive median CAR of 
4.61% (sig. 1%).  These results indicate that the stock market is reacting positively to news 
that a hedge fund is actively attempting to force the target companies to improve its 
performance.  
Panel B reports BHARs relative to the same benchmarks as just discussed.  For the M&A 
subsample, I document a positive median abnormal return relative to both the control group 
(5.23%, sig. 1%) and the country specific benchmark (6.21%, sig. 5%).  These results might 
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indicate that the stock markets react positively to the news that hedge funds are trying to 
intervene in the M&A proceedings.  It is also consistent with the findings presented earlier 
that indicated activists were largely successful when it comes to targeted companies 
involved in M&A deals.  This result is consistent with existing hedge fund activism 
research as outlined earlier in section 2.5.6.  For the sample of companies targeted on the 
issue of corporate governance, I find a positive median abnormal return of 5.29% (sig. 1%) 
relative to the control groups.  Over the same three year window, the median abnormal 
return grows to 7.16% (sig. 1%) when measured relative to the country benchmark.  Finally, 
the „other‟ sample produces a positive median abnormal return relative to both the control 
group (8.76%, sig. 1%) and the country benchmark (5.02%, sig. 1%).  This result 
contradicts the findings of existing US research in this area which found little or no returns 
from targeting on the strategic direction of the firm.  However they do support my earlier 
findings that targeted firms are cash rich at the time of targeting and the subsequent 
improvements in dividend payout as a result of activist pressure.  Thus they suggest that he 
stock market might be in favour of the enhanced cash payments to shareholders that the 
activist obtains.  
My results indicate that the stock market reacts positively to the news that a hedge fund 
activist is targeting a company from the UK or Europe.  The shareholder value analysis 
supports the improvement in operating performance that we documented earlier.  It is also 
consistent with the finding of previous research into hedge fund activism (Boyson and 
Mooradian, 2007; Brav et al, 2008; Klein and Zur, 2008) outlined in section 2.5.6. 
8.3.6 Multivariate Regression 
Table 8.10 reports the results of the multivariate regressions to indicate which operating 
performance and strategic changes help to generate the abnormal returns.  I regress the two 
year post targeting BHAR onto the change in operating performance and strategy for each 
of my main samples. 
[INSER Table 8.10 HERE] 
The left hand column reports the regression results for the Filings sample.  I find a small 
negative relationship between the changes in the cash balances of targeted firms and their 
two year abnormal return (-0.04, sig. 10%).  I find a positive relationship between the 
changes in leverage (0.57, sig. 10%) and dividend payout (0.39, sig.10%) and the two year 
abnormal return.  These results are consistent with my earlier results and the findings of 
existing US research, that reductions in cash balances and increases in leverage and 
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dividend payout rates lead to positive abnormal returns over the two years after an activist 
hedge fund reveals the purchase of a stake.  I also find a negative relationship between total 
assets (-0.73, sig. 5%) which indicates restructuring efforts have a positive impact on 
shareholder value.  Finally, I find a positive relationship for R&D spending as a proportion 
of sales (1.02, sig. 5%, which might indicate that a value increasing strategy is to encourage 
targeted firms to become more innovative.   
The right hand column reports regression results for the Press sample.  I find a positive 
relationship between ROE and the two year post abnormal return (0.13, sig. 10%).  Similar 
to the Filings sample, I find that changes in cash balances are negative related to the 
abnormal return generated (-0.18, sig. 1%) over the two year period post targeting.  
Furthermore, consistent with my findings for the Filings sample I find that changes in 
dividend payout and leverage are positively related to the two year post targeting abnormal 
return (0.21, sig, 5% and 0.32, sig. 5% respectively).  These results further support both my 
prior findings and those of the incumbent literature which shows hedge funds target firms in 
which there is scope to increase leverage and return the cash to shareholders.  
8.3.7 Robustness Check 
I test the robustness of the UK filings sample long term results using two further 
benchmarks.  I test the robustness of the Carhart (1997) four factor models using the Fama 
French (1993) three factor models.  I further test the robustness of the results using a 
GARCH (1, 1) model.  The result of this analysis can be seen in the Appendices tables as 
described in the following section.  See Chapter 3 for a full explanation of these 
methodologies. 
Table 8A.1 reports the results of the FF3 and GARCH methodology for the Filings sample.  
Results are not statistically significant unless stated. 
[INSERT Table 8A.1 HERE] 
Panel A of Table 8A.1 reports long term abnormal returns when the FF3 model is used as 
the benchmark.  The full sample of firms targeted by a hedge fund activist generates a 
positive median abnormal return of 8.52% (sig. 1%) relative to the FF3 model.  For the 
sample of firms targeted by only one activist, I find a positive mean abnormal return of 
8.82% (sig. 5%), while the presence of two activist hedge funds on the share register 
produces a positive median abnormal return of 11.92% (sig. 5%).  Finally, targeting by 
three of more activist hedge funds produces a positive median abnormal return of 4.91% 
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(sig. 1%) relative to the FF3 model.  These results might indicate that the stock market is in 
favour of multiple activists targeting a company, consistent with my earlier findings.  
However, it might also suggest that the stock market believes that too many activists could 
be overly distracting for the company management.  They support my earlier findings as 
presented in the prior section. 
Panel B reports similar results for GARCH model.  The full sample produces a positive 
median abnormal return of 11.05% (sig. 1%) which is consistent with our earlier findings.  
For the subsamples of firms divided by the number of activists targeting, we find positive 
median abnormal returns of 8.14% (sig. 5%), 16.96% (sig. 1%) and 11.19% (sig. 1%) for 
targeting by one, two and three or more activists respectively.  Once again, these results are 
consistent with the findings presented in our main analysis. 
Table 8A.2 reports the results of the calendar time regressions for the filings sample using 
the Fama French (1993) three factor benchmark.  The alpha is the mean monthly abnormal 
return for the event window under study. 
[INSERT Table 8A.2 HERE] 
For the sample of firms targeted by two activist hedge funds, we find a positive alpha of 
0.32% (sig. 1%) per month over the 12 month period from the filings date.  When the 
window is extended to 24 months, the alpha increases to 0.65% per month (sig. 10%), 
indicating that the shareholder value performance of the targeted firms increases over the 
longer term.  When the Carhart (1997) model is used, the only significant result that I find is 
an alpha of 0.17% per month (sig. 1%) over the 12 month window for the sample of firms 
that attract the attentions of two activist hedge funds.  The remainder of the results is not 
statistically significant.  This result supports my earlier results that indicating that the 
presence of multiple activist hedge funds is necessary to induce improvements in target‟s 
shareholder value performance. 
Overall the results that are presented in this section support the results from our main 
analysis in indicating that the shareholder value performance of targeted firms improves as 
a result of targeting by an activist hedge fund.   They also give further evidence that the 
stock market looks favourably upon the attention of multiple activists so long as the 
presence of too many activist hedge funds doesn‟t give rise to possible distraction of target 
company management. 
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8.4 Hedge Fund Activists Vs Engaged Investors 
The survey results presented in Chapter 4 highlighted a wariness that UK Institutional 
investors held for the motives of, and strategies used by, hedge funds as shareholder 
activists.  They displayed fear that aggressive tactics used by hedge funds activists, as well 
as the shorter investment horizon that they follow could be detrimental to the interests of the 
traditional institutional investors‟ clients.  In this research I analyse the impact of activism 
by both types of investor.  This section conducts a comparative analysis of the returns 
generated by these two activism styles.   
Over the short term, I find evidence that traditional shareholder activism as presented in 
chapter 5 generates positive abnormal returns of up to 5.44% for both targeted voting 
activity and the requisition of an EGM targeting the board of directors.  However, for the 
actual EGM meeting date I document a negative abnormal return of around -1%.147  In 
contrast, I document large positive short term abnormal returns for both my Press and 
Filings hedge fund activism samples of up to 10%.  This suggests that the stock market 
reacts much more positively to news that an aggressive activist hedge fund is looking to 
target a UK or EU company.   
Over the longer term, I find significant negative abnormal returns of up to 6% for 
companies targeted by traditional institutional investors.  The results are consistently 
negative across all types of targeting and all types of issue attracting the shareholders 
attention.  However, my samples of companies targeted by hedge fund activists generate 
substantial positive abnormal returns in the region of 10% - 20%.  This suggests that hedge 
funds are more successful in improving the performance of targeted companies.  My 
findings also support those of Boyson and Mooradian (2007) who find evidence that 
aggressive hedge fund activists generate larger abnormal returns than more passive 
investors. 
These findings suggest that hedge funds are much more successful at generating improved 
returns for their investors.  However, these results must be treated with caution.  The 
activist hedge funds are able to target companies in which changes have been identified 
with the specific intention to improve shareholder value.  For instance, the UK investor 
Hermes uses a Focus Fund to target companies in which it can generate a 20% improvement 
                                                   
147 It is worth remembering that all of the resolutions, which targeted board changes, were defeated. 
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in shareholder value.148  However, I explained in Chapter 2 that institutional investor 
engagement is generally conducted against companies already held in the investment 
portfolios.  In this manner, the activism by traditional institutional investors is conducted to 
address issues of concern before they manifest into large performance declines.  
Furthermore, the desire by traditional investors to maintain good relations with their 
investees might also contribute to their poorer returns.  They could be unwilling to take an 
aggressive stance with target companies for this reason.  Hedge fund activists do not 
generally suffer this conflict, allowing them to exhibit the necessary aggression required to 
achieve their performance enhancing objectives.  These style differences could therefore 
explain why engagement undertaken by traditional institutional investors does not generate 
the same magnitude of returns as documented for hedge fund targeting. 
8.5 Summary 
This chapter analyses the recent phenomenon of activism by hedge funds in the UK and 
Europe.  Prior research into hedge fund activism in the US find significant positive 
abnormal returns associated with this type of pressure (Klein and Zur, 2008; Clifford, 
2008).  However, there has not been a study that has examined the returns generated by 
hedge fund activism within a European context.  The results of this chapter indicate that 
targeting by an activist hedge fund produces tangible changes in the operating performance 
of targeted companies when measured by changes in ROA, ROS and ROE.  This is 
consistent with the prior US research.  Furthermore, I also find limited changes in the size 
of assets and the employee base of companies targeted by one of more activist hedge funds.  
This is consistent with the findings of Becht et al (2008) in their study of the Hermes UK 
Focus Fund.  Consistent with the prior research outlined in section 2.5.6 I find strong 
evidence that activist hedge funds are successful in forcing cash rich, underleveraged firms 
to ramp up both leverage and dividends in order to return cash to shareholders.  I also find 
evidence that this strategy is positively related to long term increases in the target‟s 
shareholder value performance.  However, I find that targeted firms are not performing 
significantly worse than the matched control groups at the time of targeting.  The main 
difference is in the lower leerage and higher cash balances that they operate.  As such, I find 
little support for hypothesis 5. 
                                                   
148 See Becht et al (2008) for an analysis of shareholder activism by HUKFF.  Hermes is an institutional 
investor, however, it‟s UK Focus Fund could be interpreted as operating in the mould of an activist hedge 
fund. 
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The prior US research also documents significant short term announcement effect abnormal 
returns when the 13D filings disclosing the hedge fund stake are filed with the SEC.  Using 
a similar methodology by means of UK shareholder filings, I also find significant short and 
long term abnormal returns associated with the announcement that a known activist hedge 
fund has purchased a stake in a UK company.  My results are consistent with the findings of 
(Boyson and Mooradian (2007) who find evidence that the presence of an activist hedge 
fund on company‟s share register will begin the process of change desired by the activist 
even before initial contact is made.  The abnormal returns increase as the number of 
activists targeting the company increases from one to two activist hedge funds.  However, 
over the long term I find strong evidence that the increase in abnormal return is tempered as 
the number of hedge funds targeting a company increases.  This suggests that the market is 
concerned that too many activists could hinder the company‟s ability to operate effectively 
by distracting management.  Furthermore, the results are robust when checked using 
sophisticated benchmark models, such as FF3 and GARCH benchmarks.  However, caution 
must be encouraged when understanding these results.  I don‟t attempt to isolate the impact 
of the activist pressure announcement from the share price impact of a substantial 
shareholding transaction.  As a result, the true abnormal return generated by the activist 
pressure could be lower than the return I report. 
I also look at the impact of press campaigns and find similar long term shareholder value 
performance improvements as a result of this type of targeting.  Again, these results are 
consistent with US research into activism by hedge funds.  I also document evidence 
consistent with Klein and Zur (2008) that hedge funds are largely successful in achieving 
their objectives when conducting an activist campaign.  Consistent with US research I find 
that instances in which the activist hedge fund attempts to target companies involved in 
M&A proceedings generate significant abnormal returns over both the long and short term.  
This suggests that the stock market is reacting positively to the attempts to scupper or 
change the terms of the M&A deal.  In the following  
Finally, my results indicate that hedge fund activists are much more successful that 
institutional investors in bring performance enhancing change to target companies.  Hedge 
funds also generate much larger abnormal returns at companies targeted over both the long 
and short term.  However, the different investment styles pursued by these two types of 
investors could explain the difference. 
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Table 8.1 - Summary of Hedge Fund Activism Samples 
This table reports the aggregate number of campaigns undertaken by hedge funds in the UK and Europe.  
The sample period runs from January 2000 to the end of 2007.  The „Filings‟ sample is the sample 
collected from regulatory filings indicating that at activist hedge fund has purchased a stake in a UK 
company.  The „Press‟ sample is the sample in which the activist hedge fund‟s process was covered in 
newspapers. 
 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Total 
 
  
       
  
Panel A: Filings   
       
  
 
  
       
  
No of Companies 22 16 24 39 49 59 57 104 370 
No of Targeting 22 16 27 41 54 90 121 186 557 
 
  
       
  
Panel B: Press    
       
  
 
  
       
  
No of Companies 3 4 9 14 18 21 17 15 101 
           
Table 8.2 - Summary of Issues Targeted in ‘Press’ Sample 
This table reports the number of instances in which a hedge fund activist targeted a firm from the „Press‟ 
sample on an issue of M&A strategy, corporate governance or „other‟ reasons.  The second column in the 
table reports the percentage of targeting in which the activist was successful in achieving their desired 
outcome.  The right hand column lists the percentage of times the activist was partially successful in 
achieving its objectives. 
 
Focus of Targeting Number Successful (%) Partial Success (%) 
M&A 48 42 18 
Corporate Governance 57 22 13 
Other Reason 61 39 24 
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Table 8.3 - Operating Performance Statistics 
This table reports operating performance statistics for the targets of hedge fund activism in our three main samples 30 
days prior to targeting.  We also report similar statistics for our matched control firms.  Control firms are matched 
using the same criteria as for the main activism chapters.  Panel A reports statistics for the sample of firms targeted 
by hedge fund filings.  Panel B reports statistics for the sample of firms targeted based on press articles.  MV is the 
market value of the firm 30 days prior to the targeting date, calculated as share price of the firm multiplied by the 
number of outstanding shares.  The following accounting variables are from the most recent annual accounting 
statement prior to the targeting date.  DIVYLD is the dividend yield for the company 30 days prior to the targeting 
date, defined as the dividend per share divided by the share price of the company.  ROA is the return on assets for the 
firm, defined as EBIT divided by total assets.  ROE is the return on equity for the firm, defined as net profit after tax 
divided by total shareholders‟ equity.  CASH is the value of cash on the balance sheet of the firm.  BK-MKT is the 
book to market value of the 30 days prior to the targeting date, defined as the book value of equity divided by the 
market value of the company.  EBITDA/TA is the value of EBITDA divided by total assets.  All values are in 
percent, except for MV and CASH which are reported in £millions.  All values are in percent, except for MV and 
CASH which are reported in £millions.  We report P-values for the t-statistic and Wilcoxon z-statistic for the mean 
and median differences between the target and control samples.   
  N Mean Median Mean Median T-Stat Z-Stat 
                
  
Target Sample Control  Sample 
          Panel A: Filings (N=370) 
               MV 312 712.40 128.46 654.98 185.34 0.67 0.04 
ROS 199 1.27 6.32 3.78 8.35 0.11 0.33 
DIVYLD 264 2.46 2.21 4.98 4.24 0.02 0.37 
ROA 198 1.34 4.13 3.82 4.15 0.39 0.94 
ROE 192 -1.97 5.78 3.14 3.87 0.46 0.90 
CASH 198 55.61 11.74 14.67 13.87 0.12 0.06 
BK-MKT 206 0.76 0.66 0.54 0.52 0.51 0.76 
EBITDA/TA 206 0.03 0.05 0.13 0.09 0.07 0.45 
        Panel B: Press (N=101) 
               MV 101 1325.87 342.76 960.89 296.98 0.02 0.63 
ROS 100 2.36 7.28 7.58 9.38 0.44 0.39 
DIVYLD 98 3.48 5.98 6.72 4.63 0.02 0.60 
ROA 100 3.86 6.82 5.69 7.59 0.40 0.88 
ROE 97 4.19 8.93 4.72 6.83 0.27 0.88 
CASH 96 68.29 21.74 17.48 12.63 0.21 0.54 
BK-MKT 95 0.68 0.53 0.42 0.33 0.08 0.54 
EBITDA/TA 87 0.17 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.45 0.25 
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Table 8.4 - Strategic Variables Statistics 
This table reports strategic variables for the targets of hedge fund activism in our three main samples 30 days prior to 
targeting.  We also report similar statistics for our matched control firms.  Control firms are matched using the same 
criteria as for the main activism chapters.  Panel A reports statistics for the sample of firms targeted by hedge fund 
filings.  Panel B reports statistics for the sample of firms targeted based on press articles.  DIVPAY is the firm‟s 
dividend payout rate.  TOTASS is the value of the total assets of the firm scaled by sales.  EMP is the number of 
employees employed by the firm scaled by sales.  LEV is the leverage level of the firm, calculated as the total debt 
outstanding divided by the total value of the firm.  INT/ASS is the value of intangible assets divided by the value of 
total assets.  CAPEX/TA is the value of capital expenditure divided by the total assets of the firm.  RD/SALES is the 
value of research and development divided by the level of sales for the firm.    All of the variables are ratios with the 
exception of TOTASS which is in millions and EMP which is in thousands.  We report P-values for the t-statistic and 
Wilcoxon z-statistic for the mean and median differences between the target and control samples.   
  N Mean Median Mean Median T-Stat Z-Stat 
        
  
Target Sample Control  Sample 
          Panel A: Filings (N=370) 
               DIVPAY 222 0.41 0.40 0.36 0.17 0.36 0.64 
TOTASS 208 1649.27 179.19 987.34 201.48 0.28 0.74 
EMP 197 5.95 1.42 8.63 2.13 0.63 0.10 
LEV 208 0.36 0.33 0.49 0.41 0.22 0.04 
INT/ASS 205 0.14 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.30 0.22 
CAPEX/TA 203 0.05 0.03 0.19 0.08 0.72 0.83 
RD/SALES 49 0.07 0.01 0.11 0.06 0.84 0.90 
        Panel B: Press (N=101) 
               DIVPAY 100 0.24 0.21 0.32 0.26 0.98 0.08 
TOTASS 98 1246.83 265.91 769.25 195.49 0.47 0.13 
EMP 100 4.98 3.62 3.87 2.84 0.03 0.46 
LEV 97 0.52 0.27 0.37 0.22 0.13 0.82 
INT/ASS 96 0.19 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.00 0.25 
CAPEX/TA 95 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.73 0.96 
RD/SALES 87 0.02 0.01 0.06 0.04 0.24 0.16 
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Table 8.5- Change in Operating Performance 
This table reports the change operating performance statistics for the targets of hedge fund activism over the period from 2 years prior to targeting, to two years post targeting.  We report 
the raw change, as well as the abnormal change over and above the change in the control firms over the sample period.  We also report the abnormal change relative the change in median 
firm in the targets 3-digit SIC code.  Control firms are matched using the same criteria as for the main activism chapters.  Panel A reports statis tics for the sample of firms targeted by 
hedge fund filings.  Panel B reports statistics for the sample of firms targeted based on press articles.  MV is the market value of the firm, calculated as share price of the firm multiplied 
by the number of outstanding shares.  DIVYLD is the dividend yield for the company, defined as the dividend per share divided by the share price of the company.  ROA is the return on 
assets for the firm, defined as EBIT divided by total assets.  ROE is the return on equity for the firm, defined as net profit after tax divided by total shareholders‟ equity.  CASH is the 
value of cash on the balance sheet of the firm.  BK-MKT is the book to market value, defined as the book value of equity divided by the market value of the company.  EBITDA/TA is 
the value of EBITDA divided by total assets.  All values are in percent, except for MV and CASH which are reported in millions.  The figures a, b, c indicates statistical significance at 
the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test.   
 
  
N 
Year – 2 Year + 2 
% Change % Vs 
% Vs Ind Median 
(-2,+2) Controls 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
            Panel A: Filings 
                       MV 268 577.84 132.94 660.06 143.42 0.14 0.08 0.13 0.01 0.06 0.01 
ROS 274 -6.86 8.35 14.54 6.32 3.12 -0.24 0.36c -0.22 1.90a -0.09 
DIVYLD 238 3.00 3.04 2.14 2.08 -0.29 -0.32 -0.15 -0.22 -0.06 -0.03 
ROA 272 2.23 4.46 2.23 3.81 0.00 -0.15 0.00 0.12c 0.00 -0.02 
ROE 260 -1.19 6.91 1.87 4.95 2.57 -0.28 0.06c -0.26 1.31a -0.26 
CASH 276 39.64 10.11 57.17 16.48 0.44 0.63 0.24 0.58 0.19 0.08 
BK-MKT 258 0.71 0.64 0.74 0.73 0.04 0.14 0.03 -0.06c 0.01 0.11 
EBITDA/TA 284 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.05 11.25 -0.11 7.82 -0.05 6.70 -0.01 
            Panel B: Press  
                       MV 101 967.45 276.89 1578.58 412.53 0.63 0.49 0.02 0.20 0.06 0.42 
ROS 100 2.14 5.14 4.68 9.45 1.19 0.84 1.05 0.49 1.55b 0.48 
DIVYLD 98 2.54 2.79 4.81 5.57 0.89 1.00 0.67 0.61 0.03 0.68 
ROA 100 0.87 4.27 5.87 6.59 5.75 0.54 0.73b 0.35 4.75 0.35 
ROE 97 0.86 2.67 3.78 4.51 3.40 0.69 1.94 0.04 2.49a 0.09 
CASH 96 41.34 23.56 22.67 9.74 -0.45 -0.59 -0.24 -0.23 -0.04 -0.19 
BK-MKT 95 0.81 0.74 0.42 0.32 -0.48 -0.57 -0.42 -0.40b -0.14 -0.47c 
EBITDA/TA 87 0.13 0.07 0.21 0.11 0.62 0.57 0.51 0.22 0.59 0.22 
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Table 8.6- Change in Strategic Variables 
This table reports the change strategic statistics for the targets of hedge fund activism over the period from 2 years prior to targeting, to two years post targeting.  We report the raw 
change, as well as the abnormal change over and above the change in the control firms over the sample period.  We also report  the abnormal change relative the change in median firm in 
the targets 3-digit SIC code.  Control firms are matched using the same criteria as for the main activism chapters.  Panel A reports statist ics for the sample of firms targeted by hedge fund 
filings.  Panel B reports statistics for the sample of firms targeted based on press articles.  DIVPAY is the firm‟s dividend payout rate.  TOTASS is the value of the total assets of the firm 
scaled by sales.  EMP is the number of employees employed by the firm scaled by sales.  LEV is the leverage level of the firm, calculated as the total debt outstanding divided by the total 
value of the firm.  INT/ASS is the value of intangible assets divided by the value of total assets.  CAPEX/TA is the value of capital expenditure divided by the total assets of the firm.  
RD/SALES is the value of research and development divided by the level of sales for the firm.    All variables are ratios with the exception of TOTASS which is in millions and EMP 
which is in thousands.  We report P-values for the t-statistic and Wilcoxon z-statistic for the mean and median differences between the target and control samples.   
 
  
N 
Year - 2 Year + 2 
% Change % Vs 
% Vs Ind Median 
(-2,+2) Controls 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
            Panel A: Filings 
                      DIVPAY 197 0.47 0.42 0.41 0.41 -0.11 -0.04 0.09 0.03 -0.01 -0.01 
TOTASS 289 1094.42 156.77 893.05 236.54 -0.18 0.51 -0.01 0.17c -0.05 0.24c 
EMP 283 5.36 1.11 6.63 1.63 0.24 0.47 0.20 0.42 0.21b 0.06 
LEV 288 0.38 0.34 0.35 0.37 -0.07 0.11 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.09 
INT/ASS 285 0.16 0.06 0.13 0.04 -0.18 -0.33 -0.03 -0.29 -0.10 -0.24 
CAPEX/TA 287 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 -0.10 -0.05 -0.07 -0.03 -0.01 0.00 
RD/SALES 82 0.14 0.01 0.07 0.01 -0.52 -0.18 -0.39 -0.11 -0.51 -0.09 
            Panel B: Press  
                      DIVPAY 100 0.12 0.17 0.53 0.39 3.42 1.29 1.94a 0.82c 0.95a 0.92 
TOTASS 98 986.95 187.56 1061.23 196.32 0.08 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.02 
EMP 100 7.54 4.92 5.82 4.31 -0.23 -0.12 -0.35c -0.09 -0.18 -0.05 
LEV 97 0.43 0.39 0.78 0.65 0.81 0.67 0.18 0.31 0.53 0.63c 
INT/ASS 96 0.23 0.11 0.17 0.09 -0.26 -0.18 -0.07 -0.09 -0.24 -0.14 
CAPEX/TA 95 0.06 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.50 -0.42 0.14 -0.17 0.24 -0.20 
RD/SALES 87 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.13 1.25 0.44 0.17 0.10 1.10 0.38 
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Table 8.7- Abnormal Returns for Hedge Fund Filings Samples  
 
This table reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the hedge fund filings.  The table reports columns for the complete sample as well as subsamples divided by the 
number of hedge funds targeting the company.  Panel A reports short term CARs while Panel B reports long term BHARs.  We calculate abnormal returns as the target firm return minus the 
control firm return.  We also calculate abnormal returns relative to the FTSE all share benchmark.  Panel C reports calendar time portfolio returns relative to the Carhart (1997) four factor 
benchmark.  The figures a, b, c indicates statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 
  All (n=423) One (n=263) Two (n=181) Three+ (n=85) 
  mean median   % (+) mean median   % (+) mean median   % (+) mean median   % (+) 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel A: Short Term CARs   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Control Groups     
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  (-5,5) 3.81a 1.00a 57.56 4.93a 1.46a 56.16 2.12 0.52c 56.12 3.33a 0.71a 60.24 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  FTSE All Share   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  (-5,5) 4.92a 1.57a 60.66 6.80a 2.05a 64.84 2.09a 1.24c 55.10 4.11a 1.17a 58.43
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel B: Long Term BHARs   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Control Groups     
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12) 8.04b 3.90 53.26 6.57 3.90 53.59 7.08a 6.70 60.47 4.77 -1.62 43.24
(1,24) 13.81
b
 6.87
b
 53.26 10.45 3.93 53.59 14.07 10.62a 60.47 9.03c 6.67b 43.24 
(1,36) 14.31
a
 13.05
a
 56.32 11.78b 8.14 53.59 14.63a 12.96b 60.47 15.87a 14.19a 64.86 
 
                
Panel C: Long Term C4 Returns       
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12) 4.78c 3.67 53.26 4.56 3.75 53.59 7.68a 6.34 60.47 4.17 2.23 43.24 
(1,24) 7.52
a
 3.48
c
 53.26 8.36a 7.92a 53.59 6.87 6.21a 60.47 9.31c 7.45b 43.24 
(1,36) 8.35
a
 7.74
a
 56.32 7.87b 6.57a 53.59 9.58b 8.45b 60.47 11.87a 11.23a 64.86 
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Table 8.8- Abnormal Returns for Hedge Fund Press Samples Divided By Region 
This table reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the hedge fund campaigns using press data 
divided by region.  Panel A reports short term CARs while Panel B reports long term BHARs.  We calculate abnormal 
returns as the target firm return minus the control firm return.  We also calculate abnormal returns relative to the target 
companies‟ stock market benchmark (such as the DAX or CAC 40 for German and French targets respectively).  The figures 
a, b, c indicates statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 
  UK (n=43) Europe (n=58) 
  mean median   % (+) Mean median   % (+) 
 
  
  
  
  Panel A: Short Term CARs   
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  Control Groups     
  
 
  
  
  
  (-5,5) 2.67a 1.72a 51.62 3.63c 2.86b 53.26 
 
  
  
  
  Country Benchmark   
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  (-5,5) 3.24a 2.37a 51.62 5.67a 3.46a 54.42
 
  
  
  
  Panel B: Long Term BHARs   
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  Control Groups     
  
 
  
  
  
  (1,12) 5.68b 3.13 54.62 4.92 2.18 54.78
(1,24) 6.45
b
 4.58
b
 51.27 7.89 5.78 52.98 
(1,36) 5.47
a
 7.82
a
 55.24 8.67b 7.82b 51.96 
 
        
Country Benchmark       
  
 
  
  
  
  (1,12) 3.46c 2.65 52.87 2.76 1.28 53.96 
(1,24) 5.89
a
 4.13
c
 58.37 6.71a 5.92a 51.87 
(1,36) 9.35
a
 6.83
a
 60.19 8.53b 5.10a 54.98 
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Table 8.9- Abnormal Returns for Hedge Fund Press Samples Divided Issue 
This table reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the hedge fund campaigns using press data 
divided Issue.  Panel A reports short term CARs while Panel B reports long term BHARs.  We calculate abnormal returns as 
the target firm return minus the control firm return.  We also calculate abnormal returns relative to the target companies‟ 
stock market benchmark (such as the DAX or CAC 40 for German and French targets respectively).  The figures a, b, c 
indicates statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 
  M&A (n=47) 
Corporate Governance 
(n=22) Other (n=32) 
  mean median 
  % 
(+) mean median 
  % 
(+) mean median 
  % 
(+) 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel A: Short Term CARs   
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  Control Groups     
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  (-5,5) 4.19b 2.86 56.81 2.67a 1.78 52.87 4.78a 2.48b 52.89 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  Country Benchmark   
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  (-5,5) 3.89a 2.18c 55.89 3.79 2.19b 58.96 5.81a 4.61a 61.28
 
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel B: Long Term BHARs   
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  Control Groups     
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12) 4.67a 3.40c 54.89 4.68 3.18b 53.90 6.98 5.68a 56.92
(1,24) 5.89
b
 5.29
a
 52.97 6.94a 6.78a 54.87 8.49a 6.93a 53.86 
(1,36) 6.91
a
 5.23
a
 54.78 5.78a 5.24a 56.37 10.43a 8.76a 52.89 
 
            
Country Benchmark       
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12) 4.58a 3.14b 51.90 4.89 4.19a 56.78 6.59 5.18b 51.95 
(1,24) 6.82
c
 5.92 57.29 7.27b 6.54c 53.68 6.12a 5.82c 56.30 
(1,36) 8.22
a
 6.21
b
 57.28 8.92b 7.16b 56.25 5.69a 5.02a 52.81 
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Table 8.10 - Multivariate Regressions 
This table reports the multivariate regressions for the targets of activism in our two main hedge fund activism samples. I 
regress the operating performance and strategic changes over the sample period onto the two year post activism BHAR.  See 
Chapter 3 for a definition of the variables used in this analysis.  The figures a, b, c indicates statistical significance at the 
0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test.   
 
  Filings Sample Press Sample 
  
Operating 
Performance 
Strategy 
Operating 
Performance 
Strategy 
  
  
  
 INTERCEPT -0.01 -0.12 -0.05 0.07 
MV 0.47 
 
0.79 
 DIVYLD 0.06 
 
0.35 
 ROA 0.18 
 
0.02 
 ROE 0.29 
 
0.13
c
 
 ROS 0.14 
 
0.04 
 CASH -0.04c 
 
-0.18
a
 
 BK-MKT 0.06 
 
0.01 
 EBITDA/TA 0.05 
 
0.19 
   
  
  
 DIVPAY 
 
0.39
c
   0.21b 
TOTASS 
 
-0.73
b
   -0.26 
EMP 
 
2.95   0.24 
LEV 
 
0.57
c
   0.32b 
INT/ASS 
 
0.00   -0.03 
CAPEX/TA 
 
-0.05   0.01 
RD/SALES 
 
1.02
b
   -0.08 
  
  
  
 ADJ. R 0.79 0.62 0.40 0.83 
F STAT 36.54
a
 4.28
b
 1.05 17.88a 
N 241 236 84 79 
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Appendix 8.1 – Robustness Check Results Tables 
Table 8A.1 - Abnormal Returns for Hedge Fund Filings Samples  
 
This table reports the short and long term mean and median abnormal returns for the hedge fund filings.  The table reports columns for the complete sample as well as subsamples divided by the 
number of hedge funds targeting the company.  Panel A reports calendar time portfolio returns relative to the Fama French (1993) three factor benchmark.  Panel B reports similar results using a 
GARCH (1, 1) benchmarking model. The figures a, b, c indicates statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test. 
 
 
  All (n=423) One (n=263) Two (n=181) Three+ (n=85) 
  mean median 
  % 
(+) mean median 
  % 
(+) mean median 
  % 
(+) mean median 
  % 
(+) 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel A: Long Term FF3 Returns   
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12) 4.21b 3.21 53.26 5.73 2.15 53.59 5.67 4.36 60.47 4.21 1.12 53.42 
(1,24) 8.63
b
 5.72
b
 53.26 4.51 2.91 53.59 13.71 11.23a 60.47 7.32c 5.71b 52.24 
(1,36) 7.12
a
 8.52
a
 56.32 8.82b 7.41 53.59 12.38a 11.92b 60.47 5.76a 4.91a 64.86 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  Panel B: Long Term GARCH Returns     
  
  
  
  
  
 
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  (1,12) 5.04b 3.90 53.26 6.57 3.90 53.59 7.08a 6.70 60.47 4.77 -1.62 43.24 
(1,24) 7.81
a
 6.87
b
 56.32 10.45b 3.93 53.59 16.07a 13.62 60.47 7.03b 6.67c 64.86 
(1,36) 13.31
a
 11.05
a
 61.30 14.78b 8.14b 56.35 11.63a 16.96a 67.44 11.87a 11.19a 78.38 
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Table 8A.2- Filings Sample Calendar Time Regressions 
This table reports the results of the calendar time regressions for the hedge fund filings sample.  The first column reports the 
coefficients using the Fama French (1993) factors as the benchmark over the holding periods covering 12, 24 and 36 months 
from the targeting date, using the following regression:  
(Rp - Rf)t = α + β1(RM - Rf)t + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + εt 
where (Rp - Rf)t is the average monthly return on the portfolio of targeted stocks less the return on the one-month risk-free 
rate in calendar month t; (RM - Rf)t is the return on the FTSE All Share return index less the return on the one-month risk-free 
rate in calendar month t; SMBt is the difference between the value-weighted average return on the small-cap portfolios and 
large-cap portfolios; and HMLt is the difference between the value-weighted average return on the high book-to-market 
portfolios and low book-to-market portfolios.  The second column reports similar coefficient results using the Carhart (1997) 
factors as the benchmark, using the following regression:  
(Rp - Rf)t = α + β1(RM - Rf)t + β2SMBt + β3HMLt β4UMDt + εt 
The factors are the same as for the Fama French (1993) model with the exception that UMD t is the difference between the 
value weighted average return on the high past-year stock-return portfolios and low past-year stock-return portfolios.  The 
reported alpha is the mean monthly abnormal return for the test window.   The figures a,b,c indicate statistical significance at 
the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test.   
 
Holding Period α β1 β2 β3 R
2
 α β1 β2 β3 β4 R
2
 
 
  
    
  
     Panel A: All (n=423)   
    
  
     
 
  
    
  
     (1,12) 0.76 0.32b -0.03 -0.09 0.07 0.66 0.24c -0.40b -0.44c -0.37 0.13 
(1,24) 0.34 0.34a -0.01 -0.05 0.14 0.29 0.25a -0.34b -0.32c -0.34 0.22 
(1,36) 0.20 0.33a 0.01 -0.03 0.15 0.19 0.23a -0.37b -0.33b -0.24 0.24 
                        
Panel B: One (n=263)              
 
             
(1,12) 0.57 0.30c -0.12 -0.06 0.05 0.51 0.23 -0.42c -0.39 -0.52 0.09 
(1,24) 0.18 0.30a -0.08 -0.02 0.10 0.17 0.22b -0.37b -0.31 -0.41 0.17 
(1,36) 0.06 0.30a -0.06 0.00 0.11 0.08 0.20b -0.40a -0.32c -0.30 0.19 
 
  
    
  
     Panel C: Two (n=181)     
 
             
(1,12) 0.32
a
 0.35
a
 0.15 -0.16 0.11 0.17a 0.27b -0.15 -0.35 0.02 0.11 
(1,24) 0.65
c
 0.40
a
 0.13 -0.1 0.18 0.56 0.32a -0.19 -0.25 -0.05 0.18 
(1,36) 0.38 0.39a 0.09 -0.08 0.15 0.35 0.31a -0.23 -0.23 0.04 0.17 
                        
Panel D: Three+ (n=85)              
 
             
(1,12) 1.2 0.45b 0.4 -0.19 0.1 0.91 0.28 -0.65b -1.02a 0 0.15 
(1,24) 0.87 0.47a 0.28 -0.23 0.13 0.61 0.34b -0.38c -0.53c -0.28 0.14 
(1,36) 0.81 0.50a 0.34c -0.2 0.15 0.61 0.34b -0.42b -0.51c -0.25 0.16 
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Appendix 8B – Abnormal returns around event dates 
The following table documents abnormal returns around the event dates for the hedge fund activism Filings and 
Press samples. I calculate abnormal returns as the target firm return minus the control firm return.  Control firms 
are matched by industry (2-digit SIC) and within ±20% of target market value one month prior to targeting.  
Where no adequate match can be found, the conditions are relaxed to find a firm within 50% of target market 
value in the year prior to targeting.  The figures a, b, c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
levels, respectively, using a 2-tail test.   
 
    Filings   Press 
Day N Mean Median N Mean Median 
-20 423 0.44b -0.05 101 0.39 -0.05 
-19 423 0.22c -0.11 101 0.17 -0.10 
-18 423 0.06 0.00c 101 -0.01 -0.06 
-17 423 0.00 -0.06 101 0.01 -0.08 
-16 423 0.09 0.00c 101 0.06 -0.06 
-15 423 0.16 -0.06 101 0.15 -0.05 
-14 423 0.07 -0.08c 101 0.12 -0.08 
-13 423 0.24b 0.00 101 0.27c -0.02 
-12 423 -0.02 -0.02 101 0.00 -0.07 
-11 423 0.24 0.00 101 0.29 -0.03 
-10 423 0.42c 0.00 101 0.36 -0.08 
-9 423 0.05 -0.02 101 0.02 -0.08 
-8 423 0.37b -0.03 101 0.32c -0.09 
-7 423 0.02 0.00 101 -0.03 -0.07 
-6 423 0.14 0.00 101 0.10 -0.03 
-5 423 0.23 -0.06 101 0.20 -0.08 
-4 423 0.87c 0.00 101 0.86c -0.03b 
-3 423 0.41b 0.00 101 0.37 -0.04b 
-2 423 0.63a 0.00c 101 0.60b -0.04 
-1 423 2.17a 0.18a 101 2.13a 0.02 
0 423 0.23 -0.01 101 0.20 -0.05 
1 423 0.10 0.00 101 0.07 -0.05 
2 423 0.21b 0.04b 101 0.15 -0.04 
3 423 0.06 -0.01 101 0.07 -0.09 
4 423 0.00 0.00 101 0.00 -0.07 
5 423 0.01 -0.02 101 -0.03 -0.06 
6 423 0.17 -0.05 101 0.13 -0.07 
7 423 -0.07 -0.08 101 -0.07 -0.07 
8 423 0.08 0.00 101 0.01 -0.04 
9 423 -0.11 -0.15a 101 -0.10 -0.09 
10 423 0.07 -0.05 101 0.05 -0.06 
11 423 0.08 0.00 101 0.07 -0.05 
12 423 -0.12 -0.01 101 -0.18c -0.09 
13 423 -0.13 -0.04 101 -0.20 -0.09 
14 423 -0.21b -0.20b 101 -0.18 -0.08 
15 423 0.09 0.00 101 0.03 -0.07 
16 423 0.14 -0.02 101 0.09 -0.05 
17 423 -0.16b -0.08b 101 -0.07 -0.07 
18 423 -0.06 -0.03 101 -0.09 -0.09 
19 423 0.00 0.00 101 -0.07 -0.08 
20 423 0.00 -0.03 101 -0.04 -0.05 
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Chapter 9 Conclusions 
 
9.1 Introduction 
Shareholder activism is an effort to change the governance structure, strategic direction 
and/or the behaviour of target companies so as to better serve shareholders‟ interests.  
Shareholder activism emanates from the US, where its origins can be traced back as far as 
1932 (Talner, 1983).  The aim is to reverse the fortunes of underperforming companies and 
improve their shareholder value performance.   Chapter 2 reviews the incumbent literature 
that looks at the impact of shareholder activism and finds there is a lot of ambiguity with 
regards to the scale and direction of the shareholder value and operational performance 
changes that activism produces.   
Chapter 2 also illustrates the steps that have been taken over the past decade to encourage 
UK institutional investors to take a more engaged approach to their investee companies.  
However, thus far only Becht et al (2008) empirically studied the impact of shareholder 
activism in Europe via a clinical study of engagement carried out by Hermes UK Focus 
Fund (HUKFF).  They find a positive announcement effect on the stock market value of the 
investee companies resulting from governance related engagement as well as a small 
change to operating performance following engagement.  However, the clinical nature of 
this study covering only one fund limits the generalisability of its results.   To address the 
gap identified in the existing literature, this thesis conducts a thorough empirical 
investigation of shareholder activism in the UK.149 
The aim of this research is to assess whether shareholder activism makes a difference to 
corporate behaviour and performance, and creates value for shareholders when targeting 
UK companies. I use a large sample empirical analysis, as well as a qualitative survey of 
UK institutional Fund managers to understand the scope and impact of shareholder 
engagement in the UK.  In order to carry out this assessment, its impact on the intermediate 
mechanisms outlined above must be investigated.  The issues that are to be studied in the 
research are: 
 Define and identify various types of shareholder activism  
                                                   
149 Section 2.6 outlines the limitations of existing shareholder activism research and frames the research 
aims and hypotheses that this research addresses. 
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 Assess their frequency and intensity  
 Evaluate the impact of activism on structural and behavioural changes in investee 
companies 
 Evaluate the impact on efficiency and effectiveness of specific corporate decisions 
e.g. acquisitions and executive compensation   
 Evaluate the impact on overall operating performance and shareholder value 
creation. 
 Evaluate the impact of hedge fund activism on UK and EU targets firms. 
Using a sample of 595 companies targeted by voting by institutional investors abstaining or 
voting against resolutions at AGM or EGMs, 172 companies targeted through private 
negotiation, and 29 companies targeted by shareholder resolutions over the period 2002 to 
June 2007, I attempt to analyse the impact of activist pressure on a large sample of targeted 
firms in the UK.  Chapter 4 presents the results of the engagement survey that was 
conducted with engaged institutional investors in the UK.  Chapter 5 presents the empirical 
analysis of activism on shareholder value and operating performance, while Chapter 6 
presents the results of targeting on the issues of strategy, corporate governance and 
executive compensation. Chapter 7 presents a case study looking at the Deutsche Boerse 
takeover attempt for the London Stock Exchange in 2005.  Chapter 8 conducts an empirical 
analysis of activism by hedge fund activists on target companies‟ shareholder value, 
operating performance and strategy.  Finally this chapter summarises the main empirical 
results in section 9.2, outlines the limitations of my study in section 9.3 and presents 
contributions to knowledge and practice in section 9.4. 
9.2 Summary of Results 
Thus section summarises the main results of the 5 results chapters. 
Chapter 4 presents the findings of the shareholder engagement survey.  I find evidence that 
institutional shareholders have no preference for being called „activists‟ or „engaged‟ 
investors.  Some investee companies were becoming wary of being targeted by an „activist‟ 
investor, which the interviewees attributed to the rise of hedge funds and the aggressive, 
public tactics that they employ.  However, the interviewees felt that that the investees 
understood them enough to not view them as aggressive activists.  I also found some 
evidence that the institutions surveyed were having difficulty assessing the impact of their 
engagement programmes unless they were a specialist engagement house.  The performance 
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was limiting their ability to secure resources to expand their shareholder engagement teams, 
with some teams employing as few as 3 or 4 individuals to cover a large investment 
universe, and as such SRI was better left to specialist SRI houses.  Finally, the respondents 
felt that the future of shareholder engagement lay in well thought out engagement 
programmes and not through mandatory voting or engagement as advocated in recent 
government reports (See Myners Review in 2001).  In this respect, the interviewees 
expected to see a rise in the use specialist engagement institutions unless they can obtain the 
necessary funding to expand their own departments significantly.   
Chapter 5 analyses the recent phenomenon of shareholder activism in the UK and 
empirically assesses its impact on target firms shareholder value and operating 
performance.  Until now, only one study by Becht et al (2008) has attempted to assess the 
impact of activism in the UK.  I find evidence that UK institutional investors target average 
performing companies companies with marginally higher (though not statistically 
significantly different) operating performance than the control sample.  Furthermore, I find 
operating performance at targeted firms declines, with the exception of small improvements 
when using targeted voting, as a result of activist pressures.  The exception is limited 
improvements in operating performance of firms targeted through voting activity.  As such, 
I find no evidence that firms enjoy improved operating performance as a result of activist 
targeting.  I further find that firms targeted by institutional activists in the UK generally 
outperform a control sample portfolio and the FTSE All Share over the short term around 
the meeting dates. This outperformance is not carried through to the long term when we use 
the same benchmarks, or when I measure the impact relative to more sophisticated 
multifactor models.  Firms targeted by activists repeatedly using voting activity over the 
sample period exhibit significantly large negative abnormal returns over the long term.  
These results suggest activism by UK institutional investors is largely ineffective.   
Chapter 6 presents analysis of the impact of activism by UK institutional investors on target 
firms‟ where the issue of focus was problems with the firm‟s strategy, corporate governance 
or executive compensation.  I find limited but small changes in the number of employees 
employed by the firm two years after targeting occurs.  Furthermore, I find a small 
reduction in leverage and R&D spending for firms targeted through private negotiation over 
the two years after targeting occurs.  Furthermore, I find little significant change in the 
composure of target firms‟ corporate governance over and above a small change in the size 
of target company boards relative to the benchmark samples.  I do, however find targeting 
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through voting activity reduces the CEO‟s cash component of the compensation by -0.21 
(p-value 0.00) relative to the median industry firm.  However, firms targeted through 
private negotiation suffer an increase in the levels of compensation for both executive and 
CEO pay relative to both benchmarks.  I find similar results to Chapter 5 in that I document 
positive abnormal returns over the short term, but negative abnormal returns over the longer 
windows.  Furthermore, I find more evidence that repeat targeting destroys long term 
shareholder value. 
Chapter 7 presents a case study of the eventually thwarted a takeover bid by Deutsche 
Boerse for the London Stock Exchange. Primarily the case marks the emergence of the 
Anglo-American style shareholder rights movement in a country that offers only limited 
power to the shareholders of corporations.  In the process it illustrates the mechanisms by 
which functional convergence of corporate governance regimes can occur long before the 
legal framework catches up.  In Germany, the corporate governance regime requires 
stakeholder interests to be maximised rather than the sole interests of shareholders. This 
case illustrates how a single issue such as the strategic logic or the value creation potential 
of a takeover bid can rapidly spiral to become a wider campaign over deeply rooted 
governance concerns at targeted companies.  Furthermore, the case sheds light on the 
importance of communication between management and shareholders especially when 
corporate decisions of great strategic importance are being implemented.  The globalisation 
of stock markets is empowering shareholders to assert their rights and their activism is 
driving corporate governance regimes towards greater convergence and recognition of the 
primacy of shareholder interests.  The case further suggests an additional mechanism by 
which international governance systems can converge in function towards a common theme 
even if the form of national regimes remains largely unaltered.  
Chapter 8 empirically assesses the impact of hedge fund activism on target companies.  I 
find evidence that targeting by an activist hedge fund produces tangible changes in the 
operating performance and strategic focus of targeted companies.  Activist hedge funds are 
also successful in forcing cash rich, underleveraged firms to ramp up both leverage and 
dividends in order to return cash to shareholders.  I find significant short and long term 
abnormal returns associated with the announcement that a known activist hedge fund has 
purchased a stake in a UK company.  However, some of the abnormal return could be due 
to the share price impact of the hedge fund purchasing a substantial shareholding in the 
target.  I also find substantial returns over both the short and long term for press campaigns 
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undertaken by hedge fund activists.  Furthermore, over the long term I find strong evidence 
that the increase in abnormal return is tempered as the number of hedge funds targeting a 
company increases.  I further find that instances in which the activist hedge fund attempts to 
target companies involved in M&A proceedings generate significant abnormal returns over 
both the long and short term.  Finally, my results indicate that hedge fund activists are much 
more successful that institutional investors in bring performance enhancing change to target 
companies.   
9.3 Limitations of Research 
Like other empirical studies in corporate finance, this thesis is subject to several limitations 
and my results should be treated with caution. Future research on shareholder activism 
should tackle these issues in order to report more robust and fruitful results. 
Firstly, in the shareholder engagement survey presented Chapter 4 my sample is quite small.  
I received questionnaire responses from 13 institutional investors, and conducted follow up 
interviews with 4 of these respondents.  In the study by Holland et al (2004) the authors 
conducted 20 interviews with UK institutional investors.  The consequence is that my 
findings must be treated with caution when drawing general conclusions about the 
shareholder engagement arena in the UK.  Furthermore, my findings for this survey might 
be subject to selection bias because the target respondent list as compiled by ourselves in 
conjunction with the ISC steering panel was selected to ensure responses were only 
received from institutional investors that identified as having an engagement programme.  
As a result I don‟t target non-engaged investors.  These investors might be able to give 
valuable insight into the reasons why they either don‟t conduct engagement at all, or don‟t 
have an engagement programme as advanced as the institutions we surveyed.  Furthermore, 
we didn‟t conduct interviewees with any of the parties advocating mandated engagement, 
such as Paul Myners.  These parties might have been able to explain the external view of 
shareholder engagement by UK institutions.  Future research might also look to survey 
companies that have been targeted by institutional investors.  This would provide an 
understanding of the target‟s experiences when of the engagement process.  Finally, a future 
survey could survey activist hedge funds to obtain their opinions of shareholder engagement 
by institutional investors.  It might also allow them to explain why they feel their different 
activism style is more effective.  
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In Chapters 5 and 6, my voting and negotiation samples were selected from institutional 
investor voting and engagement reports.  At the time of sampling, only 16 UK institutions 
published detailed voting records.  Furthermore, only a handful of companies publish 
engagement reports that detail the companies that they have met with and the issue of 
concern.  Often, the negotiation reports are not very detailed which can make classification 
of the events into both targeting issue as well as the time of targeting.  Wrongly classifying 
these negotiation events or placing them into the wrong quarterly period could skew the 
results and lead to incorrectly specified results.  Additionally, the voting records are not an 
exhaustive dataset.  I could have missed companies in which an investor conducted targeted 
voting simply because that institution doesn‟t publish detailed voting records.  Future 
research should be able to address these problems as more institutions publish voting and 
negotiation records.  The NAPF and IMA engagement surveys indicate that this the volume 
of published engagement and voting records is likely to continue to increase.  Additionally, 
future research might analyse the proportion of abstention/votes against to determine 
whether the proportion of total votes falling into these categories has an impact on the 
magnitude of the return generated.   
The small size of the shareholder resolutions sample could lead to mis-specified results.  I 
only have a sample of 29 companies targeted using this method, compared to US studies in 
which the sample size can cover 1,000+ events (Gillan and Starks, 2007).  This not only 
presents problems for conducting statistical tests, but it also means that the results cannot be 
directly compared to the findings of US studies.  Future research might seek to widen the 
categories of shareholder resolutions sponsors to obtain a larger dataset that might provide 
more robust results. 
The control methodology used in the empirical chapters is also subject to a major flaw due 
to the limited publication of detailed voting and engagement records.  I have to make an 
assumption that if a company doesn‟t appear on these records then it has not been targeted 
by an activist institution.  This could allow some of the control companies to be incorrectly 
classified if they have been targeted by a company that hasn‟t published its voting or 
engagement.  Karpof (2001) finds that poor control groups could contribute to the poor 
returns documented in prior studies of US shareholder activism.  Furthermore, the small 
number of UK and EU stocks when compared to the US universe makes tight matching of 
control firms very difficult.  The UK has a small number of mega-cap stocks for which 
control firms are not available.  These are therefore removed from the analysis.  Future 
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research could seek to analyse the impact on these stocks and conduct analysis of the 
possible impact that the size of target firms could have on the success of the engagement.  It 
could be that larger firms are more difficult to change by institutional investor engagement. 
Additionally, in the empirical chapters I analyse the pre-event characteristics of investee 
firms by looking at a range of operating performance, strategy, corporate governance and 
executive compensation variables 30 days prior to targeting and comparing them to similar 
ariables for the matched control group.  However, this is a very simplistic analytical 
technique.  A much more robust method would be to use a series of logistic regressions that 
would not only indicate which specific charecteristics affect the likelihood of being targeted 
by an activist, but also the strength and direction of the relationship.  This is an area in 
which future research efforts will be directed in order to gain a thorough understanding of 
which firms attract activist attention. 
In the empirical chapters I analyse the pre and post activism firms charecteristics of 
companies targeted by institutional and hedge fund activists to undertand how they change 
the companies that they target.  However, the basic analysis that I undertake does not 
directly link the changes in charecteristics to the activist intervention.  A much more robust 
methodology would be to model the different firm charecteristics in order to account for 
changes in other firm variables, such as firm size or board structure that could impact on the 
firm‟s performance in addition to the activist‟s intervention.  This is an area in which future 
research should be directed in order to obtain a robust understanding of the activist‟s impact 
on target firm charecteristics.   
Furthermore, a number of the variables that were used I nthe analyse are not robust proxies.  
For example, I used M&A volume and value to proxy for the efficiency of M&A activity by 
the target firms.  However, a more robust measure would be to use the stock market 
reaction to these deal announcements to determine how they are perceived by the stock 
market.  Furthermore, I exclude all delas in which the target is a private company. This is a 
very restrictive condition as I could have excluded a very important set of M&A 
transactions.  In future research, I would yake the time to verify these transactions better so 
as to include them in the dataset.  Additionally, some of the corporate governance and 
executive compensation proxies, such as CEO turnover or CEO pay-performance 
sensitivity, do not adequately measure how these measures hange to become more firm-
performance orientated.  In future extensions of this work, the research will seek to use 
more robust proxies for firm efficiency charecteristics and incorporate these into the models 
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that have been previously described.  This should help to ensure that the activists‟ impact on 
target firms is much more accurately analysed.  
In Chapter 7 I present a case study of the eventually thwarted a takeover bid by Deutsche 
Boerse for the London Stock Exchange.  The results of this case study should be analysed 
with care because this is single case study and not a large sample analysis of the effects of 
activism in Germany.  Thus it can infer that convergence is occurring, however, we cannot 
categorically state that the forces of convergence are being facilitated through shareholder 
activism.  It could be that this happened to be a unique case.  Future research might seek to 
analyse the impact of a larger sample of instances in which Anglo Saxon investors have 
managed to use their activism processes to target companies in less shareholder value 
focused regimes.  This would allow more robust results to be obtained in order to assess 
whether activism is a reliable model in facilitating convergence of corporate governance 
systems. 
Finally, in Chapter 8 I analyse the impact of hedge fund activism on UK and EU targets.  
Due to the small sample sizes I don‟t conduct analysis of the impact of hedge fund activism 
on companies from individual countries.  I only look at the impact on EU companies as a 
whole.  As a result, I don‟t control for the different characteristics of EU countries, such as 
regulatory or cultural differences that could impact on the abnormal returns documented.  
Future research should seek to control for these conditions to give more robust results.  
Furthermore, because of the small EU stock markets I don‟t calculate abnormal returns 
using the more sophisticated multi-factor benchmark models.  Future research should seek 
to rectify the problems that this could create in terms of poorly specified results.  I also fail 
to look at the impact of hedge fund activism on corporate governance or executive 
compensation due to the different corporate governance frameworks in EU countries, as 
well as the thin coverage of EU stocks by the Manifest database.  Future research could 
study these areas and attempt to observe any changes in these mechanisms as a result of 
aggressive hedge fund activism.  Furthermore, in my Press sample I have potential event 
date classification errors.  I use the date of the newspaper article in which the activism was 
made public.  However, it could be that the engagement was occurring in private before this 
date.  In this instance I would not fully capture the results of the activist‟s actions.  Future 
research should analyse the impact of engagement over a longer event window to try and 
counteract this problem.  Finally, the abnormal returns generated by the filings sample 
target firms could be contaminated by the double effect of activist pressure and the purchase 
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of a substantial shareholding by the activism.  This should be analysed in future research by 
either conducting a comparative analysis of firms in which a non-activist hedge fund 
purchases a stake to see if the abnormal return is any different, or by analysing the different 
abnormal returns exhibited by different activist hedge fund block purchases.  This would 
shed light on how much of the reported abnormal return is as a result of a large block 
purchase rather than the announcement of the activist‟s pressure. 
9.4 Contributions to Knowledge and Practice 
This thesis attempts to survey engaged UK institutional investors in order to understand the 
scope and magnitude of shareholder engagement in the UK.  Subsequently, the thesis 
presents a thorough empirical analysis of the impact of shareholder activism targeted 
against UK companies by institutional investors and contrasts the results with the returns 
generated by more aggressive hedge fund activism.  This study makes a number of 
contributions to the existing shareholder activism literature and contains several 
recommendations for practitioners. 
Firstly, this thesis makes a contribution to the literature base by conducting the first large 
sample empirical analysis of shareholder activism in the UK.  As outlined in Chapter 2 
there has so far only been one paper that empirically assesses the impact of activism in a 
UK context.  However, the clinical nature of the study by Becht et al (2008) and the unique 
investment model used by the focal investor makes the results of that paper makes it 
difficult to generalise the results across all institutions.  This study addresses this gap in the 
literature by studying more widespread activism.  This is a major contribution of the thesis. 
Secondly, Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the shareholder engagement arena in the UK.  
The results indicate that shareholder engagement is growing in both scale and scope and 
that engaged UK shareholders are fearful that mandated engagement will hinder their ability 
to effectively target problematic companies.  Furthermore, the results indicate that investors 
are likely to continue to increase their engagement programmes in future.  The results 
provide a valuable contribution to the theory of shareholder engagement in the UK and 
update the findings of Holland (1998) and Hendry et al (2007) because the engagement 
arena has evolved dramatically since these studies were undertaken. 
Chapters 5 and 6 demonstrate that UK shareholders generally target average performing 
companies relative to the control sample.  This is in contrast with existing literature in 
which activists are shown to target poorly performing companies.  Thus, I theorise that 
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shareholder engagement by institutional investors is undertaken for subtly different reasons 
in the UK than in the US.  I theorise that institutional investors mainly use engagement with 
companies as a preventative tool rather than as a corrective measure.  My results suggest 
that investors are targeting companies before issues of concern, such as lack of board 
independence or poor strategy, are able to manifest into larger problems that hinder firm 
performance.  Institutional investors target companies already held in their portfolios, rather 
than purchasing stocks with the intention to agitate for value enhancing changes.  Thus they 
are unlikely to see large scale returns as documented for hedge fund activists in Chapter 8.  
This is a large contribution to the theory of shareholder engagement because it provides an 
alternative rationale for conducting engagement rather than the traditional reasons 
surrounding generating shareholder value returns. 
Chapter 5 and 6 further indicate that the stock market reacts positively over the short term 
to targeted voting and shareholder resolutions.  This would indicate that the stock market 
reacts positively to the news that an investor is taking steps to limit the potential for value 
destruction at investee companies.  This result is consistent with the only existing UK by 
Becht et al (2008).  However, over longer term event windows I find negative abnormal 
returns which indicate that the investor hasn‟t been successful in preventing potentially 
value destructive issues from crystallising into poor performance.  This result is supported 
by the decline in operating performance.  The results are also negative for the private 
negotiation subsamples.  My evidence suggests that shareholder engagement in the UK is 
not necessarily a shareholder value generating tool when conducted by institutional 
investors. However, given my theory that the engagement is preventative rather than 
corrective in nature, it could be that the engagement has prevented much larger negative 
returns than would have occurred if the investor hadn‟t taken an activist stance.  This is an 
important contribution for practitioners because it illustrates that shareholder engagement is 
unlikely to be an investment strategy generating large returns unless it is undertaken in the 
style of investors such as Hermes (see Becht et al, 2008). 
These chapters provide further evidence that the long term shareholder value performance 
of companies repeatedly targeted by voting activity over the sample period is worse than for 
companies targeted only once.  Furthermore, I find evidence that targeting companies with 
more widespread issues than companies in which an investor only has concern about one 
area (such as strategy) generates larger negative returns.  Thus my results provide evidence 
that companies resistant to change and who subsequently repeatedly attract activist pressure 
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are likely to exhibit significant declines in shareholder value performance.  Consequently 
investment professionals need to weigh up the larger cost of repeatedly targeting an 
unresponsive company and giving a negative signal to the market, or stopping the public 
voting activity and allowing the performance of the company to worsen.  Therefore, my 
study suggests that investment professionals need to think carefully about the public or 
private targeting approaches they use and the consequences they can have.   
The case study presented in Chapter 7 highlights a valuable mechanism by which the forces 
of convergence can be promoted. It raises a number of important issues regarding the 
corporate governance regime in Germany, the challenges posed by overseas investors, and 
the international convergence of corporate governance regimes.  The chapter discusses 
issues surrounding the governance of German companies as regards the relative balance of 
power between managers and shareholders. The case also illustrates the globalisation of the 
concept and practices of shareholder activism and indicates that company directors in non 
Anglo Saxon corporate governance regimes need to be aware of the new shareholder value 
based requirements that attracting investment from US/UK companies can bring.  
Furthermore, the Deutsche Boerse example also illustrates that a small issue of a particular 
corporate decision can rapidly escalate into a much more serious problem with wider 
ramifications.  Finally, the case illustrates that activist hedge funds and traditional 
institutional investors can operate together to successfully target a company exhibiting poor 
corporate governance.   
Chapter 8 illustrates that hedge fund activism in the UK and EU is successful in improving 
the operating performance and strategic direction of targeted companies.  Furthermore, I 
find evidence that hedge fund activism in this region generates substantial shareholder value 
returns over both the long and short term.  This result is consistent with prior research as 
presented in Chapter 2.  Thus my results indicate that more aggressive and high profile 
activism is necessary to generate shareholder value performance improvements at targeted 
companies.  Furthermore, a policy of purchasing a stake in a company with the intention of 
taking an activist stance rather than targeting existing positions is likely to be necessary for 
activism to be a profitable investment strategy.  This is an important contribution for 
practitioners when deciding upon an activism strategy.  However, care must be taken 
because some of the abnormal return for the filings sample could be as a result of a large 
block purchase by the activist rather than the announcement that a firm is becoming 
targeted by an activist hedge fund. 
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Finally, this thesis provides a contribution to the policy debate surrounding shareholder 
activism in the UK.  As Chapter 2 explains, there are moves to force institutional investors 
in the UK to engage with their investee companies.  My results indicate that this policy has 
the potential to significantly destroy value at targeted companies.  Furthermore, if 
engagement becomes more widespread the distracting effect it could have on managers will 
potentially exacerbate this problem further.  Thus, engagement in the UK is better left to 
committed investment professionals with well thought out engagement programmes. 
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